Sally Sedgwick
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199698363
- eISBN:
- 9780191738692
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698363.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter identifies ‘speculative’ elements Hegel claims to discover in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, elements he believes Kant himself failed to appreciate. That is, Hegel discovers resources ...
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This chapter identifies ‘speculative’ elements Hegel claims to discover in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, elements he believes Kant himself failed to appreciate. That is, Hegel discovers resources in the Transcendental Deduction for overcoming the heterogeneity of concept and intuition. In his view, the idea of identity is, for example, implicit in Kant’s conception of the faculty of the original synthetic unity of apperception. This chapter provides further evidence that the identity Hegel claims to discover in the Transcendental Deduction is achieved neither by a reduction of concepts to intuitions, nor by a reduction of intuitions to concepts. The lesson Hegel believes we should ultimately derive from the Transcendental Deduction is that we need a new and non-Kantian account of the nature and origin of conceptual form.Less
This chapter identifies ‘speculative’ elements Hegel claims to discover in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, elements he believes Kant himself failed to appreciate. That is, Hegel discovers resources in the Transcendental Deduction for overcoming the heterogeneity of concept and intuition. In his view, the idea of identity is, for example, implicit in Kant’s conception of the faculty of the original synthetic unity of apperception. This chapter provides further evidence that the identity Hegel claims to discover in the Transcendental Deduction is achieved neither by a reduction of concepts to intuitions, nor by a reduction of intuitions to concepts. The lesson Hegel believes we should ultimately derive from the Transcendental Deduction is that we need a new and non-Kantian account of the nature and origin of conceptual form.
C. Thomas Powell
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198244486
- eISBN:
- 9780191680779
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244486.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
From Rene Descartes to David Hume, philosophers in the 17th and 18th centuries developed a dialectic of radically conflicting claims about the nature of the self. In the Paralogisms of The Critique ...
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From Rene Descartes to David Hume, philosophers in the 17th and 18th centuries developed a dialectic of radically conflicting claims about the nature of the self. In the Paralogisms of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant comes to terms with this dialectic, and with the character of the experiencing self. This book seeks to elucidate these difficult texts, in part by applying to the Paralogisms insights drawn from Kant's Transcendental Deduction. This book shows that the structure of the Paralogisms provides an essential key to understanding both Kant's critique of ‘rational psychology’ and his theory of self-consciousness. As Kant realized, the ways in which we must represent ourselves to ourselves have import not only for epistemology, but for our view of persons and of our own immortality, and for moral philosophy as well. Kant's theory of self-consciousness is also shown to have implications for contemporary discussions of the problem of other minds, functionalism, and the problem of indexical self-reference.Less
From Rene Descartes to David Hume, philosophers in the 17th and 18th centuries developed a dialectic of radically conflicting claims about the nature of the self. In the Paralogisms of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant comes to terms with this dialectic, and with the character of the experiencing self. This book seeks to elucidate these difficult texts, in part by applying to the Paralogisms insights drawn from Kant's Transcendental Deduction. This book shows that the structure of the Paralogisms provides an essential key to understanding both Kant's critique of ‘rational psychology’ and his theory of self-consciousness. As Kant realized, the ways in which we must represent ourselves to ourselves have import not only for epistemology, but for our view of persons and of our own immortality, and for moral philosophy as well. Kant's theory of self-consciousness is also shown to have implications for contemporary discussions of the problem of other minds, functionalism, and the problem of indexical self-reference.
Georges Dicker
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195153064
- eISBN:
- 9780199835027
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195153065.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book expounds, analyzes, and appraises the constructive part of Kant’s theory of knowledge, as presented in the Prefaces, Introduction, Transcendental Aesthetic, and especially the ...
