Craig Bourne
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199212804
- eISBN:
- 9780191707094
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212804.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Begins by showing how theories of causation can be accommodated within presentism, discussing the regularity theory, the counterfactual theory, and the chance‐raising theory. Discusses the direction ...
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Begins by showing how theories of causation can be accommodated within presentism, discussing the regularity theory, the counterfactual theory, and the chance‐raising theory. Discusses the direction of time and causation and whether counterfactuals can ground it; also, whether the means–end connotation of causation guarantees the earlier to later direction of causation, but shows that it cannot by discussing Newcomb's problem in decision theory. Shows that Mellor's attempt to rule out causal loops, and thus backwards causation, fails. Concludes by discussing the ways in which presentism might be is said to be compatible with time travel and backwards causation, but shows how it is not possible on the theory I have developed.Less
Begins by showing how theories of causation can be accommodated within presentism, discussing the regularity theory, the counterfactual theory, and the chance‐raising theory. Discusses the direction of time and causation and whether counterfactuals can ground it; also, whether the means–end connotation of causation guarantees the earlier to later direction of causation, but shows that it cannot by discussing Newcomb's problem in decision theory. Shows that Mellor's attempt to rule out causal loops, and thus backwards causation, fails. Concludes by discussing the ways in which presentism might be is said to be compatible with time travel and backwards causation, but shows how it is not possible on the theory I have developed.
Nick Huggett
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195379518
- eISBN:
- 9780199776559
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379518.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Suppose you were to walk through a door and come out on the other side the day before; that would be travel backwards in time, as these chapters explain. However, is it at all possible? Chapter 12 ...
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Suppose you were to walk through a door and come out on the other side the day before; that would be travel backwards in time, as these chapters explain. However, is it at all possible? Chapter 12 addresses the question within the laws of physics, explaining that some laws prohibit it, some allow it in special circumstances, and others quite generally. Simple examples are considered, including a world of ‘cellular automata’, to explain what our best theory of space and time, general relativity says. Chapter 13 addresses the paradoxical nature of time travel: if you travelled back a day when you stepped through the door you cannot then stop yourself from doing so, whatever you try! By considering what we mean by saying something can or cannot be done, and what it means to have free will, the chapter explains why there is no real paradox.Less
Suppose you were to walk through a door and come out on the other side the day before; that would be travel backwards in time, as these chapters explain. However, is it at all possible? Chapter 12 addresses the question within the laws of physics, explaining that some laws prohibit it, some allow it in special circumstances, and others quite generally. Simple examples are considered, including a world of ‘cellular automata’, to explain what our best theory of space and time, general relativity says. Chapter 13 addresses the paradoxical nature of time travel: if you travelled back a day when you stepped through the door you cannot then stop yourself from doing so, whatever you try! By considering what we mean by saying something can or cannot be done, and what it means to have free will, the chapter explains why there is no real paradox.
Barry Dainton
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199288847
- eISBN:
- 9780191710742
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288847.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
What if a stream of consciousness were to branch into two? What if a single self were to divide into two? Does the thesis that phenomenal continuity is subject-preserving collapse at this point? It ...
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What if a stream of consciousness were to branch into two? What if a single self were to divide into two? Does the thesis that phenomenal continuity is subject-preserving collapse at this point? It might be thought that it must, since it is widely believed that if one subject were to divide into two, the resulting subjects must be distinct from the original subject since they are obviously distinct from one another. This chapter provides reasons for rejecting this (and various other) interpretations of fission. An alternative interpretation is developed which renders it possible to regard the products of fission as identical with both one another and the subject who divided into them. This interpretation construes fission in terms of branching personal time. As such it is just one instance of a more general phenomenon, the coming apart of personal (or proper) and ordinary (or external) temporal systems: time travel creates analogous dislocations. Fusion is susceptible to the same treatment. The general conclusion: lives are not necessarily linear, they can come in many shapes.Less
What if a stream of consciousness were to branch into two? What if a single self were to divide into two? Does the thesis that phenomenal continuity is subject-preserving collapse at this point? It might be thought that it must, since it is widely believed that if one subject were to divide into two, the resulting subjects must be distinct from the original subject since they are obviously distinct from one another. This chapter provides reasons for rejecting this (and various other) interpretations of fission. An alternative interpretation is developed which renders it possible to regard the products of fission as identical with both one another and the subject who divided into them. This interpretation construes fission in terms of branching personal time. As such it is just one instance of a more general phenomenon, the coming apart of personal (or proper) and ordinary (or external) temporal systems: time travel creates analogous dislocations. Fusion is susceptible to the same treatment. The general conclusion: lives are not necessarily linear, they can come in many shapes.
