Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300574
- eISBN:
- 9780199783748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter uses the Prisoner's Dilemma as the linking idea in an overview of many of the topics covered later in the book. The basic ideas are that of a dominated strategy and a Pareto-efficient ...
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This chapter uses the Prisoner's Dilemma as the linking idea in an overview of many of the topics covered later in the book. The basic ideas are that of a dominated strategy and a Pareto-efficient outcome. Various fallacies that promote the latter notion over the former are considered. At the same time, the chapter introduces problems in the private provision of public goods, the economic theory of imperfect competition, repeated games, the tragedy of the commons, and mechanism design. The idea of a Nash equilibrium is introduced.Less
This chapter uses the Prisoner's Dilemma as the linking idea in an overview of many of the topics covered later in the book. The basic ideas are that of a dominated strategy and a Pareto-efficient outcome. Various fallacies that promote the latter notion over the former are considered. At the same time, the chapter introduces problems in the private provision of public goods, the economic theory of imperfect competition, repeated games, the tragedy of the commons, and mechanism design. The idea of a Nash equilibrium is introduced.
ROBERT V. DODGE
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199857203
- eISBN:
- 9780199932597
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199857203.003.0016
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter looks at self-interest and group welfare in society. It introduces Schelling's view of a social contract to restrict self-interest from overcoming the general good, which is followed by ...
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This chapter looks at self-interest and group welfare in society. It introduces Schelling's view of a social contract to restrict self-interest from overcoming the general good, which is followed by an example he uses. The chapter is then concerned with Hardin's “The Tragedy of the Commons” as an explanation for the failure of individual cooperation in society's interest. Hardin described a multi-person prisoner's dilemma where it was in everyone's interest to cooperate but nobody had individual incentive to do so. Overfishing, pollution, and congestion are common problems which illustrate this. The remainder of the chapter is about the idea of fair division. Historical references come from Herodotus and the Bible. The method of “one cuts, the other chooses,” introduces Hugo Steinhaus, who expanded it to encompass “the last diminisher” as a way for physical objects to be distributed among “n” number of players. Steinhaus's method for “adding value” follows, where the total can exceed 100% of what is being divided. This involves the division of objects when claimants place different values on what is to be divided. The use of lottery and auction as methods for fair division are introduced and the chapter concludes with a Schelling problem, “Overbooked Airline Flight.” No solutionis provided; just guidelines to consider in determining what would be fair and what would be seen to be fair.Less
This chapter looks at self-interest and group welfare in society. It introduces Schelling's view of a social contract to restrict self-interest from overcoming the general good, which is followed by an example he uses. The chapter is then concerned with Hardin's “The Tragedy of the Commons” as an explanation for the failure of individual cooperation in society's interest. Hardin described a multi-person prisoner's dilemma where it was in everyone's interest to cooperate but nobody had individual incentive to do so. Overfishing, pollution, and congestion are common problems which illustrate this. The remainder of the chapter is about the idea of fair division. Historical references come from Herodotus and the Bible. The method of “one cuts, the other chooses,” introduces Hugo Steinhaus, who expanded it to encompass “the last diminisher” as a way for physical objects to be distributed among “n” number of players. Steinhaus's method for “adding value” follows, where the total can exceed 100% of what is being divided. This involves the division of objects when claimants place different values on what is to be divided. The use of lottery and auction as methods for fair division are introduced and the chapter concludes with a Schelling problem, “Overbooked Airline Flight.” No solutionis provided; just guidelines to consider in determining what would be fair and what would be seen to be fair.
Stephen M. Gardiner
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195379440
- eISBN:
- 9780199897100
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379440.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter continues the investigation of the global storm. The chapter asks the question: if the optimistic analysis fails for climate change, what are the alternatives? The chapter especially ...
