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This book is among the first to address the issues raised by the International Criminal Court from an International Relations perspective. By clearly outlining a theoretical framework to interpret these issues, it makes a significant contribution to the English School's study of international society. More specifically, it offers a concise definition of ‘world society’ and thus helps to resolve a longstanding problem in international theory. This groundbreaking conceptual work is supported by an indepth empirical analysis of American opposition to the ICC. The book goes beyond the familiar arguments related to national interests and argues that the Court has exposed the extent to which American notions of accountability are tied to the nation‐state. Where other democracies are willing to renegotiate their social contract because they see themselves as part of world society, the US protects its particular contract with ‘the American people’ because it offers a means of distinguishing that nation and its democracy from the rest of the world. In opposing the ICC, therefore, the US seeks to defend a society of states because this kind of society can accommodate American exceptionalism and advance particular US interests. This ‘sovereigntist’, or more accurately ‘Americanist’, influence is further illustrated in chapters on the customary international law, universal jurisdiction, transatlantic relations and US policy on international humanitarian law in the war on terror. The book concludes by evoking E.H. Carr's criticism of those great powers who claim that a harmony exists between their particular interests and those of wider society. It also recalls his argument that great powers sometimes need to compromise and in this context it argues that support for the ICC is a more effective means of fulfilling America's purpose and a less costly sacrifice for the US to make than that demanded by the ‘Americanist’ policy of nation‐building.

Since 1945, two major projects have dominated European worldviews: the transatlantic partnership and “integration” in the European Union. Neither is fundamentally at risk today, but both have entered uncharted territory. President Bush has asked bluntly if Europeans are “with us or against us,” and most lean toward the latter. The EU’s original road map for integration culminated in monetary union, and its future agenda is vague. This introduction and the book that follows chart the many trends of change that carried Europe to this crossroads. It aims for accessibility for European and American students, avoiding theoretical jargon and mapping European trends in comparison to American policies and institutions.

This book examines the international law of jurisdiction, focusing on the areas of law where jurisdiction is most contentious: criminal, antitrust, securities, discovery, and international humanitarian and human rights law. Since F.A. Mann's work in the 1980s, no analytical overview has been attempted of this crucial topic in international law: prescribing the admissible geographical reach of a State's laws. The need for such an overview has grown more pressing in recent years as the traditional framework of the law of jurisdiction, grounded in the principles of sovereignty and territoriality, has been undermined by piecemeal developments. Antitrust jurisdiction is heading in new directions, influenced by law and economics approaches; new EC rules are reshaping jurisdiction in securities law; the U.S. is arguably overreaching in the field of corporate governance law; and the universality principle has gained ground in European criminal law and U.S. tort law. Such developments have given rise to conflicts over competency that struggle to be resolved within traditional jurisdiction theory. This study proposes an innovative approach that departs from the classical solutions and advocates a general principle of international subsidiary jurisdiction. Under the new proposed rule, States would be entitled, and at times even obliged, to exercise subsidiary jurisdiction over internationally relevant situations in the interest of the international community if the State having primary jurisdiction fails to assume its responsibility.

This book addresses a striking puzzle in contemporary world politics: Why have European states responded in varying ways to unilateralist tendencies in US foreign policy? The United States played a hegemonic leadership role in building the post‐war multilateral order, but has been reluctant to embrace many recent multilateral treaty initiatives championed by its traditional European allies, such as the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, the International Criminal Court, or the verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. European responses to US objections, however, have varied across these different transatlantic controversies. In some cases, European decision‐makers watered down or abandoned contested treaties, whereas in others, they opted for regime‐building excluding the US, that is, for a strategy of non‐hegemonic cooperation. How Europeans choose to deal with the ‘reluctant hegemon’ has critical implications for how key global challenges are addressed—yet, the variation of their responses has been largely overlooked in a scholarly debate fixated on understanding US policy. This book fills this important gap by studying European strategic choices in five recent transatlantic conflicts over multilateral agreements. It argues that neither realist accounts of global power dynamics nor rational institutionalist models of cooperation can fully explain why Europeans opt for non‐hegemonic cooperation in some cases but not others. To resolve this puzzle, we need to combine rationalist propositions with constructivist insights about normative constraints on states’ institutional choices. By developing such an integrated model, the book sheds new light on the long‐standing theoretical debate about the relationship between hegemony and international cooperation.

