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The previous chapters developed a theory of environmental cooperation in isolation of other international affairs. This chapter considers the possibility of linking different issues, focusing on linkage to international trade. It explains that for many environmental problems, trade is automatically linked. One consequence of this is trade “leakage”. Cooperation to reduce pollution by some countries may, through the trade mechanism, cause other countries to increase their pollution. It explains how trade restrictions can more than neutralize this trade leakage; they can actually help in sustaining more cooperation without harming international trade. The theory is illustrated by reference to sea turtle protection, tuna conservation, and the Fur Seal and Montreal Protocol agreements.

This chapter illustrates an original survey of rank-and-file International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) members. It begins with a specific puzzle: though ILWU members clearly have benefited from increased international trade, the union has maintained a consistent stance opposing trade liberalization for several decades. Interviews with ILWU leaders show that the union's stance appears to be sincere, based on the belief that current international trade rules unfairly benefit multinational corporations while imposing costs on the workers and the environment in both rich and poor countries. The chapter finds that ILWU members are more likely to have strong political opinions; they are more likely to support trade restrictions; and they are more likely to engage in politics, including turning out to vote, protest, and donate to political causes.

The various mechanisms allowing for the re‐imposition of trade barriers are discussed in this chapter, which summarizes the rules on––and the economics of––the use of instruments of contingent protection. These have been very important in dealing with domestic political pressures and allowing the pursuit of non‐economic objectives. In practice, they have often been abused, to the detriment of both national and global welfare. The chapter focuses mainly on the safeguards and exceptions embodied in GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade); those of the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) are very similar or still in development. The different sections are as follows: Renegotiation of concessions; Waivers; Emergency protection and VERs (voluntary export restraints); Antidumping actions; Measures to countervail subsidized imports; Trade restrictions for balance of payments purposes; Infant industry protection; General exceptions; and Conclusion.

In this chapter, we look into how environmental regulatory protectionism also expands to the operations of ‘baptist–bootlegger’ coalitions. These coalitions are said to provide the initial indication that a trade-restricting environmental regulation was implemented by the government for the protection of industry interests instead of environmental interests. A list of criteria is provided to demonstrate how to differentiate between situations in which the relative costs of produce are affected by environmental regulation and situations in which cross-border issues develop from environmental regulations. The chapter also offers a historical perspective of the trade–environment disputes, while giving emphasis to the institutional opportunities brought about during the NAFTA era through presenting ten cases from 1982 to the present.

This chapter focuses on the legal relationship, and possible conflicts of norms, between the international ozone regime and WTO law. After a brief analysis of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the Montreal Protocol, its amendments, and adjustments, it examines the possible conflicts of norms that may stem from the adoption of trade measures against parties not complying with the ozone regime, and conflicts with WTO law that may arise from the imposition of trade restrictions vis-à-vis states that are not party to the ozone regime. The chapter concludes that from the viewpoint of the international ozone protection regime, the often cited ‘chilling effect’ of the WTO treaty and the need to revise WTO law appear to be overstated.

As shown in the WTO Appellate Body's 1998 decision regarding Beef Hormones, industry protection, trade, and food safety may constitute fundamental issues on the global trade policy agenda. In this particular case, the WTO panel and the appeal body found that the EU enforced unjustifiable trade restrictions and that they veered away from the trading obligations established by the WTO. The fundamental problem lies in how the domestic administration of the measures imposed by the WTO SPS Committee can be influenced by domestic producers who attempt to obtain shelter against more competitive imports. As fresh food products are sensitive to deterioration, barriers to entry may come about, since foreign producers are unlikely to receive fair treatment. In this chapter, we explore the agricultural case in which the discriminatory application of sanitary and phytosanitary standards restricted trade in North America.

This chapter provides an account of liberal economics in Germany during the Weimar period. It presents a history of the economic activity of Germany from the late 15th and 16th century to the present century. In the first half of the 19th century, German liberals hoped that unification would lead to the abolition of restrictions on industry and trade. The free-market mechanism had no sense of liberation when the new currency was introduced, on the contrary, stabilization brought drastic cuts in public spending and large-scale unemployment. Germany's financial and economic problems came to the fore after the humiliating terms imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty in June 1919, which as a result lead to protectionist trade-policies to be temporarily abandoned when the treaty forbade Germany to erect tariff barriers against her former enemies. German economic depression after 1929 attacked all forms of government intervention, including unemployment benefit. Despite these unfortunate political circumstances, there were many economists who defended the old canons of laissez-faireliberalism.

This chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower's ideas about the role of trade and investment in U.S. foreign policy. In inheriting a system of trade restrictions against the Communist bloc, Eisenhower faced a dilemma. He believed in fighting Communism on every front, but he considered the control regime in place onerous for U.S. friends, allies, and Americans. He would accordingly oppose efforts to strengthen prohibitions and refuse to penalize those countries whose economic future depended on liberalized trade rules. This clearly applied to trade with China, where the president openly supported liberalization of the international order even though he did not revolutionize American policy. On December 17, 1950, the United States made a unilateral decision to embargo China in retaliation for its entry into the Korean War. This chapter considers the effects of the U.S.-promoted trade control regimes on the United States.