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This chapter continues the investigation of the global storm. The chapter asks the question: if the optimistic analysis fails for climate change, what are the alternatives? The chapter especially looks at what might explain the last two decades of climate policy and hopes for a better model for the problem in the future. The chapter states that one option is to invoke the prisoner's dilemma and the model of the tragedy of the commons. The chapter explores the strengths and weaknesses of this account. The chapter considers the standard prisoner's dilemma model, and argues that climate change deviates from it in significant ways. It then claims that those deviations reflect important differences between the prisoner's dilemma and the tragedy of the commons metaphors. Climate change is an evolving tragedy, the chapter states. Finally the chapter looks at some issues raised by this analysis.Less
This chapter continues the investigation of the global storm. The chapter asks the question: if the optimistic analysis fails for climate change, what are the alternatives? The chapter especially looks at what might explain the last two decades of climate policy and hopes for a better model for the problem in the future. The chapter states that one option is to invoke the prisoner's dilemma and the model of the tragedy of the commons. The chapter explores the strengths and weaknesses of this account. The chapter considers the standard prisoner's dilemma model, and argues that climate change deviates from it in significant ways. It then claims that those deviations reflect important differences between the prisoner's dilemma and the tragedy of the commons metaphors. Climate change is an evolving tragedy, the chapter states. Finally the chapter looks at some issues raised by this analysis.
Jean‐Marie Baland and Jean‐Philippe Platteau
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198290612
- eISBN:
- 9780191601613
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198290616.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
This chapter analyses the ‘tragedy of the commons’, which attributes the inefficiency in managing natural resources to the absence of well-defined property rights and the regime of open access that ...
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This chapter analyses the ‘tragedy of the commons’, which attributes the inefficiency in managing natural resources to the absence of well-defined property rights and the regime of open access that characterizes them. It discusses the problem of open access and problem of common property, the Pareto-inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium under common property, and the Lindahl equilibrium.Less
This chapter analyses the ‘tragedy of the commons’, which attributes the inefficiency in managing natural resources to the absence of well-defined property rights and the regime of open access that characterizes them. It discusses the problem of open access and problem of common property, the Pareto-inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium under common property, and the Lindahl equilibrium.
Frank Hendriks
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199572786
- eISBN:
- 9780191722370
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572786.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
In voter democracy the citizens are king, particularly as preference indicators in directly aggregative procedures – as citizens who raise hands on matters in town meetings, make choices between ...
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In voter democracy the citizens are king, particularly as preference indicators in directly aggregative procedures – as citizens who raise hands on matters in town meetings, make choices between options in referendums, tick preference boxes in user questionnaires, etc. The distinction between citizenship and leadership is smaller in voter democracy than in pendulum or consensus democracy; public leaders are often private persons who take the initiative, literally, and mobilize support behind a proposal. In today's world, voter democracy is most clearly exhibited in the USA and Switzerland, places where ‘fend for yourself’ – an emphasis on self‐rule combined with self‐protection – is crucial. The core quality of voter democracy is the mobilization of private responsibility, initiative, and trust in the voluntary association of citizens. But ‘tragedies of the commons’ loom large; for each individual separately, voter democracy may seem like a good idea, but for all individuals together it may have tragic – irrational, illiberal – effects.Less
In voter democracy the citizens are king, particularly as preference indicators in directly aggregative procedures – as citizens who raise hands on matters in town meetings, make choices between options in referendums, tick preference boxes in user questionnaires, etc. The distinction between citizenship and leadership is smaller in voter democracy than in pendulum or consensus democracy; public leaders are often private persons who take the initiative, literally, and mobilize support behind a proposal. In today's world, voter democracy is most clearly exhibited in the USA and Switzerland, places where ‘fend for yourself’ – an emphasis on self‐rule combined with self‐protection – is crucial. The core quality of voter democracy is the mobilization of private responsibility, initiative, and trust in the voluntary association of citizens. But ‘tragedies of the commons’ loom large; for each individual separately, voter democracy may seem like a good idea, but for all individuals together it may have tragic – irrational, illiberal – effects.
