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Interference involves an intentional or quasi‐intentional worsening of someone's choice situation and occurs on an arbitrary basis to the extent that it is not forced to track the interests and ideas of those who suffer the interference. One party dominates another just so far as they have the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in some of the other's choices; where such domination occurs, it will tend to be a matter of common knowledge among relevant parties but that is not part of the definition. Domination in the sense defined may occur without actual interference: it requires only the capacity for interference; and interference may occur without any domination: if the interference is not arbitrary then it will not dominate. Non‐domination may be advanced in a society either through people coming to have equal powers, or through a legal regime stopping people from dominating one another without itself dominating anyone in turn. When someone enjoys non‐domination, it will usually be a matter of common knowledge among relevant parties, so that non‐domination has a subjective and inter‐subjective aspect: it is associated with tranquillity, in Montesquieu's phrase, and with the ability to look others in the eye. Notwithstanding the allegations of Paley and early liberals, freedom as non‐domination is not a confused ideal, it comes in degrees both of intensity and extent, and it is not an impossibly radical ideal; the rich demands that it would make on the state look capable of being satisfied in our world, even if they were not capable of satisfaction in Paley's.

Sextus Empiricus' claim that the Sceptic is engaged in the search for truth has struck many as dubious for two reasons. First, the discovery of truth is neither the necessary nor the most efficient means to the Sceptic's ultimate end or objective, tranquillity. Second, the Sceptic routinely uses arguments—the Agrippan modes—that purport to show that no one can have any reason to believe anything, and the use of arguments with this negative dogmatic conclusion seems to be incompatible with engagement in the search for truth. This chapter explains why, according to Sextus, the Sceptic engages in the search for truth and how it is possible for the Sceptic to do so while using, as he does, the Agrippan modes.

The Epicureans attempted to assuage fears of premature death by offering a vision of a complete life divorced from concerns of duration. It is possible, on their account, to have lived a complete life although one is very young if one has attained the Epicurean goal of ataraxia, the absence of mental anxiety. The chapter outlines and examines the Epicurean view, contrasting it with other approaches to the nature of a ‘complete life’.

Stoic tranquillity was achieved partly through applying reservation to their desires. Earlier analyses of reservation were criticised by Brennan, who contributed the insight that reservation can be applied to expectations. Brunschwig criticised Brennan’s analysis, and contributed the insight that Marcus Aurelius advocated a further exercise of reversing one’s desires, if frustrated. The analysis offered here seeks to preserve these insights, while avoiding difficulties in both analyses.

This chapter argues that the Pyrrhonist's strategy for achieving his goal of άταραξία or tranquillity demands that the mature Pyrrhonist's έποχή should be far more extensive that the έποχή associated with the ordinary person. Philip Hallie's account of the scope of Pyrrhonist's έποχή is profoundly unsatisfactory.

Chapter Three charts the development of ancient Pyrrhonism, from its origins with Pyrrho of Elis through Timon of Phlius and Aenesidemus, concluding with the chronicling work of Sextus Empiricus. The chapter unpacks the conceptual apparatus of Pyrrhonism in some detail, including: scepticism as practice (agogê), its Fourfold way of observing appearances (phainomena), its observance (teresis) of the pre-theoretical understandings (prolepsis) of common life (ho bios ho koinos), its argumentative modes (tropoi, both Aenesidemus’ ten and Agrippa’s five tropes), its suspension of judgment (epochê), its practice of balancing oppositions (isosthenia), its non-assertive silence (aphasia) about what is hidden (ta adêla), its critiques of causality, its Apelletic method, its critical and inquiring openness (zetesis), its quasi-goal of tranquillity (ataraxia), and its anti-Platonic ideas about recollection. The chapter closes with a seven-point General Framework defining Pyrrhonian Scepticism.

Custom is the second dimension of the Pyrrhonian Fourfold, and Hume positions custom and habit centrally in his thought. Chapter Five unpacks and weighs the philosophical import of Hume’s thinking about custom and habit. Chapter Six describes the way Hume’s use of custom and habit inform Hume’s theory of general ideas and anticipates hermeneutic philosophy, as well as howHume’s Copy Principle enacts the historicity of Pyrrhonian recollection. The text goes on to show how custom and habit inform Hume’s ideas about nature, contingency, reasoning, moral and aesthetic judgment, and the human self. The chapter then moves into an investigation of Hume’s political theory and his ideas about religion. The chapter shows how the complex and sometimes apparently inconsistent weave of Hume’s thinking about politics and religion is coherently organized around central features of scepticism. With an eye towards the various virtues and pathologies of politics and religion, Chapter Six explores Hume’s critical ideas about opinion, true religion, moderation, tranquillity, balancing, common life, metaphysics, faction, enthusiasm, and superstition.

This chapter explores a contemporary work for contralto by William Mathias. The piece runs in a continuous span, but contains many contrasting sections within it. Although conceived for a rich, low voice, it also requires the lightness and agility to articulate swift staccato passages with aplomb. The highest pitches are at a loud dynamic. Otherwise, the contralto’s strong chest register is exploited rewardingly. A good deal of stamina is required to sustain and conserve energy through a welter of varied gestures and moods, which are enhanced by a striking piano part. The musical language is ‘advanced traditional’. It should prove an excellent vehicle for an enterprising duo able to give an authoritative interpretation. The inspiring text is an additional asset.