David Wallace
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199546961
- eISBN:
- 9780191741418
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546961.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter reviews a collection of other philosophical and conceptual consequences of the Everett interpretation: the popular-science idea that chaos theory makes the future sensitively dependent ...
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This chapter reviews a collection of other philosophical and conceptual consequences of the Everett interpretation: the popular-science idea that chaos theory makes the future sensitively dependent upon our present actions; some exotic situations involving quantum probability, such as the infamous ‘quantum suicide’ thought experiment; the proposal by Deutsch that other worlds are directly observed in quantum-mechanical interference processes; the ontologica status of mixed states; and the nature of time travel in an Everettian universe.Less
This chapter reviews a collection of other philosophical and conceptual consequences of the Everett interpretation: the popular-science idea that chaos theory makes the future sensitively dependent upon our present actions; some exotic situations involving quantum probability, such as the infamous ‘quantum suicide’ thought experiment; the proposal by Deutsch that other worlds are directly observed in quantum-mechanical interference processes; the ontologica status of mixed states; and the nature of time travel in an Everettian universe.
Nick Huggett
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195379518
- eISBN:
- 9780199776559
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379518.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Suppose you were to walk through a door and come out on the other side the day before; that would be travel backwards in time, as these chapters explain. However, is it at all possible? Chapter 12 ...
More
Suppose you were to walk through a door and come out on the other side the day before; that would be travel backwards in time, as these chapters explain. However, is it at all possible? Chapter 12 addresses the question within the laws of physics, explaining that some laws prohibit it, some allow it in special circumstances, and others quite generally. Simple examples are considered, including a world of ‘cellular automata’, to explain what our best theory of space and time, general relativity says. Chapter 13 addresses the paradoxical nature of time travel: if you travelled back a day when you stepped through the door you cannot then stop yourself from doing so, whatever you try! By considering what we mean by saying something can or cannot be done, and what it means to have free will, the chapter explains why there is no real paradox.Less
Suppose you were to walk through a door and come out on the other side the day before; that would be travel backwards in time, as these chapters explain. However, is it at all possible? Chapter 12 addresses the question within the laws of physics, explaining that some laws prohibit it, some allow it in special circumstances, and others quite generally. Simple examples are considered, including a world of ‘cellular automata’, to explain what our best theory of space and time, general relativity says. Chapter 13 addresses the paradoxical nature of time travel: if you travelled back a day when you stepped through the door you cannot then stop yourself from doing so, whatever you try! By considering what we mean by saying something can or cannot be done, and what it means to have free will, the chapter explains why there is no real paradox.
David Lewis
- Published in print:
- 1987
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195036466
- eISBN:
- 9780199833399
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195036468.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This paper argues that time travel is possible, and that the paradoxes of time travel are oddities, not impossibilities. The defence of the possibility of time travel involves a commitment to ...
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This paper argues that time travel is possible, and that the paradoxes of time travel are oddities, not impossibilities. The defence of the possibility of time travel involves a commitment to enduring things having temporal as well as spatial parts, psychological continuity and connectedness and causal continuity as criteria of personal identity, and a distinction between external and personal time.Less
This paper argues that time travel is possible, and that the paradoxes of time travel are oddities, not impossibilities. The defence of the possibility of time travel involves a commitment to enduring things having temporal as well as spatial parts, psychological continuity and connectedness and causal continuity as criteria of personal identity, and a distinction between external and personal time.
Theodore Sider
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199244430
- eISBN:
- 9780191598425
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924443X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Some traditional arguments for four‐dimensionalism are weak: denying four‐dimensionalism does not prohibit the application of modern logic to natural language, does not imply the A‐theory of time and ...