Jean‐Marie Baland and Jean‐Philippe Platteau
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198290612
- eISBN:
- 9780191601613
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198290616.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
This chapter analyses the pessimistic view implied by the ‘tragedy of commons’, that uncoordinated human behaviour leads to the destruction of the commons. It identifies the limitations of Ronald ...
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This chapter analyses the pessimistic view implied by the ‘tragedy of commons’, that uncoordinated human behaviour leads to the destruction of the commons. It identifies the limitations of Ronald Coase’s theory that agents may get involved in voluntary exchanges of their rights to impose externalities on the others. The possibility of spontaneous cooperative behaviour in a strategic framework is examined based on recent developments in non-cooperative game theory. It is argued that many of the problems encountered in unregulated common property are problems of coordination and leadership, thus not adequately represented by the prisoner’s dilemma.Less
This chapter analyses the pessimistic view implied by the ‘tragedy of commons’, that uncoordinated human behaviour leads to the destruction of the commons. It identifies the limitations of Ronald Coase’s theory that agents may get involved in voluntary exchanges of their rights to impose externalities on the others. The possibility of spontaneous cooperative behaviour in a strategic framework is examined based on recent developments in non-cooperative game theory. It is argued that many of the problems encountered in unregulated common property are problems of coordination and leadership, thus not adequately represented by the prisoner’s dilemma.
Margaret P. Battin, Leslie P. Francis, Jay A. Jacobson, and Charles B. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195335842
- eISBN:
- 9780199868926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335842.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Antimicrobial resistance is growing at an alarming rate: reports of extensive multiple-drug resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB and MDR-TB) and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) are but ...
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Antimicrobial resistance is growing at an alarming rate: reports of extensive multiple-drug resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB and MDR-TB) and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) are but two of the most serious examples. Among the many causes of antibiotic resistance are overuse and a failure to complete courses of treatment. This chapter considers how patients, considering themselves as both potential victims and as potential vectors, might take risks of resistance into account in their decisions about treatment. Some analyses of antimicrobial resistance treat it as a tragedy of the commons: of rational individual decisions about use adding up to a catastrophe of overuse. This analysis is incomplete because it fails to take into account the interests of patients who might be victims in practices that continue to make antibiotics available to them. The chapter also suggests the possibility of a small surcharge on antibiotic use in the developing world, to be dedicated to research on new generation antimicrobials, as a reflection of this interest in continued available of therapies for dangerous pathogens.Less
Antimicrobial resistance is growing at an alarming rate: reports of extensive multiple-drug resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB and MDR-TB) and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) are but two of the most serious examples. Among the many causes of antibiotic resistance are overuse and a failure to complete courses of treatment. This chapter considers how patients, considering themselves as both potential victims and as potential vectors, might take risks of resistance into account in their decisions about treatment. Some analyses of antimicrobial resistance treat it as a tragedy of the commons: of rational individual decisions about use adding up to a catastrophe of overuse. This analysis is incomplete because it fails to take into account the interests of patients who might be victims in practices that continue to make antibiotics available to them. The chapter also suggests the possibility of a small surcharge on antibiotic use in the developing world, to be dedicated to research on new generation antimicrobials, as a reflection of this interest in continued available of therapies for dangerous pathogens.
Elinor Ostrom
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199239979
- eISBN:
- 9780191716874
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239979.003.0029
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
Upon thinking deeply about Kenneth Arrow's ‘Impossibility Theorem’, Amartya Sen advises scholars not to despair, but to engage seriously the impossibility result so that we understand it better and ...
