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This chapter considers whether moral philosophers should accept as part of their moral methodology the study hypothetical cases, such as ticking bomb scenarios, in thinking about torture. In response to the criticism of such scenarios by Albie Sachs, this chapter argues that such cases are useful for thinking about the ethics of torture if their function is properly understood. Such thought experiments are quite typical of moral philosophy in general, and do not necessarily generate objections. Moreover, those who engage in evil actions render themselves liable to torture as a means of prevention or self-defense. Hence this chapter rejects any absolute moral prohibition on torture. Nonetheless, there are pragmatic, consequentialist considerations that can justify an absolute legal prohibition on torture. Such a legal rule would help prevent mistakes and help prevent the torture of the innocent and others not liable to attack on just war theory. An absolute legal prohibition on torture is justified because on balance no more flexible stricture on its use is likely to be as productive of good outcomes.

In this chapter, I analyze the use and abuse of utilitarianism in the torture debate, arguing that the latter might turn out to be utilitarianism's nemesis. For what the debate lays bare is that, if we are to take utilitarianism seriously, then we must be prepared to torture the alleged terrorist's child, or indeed anyone at all, to prevent the so-called imminent catastrophe. Furthermore, if that conclusion is unpalatable on rule-utilitarian grounds—in terms of the institutional and long-term consequences of such a practice—then those same sorts of consideration rule out torturing the alleged terrorist themselves. That this is systematically obscured by those who would purport to justify interrogational torture by their being highly selective about the consequences they consider, and/or by arbitrarily “modifying” the scope of utilitarianism when it generates inconvenient conclusions, again suggests that utilitarianism may be fundamentally flawed; and that its use to defend interrogational torture shows this. The argument is in four sections: a refutation of the alleged necessity of interrogational torture in “ticking bomb” cases; an analysis of utilitarian proponents' of interrogational torture properly to understand that their utilitarianism cannot accommodate non-utilitarian limits when inconvenient; third, their failure to acknowledge the implications of that for the permissibility of torturing known innocents to force others to divulge information; and, fourth, how these considerations come together to suggest that utilitarianism might not be a moral theory at all.

This chapter distinguishes the current practise of torture developed through academic research funded by CIA from the irrelevant hypothetical examples often relied upon by moral philosophers, and summarizes recent arguments against torture, including the methodological critique of the ticking bomb scenario (TBS) by David Luban and a variety of substantive critiques. The latter include my own critique of torture as merciless, Luban’s critique of it as the ultimate in the tyranny condemned by liberals, Jeremy Waldron’s defence of the prohibition of torture as a legal archetype, and David Rodin’s defence of the prohibition as a moral archetype. An effective form of interrogation that is an alternative to torture is morally evaluated.

This chapter analyses the ‘ticking bomb scenario’ (TBS), which is frequently used to justify torture. Topics covered include myth and fact in the TBS; the TBS and the innocent victim; the evils of torture; Shue’s 2005 paper on torture; the costs and benefits of a torture bureaucracy; and the limits of moral rationality.

This chapter looks at how the context of war affects the ethics of torture and considers the role that just war theory and international humanitarian law should play in governing its use or prohibition. Just war theory supports the principle of distinction, which grants protected status to civilians and anyone else (including captured and injured combatants) who is “out of the fight.” The principle of distinction is crucial both for limiting the horrors of the conduct of war and for making it possible to end active conflict and achieve reconciliation between adversaries. This chapter argues that the absolute moral prohibition on torture in war can be defended by validating the reasonability and importance of the conventions of international law, rather than needing to argue in the other direction—from the immorality of torture to the force of international laws banning its use. It also argues against the sort of justifications given for torture by its apologists—particularly, the dehumanization of one’s enemies by their vilification as evil, and the use of abstract cases—such as the ticking bomb scenario—that depict them as possessing evil-genius superpowers.

It is often assumed that if killing during war can be justified, then torture that does not kill also can. But torture constitutes merciless assault upon someone utterly defenceless because an effort to ‘surrender’ by providing the information sought may always be ruled by the torturer to be insufficient. Torture has different purposes, and terroristic torture is distinguished from interrogational. The ticking bomb scenario (TBS) used to defend torture ignores the terroristic variety and wildly misleads concerning interrogational torture by incorporating multiple false assumptions: the torturers have the right person, the torture victim provides timely accurate information, only torture could obtain the information, and, most importantly, torture will be rare. Practical ethics depends on examining actual practices.