This study interprets and interrelates the major political, economic and security developments in Europe – including transatlantic relations – from the end of World War II up until the present time, and looks ahead to how the continent may evolve politically in the future. It weaves all the different strands of European events together into a single picture that gives the reader a deep understanding of the continent, and of its current and future challenges. The first chapters trace European reconstruction and political, economic and security developments – both in the East and in the West – leading up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Later chapters examine the European Union's reform efforts, enlargement, movement to a single currency and emerging security role; the political and economic changes in central and Eastern Europe, including Russia; the break up of Yugoslavia and the wars that ensued; and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)'s enlargement and search for a new mission. Final chapters deal with forces affecting Europe's future, such as terrorism, nationalism, religion, demographic trends and globalisation.

Engineered to Sell traces the transnational careers of consumer engineers in advertising, market research and commercial design who transformed capitalism, from the 1930s through the 1960s. It argues that the history of marketing consumer goods is not a story of American exceptionalism. Instead, the careers of immigrants point to the limits of the “Americanization” paradigm. First, the book traces changes in marketing approaches increasingly tailored to consumers which gave rise to a dynamic world of goods. Second, it asks how and why this consumer engineering was shaped by transatlantic exchanges. From Austrian psychologists and little-known social scientists to the illustrious Bauhaus artists, the émigrés at the center of this story illustrate the vibrant cultural and commercial connections between metropolitan centers: Vienna and New York; Paris and Chicago; Berlin and San Francisco. These mid-century consumer engineers crossed national and disciplinary boundaries not only within arts and academia but also between governments, corporate actors, and social reform movements. By focusing on the transnational lives of émigré consumer researchers, marketers, and designers, Engineered to Sell details the processes of cultural translation and adaptation that mark both the mid-century transformation of American marketing and the subsequent European shift to “American” consumer capitalism.

The European Union (EU) is a central player in global financial governance. At the same time, developments outside of Europe, in particular on Wall Street and in Washington, have an enormous impact on how the EU regulates its own financial markets. Understanding European financial governance is impossible without paying attention to regulatory developments elsewhere and vice versa––both historically and in future scenarios. This book charts this European-global link in financial governance. It covers the whole breadth of financial markets, ranging from banking, auditing and accounting to derivatives trading, money laundering and tax governance. Its contributions demonstrate that global financial governance has moved beyond simple dominance by the USA. Nevertheless, transatlantic regulation relations––now the central axis of global rule setting––is not marked by intensifying conflict but rather by mutual adaptation and a readiness to accommodate national and regional idiosyncrasies.

The global rise of neoliberalism since the 1970s is widely seen as a dynamic originating in the United States and the United Kingdom, and only belatedly and partially repeated by Germany. From this Anglocentric perspective, Germany's emergence at the forefront of neoliberal reforms in the eurozone is perplexing, and tends to be attributed to the same forces conventionally associated with the Anglo-American pioneers. This book challenges this ruling narrative. It recasts the genesis of neoliberalism as a process driven by a plenitude of actors, ideas, and interests. And it lays bare the pragmatic reasoning and counterintuitive choices of German crisis managers obscured by this master story. This book argues that German officials did not intentionally set out to promote neoliberal change. Instead they were more intent on preserving Germany's export markets and competitiveness in order to stabilize the domestic compact between capital and labor. Nevertheless, the series of measures German policy elites took to manage the end of golden-age capitalism promoted neoliberal transformation in crucial respects: it destabilized the Bretton Woods system; it undermined socialist and social democratic responses to the crisis in Europe; it frustrated an internationally coordinated Keynesian reflation of the world economy; and ultimately it helped push the US into the Volcker interest-rate shock that inaugurated the attack on welfare and labor under Reagan and Thatcher. From this vantage point, the book illuminates the very different rationale behind the painful reforms German state managers have demanded of their indebted eurozone partners.

Pax Transatlantica asserts that the recurrent transatlantic crises that have dominated headlines since the end of the Cold War, while not irrelevant, pale when set against the realities of shared interests and goals. It emphasizes three key factors. First, despite inflammatory and dismissive rhetoric, NATO continues to provide a solid security structure for its member states: an institutional framework of a Pax Transatlantica that has stood the test of time by expanding its remit and scope. Second, in a world concerned with the potential effects of trade wars (especially between the United States and China) and the rise of economic nationalism, the transatlantic economic relationship stands apart as the richest, most closely integrated transcontinental economic space on the globe. Third, the book traces the parallel evolution of domestic politics on both sides of the Atlantic with specific focus on the rise of populism. Rather than a sign of transatlantic “drift,” the rise of populism—much like the emergence of so-called Third Way politics on both sides of the Atlantic in the 1990s—is evidence of a closely integrated transatlantic political space. In the end, while it is obvious that the history of the transatlantic relationship—even during the Cold War—was littered with crises, the relationship has endured. Conflicts have illustrated, time and again, the strength of the transatlantic community. The “West,” the book concludes, not only continues to exist. It is likely to thrive in the future.