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Upon thinking deeply about Kenneth Arrow's ‘Impossibility Theorem’, Amartya Sen advises scholars not to despair, but to engage seriously the impossibility result so that we understand it better and know how to cope with the problems identified. This chapter follows Sen's advice. It engages another impossibility result — that of Garrett Hardin who convinced many economists and policy analysts that it was impossible for those harvesting from a resource to self-organize to sustain that resource over time. The chapter briefly reviews evidence from field and experimental research that challenge the generalizability of Hardin's result. It then presents a theoretical argument for the factors affecting the likelihood that the users of common-pool resource will self-organized to develop new rules restrict how a common-pool resource should be used.Less
Upon thinking deeply about Kenneth Arrow's ‘Impossibility Theorem’, Amartya Sen advises scholars not to despair, but to engage seriously the impossibility result so that we understand it better and know how to cope with the problems identified. This chapter follows Sen's advice. It engages another impossibility result — that of Garrett Hardin who convinced many economists and policy analysts that it was impossible for those harvesting from a resource to self-organize to sustain that resource over time. The chapter briefly reviews evidence from field and experimental research that challenge the generalizability of Hardin's result. It then presents a theoretical argument for the factors affecting the likelihood that the users of common-pool resource will self-organized to develop new rules restrict how a common-pool resource should be used.
Dana D. Nelson
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780823268382
- eISBN:
- 9780823272525
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823268382.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, American History: early to 18th Century
Chapter 3 studies Cooper’s early novel The Pioneers (1826). So familiarly analyzed by the myth and symbol critics as an account of the conflict between “nature and civilization,” and by environmental ...
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Chapter 3 studies Cooper’s early novel The Pioneers (1826). So familiarly analyzed by the myth and symbol critics as an account of the conflict between “nature and civilization,” and by environmental critics as a depiction of man’s inherent greed and wastefulness, it becomes something more nuanced and historical when viewed with questions of the commons in mind. From this angle, Cooper’s novel, set in the 1790s, appears less a simple, mythic account of “man’s” transition from the state of “nature” into “civilization,” and more a carefully historicized account of how people distributed access to shared goods and constructed vernacular systems of social order, “fair play,” or “the peace,” on the frontier. In particular, it details how local actors reacted to the imposition of a top-down and more systematized (“modern”) legal system, engineered through the combined force of state/federal government and private capital.Less
Chapter 3 studies Cooper’s early novel The Pioneers (1826). So familiarly analyzed by the myth and symbol critics as an account of the conflict between “nature and civilization,” and by environmental critics as a depiction of man’s inherent greed and wastefulness, it becomes something more nuanced and historical when viewed with questions of the commons in mind. From this angle, Cooper’s novel, set in the 1790s, appears less a simple, mythic account of “man’s” transition from the state of “nature” into “civilization,” and more a carefully historicized account of how people distributed access to shared goods and constructed vernacular systems of social order, “fair play,” or “the peace,” on the frontier. In particular, it details how local actors reacted to the imposition of a top-down and more systematized (“modern”) legal system, engineered through the combined force of state/federal government and private capital.
Eric T. Freyfogle
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780226326085
- eISBN:
- 9780226326252
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226326252.003.0008
- Subject:
- Environmental Science, Environmental Studies
Garrett Hardin’s classic work on the tragedy of the commons can stand as a kind of Rorschach test, given the widely varied ways people interpret it based on the values and presumptions they bring to ...