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This book expounds, analyzes, and appraises the constructive part of Kant’s theory of knowledge, as presented in the Prefaces, Introduction, Transcendental Aesthetic, and especially the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. Drawing on the work of influential recent Kant commentators like Robert Paul Wolff, Peter F. Strawson, Paul Guyer, Jonathan Bennett, Henry Allison, and James Van Cleve, Dicker reconstructs the central argument of the Analytic that spans the first and second edition versions of the Transcendental Deduction and the Second Analogy of Experience. The book also contains detailed analyses of key sections of the Critiquethat enrich or supplement the central argument, such as the First Analogy and the Refutation of Idealism. As well, it offers balanced and detailed analyses of sections of the Critique that Kant took to be important but that are less closely tied to its central argument, including the Metaphysical Deduction, the Schematism, the Axioms of Intuition, the Anticipations of Perception, the Postulates of Empirical Thought, and the Third Analogy. Throughout the book, the writing is both rigorous and highly accessible. All the major arguments are reconstructed in numbered steps, in such a way that their premises are perspicuous and their validity easily seen by basic rules of sentential logic. The book is designed to be read as a companion to the constructive first half the Critique, and to be useful to undergraduate and graduate students studying Kant and to their professors. Its analyses of major Kantian arguments will be of interest to Kant scholars as well.Less
This book expounds, analyzes, and appraises the constructive part of Kant’s theory of knowledge, as presented in the Prefaces, Introduction, Transcendental Aesthetic, and especially the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. Drawing on the work of influential recent Kant commentators like Robert Paul Wolff, Peter F. Strawson, Paul Guyer, Jonathan Bennett, Henry Allison, and James Van Cleve, Dicker reconstructs the central argument of the Analytic that spans the first and second edition versions of the Transcendental Deduction and the Second Analogy of Experience. The book also contains detailed analyses of key sections of the Critiquethat enrich or supplement the central argument, such as the First Analogy and the Refutation of Idealism. As well, it offers balanced and detailed analyses of sections of the Critique that Kant took to be important but that are less closely tied to its central argument, including the Metaphysical Deduction, the Schematism, the Axioms of Intuition, the Anticipations of Perception, the Postulates of Empirical Thought, and the Third Analogy. Throughout the book, the writing is both rigorous and highly accessible. All the major arguments are reconstructed in numbered steps, in such a way that their premises are perspicuous and their validity easily seen by basic rules of sentential logic. The book is designed to be read as a companion to the constructive first half the Critique, and to be useful to undergraduate and graduate students studying Kant and to their professors. Its analyses of major Kantian arguments will be of interest to Kant scholars as well.
C. Thomas Powell
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198244486
- eISBN:
- 9780191680779
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244486.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In the Transcendental Deduction, Immanuel Kant tries to answer the question of whether it is possible to experience a unitary self. Kant's more explicit discussion in the Paralogisms of the self and ...
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In the Transcendental Deduction, Immanuel Kant tries to answer the question of whether it is possible to experience a unitary self. Kant's more explicit discussion in the Paralogisms of the self and self-knowledge draws so heavily on the cryptic and difficult account in the Transcendental Deduction that the Paralogisms are almost incoherent when detached from the Deduction. This chapter examines Kant's account of the epistemic self as it is presented in the Transcendental Deduction. Regarding the Subjective Deduction, this chapter argues that what Kant is really doing there is analysing the relation between the synthesis of representations and the necessary conditions of the representation of the self as a continuant subject. Kant also demonstrates that experience necessarily involves knowledge of objects, and he demonstrates this necessity independently of, but in parallel with, the necessity of the representation of a unitary experiencing subject.Less
In the Transcendental Deduction, Immanuel Kant tries to answer the question of whether it is possible to experience a unitary self. Kant's more explicit discussion in the Paralogisms of the self and self-knowledge draws so heavily on the cryptic and difficult account in the Transcendental Deduction that the Paralogisms are almost incoherent when detached from the Deduction. This chapter examines Kant's account of the epistemic self as it is presented in the Transcendental Deduction. Regarding the Subjective Deduction, this chapter argues that what Kant is really doing there is analysing the relation between the synthesis of representations and the necessary conditions of the representation of the self as a continuant subject. Kant also demonstrates that experience necessarily involves knowledge of objects, and he demonstrates this necessity independently of, but in parallel with, the necessity of the representation of a unitary experiencing subject.
Patricia Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199754823
- eISBN:
- 9780199855889
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter the background materials from the Empiricists, the Rationalists, and Kant’s earlier work, and the interpretations of the structure of the transcendental deduction and of the crucial ...
