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 Finitely Repeated Games

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0017
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter presents examples of finitely repeated perfect-monitoring games of the type in which reputation arguments were first introduced, including the prisoners’ dilemma with a tit-for-tat ... More


The Partiality Problem

Randy E. Barnett

in The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198297291
eISBN:
9780191598777
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198297297.003.0007
Subject:
Political Science, Political Theory

The partiality problem refers to the need to (1) allow persons to pursue their own partial interests including the interests of those to whom they are partial, (2) while somehow taking into account ... More


Reciprocity

Ken Binmore

in Natural Justice

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195178111
eISBN:
9780199783670
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.003.0005
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

The folk theorem shows that cooperative behavior can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in indefinitely repeated games — a phenomenon known as reciprocal altruism. The same theorem offers a solution ... More


 Repeating Yourself

Ken Binmore

in Playing for Real: Game Theory

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780195300574
eISBN:
9780199783748
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0011
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter studies games played by the same players over and over again. The strategies in repeated games are modeled as finite automata, and a version of the folk theorem is proved. This says that ... More


Cooperation

ROBERT V. DODGE

in Schelling's Game Theory: How to Make Decisions

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199857203
eISBN:
9780199932597
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199857203.003.0013
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter is about the prisoner's dilemma as a repeated encounter. The best strategy is defection, or non-cooperation, if a single encounter is anticipated. In the event of repeated, or iterated ... More


Social Order

Joseph Heath

in Following the Rules: Practical Reasoning and Deontic Constraint

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780195370294
eISBN:
9780199871230
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370294.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

The bulk of this chapter constitutes a critical survey of the various efforts that have been made to resolve the problem of order without abandoning a strictly instrumental conception of rationality. ... More


The Evolution of Cooperation

Dennis L. Krebs

in The Origins of Morality: An Evolutionary Account

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199778232
eISBN:
9780199897261
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778232.003.0022
Subject:
Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology, Social Psychology

This chapter reviews theory and research on the evolution of several forms of cooperation, including incidental helping, mutualism, sharing, turn-taking, direct reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity. ... More


The Lives of Others: Social Rationality in Animals

Jeffrey R. Stevens and Andrew J. King

in Simple Heuristics in a Social World

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780195388435
eISBN:
9780199950089
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388435.003.0015
Subject:
Psychology, Social Psychology

Why do animals attend to the lives of others? Social situations have provided important pressures in the evolution of behavior. In fact, some have argued that the complexities of social life require ... More


Financial Research Relating to Trust

George A. Aragon

in Financial Ethics: A Positivist Analysis

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780195305968
eISBN:
9780199867844
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305968.003.0006
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

This chapter examines trust in the context of ethics and economic anomalies. The purpose is to demonstrate how ethical considerations can describe and predict behavior which is inconsistent with ... More


World in a Matrix

Paul Erickson, Judy L. Klein, Lorraine Daston, Paul Rebecca, Thomas Sturm, and Michael D. Gordin

in How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War Rationality

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2014
ISBN:
9780226046631
eISBN:
9780226046778
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:
10.7208/chicago/9780226046778.003.0006
Subject:
History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine

During the postwar era, discussions of conflict and cooperation, altruism and self-interest, war and peace returned consistently to the mathematical idiom of game theory. The famed “prisoner's ... More


Reciprocity

Richard Mcelreath and Robert Boyd

in Mathematical Models of Social Evolution: A Guide for the Perplexed

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
February 2013
ISBN:
9780226558264
eISBN:
9780226558288
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:
10.7208/chicago/9780226558288.003.0004
Subject:
Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics

In most primate societies, individuals have long-lasting relationships with other members of their groups. Individual monkeys often have preferred grooming partners and reliable allies. If allies and ... More


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