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Garrett Hardin’s classic work on the tragedy of the commons can stand as a kind of Rorschach test, given the widely varied ways people interpret it based on the values and presumptions they bring to bear. The differing reactions arise in part because Hardin’s tale of the uncontrolled grazing pasture is incomplete and readers fill-in the narrative gaps in differing ways. This chapter revisits Hardin’s narrative to highlight the missing pieces. At the root of the pasture degradation was the failure of the grazers to work in concert to limit their actions; it was their go-it-alone, limits-be-damned, market-driven competitive individualism. The tale thus illustrates starkly the citizen-consumer dichotomy and how rationality can produce contradictory decisions depending on whether people act alone or together. In fact, every landscape, however fragmented and privately owned, remains a commons subject to abuse in the absence of collective action. Given the gaps in Hardin’s story, readers are left to guess why the grazers failed to work together and the possible reasons are many. A now-widespread reason is the dominance of competitive, market-driven individualism. A better name for the tale is thus the tragedy of individual liberation taken too far.Less
Garrett Hardin’s classic work on the tragedy of the commons can stand as a kind of Rorschach test, given the widely varied ways people interpret it based on the values and presumptions they bring to bear. The differing reactions arise in part because Hardin’s tale of the uncontrolled grazing pasture is incomplete and readers fill-in the narrative gaps in differing ways. This chapter revisits Hardin’s narrative to highlight the missing pieces. At the root of the pasture degradation was the failure of the grazers to work in concert to limit their actions; it was their go-it-alone, limits-be-damned, market-driven competitive individualism. The tale thus illustrates starkly the citizen-consumer dichotomy and how rationality can produce contradictory decisions depending on whether people act alone or together. In fact, every landscape, however fragmented and privately owned, remains a commons subject to abuse in the absence of collective action. Given the gaps in Hardin’s story, readers are left to guess why the grazers failed to work together and the possible reasons are many. A now-widespread reason is the dominance of competitive, market-driven individualism. A better name for the tale is thus the tragedy of individual liberation taken too far.
Steven Vogel
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029100
- eISBN:
- 9780262326988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029100.003.0007
- Subject:
- Environmental Science, Environmental Studies
The collective action problem Hardin named the tragedy of the commons is another version of the phenomenon that Marx called alienation. The aggregated effect of the individual actions of myriad ...
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The collective action problem Hardin named the tragedy of the commons is another version of the phenomenon that Marx called alienation. The aggregated effect of the individual actions of myriad private individuals engaging in private transactions produces consequences harmful to all that none of them intend. This is the standard form of environmental problems. The “tragedy” does not arise from the selfishness or greed or stupidity of the individuals involved, but rather from their inability to find a way to decide together as a community what to do. This inability is characteristic of a social order based on market relations. The problem can only be solved by moving from the level of the market to the level of politics, in which decisions are made by a community as a whole, acting self-consciously as a community through discursive democratic processes.Less
The collective action problem Hardin named the tragedy of the commons is another version of the phenomenon that Marx called alienation. The aggregated effect of the individual actions of myriad private individuals engaging in private transactions produces consequences harmful to all that none of them intend. This is the standard form of environmental problems. The “tragedy” does not arise from the selfishness or greed or stupidity of the individuals involved, but rather from their inability to find a way to decide together as a community what to do. This inability is characteristic of a social order based on market relations. The problem can only be solved by moving from the level of the market to the level of politics, in which decisions are made by a community as a whole, acting self-consciously as a community through discursive democratic processes.
Stephen M. Gardiner
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195379440
- eISBN:
- 9780199897100
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379440.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter provides a detailed introduction to the metaphor of the perfect moral storm and its application to climate change. It sketches each of the main elements of the storm ‐ its global, ...
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This chapter provides a detailed introduction to the metaphor of the perfect moral storm and its application to climate change. It sketches each of the main elements of the storm ‐ its global, intergenerational and theoretical dimensions—and also the resulting problem of moral corruption. It also examines some exacerbating features of the climate case, such as scientific uncertainty, the skewed vulnerability of those least responsible, and the creation of new victims and tragic choices. These matters are taken up in more detail in later chapters.Less
This chapter provides a detailed introduction to the metaphor of the perfect moral storm and its application to climate change. It sketches each of the main elements of the storm ‐ its global, intergenerational and theoretical dimensions—and also the resulting problem of moral corruption. It also examines some exacerbating features of the climate case, such as scientific uncertainty, the skewed vulnerability of those least responsible, and the creation of new victims and tragic choices. These matters are taken up in more detail in later chapters.