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Some traditional arguments for four‐dimensionalism are weak: denying four‐dimensionalism does not prohibit the application of modern logic to natural language, does not imply the A‐theory of time and is consistent with special relativity. Others have some force but are inconclusive: the argument from analogies between time and space and Lewis's argument from temporary intrinsics. Some new arguments fare better. (1) Only four‐dimensionalists can admit certain (admittedly exotic) possibilities involving timeless objects and time travel into one's own past. (2) Either substantivalism or relationalism about space‐time is true. Given substantivalism (and a sensible, flexible theory of de re modal predication), one might as well identify continuants with regions of space‐time, which have temporal parts. Alternatively, one could identify continuants with instantaneous slices of space‐time and employ temporal counterpart theory; either way, we have a four‐dimensionalist metaphysics of continuants. On the other hand, relationalism about space‐time cannot be made to work without temporal parts. So either way, we have an argument for four‐dimensionalism. (3) It can never be vague how many objects exist; if temporal parts do not exist then a restrictive account of which filled regions of space‐time contain objects must be given; but no such account can be given that is plausible and non‐vague.Less
Some traditional arguments for four‐dimensionalism are weak: denying four‐dimensionalism does not prohibit the application of modern logic to natural language, does not imply the A‐theory of time and is consistent with special relativity. Others have some force but are inconclusive: the argument from analogies between time and space and Lewis's argument from temporary intrinsics. Some new arguments fare better. (1) Only four‐dimensionalists can admit certain (admittedly exotic) possibilities involving timeless objects and time travel into one's own past. (2) Either substantivalism or relationalism about space‐time is true. Given substantivalism (and a sensible, flexible theory of de re modal predication), one might as well identify continuants with regions of space‐time, which have temporal parts. Alternatively, one could identify continuants with instantaneous slices of space‐time and employ temporal counterpart theory; either way, we have a four‐dimensionalist metaphysics of continuants. On the other hand, relationalism about space‐time cannot be made to work without temporal parts. So either way, we have an argument for four‐dimensionalism. (3) It can never be vague how many objects exist; if temporal parts do not exist then a restrictive account of which filled regions of space‐time contain objects must be given; but no such account can be given that is plausible and non‐vague.
Bede Rundle
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199575114
- eISBN:
- 9780191722349
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199575114.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A number of issues relating to time involve questions of possible asymmetry between past, present, and future. An example is given with matters concerning infinity: Could the universe extend ...
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A number of issues relating to time involve questions of possible asymmetry between past, present, and future. An example is given with matters concerning infinity: Could the universe extend infinitely into the future? Could it extend infinitely far back into the past? Bound up with the latter is the question of whether it makes sense to speak of a beginning of the universe. Another asymmetry concerns causation: must this always be from past or present to future, or can there be backwards causation? After an examination of the causal relation more generally, this question is answered in the negative. Time travel raises much the same issues as does backwards causation, and here too it is held that we do not have a real possibility.Less
A number of issues relating to time involve questions of possible asymmetry between past, present, and future. An example is given with matters concerning infinity: Could the universe extend infinitely into the future? Could it extend infinitely far back into the past? Bound up with the latter is the question of whether it makes sense to speak of a beginning of the universe. Another asymmetry concerns causation: must this always be from past or present to future, or can there be backwards causation? After an examination of the causal relation more generally, this question is answered in the negative. Time travel raises much the same issues as does backwards causation, and here too it is held that we do not have a real possibility.
D. H. Mellor
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199645084
- eISBN:
- 9780191743351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645084.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter distinguishes time travel from time passing, and shows how forward time travel is not only possible but actually occurs. It then shows why some alleged examples of backward time travel – ...
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This chapter distinguishes time travel from time passing, and shows how forward time travel is not only possible but actually occurs. It then shows why some alleged examples of backward time travel – e.g. Feynman’s theory of positrons as time-travelling electrons – are no such thing. After rejecting various objections to backward time travel, it advocates the unfashionable one that travellers into the past could do things that would stop them having travelled, which is impossible.Less
This chapter distinguishes time travel from time passing, and shows how forward time travel is not only possible but actually occurs. It then shows why some alleged examples of backward time travel – e.g. Feynman’s theory of positrons as time-travelling electrons – are no such thing. After rejecting various objections to backward time travel, it advocates the unfashionable one that travellers into the past could do things that would stop them having travelled, which is impossible.
Michael C. Corballis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262016636
- eISBN:
- 9780262298988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262016636.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Tulving drew a distinction between two forms of declarative memory, semantic and episodic. The notion of episodic memory as conscious, reexperienced memory for specific episodes has been extended to ...