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In this chapter the background materials from the Empiricists, the Rationalists, and Kant’s earlier work, and the interpretations of the structure of the transcendental deduction and of the crucial notion of ‘synthesis’ are brought together in an account of the argument that the ‘unity of apperception’ is a necessary condition for rational cognition. The chapter explains in more detail what Kant understands by ‘rational cognition’ and it clarifies his various formulations of the ‘principle of apperception.’ It also shows how the theory of apperception fits into the deduction of the legitimacy of the categories and it considers the relations between transcendental and empirical apperception.Less
In this chapter the background materials from the Empiricists, the Rationalists, and Kant’s earlier work, and the interpretations of the structure of the transcendental deduction and of the crucial notion of ‘synthesis’ are brought together in an account of the argument that the ‘unity of apperception’ is a necessary condition for rational cognition. The chapter explains in more detail what Kant understands by ‘rational cognition’ and it clarifies his various formulations of the ‘principle of apperception.’ It also shows how the theory of apperception fits into the deduction of the legitimacy of the categories and it considers the relations between transcendental and empirical apperception.
Patricia Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199754823
- eISBN:
- 9780199855889
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Kant’s theory of the cognitive subject emerges in the course of the transcendental deduction—the argument for the legitimacy of the categories. This chapter answers some basic questions about the ...
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Kant’s theory of the cognitive subject emerges in the course of the transcendental deduction—the argument for the legitimacy of the categories. This chapter answers some basic questions about the deduction: What is the nature of the argument? What are its premises and conclusions? It also suggests a way of understanding Kant’s arresting claim that cognition contains ‘a priori’ elements that arise in cognition through the activities of the mind.Less
Kant’s theory of the cognitive subject emerges in the course of the transcendental deduction—the argument for the legitimacy of the categories. This chapter answers some basic questions about the deduction: What is the nature of the argument? What are its premises and conclusions? It also suggests a way of understanding Kant’s arresting claim that cognition contains ‘a priori’ elements that arise in cognition through the activities of the mind.
R. Kevin Hill
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199285525
- eISBN:
- 9780191700354
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285525.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book gives a new interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy and examines in detail his debt to Kant, in particular the Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of ...
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This book gives a new interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy and examines in detail his debt to Kant, in particular the Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of Judgement. Nietzsche, it argues, knew Kant far better than is commonly thought, and can only be thoroughly understood in relation to Kant. Nietzsche's Critiques maintains that beneath the surface of his texts there is a systematic commitment to a form of early Neo-Kantianism in metaphysics and epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics, grounded in his reading of the three Critiques, Kuno Fischer's commentary on the first Critique, and Friedrich Lange's discussion of Kant in The History of Materialism. The book also documents the decisive influence Nietzsche's close reading of the Critique of Judgement had on the writing of the Birth of Tragedy, and offers a remarkably accessible interpretation of Kant's system, while clarifying such difficult issues as the interpretation of Kant's ‘Transcendental Deduction’ and his notion of reflective judgement.Less
This book gives a new interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy and examines in detail his debt to Kant, in particular the Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of Judgement. Nietzsche, it argues, knew Kant far better than is commonly thought, and can only be thoroughly understood in relation to Kant. Nietzsche's Critiques maintains that beneath the surface of his texts there is a systematic commitment to a form of early Neo-Kantianism in metaphysics and epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics, grounded in his reading of the three Critiques, Kuno Fischer's commentary on the first Critique, and Friedrich Lange's discussion of Kant in The History of Materialism. The book also documents the decisive influence Nietzsche's close reading of the Critique of Judgement had on the writing of the Birth of Tragedy, and offers a remarkably accessible interpretation of Kant's system, while clarifying such difficult issues as the interpretation of Kant's ‘Transcendental Deduction’ and his notion of reflective judgement.
Jacqueline Mariña
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199206377
- eISBN:
- 9780191709753
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206377.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter continues the analysis of Spinozism. It focuses on Schleiermacher's long discussion of personal identity, which is extremely significant for Schleiermacher's later understanding of ...