D. G. Webster
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029551
- eISBN:
- 9780262329972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029551.003.0001
- Subject:
- Environmental Science, Nature
After a brief overview of the state of global fisheries, this chapter introduces the concept of responsive governance and describes the AC/SC framework, which is used to guide the historical analysis ...
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After a brief overview of the state of global fisheries, this chapter introduces the concept of responsive governance and describes the AC/SC framework, which is used to guide the historical analysis throughout the book. It also defines the profit disconnect, which is the difference between the equilibrium level of production and the sustainable level of production in a fishery or region, and the power disconnectLess
After a brief overview of the state of global fisheries, this chapter introduces the concept of responsive governance and describes the AC/SC framework, which is used to guide the historical analysis throughout the book. It also defines the profit disconnect, which is the difference between the equilibrium level of production and the sustainable level of production in a fishery or region, and the power disconnect
Noah J. Toly
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- June 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190249427
- eISBN:
- 9780190249441
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190249427.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter argues that modern environmental thought has consistently been preoccupied with the tragic. Drawing upon the work of Paul Ricoeur, the chapter explores the ways in which common themes in ...
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This chapter argues that modern environmental thought has consistently been preoccupied with the tragic. Drawing upon the work of Paul Ricoeur, the chapter explores the ways in which common themes in modern environmental thought symbolize the need to give up, undermine, or destroy one or more goods in order to possess one or more other goods. Specifically, scarcity (which has preoccupied modern environmental thought from its beginnings), tragedy (as explored in literature on the tragedy of the commons), and risk (a measure of the likelihood that certain costs will be incurred) each simultaneously illuminate and mask aspects of our relationship to the tragic.Less
This chapter argues that modern environmental thought has consistently been preoccupied with the tragic. Drawing upon the work of Paul Ricoeur, the chapter explores the ways in which common themes in modern environmental thought symbolize the need to give up, undermine, or destroy one or more goods in order to possess one or more other goods. Specifically, scarcity (which has preoccupied modern environmental thought from its beginnings), tragedy (as explored in literature on the tragedy of the commons), and risk (a measure of the likelihood that certain costs will be incurred) each simultaneously illuminate and mask aspects of our relationship to the tragic.
Roger A. Lohmann
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231151689
- eISBN:
- 9780231525282
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231151689.003.0014
- Subject:
- Social Work, Communities and Organizations
This chapter critiques the concept of the tragedy of the commons to set the stage for discussing the commons theory of association. The tragedy of the commons denotes a situation where individuals ...
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This chapter critiques the concept of the tragedy of the commons to set the stage for discussing the commons theory of association. The tragedy of the commons denotes a situation where individuals act independently and rationally according to their self-interest and behave contrary to the best interests of the whole group by depleting some common resource. The notion suggests that all voluntary cooperation is doomed to fail. However, studies of the commons theory of association have consistently shown that common group interests are more stable than the tragedy hypothesis would suggest. The commons theory argues that in groups where open and unrestrained participation, shared resources, and shared purposes are present, two additional conditions are likely to emerge to avert a commons tragedy: social capital and a shared moral order.Less
This chapter critiques the concept of the tragedy of the commons to set the stage for discussing the commons theory of association. The tragedy of the commons denotes a situation where individuals act independently and rationally according to their self-interest and behave contrary to the best interests of the whole group by depleting some common resource. The notion suggests that all voluntary cooperation is doomed to fail. However, studies of the commons theory of association have consistently shown that common group interests are more stable than the tragedy hypothesis would suggest. The commons theory argues that in groups where open and unrestrained participation, shared resources, and shared purposes are present, two additional conditions are likely to emerge to avert a commons tragedy: social capital and a shared moral order.
Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199246489
- eISBN:
- 9780191601460
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246483.003.0015
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
The intangible hand is distinguished by the way in which it gives rise to social norms, where these are distinct from the laws that the polity coercively supports and the regularities that emerge ...
