Kent Jones
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195378825
- eISBN:
- 9780199852598
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195378825.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic Systems
Unlike the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which served as a “provisional agreement”, had no fixed set of members, and was not recognized as a bona fide international organization, the ...
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Unlike the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which served as a “provisional agreement”, had no fixed set of members, and was not recognized as a bona fide international organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO) which possesses a permanent structure and members, was designed to incorporate and replace the GATT in the Uruguay Round trade agreement. In line with the Uruguay Round, WTO negotiations concerned issues of agriculture and services, intellectual property, domestic laws, and other such issues that involve imports. Although the WTO has been able to achieve a lot of its goals, it has yet to produce new multilateral trade agreements and function as a “trade liberalization machine”. As WTO is relatively unsuccessful in establishing global agreements, this book discusses the Doha Blues or the frustrations that experienced by negotiations in 2001. The book adopts a thematic approach while concentrating on the institutional facets of the problem.Less
Unlike the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which served as a “provisional agreement”, had no fixed set of members, and was not recognized as a bona fide international organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO) which possesses a permanent structure and members, was designed to incorporate and replace the GATT in the Uruguay Round trade agreement. In line with the Uruguay Round, WTO negotiations concerned issues of agriculture and services, intellectual property, domestic laws, and other such issues that involve imports. Although the WTO has been able to achieve a lot of its goals, it has yet to produce new multilateral trade agreements and function as a “trade liberalization machine”. As WTO is relatively unsuccessful in establishing global agreements, this book discusses the Doha Blues or the frustrations that experienced by negotiations in 2001. The book adopts a thematic approach while concentrating on the institutional facets of the problem.
Kenneth W. Dam
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199282623
- eISBN:
- 9780191700224
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282623.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This chapter recalls that the year 2004 was the 70th anniversary of the US Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 which fundamentally changed trade policy-making in the US and furnished the template ...
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This chapter recalls that the year 2004 was the 70th anniversary of the US Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 which fundamentally changed trade policy-making in the US and furnished the template for Congressional advance authorization for Executive Branch negotiations for reciprocal trade liberalization agreements. The chapter describes how Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, designed this Act as a means of breaking ‘the logrolling dynamics’ of the protectionist Smoot-Hawley tariff legislation of 1930. This chapter also explains why the Hull principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination are harder to apply to sectoral services negotiations. As long as the few import-competing producers threatened by trade competition can influence domestic trade policy-making so much more strongly than the many consumers and exporters benefiting from trade liberalization, Cordell Hull's insights on the ‘constitutional failures’ of trade policy-making and on the need for offsetting the political influence of import-competing firms remain of crucial importance.Less
This chapter recalls that the year 2004 was the 70th anniversary of the US Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 which fundamentally changed trade policy-making in the US and furnished the template for Congressional advance authorization for Executive Branch negotiations for reciprocal trade liberalization agreements. The chapter describes how Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, designed this Act as a means of breaking ‘the logrolling dynamics’ of the protectionist Smoot-Hawley tariff legislation of 1930. This chapter also explains why the Hull principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination are harder to apply to sectoral services negotiations. As long as the few import-competing producers threatened by trade competition can influence domestic trade policy-making so much more strongly than the many consumers and exporters benefiting from trade liberalization, Cordell Hull's insights on the ‘constitutional failures’ of trade policy-making and on the need for offsetting the political influence of import-competing firms remain of crucial importance.