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Tulving drew a distinction between two forms of declarative memory, semantic and episodic. The notion of episodic memory as conscious, reexperienced memory for specific episodes has been extended to the notion of mental time travel, whereby we can imagine future episodes as well as past ones. The further claim that mental time travel is uniquely human has been challenged in a number of studies purporting to reveal both episodic memory and the imagining of future episodes in nonhuman species, including birds and great apes. The basic issue remains somewhat unresolved. This chapter contends that the capacity for mental time travel in humans vastly exceeds that in nonhuman animals in variety, timescale, and combinatorial complexity. These properties may have built on a capacity for the generation of fantasy and the imagination of impossible events. The generativity of mental time travel is a prelude to language, whereby mental journeys through time can be shared and fictitious events (e.g., stories, fairy tales, and myths) can be generated. This chapter holds that the capacity for mental time travel is at best only minimally present in nonhuman species. The complexity and specificity of human mental time travel, and its sharing, may have been driven by the necessities of social cohesion and group planning during the Pleistocene.Less
Tulving drew a distinction between two forms of declarative memory, semantic and episodic. The notion of episodic memory as conscious, reexperienced memory for specific episodes has been extended to the notion of mental time travel, whereby we can imagine future episodes as well as past ones. The further claim that mental time travel is uniquely human has been challenged in a number of studies purporting to reveal both episodic memory and the imagining of future episodes in nonhuman species, including birds and great apes. The basic issue remains somewhat unresolved. This chapter contends that the capacity for mental time travel in humans vastly exceeds that in nonhuman animals in variety, timescale, and combinatorial complexity. These properties may have built on a capacity for the generation of fantasy and the imagination of impossible events. The generativity of mental time travel is a prelude to language, whereby mental journeys through time can be shared and fictitious events (e.g., stories, fairy tales, and myths) can be generated. This chapter holds that the capacity for mental time travel is at best only minimally present in nonhuman species. The complexity and specificity of human mental time travel, and its sharing, may have been driven by the necessities of social cohesion and group planning during the Pleistocene.
Endel Tulving and Karl K. Szpunar
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199791569
- eISBN:
- 9780199919215
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199791569.003.0075
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
Future exerts a powerful influence over human action. This is yet another instance of the curious circumstance that something that does not exist in physical reality has an effect on something that ...
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Future exerts a powerful influence over human action. This is yet another instance of the curious circumstance that something that does not exist in physical reality has an effect on something that does. This interesting phenomenon is the topic of this chapter. The resolution of the apparent paradox entailed in the phenomenon lies in the realization that there exist two realities--one physical and the other mental--and that while future does not exist in the physical reality it does in the mental reality. We discuss the nature of the two realities and the relation between them. Mental reality, also known as the mind, depends on that part of physical reality that constitutes the brain. Mind and brain are different manifestations of the same basic, as yet unknown, “stuff. ” Mind (mental realty) depends on the brain (physical reality) but it also transcends the brain in the sense that nothing that exists in the mind also exists in the brain. Mind, including conscious awareness of subjective aspects of time--past and future--governs much of human action. The study of the relation between the mind and and the brain, and the search for the common stuff that they are “made of, ” constitute central objectives of cognitive neuroscience.Less
Future exerts a powerful influence over human action. This is yet another instance of the curious circumstance that something that does not exist in physical reality has an effect on something that does. This interesting phenomenon is the topic of this chapter. The resolution of the apparent paradox entailed in the phenomenon lies in the realization that there exist two realities--one physical and the other mental--and that while future does not exist in the physical reality it does in the mental reality. We discuss the nature of the two realities and the relation between them. Mental reality, also known as the mind, depends on that part of physical reality that constitutes the brain. Mind and brain are different manifestations of the same basic, as yet unknown, “stuff. ” Mind (mental realty) depends on the brain (physical reality) but it also transcends the brain in the sense that nothing that exists in the mind also exists in the brain. Mind, including conscious awareness of subjective aspects of time--past and future--governs much of human action. The study of the relation between the mind and and the brain, and the search for the common stuff that they are “made of, ” constitute central objectives of cognitive neuroscience.
Thomas Suddendorf, Donna Rose Addis, and Michael C. Corballis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195395518
- eISBN:
- 9780199897230
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195395518.003.0121
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
This chapter reviews neuroscientific evidence for the continuity of mental time travel into the past and future, and considers what, if anything, might be uniquely human about mental time travel. It ...
