John Heil
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199259748
- eISBN:
- 9780191597657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259747.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Truths require truth‐makers; but what is it to be ‘made true’? One possibility: truth‐makers entail truths. I reject this account, arguing that entailment is a relation holding among representations, ...
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Truths require truth‐makers; but what is it to be ‘made true’? One possibility: truth‐makers entail truths. I reject this account, arguing that entailment is a relation holding among representations, and suggesting that the entailment model owes its plausibility to an implicit acceptance of the Picture Theory.Less
Truths require truth‐makers; but what is it to be ‘made true’? One possibility: truth‐makers entail truths. I reject this account, arguing that entailment is a relation holding among representations, and suggesting that the entailment model owes its plausibility to an implicit acceptance of the Picture Theory.
Thomas Hofweber
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198746973
- eISBN:
- 9780191863622
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198746973.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Idealism in its strong form is the view that our human minds in particular, not just minds in general, are metaphysically central to reality, somehow. This chapter presents an argument for this ...
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Idealism in its strong form is the view that our human minds in particular, not just minds in general, are metaphysically central to reality, somehow. This chapter presents an argument for this strong form of idealism. The argument will come largely from the philosophy of language, which might sound dubious. However, it will be shown that such an argument can establish a substantial metaphysical conclusion nonetheless. One key move is to distinguish two versions of idealism tied to two ways of conceiving of reality: the totality of facts vs. the totality of things. Ontological idealism is false: we are not central for reality understood as the totality of things. However, conceptual idealism, a version of idealism concerning the totality of facts, is true. The argument given in this chapter aims to show why and how that can be.Less
Idealism in its strong form is the view that our human minds in particular, not just minds in general, are metaphysically central to reality, somehow. This chapter presents an argument for this strong form of idealism. The argument will come largely from the philosophy of language, which might sound dubious. However, it will be shown that such an argument can establish a substantial metaphysical conclusion nonetheless. One key move is to distinguish two versions of idealism tied to two ways of conceiving of reality: the totality of facts vs. the totality of things. Ontological idealism is false: we are not central for reality understood as the totality of things. However, conceptual idealism, a version of idealism concerning the totality of facts, is true. The argument given in this chapter aims to show why and how that can be.
Stephen Mumford
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- November 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198831532
- eISBN:
- 9780191869303
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198831532.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Truths are supposed to be made true by something that exists, such as a fact, according to truthmaker theory. What, though, of apparent truths concerning what is not the case? How can they be made ...
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Truths are supposed to be made true by something that exists, such as a fact, according to truthmaker theory. What, though, of apparent truths concerning what is not the case? How can they be made true by something that is? This paradox of negative judgement has been re-articulated by Molnar. We must either meet his challenge, of identifying the positive truthmakers for the negative truths, or we must reject at least one of the premises that jointly entailed that there were such truthmakers. Attempts to solve this problem have all failed. Candidate positive truthmakers usually rely on smuggling in some negative aspect. It also looks difficult to reject any of Molnar’s premises since doing so comes at a seemingly high price. At present, this problem remains unresolved.Less
Truths are supposed to be made true by something that exists, such as a fact, according to truthmaker theory. What, though, of apparent truths concerning what is not the case? How can they be made true by something that is? This paradox of negative judgement has been re-articulated by Molnar. We must either meet his challenge, of identifying the positive truthmakers for the negative truths, or we must reject at least one of the premises that jointly entailed that there were such truthmakers. Attempts to solve this problem have all failed. Candidate positive truthmakers usually rely on smuggling in some negative aspect. It also looks difficult to reject any of Molnar’s premises since doing so comes at a seemingly high price. At present, this problem remains unresolved.