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The intangible hand is distinguished by the way in which it gives rise to social norms, where these are distinct from the laws that the polity coercively supports and the regularities that emerge spontaneously from the operation of the market. There is a well-known argument that norms are not going to be available when they are needed–in particular, when they are needed to help people escape collective predicaments–but this would apply only if the giving of esteem required intentional effort; it does not apply to esteem in the sense in which it may involve only the formation of an attitude. The chapter illustrates the many different ways in which norms may emerge and be sustained under the influence of esteem forces.Less
The intangible hand is distinguished by the way in which it gives rise to social norms, where these are distinct from the laws that the polity coercively supports and the regularities that emerge spontaneously from the operation of the market. There is a well-known argument that norms are not going to be available when they are needed–in particular, when they are needed to help people escape collective predicaments–but this would apply only if the giving of esteem required intentional effort; it does not apply to esteem in the sense in which it may involve only the formation of an attitude. The chapter illustrates the many different ways in which norms may emerge and be sustained under the influence of esteem forces.
Lee Anne Fennell
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780226650265
- eISBN:
- 9780226650432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226650432.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
Chapter 3 extends the theme of assembling cooperation to collective action problems more broadly, whether saving a fishery from collapse or collecting funds to cure a disease. The chapter explains ...
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Chapter 3 extends the theme of assembling cooperation to collective action problems more broadly, whether saving a fishery from collapse or collecting funds to cure a disease. The chapter explains how lumpy social goals—ones that are all-or-nothing—present different, and generally more favorable, prospects for success than a standard tragedy of the commons or prisoners’ dilemma scenario. Unlike these more familiar templates, a lumpy social goal cannot be enjoyed at all until a particular threshold is reached. This can make it rational for an actor who values the goal to contribute to its provision. Also significant are the increments in which contributions to a common goal can be made. When resources are harvested from a common pool, for example, the way in which the resource units are defined and divided can influence the prospects for success. Informal solutions to such problems often depend on focal points, and the segmentation of resources can prove focal. Visible and discrete units, whether natural or constructed through harvesting methods or equipment, can facilitate metering one’s own behavior and monitoring that of others. Likewise, finding the optimal granularity for charitable contributions volunteerism is important to achieving collective objectives.Less
Chapter 3 extends the theme of assembling cooperation to collective action problems more broadly, whether saving a fishery from collapse or collecting funds to cure a disease. The chapter explains how lumpy social goals—ones that are all-or-nothing—present different, and generally more favorable, prospects for success than a standard tragedy of the commons or prisoners’ dilemma scenario. Unlike these more familiar templates, a lumpy social goal cannot be enjoyed at all until a particular threshold is reached. This can make it rational for an actor who values the goal to contribute to its provision. Also significant are the increments in which contributions to a common goal can be made. When resources are harvested from a common pool, for example, the way in which the resource units are defined and divided can influence the prospects for success. Informal solutions to such problems often depend on focal points, and the segmentation of resources can prove focal. Visible and discrete units, whether natural or constructed through harvesting methods or equipment, can facilitate metering one’s own behavior and monitoring that of others. Likewise, finding the optimal granularity for charitable contributions volunteerism is important to achieving collective objectives.
Rajshree Chandra
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- April 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199459766
- eISBN:
- 9780199086542
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199459766.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Intellectual Property, IT, and Media Law
Chapter 3 takes the making of the law a step further and asks: From where does law derive its authority or the legitimacy to speak? What legitimizes the formalization of law in the terms described in ...