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This chapter reviews neuroscientific evidence for the continuity of mental time travel into the past and future, and considers what, if anything, might be uniquely human about mental time travel. It suggests that human language may have evolved primarily for the communication of episodes, whether from the past or the imagined future, or indeed in the form of fiction. It concludes with some speculation as to when and why mental time travel evolved in hominin evolution.Less
This chapter reviews neuroscientific evidence for the continuity of mental time travel into the past and future, and considers what, if anything, might be uniquely human about mental time travel. It suggests that human language may have evolved primarily for the communication of episodes, whether from the past or the imagined future, or indeed in the form of fiction. It concludes with some speculation as to when and why mental time travel evolved in hominin evolution.
Nora S. Newcombe, Marianne E. Lloyd, and Frances Balcomb
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195340792
- eISBN:
- 9780199932078
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195340792.003.0004
- Subject:
- Psychology, Developmental Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
This chapter examines the development of one fundamental feature of episodic recollection, namely, the capacity to bind different features of an event into an integrated representation. It ...
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This chapter examines the development of one fundamental feature of episodic recollection, namely, the capacity to bind different features of an event into an integrated representation. It distinguishes this capacity from the operation of strategies and other forms of controlled mechanisms that promote and monitor binding operations. It examines the development of binding during childhood and integrates this knowledge with a lifespan perspective and investigations with nonhuman animals. It offers comments on how binding might affect the emergence and development not only of episodic memory, but also of other faculties conceptually linked to episodic memory, such as mental travel time and imagining the future.Less
This chapter examines the development of one fundamental feature of episodic recollection, namely, the capacity to bind different features of an event into an integrated representation. It distinguishes this capacity from the operation of strategies and other forms of controlled mechanisms that promote and monitor binding operations. It examines the development of binding during childhood and integrates this knowledge with a lifespan perspective and investigations with nonhuman animals. It offers comments on how binding might affect the emergence and development not only of episodic memory, but also of other faculties conceptually linked to episodic memory, such as mental travel time and imagining the future.
Anthony Dickinson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262016636
- eISBN:
- 9780262298988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262016636.003.0006
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter draws a distinction between two forms of prospective behavior, goal-directed behavior and future planning, in terms of the motivational relevance of the goal or outcome of the behavior. ...
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This chapter draws a distinction between two forms of prospective behavior, goal-directed behavior and future planning, in terms of the motivational relevance of the goal or outcome of the behavior. Goal-directed behavior is relevant to the animal’s current motivational state, whereas future planning refers to action taken in the service of future needs. Two criteria are employed to distinguish goal-directed actions from habitual behavior. Performance must be sensitive, first, to the current incentive value of the goal as assessed by the outcome revaluation procedure (goal criterion) and, second, to the instrumental contingency between the action and the outcome (instrumental criterion). Both associative and cognitive accounts of goal-directed behavior are considered. Discussion of future planning focuses primarily two accounts of the sensitivity of behavior to future consequences: the mnemonic-associative theory and the mental time travel account. Although the avian food-caching paradigm has yielded evidence for mnemonic-associative theory, support for mental time travel in animals comes largely by default. The empirical evaluation of mental time travel awaits a more detailed and articulated specification of the underlying cognitive processes.Less
This chapter draws a distinction between two forms of prospective behavior, goal-directed behavior and future planning, in terms of the motivational relevance of the goal or outcome of the behavior. Goal-directed behavior is relevant to the animal’s current motivational state, whereas future planning refers to action taken in the service of future needs. Two criteria are employed to distinguish goal-directed actions from habitual behavior. Performance must be sensitive, first, to the current incentive value of the goal as assessed by the outcome revaluation procedure (goal criterion) and, second, to the instrumental contingency between the action and the outcome (instrumental criterion). Both associative and cognitive accounts of goal-directed behavior are considered. Discussion of future planning focuses primarily two accounts of the sensitivity of behavior to future consequences: the mnemonic-associative theory and the mental time travel account. Although the avian food-caching paradigm has yielded evidence for mnemonic-associative theory, support for mental time travel in animals comes largely by default. The empirical evaluation of mental time travel awaits a more detailed and articulated specification of the underlying cognitive processes.
Jim Blascovich
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195389760
- eISBN:
- 9780199863341
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389760.003.0011
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
A decade of study and research using digital virtual reality technology has led to several propositions that bear on the interplay among consciousness, free will, and virtual reality. Conscious and ...