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This chapter continues the analysis of Spinozism. It focuses on Schleiermacher's long discussion of personal identity, which is extremely significant for Schleiermacher's later understanding of reflective self-consciousness. In it Schleiermacher reveals himself to be intimately acquainted with both Kant's transcendental deduction as well as Kant's chapter on the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason. Schleiermacher argues, in agreement with Kant, that we have no access to a substantial noumenal self. Rather, identity of the subject is cognizable only in and through the synthesis of the manifold of intuition. The only reflective access we have to self is through the products of its transcendental activity; the transcendental activity itself, however, cannot become an object for consciousness but is only given in immediacy. The philosophical position Schleiermacher develops here is key to gaining an understanding of the position he develops in the Monologen.Less
This chapter continues the analysis of Spinozism. It focuses on Schleiermacher's long discussion of personal identity, which is extremely significant for Schleiermacher's later understanding of reflective self-consciousness. In it Schleiermacher reveals himself to be intimately acquainted with both Kant's transcendental deduction as well as Kant's chapter on the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason. Schleiermacher argues, in agreement with Kant, that we have no access to a substantial noumenal self. Rather, identity of the subject is cognizable only in and through the synthesis of the manifold of intuition. The only reflective access we have to self is through the products of its transcendental activity; the transcendental activity itself, however, cannot become an object for consciousness but is only given in immediacy. The philosophical position Schleiermacher develops here is key to gaining an understanding of the position he develops in the Monologen.
Paul Crowther
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579976
- eISBN:
- 9780191722615
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579976.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, History of Philosophy
This chapter addresses and revises a foundational feature of Kant's epistemology, namely the Transcendental Deduction. It shows how Kant's argument attempts to prove that the objective unification of ...
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This chapter addresses and revises a foundational feature of Kant's epistemology, namely the Transcendental Deduction. It shows how Kant's argument attempts to prove that the objective unification of a sensible manifold (achieved through the categories) and the objective unity of self-consciousness (or, as Kant sometimes terms it, the ‘pure’ or ‘original unity’ of ‘apperception’) are reciprocally dependent. One cannot have the one without the other. Kant's arguments on these lines (in the revised ‘B’-version of the Critique of Pure Reason) are analyzed critically. His basic position is then reconstructed in a more viable form. This involves three stages that make use of ideas from Gareth Evans and Shaun Gallagher. Special attention is paid to the role of the categories and productive imagination in the ontogenesis of experience.Less
This chapter addresses and revises a foundational feature of Kant's epistemology, namely the Transcendental Deduction. It shows how Kant's argument attempts to prove that the objective unification of a sensible manifold (achieved through the categories) and the objective unity of self-consciousness (or, as Kant sometimes terms it, the ‘pure’ or ‘original unity’ of ‘apperception’) are reciprocally dependent. One cannot have the one without the other. Kant's arguments on these lines (in the revised ‘B’-version of the Critique of Pure Reason) are analyzed critically. His basic position is then reconstructed in a more viable form. This involves three stages that make use of ideas from Gareth Evans and Shaun Gallagher. Special attention is paid to the role of the categories and productive imagination in the ontogenesis of experience.
Karl Ameriks
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199247318
- eISBN:
- 9780191601699
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247315.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Presents the original version of a regressive reading of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories on the basis of a detailed analysis of the B edition version and a critique of influential ...
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Presents the original version of a regressive reading of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories on the basis of a detailed analysis of the B edition version and a critique of influential non-regressive interpretations by Wolff, Strawson, and Bennett. It stresses difficulties in using the deduction directly to meet traditional empiricist concerns about skepticism, and it also argues that the concluding stages of Kant’s argument are not easily separated from substantive aspects of his notions of space and time as ideal forms. This essay is influenced by the early work of Dieter Henrich, and it discusses how his stress on the ‘two part’ structure of the deduction bears on important ways in which Kant’s argument is closely related to the form and content of the Transcendental Aesthetic as well.Less
Presents the original version of a regressive reading of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories on the basis of a detailed analysis of the B edition version and a critique of influential non-regressive interpretations by Wolff, Strawson, and Bennett. It stresses difficulties in using the deduction directly to meet traditional empiricist concerns about skepticism, and it also argues that the concluding stages of Kant’s argument are not easily separated from substantive aspects of his notions of space and time as ideal forms. This essay is influenced by the early work of Dieter Henrich, and it discusses how his stress on the ‘two part’ structure of the deduction bears on important ways in which Kant’s argument is closely related to the form and content of the Transcendental Aesthetic as well.
J. N. Findlay
- Published in print:
- 1981
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246381
- eISBN:
- 9780191680960
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246381.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses the following: (i) Complementarity of thought and intuition in human knowledge, relation of concepts to rules and the judgements and inferences. The judgement given too central ...