Chapter 2 reviews Japan’s restrictive system of trade and payments—how it worked and how it was liberalized. The restrictive system was not only conceived as a mechanism to conserve scarce foreign exchange reserves but also as a response to the realities of the early 1950s when most of the world’s currencies were inconvertible. After describing the system’s origins and principal features, the chapter explains its import control and export promotion aspects and shows how it was used to manage balance-of-payments crises. As background to the 1964 decision to make the yen fully convertible for current international transactions, it highlights major deregulatory changes of the late 1950s, the associated expansion of foreign exchange market activity, and the program of trade and exchange liberalization of 1960.

Article 30 recognizes the existence of a conflict between intellectual property rights and the free movement of goods. It resolves that conflict by giving priority to intellectual property rights. But it confers only a qualified priority on such rights. It does not grant Member States carte blanche to erect barriers to trade between Member States in the name of intellectual property. The restriction on trade must be ‘justified’ and it must not constitute ‘arbitrary discrimination’ or a ‘disguised restriction on trade between Member States’.

This chapter first considers the impact on world food prices of the changes in restrictions on trade in staple foods during the 2008 world food price crisis. Those changes were meant to partially insulate domestic markets from the spike in international prices. This insulation added substantially to the spike in international prices for rice, wheat, maize, and oilseeds. As a result, although domestic prices rose less than they would have without insulation in some developing countries, in many other countries they rose more than they would have in the absence of such insulation. Secondly, the chapter estimates the combined impact of such insulating behavior on poverty in various developing countries and globally. The analysis finds that the actual poverty-reducing impact of insulation is much less than its apparent impact, and that its net effect was to increase global poverty in 2008 by 8 million people. The chapter examines the relative efficiency and equity of trade restrictions and domestic policies that are designed to provide social protection for the poor when international food prices spike. It also examines the potential consequences of multilateral agreements to limit changes in restrictions on trade during such times.

Operationally efficient markets are those in which transactions are executed in a timely manner at minimal costs. If the costs are prohibitive, domestic and foreign investors will be deterred from participating, the markets will be shallower and less vibrant, and capital formation will be adversely impacted. Growth in emerging markets with severe operational inefficiencies may be stunted, even if the capacity of the markets appears to be sufficiently large. This chapter focuses on both explicit and implicit costs of trading. Explicit costs are directly calculable and include commissions paid to brokers, fees paid to exchanges, bid-ask spreads, and taxes. Implicit costs are more difficult to pin down, and reflect any salient market features that prevent traders from executing their trades at the prices they want when they want to do so. This category includes market impact costs, various proxy variables for market illiquidity, and even the existence of restrictions on certain kinds of trades.

This chapter considers whether environmental protection measures taken within an area that has not (yet) been regulated by the EU could restrict the free movement of goods within the Union. This only becomes relevant when an environmental measure is in some way product- or market-related and can be expected to affect the functioning of the internal market. Surprisingly many types of measures, as well as omissions, are deemed to have an effect on the internal market. While the Treaty provisions on the free movement of goods are what most frequently affects measures taken or contemplated by Member States in order to protect human health or the environment, such measures may in some cases also conflict with other Treaty rules. This chapter also briefly discusses another pertinent area—environmental taxes.

As the center of the world rice market, East and Southeast Asia is the focal point for a number of challenges to regional and global political stability. Rice is increasingly the food staple of the poor, so food security depends on keeping rice prices reasonably low and stable. This is a difficult task, as El Niño events challenge the stability of rice production in the region and individual countries—both regular exporters and importers—resort to trade restrictions to protect domestic consumers and producers. Increasing confidence in more open borders to rice trade will be critical to improving food security in the region and globally, but a political economy framework based on new behavioral insights will be critical to making progress.

This chapter discusses how Burma was not the only Southeast Asian country subjected to American sanctions. The Eisenhower administration restricted trade with North Vietnam from 1954 to 1994. Cambodia was subjected to similar measures in 1975 when the Khmer Rouge took over. As for Burma, human rights violations accounted in part for these measures. Critics of these sanctions used similar arguments: they were ineffective and harmful for ordinary people—it would be better for the United States to be involved in these countries rather than isolating them. Sanctions were expanded under the George W. Bush administration, but there was increasing frustration that they were not achieving their objective of regime change. A policy review led to the Obama administration changing its course. Instead of regime change, it would work toward regime modification.

Using Peter Borsay's idea of an English Urban Renaissance, alongside other ideas including the Industrial Revolution and the Enlightenment, this chapter discusses the context within which Baskerville and other provincial printers worked during the eighteenth century. The Printing (Licensing) Act had restricted printing to London, Oxford and Cambridge; its lapse in 1695 allowed printing to develop in other provincial towns, though London continued to dominate the trade. Birmingham, as a manorial town, was free of the trade restrictions which operated in incorporated towns and printers and other businessmen were free to set up in business without formality. The context of Birmingham as a developing industrial town is outlined and cultural aspects of the town's history are discussed.

This chapter focuses on Mongolia’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Mongolia was highly successful in containing Covid-19 and preventing community outbreaks. It worked closely and successfully with neighbouring countries and international organizations such as the World Health Organization to develop and implement public health measures and testing. Moreover, Mongolia was one of the first countries to close its borders; quick and successful actions by the government to shut schools and businesses, restrict social gatherings, and ban international arrivals allowed the country to self-isolate and avoid a larger outbreak. This self-isolation, however, presents challenges in maintaining economic functioning as the country is highly dependent on imports of many consumer products and exports of natural resources. In May of 2020, the country started to move ahead with plans to reopen some businesses; trade with China started to resume to allow the export of key commodities such as coal and copper, but longer-term challenges remained due to high internal and external debt levels, continued international travel and trade restrictions, and the global economic slowdown.