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A decade of study and research using digital virtual reality technology has led to several propositions that bear on the interplay among consciousness, free will, and virtual reality. Conscious and unconscious transportation, media and communication, and escaping the current situation are discussed in relation to consciousness and virtual reality research.Less
A decade of study and research using digital virtual reality technology has led to several propositions that bear on the interplay among consciousness, free will, and virtual reality. Conscious and unconscious transportation, media and communication, and escaping the current situation are discussed in relation to consciousness and virtual reality research.
Thomas A. Prendergast and Stephanie Trigg
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781526126863
- eISBN:
- 9781526142009
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9781526126863.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, Early and Medieval Literature
Conventional wisdom sees medievalism occurring “after” the Middle Ages; and indeed much medievalist practice seems to support this view, as the Middle Ages are often conceptualised in spatio-temporal ...
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Conventional wisdom sees medievalism occurring “after” the Middle Ages; and indeed much medievalist practice seems to support this view, as the Middle Ages are often conceptualised in spatio-temporal terms, through the fictions of time-travel and the specific trope of “portal medievalism”. But the two formations are more accurately seen as mutually constitutive. Medieval literature offers many examples of layered or multiple temporalities. These are often structured around cultural and social difference, which is figured in powerfully affective, not just epistemological terms. Several examples from medieval English literature demonstrate how medieval culture prefigures many of medievalism’s concerns with the alterity of the past.Less
Conventional wisdom sees medievalism occurring “after” the Middle Ages; and indeed much medievalist practice seems to support this view, as the Middle Ages are often conceptualised in spatio-temporal terms, through the fictions of time-travel and the specific trope of “portal medievalism”. But the two formations are more accurately seen as mutually constitutive. Medieval literature offers many examples of layered or multiple temporalities. These are often structured around cultural and social difference, which is figured in powerfully affective, not just epistemological terms. Several examples from medieval English literature demonstrate how medieval culture prefigures many of medievalism’s concerns with the alterity of the past.
Kathleen D. Vohs
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195389760
- eISBN:
- 9780199863341
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389760.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter conceptualizes free will as executive functioning. Free will is for goal-directed and therefore future-oriented behaviors, which are governed by a limited stock of energy. Planning, ...
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This chapter conceptualizes free will as executive functioning. Free will is for goal-directed and therefore future-oriented behaviors, which are governed by a limited stock of energy. Planning, decision making, future orientation, and theory of mind behaviors are reviewed.Less
This chapter conceptualizes free will as executive functioning. Free will is for goal-directed and therefore future-oriented behaviors, which are governed by a limited stock of energy. Planning, decision making, future orientation, and theory of mind behaviors are reviewed.
William A. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195377804
- eISBN:
- 9780199848461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377804.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Human language and cognition are often described as having the property of displacement. Displacement may be both temporal and spatial. Thus, we ...
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Human language and cognition are often described as having the property of displacement. Displacement may be both temporal and spatial. Thus, we may think or communicate about events that occurred at some time in the past or that will occur at some time in the future. This ability is referred to as cognitive time travel, and memories of personal events that occurred at specific times in the past are referred to as episodic memories. People also can think or communicate about places distant from their current location, and we might call this cognitive spatial travel. This chapter examines whether these displacement abilities of humans can be found in animals. With regard to the temporal displacement question, it considers the hypothesis that animals are “stuck in time.” A parallel “stuck-in-space” hypothesis may be advanced regarding spatial displacement. This chapter reviews some of the evidence on the stuck-in-time hypothesis concerning both the possibility of episodic memory in animals and the anticipation of future events. The questions of temporal and spatial displacement in animal cognition are discussed.Less
Human language and cognition are often described as having the property of displacement. Displacement may be both temporal and spatial. Thus, we may think or communicate about events that occurred at some time in the past or that will occur at some time in the future. This ability is referred to as cognitive time travel, and memories of personal events that occurred at specific times in the past are referred to as episodic memories. People also can think or communicate about places distant from their current location, and we might call this cognitive spatial travel. This chapter examines whether these displacement abilities of humans can be found in animals. With regard to the temporal displacement question, it considers the hypothesis that animals are “stuck in time.” A parallel “stuck-in-space” hypothesis may be advanced regarding spatial displacement. This chapter reviews some of the evidence on the stuck-in-time hypothesis concerning both the possibility of episodic memory in animals and the anticipation of future events. The questions of temporal and spatial displacement in animal cognition are discussed.