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This chapter discusses the following: (i) Complementarity of thought and intuition in human knowledge, relation of concepts to rules and the judgements and inferences. The judgement given too central a place in Kantian theory: other conceptual structures, e.g., the set, are ignored; (ii) A priori concepts, judgements, and ideas; (iii) Brief examination of the metaphysical Deduction of the Categories; (iv) Kant's Transcendental Deductions are most illuminating to read in conjunction with the Analytic of Principles; (v) Examination of the First Edition Deduction. The three empirical syntheses and their transcendental prototypes. Puzzling abandonment of the Transcendental Object as underlying necessary syntheses, and concentration on the equally obscure Transcendental Subject; (vi) The Transcendental Deduction of the Second Edition is a vastly confused document involving most of the logical faults of the First Edition Deduction, without its illuminating excursions into transcendental psychology.Less
This chapter discusses the following: (i) Complementarity of thought and intuition in human knowledge, relation of concepts to rules and the judgements and inferences. The judgement given too central a place in Kantian theory: other conceptual structures, e.g., the set, are ignored; (ii) A priori concepts, judgements, and ideas; (iii) Brief examination of the metaphysical Deduction of the Categories; (iv) Kant's Transcendental Deductions are most illuminating to read in conjunction with the Analytic of Principles; (v) Examination of the First Edition Deduction. The three empirical syntheses and their transcendental prototypes. Puzzling abandonment of the Transcendental Object as underlying necessary syntheses, and concentration on the equally obscure Transcendental Subject; (vi) The Transcendental Deduction of the Second Edition is a vastly confused document involving most of the logical faults of the First Edition Deduction, without its illuminating excursions into transcendental psychology.
R. Kevin Hill
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199285525
- eISBN:
- 9780191700354
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285525.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter provides a novel account of Kant's idea of the transcendental unity of appreciation and the role it performs in creating the illusion of mental substance. It differentiates ...
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This chapter provides a novel account of Kant's idea of the transcendental unity of appreciation and the role it performs in creating the illusion of mental substance. It differentiates Transcendental Deduction from Metaphysical Deduction. It also explains three paralogisms and how they influenced Nietzsche. This chapter discusses how Kant's thoughts decisively influenced Nietzsche's own account of selfhood as synthesis and his critique of metaphysics.Less
This chapter provides a novel account of Kant's idea of the transcendental unity of appreciation and the role it performs in creating the illusion of mental substance. It differentiates Transcendental Deduction from Metaphysical Deduction. It also explains three paralogisms and how they influenced Nietzsche. This chapter discusses how Kant's thoughts decisively influenced Nietzsche's own account of selfhood as synthesis and his critique of metaphysics.
Karl Ameriks
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199247318
- eISBN:
- 9780191601699
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247315.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter is influenced by the work of Gerold Prauss, and it consists largely in an overview of interpretations of Kant’s transcendental deduction and transcendental idealism. It distinguishes a ...
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This chapter is influenced by the work of Gerold Prauss, and it consists largely in an overview of interpretations of Kant’s transcendental deduction and transcendental idealism. It distinguishes a wide variety of non-regressive interpretations of the deduction, and indicates some of their limitations. More positively, it explains how Prauss’ highly original discussion of Kant’s notion of appearance in experience helps with understanding details of the complex Critical conception of judgements of perception. The survey of work on transcendental idealism gives special attention to the early Kant scholarship of Prauss and Henry E. Allison, but it does not endorse their preference for a relatively non-metaphysical version of Kant’s doctrine.Less
This chapter is influenced by the work of Gerold Prauss, and it consists largely in an overview of interpretations of Kant’s transcendental deduction and transcendental idealism. It distinguishes a wide variety of non-regressive interpretations of the deduction, and indicates some of their limitations. More positively, it explains how Prauss’ highly original discussion of Kant’s notion of appearance in experience helps with understanding details of the complex Critical conception of judgements of perception. The survey of work on transcendental idealism gives special attention to the early Kant scholarship of Prauss and Henry E. Allison, but it does not endorse their preference for a relatively non-metaphysical version of Kant’s doctrine.
Georges Dicker
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195153064
- eISBN:
- 9780199835027
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195153065.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter introduces Kant’s theory of categories and corresponding principles. It explains and evaluates Kant’s attempt to derive his categories from forms of judgment. It also discusses in detail ...