This chapter describes how music can ease a troubled mind. This healing potential is traditionally associated with a style of sweet tranquillity, often vaguely hymnlike, often in the vein of a reverie. The healing force of music is not limited to overt consolation or to consolation at all. Some music heals by lamenting, some by inspiring hope. Classical music can do that too, and console just as well as other kinds. Its healing power lies in its capacity for drama. It heals by finding logic to deal with darkness and by giving that logic expression in the fate of melody. The result is the liberating energy, which works against all forms of darkness both great and small.

This chapter examines the reasoning of a participant in Cosmic Mysticism as she grappled with her doubts, focusing on the pathways that arise when scientific rationalization appears to be futile. Lili Bayati, a twenty-four-year-old master's student in child psychology, had been attending Cosmic Mysticism classes along with her mother. She was initially skeptical of exorcism, but eventually became a witness to its positive impact. According to Lili, metatherapy cured her wrist without requiring her belief, nor even depending on her awareness that treatment was under way. The chapter first describes Lili's experiences with metatherapy, defensive radiation, and exorcism before discussing the ways that Cosmic Mysticism brought her tranquillity after anguish and furnished accounts of cosmology and theodicy that she found more logical than the ideas she had learned in religious textbooks in school.

“Preservation of Space Heritage using Models from the Sea and Antarctica” turns to existing precedents set by the concepts of international waters and lands, like Underwater Heritage for the sea and Antarctica, as possible models for how other properties that lack ownership (such as Tranquillity Base on the Moon) could be preserved. The authors also discuss the concept of cultural landscape as a mechanism that is gaining recognition among other types of historic preservation efforts, being made by the likes of the UN Convention, NASA Guidelines, XPrize, and the Outer Space Treaty, and how it is becoming more important as threats to space heritage are emerging.

“Preservation Works” provides examples of real case studies where historic preservation of space heritage has been successful, demonstrating potential routes for preservation. The chapter includes discussions on saving the Space Shuttles (led by Donaldson), designation of Tranquillity Base on state historical registries, establishment of a multi-state park for the Manhattan Project, and other smaller efforts to preserve artifacts and recognize sites.

Chapter 4 addresses three inter-related strategies employed by women following the demise of the Trujillato to reconstruct the body politic in the face of drastic political transition, a second U.S. occupation, and general social upheaval. First, Dominican women again called on the rhetoric of motherhood and maternalism in support of a return to domestic tranquility and for a nation free of dictatorial politics and foreign meddling. Second, political participation by women served to demonstrate a re-envisioning of the nature of Dominican politics through their burgeoning support of full gendered equality. Third, as now long-term members of a number of inter-American organizations, women called for continental solidarity to return sovereignty to Latin American nations plagued by foreign intervention, particularly their own. These strategies demonstrate both the potential for maternal politics as a form of national healing as well is its limitations for creating true gender equity.

This chapter contains an essay by D. T. Suzuki, published in the journal Cultural East in 1946. Suzuki first talks about the tea room, which he says is symbolic of certain aspects of Eastern culture, especially of Japanese culture. According to Suzuki, the tea room is a kind of social institution, meant for the cultural few who can appreciate art and learning. He then describes what might be called the four aesthetic and spiritual principles of the tea cult that are assembled to make a syncretic blend of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism in a form of art: harmony, respect, purity, and tranquillity. Suzuki also discusses the notion of No-tea articulated by Seisetsu, a Zen master of the eighteenth century, as well as his desire to reach the spirit of the tea cult by way of negation. Suzuki concludes by emphasizing the link between the tea cult and Zen.

Pyrrho of Elis advocated a nihilist attitude towards reality and knowledge, according to which a thing is neither knowable as something specific nor is it really anything specific. This attitude should deprive its holder of all beliefs (save this insight) and above all furnish him with tranquillity. Neo-Pyrrhonists interpreted Pyrrho’s philosophy as radical skepticism as opposed to academic skepticism. They also appropriated Pyrrho’s promise of tranquillity. Of our Neo-Pyrrhonist sources, Sextus Empiricus makes the most of sceptical tranquillity, in a complex and perplexing attempt to explain that the sceptic aims at tranquillity but attains it by chance. His attempt may be indebted to the Empiricists, the Pyrrhonists’ medical counterparts, according to whom the origins of successful treatments of diseases could be based on chance.

An examination of Sextus Empiricus’ claim that Pyrrhonist Scepticism is a kind of philosophy different from both positive and negative dogmatism. What Sextus describes in the first book of Outlines of Scepticism as the Pyrrhonist way of life is not a different kind of philosophy, but a way of using reasoning and argument not only to undermine philosophy itself, but even any kind of judgement based on reasons. The label ‘investigators’ does seem to apply to the Academic Sceptics, but theirs is not a different kind of philosophy; it is simply an undogmatic version that abandons claims to certainty.