David Wittenberg
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780823249961
- eISBN:
- 9780823252503
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823249961.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book argues that time travel fiction is a narrative “laboratory,” a setting for thought experiments in which essential theoretical questions about storytelling—and, by extension, about the ...
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This book argues that time travel fiction is a narrative “laboratory,” a setting for thought experiments in which essential theoretical questions about storytelling—and, by extension, about the philosophy of temporality, history, and subjectivity—are represented in the form of literal devices and plots. Drawing on physics, philosophy, narrative theory, psychoanalysis, and film theory, the book links innovations in time travel fiction to specific shifts in the popularization of science, from evolutionary biology in the late 1800s, through relativity and quantum physics in the mid–20th century, to more recent multiverse cosmologies. Wittenberg shows how awareness of these scientific models leads to surprising innovations in the literary “time machine,” which evolves from a vehicle for sociopolitical commentary into a psychological and narratological device capable of exploring with great sophistication the temporal structure and significance of subjects, viewpoints, and historical events. The book covers work by well-known time travel writers such as Wells, Heinlein, Delany, and Harlan Ellison, as well as pulp writers of the 1920s through the 1940s, popular and avant-garde postwar science fiction, television such as The Twilight Zone and Star Trek, and current cinema. Literature, film, and TV are read alongside theoretical work ranging from Einstein, Schrödinger, and Hawking to Gérard Genette, David Lewis, and Gilles Deleuze. Wittenberg argues that even the most mainstream audiences of popular time travel fiction and cinema are vigorously engaged with many of the same questions about temporality, identity, and history that concern literary theorists, media and film scholars, and philosophers.Less
This book argues that time travel fiction is a narrative “laboratory,” a setting for thought experiments in which essential theoretical questions about storytelling—and, by extension, about the philosophy of temporality, history, and subjectivity—are represented in the form of literal devices and plots. Drawing on physics, philosophy, narrative theory, psychoanalysis, and film theory, the book links innovations in time travel fiction to specific shifts in the popularization of science, from evolutionary biology in the late 1800s, through relativity and quantum physics in the mid–20th century, to more recent multiverse cosmologies. Wittenberg shows how awareness of these scientific models leads to surprising innovations in the literary “time machine,” which evolves from a vehicle for sociopolitical commentary into a psychological and narratological device capable of exploring with great sophistication the temporal structure and significance of subjects, viewpoints, and historical events. The book covers work by well-known time travel writers such as Wells, Heinlein, Delany, and Harlan Ellison, as well as pulp writers of the 1920s through the 1940s, popular and avant-garde postwar science fiction, television such as The Twilight Zone and Star Trek, and current cinema. Literature, film, and TV are read alongside theoretical work ranging from Einstein, Schrödinger, and Hawking to Gérard Genette, David Lewis, and Gilles Deleuze. Wittenberg argues that even the most mainstream audiences of popular time travel fiction and cinema are vigorously engaged with many of the same questions about temporality, identity, and history that concern literary theorists, media and film scholars, and philosophers.
Ryan Wasserman
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198793335
- eISBN:
- 9780191841989
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198793335.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Chapter 1 explains the concept of time travel, clarifies the main question to be addressed, and previews the paradoxes to come. Section 1 explains the traditional view of time travel as involving a ...
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Chapter 1 explains the concept of time travel, clarifies the main question to be addressed, and previews the paradoxes to come. Section 1 explains the traditional view of time travel as involving a discrepancy between “personal” and “external” time. Section 2 contrasts this kind of time travel with other, purported examples of time travel. Section 3 distinguishes a number of different questions about time travel, including the question of whether or not time travel is compatible with the laws of metaphysics—particularly those having to do with the nature of time, freedom, causation, and identity. Finally, section 4 provides an outline of the rest of the book by introducing some of the key paradoxes to be addressed. Other topics in this chapter include time, causation, and metaphysical grounding.Less
Chapter 1 explains the concept of time travel, clarifies the main question to be addressed, and previews the paradoxes to come. Section 1 explains the traditional view of time travel as involving a discrepancy between “personal” and “external” time. Section 2 contrasts this kind of time travel with other, purported examples of time travel. Section 3 distinguishes a number of different questions about time travel, including the question of whether or not time travel is compatible with the laws of metaphysics—particularly those having to do with the nature of time, freedom, causation, and identity. Finally, section 4 provides an outline of the rest of the book by introducing some of the key paradoxes to be addressed. Other topics in this chapter include time, causation, and metaphysical grounding.