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Chapter 3 takes the making of the law a step further and asks: From where does law derive its authority or the legitimacy to speak? What legitimizes the formalization of law in the terms described in Chapter 2? The author suggests that one of the ways in which this is done is by claiming a moral narrative and adopting an ethical stance. She takes up two broad discourses—environmentalism and innovation—to suggest that both these discursive narratives have, often in divergent and disconsonant ways, legitimized the enclosure of the commons (and public goods) through the appropriation and inversion of the ‘moral economy of commons’ framework.Less
Chapter 3 takes the making of the law a step further and asks: From where does law derive its authority or the legitimacy to speak? What legitimizes the formalization of law in the terms described in Chapter 2? The author suggests that one of the ways in which this is done is by claiming a moral narrative and adopting an ethical stance. She takes up two broad discourses—environmentalism and innovation—to suggest that both these discursive narratives have, often in divergent and disconsonant ways, legitimized the enclosure of the commons (and public goods) through the appropriation and inversion of the ‘moral economy of commons’ framework.
Niki Harré, Taciano L. Milfont, William Helton, and Andrea Mead
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199794942
- eISBN:
- 9780199914500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794942.003.0057
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
The current ecological crisis is of enormous relevance to psychology teaching, as it is essentially a problem of human behaviour. Despite this, psychology has been slow to contribute. As a result, ...
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The current ecological crisis is of enormous relevance to psychology teaching, as it is essentially a problem of human behaviour. Despite this, psychology has been slow to contribute. As a result, our environmental problems deepen, while our knowledge, skills and values as teachers of psychology remain largely untapped. This chapter urges psychology educators to consider how they can nurture the psychologically literate citizen through a focus on ecological sustainability. We present four case studies from New Zealand psychology departments. Two are laboratory exercises, one based on a social dilemma, the Tragedy of the Commons, and the other on perceptions of animal cognition. The third is a fourth year class that is open to students from different disciplines. The final case study is an action research and teaching project designed to create a sustainable school. Participating in these experiences highlights for students the ecological issues faced by people everywhere, how to cooperate in the sustainable and equitable use of resources, how cognitions and moral reasoning are affected by culture and how to use one’s psychological literacy to effect social change.Less
The current ecological crisis is of enormous relevance to psychology teaching, as it is essentially a problem of human behaviour. Despite this, psychology has been slow to contribute. As a result, our environmental problems deepen, while our knowledge, skills and values as teachers of psychology remain largely untapped. This chapter urges psychology educators to consider how they can nurture the psychologically literate citizen through a focus on ecological sustainability. We present four case studies from New Zealand psychology departments. Two are laboratory exercises, one based on a social dilemma, the Tragedy of the Commons, and the other on perceptions of animal cognition. The third is a fourth year class that is open to students from different disciplines. The final case study is an action research and teaching project designed to create a sustainable school. Participating in these experiences highlights for students the ecological issues faced by people everywhere, how to cooperate in the sustainable and equitable use of resources, how cognitions and moral reasoning are affected by culture and how to use one’s psychological literacy to effect social change.
Rohit Prasad and V. Sridhar
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198099789
- eISBN:
- 9780199083060
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198099789.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
This chapter places spectrum in the four-fold classification of economic goods—private goods, commons goods, toll goods, and pure public goods. It identifies spectrum as a toll good and examines ...
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This chapter places spectrum in the four-fold classification of economic goods—private goods, commons goods, toll goods, and pure public goods. It identifies spectrum as a toll good and examines whether the classification would change in the presence of technological development that allows greater sharing of spectrum. The nature of spectrum as an economic good opens up a series of questions that challenge our traditional view of market-oriented societies based upon private property. The feasibility of non-exclusive use, the associated challenges, and the immense benefits that can be gained by society upon a wise resolution of the conundrums, is addressed in this chapter.Less
This chapter places spectrum in the four-fold classification of economic goods—private goods, commons goods, toll goods, and pure public goods. It identifies spectrum as a toll good and examines whether the classification would change in the presence of technological development that allows greater sharing of spectrum. The nature of spectrum as an economic good opens up a series of questions that challenge our traditional view of market-oriented societies based upon private property. The feasibility of non-exclusive use, the associated challenges, and the immense benefits that can be gained by society upon a wise resolution of the conundrums, is addressed in this chapter.