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This chapter introduces Kant’s theory of categories and corresponding principles. It explains and evaluates Kant’s attempt to derive his categories from forms of judgment. It also discusses in detail the principles that do not depend on the Transcendental Deduction–namely, the Axioms of Intuition, the Anticipations of Perception, the Postulates of Empirical Thought–and introduces those that do depend on the Transcendental Deduction–namely, the Analogies of Experience.Less
This chapter introduces Kant’s theory of categories and corresponding principles. It explains and evaluates Kant’s attempt to derive his categories from forms of judgment. It also discusses in detail the principles that do not depend on the Transcendental Deduction–namely, the Axioms of Intuition, the Anticipations of Perception, the Postulates of Empirical Thought–and introduces those that do depend on the Transcendental Deduction–namely, the Analogies of Experience.
Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199647033
- eISBN:
- 9780191741166
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199647033.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay contains a “friendly” critique of Béatrice Longuenesse's interpretation of the transcendental deduction in her Kant and the Capacity to Judge. The critique is friendly because it ...
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This essay contains a “friendly” critique of Béatrice Longuenesse's interpretation of the transcendental deduction in her Kant and the Capacity to Judge. The critique is friendly because it acknowledges the many virtues of this important book, particularly her emphasis on the significance of the capacity to judge [Urteilskraft] for the argument of the first Critique. Nevertheless, it maintains that she neither provides an adequate account of the role of the categories in the two parts of the deduction nor explains how these two parts are supposed to provide a single proof of the categories as Kant claims.Less
This essay contains a “friendly” critique of Béatrice Longuenesse's interpretation of the transcendental deduction in her Kant and the Capacity to Judge. The critique is friendly because it acknowledges the many virtues of this important book, particularly her emphasis on the significance of the capacity to judge [Urteilskraft] for the argument of the first Critique. Nevertheless, it maintains that she neither provides an adequate account of the role of the categories in the two parts of the deduction nor explains how these two parts are supposed to provide a single proof of the categories as Kant claims.
Karl Ameriks
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199247318
- eISBN:
- 9780191601699
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247315.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Argues, first, that there is a common ground in a methodological sense in the similarity of structure in Kant’s three Critiques. Also contends that central to Kant’s metaphysics and argumentative ...
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Argues, first, that there is a common ground in a methodological sense in the similarity of structure in Kant’s three Critiques. Also contends that central to Kant’s metaphysics and argumentative strategy is the assumption that there is an ontological common ground uniting subjects and objects, and that this is consistent with the regressive form of Kant’s transcendental deductions and his doctrine of transcendental idealism. In addition, argues that Kant’s philosophy as a whole seeks to show how there can be a common ground of agreement between the truths of common sense, philosophy, modern science, and rational morality. While providing an overview of the book, the Introduction also discusses the special interpretative difficulties of Kant’s Critical philosophy.Less
Argues, first, that there is a common ground in a methodological sense in the similarity of structure in Kant’s three Critiques. Also contends that central to Kant’s metaphysics and argumentative strategy is the assumption that there is an ontological common ground uniting subjects and objects, and that this is consistent with the regressive form of Kant’s transcendental deductions and his doctrine of transcendental idealism. In addition, argues that Kant’s philosophy as a whole seeks to show how there can be a common ground of agreement between the truths of common sense, philosophy, modern science, and rational morality. While providing an overview of the book, the Introduction also discusses the special interpretative difficulties of Kant’s Critical philosophy.
Fiona Hughes
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748621224
- eISBN:
- 9780748652327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748621224.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter deals with the objective side of Immanuel Kant's epistemological project. As many commentators have recognised, Kant's hopes for the conclusiveness of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ ...
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This chapter deals with the objective side of Immanuel Kant's epistemological project. As many commentators have recognised, Kant's hopes for the conclusiveness of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ turned out to be rather premature. Kant claims that the categories apply to all perception, to the possibility of experience and therefore to all objects of experience. The chapter's account of the structure of Kant's extended legitimation of the categories owes much to Gerd Buchdahl's reading, in which every element of the ‘Analytic’ has a part to play. However, its reading brings out elements essential to the relation between Kant's epistemology and aesthetics, not to be found in Buchdahl or in the accounts given by others who also resist the temptation to assume that the full deduction of the categories is supplied in the ‘Transcendental Deduction’. The chapter explains how the principles of the understanding are not merely an application of the categories, but rather a further and aesthetically charged articulation that is necessary for the legitimation of the latter.Less
This chapter deals with the objective side of Immanuel Kant's epistemological project. As many commentators have recognised, Kant's hopes for the conclusiveness of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ turned out to be rather premature. Kant claims that the categories apply to all perception, to the possibility of experience and therefore to all objects of experience. The chapter's account of the structure of Kant's extended legitimation of the categories owes much to Gerd Buchdahl's reading, in which every element of the ‘Analytic’ has a part to play. However, its reading brings out elements essential to the relation between Kant's epistemology and aesthetics, not to be found in Buchdahl or in the accounts given by others who also resist the temptation to assume that the full deduction of the categories is supplied in the ‘Transcendental Deduction’. The chapter explains how the principles of the understanding are not merely an application of the categories, but rather a further and aesthetically charged articulation that is necessary for the legitimation of the latter.
Fiona Hughes
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748621224
- eISBN:
- 9780748652327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748621224.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Knowledge as opposed to intuition is only possible if we can unify and thus identify what Immanuel Kant provisionally called the object in the initial paragraphs of the Critique of Pure Reason. This ...
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Knowledge as opposed to intuition is only possible if we can unify and thus identify what Immanuel Kant provisionally called the object in the initial paragraphs of the Critique of Pure Reason. This chapter explores the other side of Kant's dualism and argues that it is best understood as reflective form. It also contends that, on closer examination, dualism requires a plural iteration of the operations of the mind as the synthesis of affectivity, and that conceptualisation requires a third term, imagination. The combination of these different elements of experience counts as synthesis. Kant's faculty talk allows for reflection on a complex model of mind in which only the combination of distinct orientations gives rise to the structure or form of experience. Within his epistemology, Kant principally distinguishes sensibility from understanding. This chapter also looks at Kant's account of determining judgement in the two editions of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’. Finally, it claims that the synthetic activity arising from a combination of a plurality of faculties is examined directly, not merely presupposed, in Kant's account of aesthetic judgement.Less
Knowledge as opposed to intuition is only possible if we can unify and thus identify what Immanuel Kant provisionally called the object in the initial paragraphs of the Critique of Pure Reason. This chapter explores the other side of Kant's dualism and argues that it is best understood as reflective form. It also contends that, on closer examination, dualism requires a plural iteration of the operations of the mind as the synthesis of affectivity, and that conceptualisation requires a third term, imagination. The combination of these different elements of experience counts as synthesis. Kant's faculty talk allows for reflection on a complex model of mind in which only the combination of distinct orientations gives rise to the structure or form of experience. Within his epistemology, Kant principally distinguishes sensibility from understanding. This chapter also looks at Kant's account of determining judgement in the two editions of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’. Finally, it claims that the synthetic activity arising from a combination of a plurality of faculties is examined directly, not merely presupposed, in Kant's account of aesthetic judgement.
Hubert Schwyzer
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198248293
- eISBN:
- 9780191681110
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248293.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses whether the need for a Transcendental Deduction is due merely to the unfortunate fact that Kant's account of concept possession proceeds from two unrelated points, or is there ...
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This chapter discusses whether the need for a Transcendental Deduction is due merely to the unfortunate fact that Kant's account of concept possession proceeds from two unrelated points, or is there still a need for such an argument once the concept possession is seen as a unified, unpartitioned capacity. The chapter also discusses Kant's claims towards the purpose of the Deduction.Less
This chapter discusses whether the need for a Transcendental Deduction is due merely to the unfortunate fact that Kant's account of concept possession proceeds from two unrelated points, or is there still a need for such an argument once the concept possession is seen as a unified, unpartitioned capacity. The chapter also discusses Kant's claims towards the purpose of the Deduction.
Hubert Schwyzer
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198248293
- eISBN:
- 9780191681110
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248293.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses a claim that can serve as a premise for the main argument of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Pure apperception is defined in this chapter as the necessity of ...
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This chapter discusses a claim that can serve as a premise for the main argument of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Pure apperception is defined in this chapter as the necessity of being able to ascribe representations or data of consciousness.Less
This chapter discusses a claim that can serve as a premise for the main argument of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Pure apperception is defined in this chapter as the necessity of being able to ascribe representations or data of consciousness.
