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Seeks to draw the main implications of the previous analysis. It argues that, in recent decades, rather than being under immediate threat, the welfare state in most Western nations has been approaching steady state, with expenditure levels that are unlikely to change radically in coming years. In aggregate terms, the biggest remaining divide is between high spending social security and state services of the states of Continental Western Europe and the poverty-alleviation states of the English-speaking world. The book concludes by arguing that, despite convergence at the aggregate expenditure level, different families of nations have distinctively different welfare state priorities and different problems.

This chapter responds to some objections to an earlier argument that proposed a theory of preventive war. This theory sought to assimilate preventive war to self-defence, but only under restricted conditions; it argued against a general rule permitting states confronting distant or immature threats to launch preventive wars, on the ground that such a permission would license too many wars; it also argued that a more restricted principle, permitting preventive wars against rogue states where the distant threat involves weapons of mass destruction (WMD), can be justified; and also it stated that the permission to launch preventive war is nonproxyable; and finally it argued that the threat a rogue state poses must be a physical threat against the homeland of the state launching a preventive war. The chapter elaborates aspects of the theory that were obscurely stated or underdeveloped in the first go-around. It focuses on the so-called ‘rights objection’ that launching preventive war is wrong because it inflicts death and destruction on people who have done nothing to forfeit their rights against such violence.

This chapter argues that violence is and has always been a crucial component in the origin and maintenance of oppression. It explores how violence and the threat of violence constrain the actions of groups, harming the victims and benefiting the correlative privileged social groups. It argues that women as a group are oppressed materially through violence, and that there is a credible, psychologically effective threat of greater harm that is transmitted by the obvious material harm that they do suffer.

The second of two case studies of Lloyd George. Explains how he was able to enact the Irish Treaty of 1921 in three parliaments and three executives, when he controlled a majority in only one of the six bodies, and that a very bare majority. Although his threat strategy was not credible, he forced the Irish delegate into a sequential game, because each Irish delegate, when forced to decide, in turn strictly preferred signing the Treaty to not signing it. Lloyd George succeeded in removing the Irish question from British politics for fifty years, and partly succeeded in removing the British question from Irish politics.

In order to show that freedom is (at least theoretically) measurable, one must show that the different kinds of constraint on freedom (physical impossibility, threats, difficulty) can be aggregated so as to provide overall freedom judgements. This can be done by reducing all of these kinds of constraint to the constraint of physical impossibility. This solution does not involve a “restrictivist” conception of constraints on freedom. Once it is recognized that overall freedom is a function of the physical compossibility of actions, it should also be recognized that agents for whom particular actions are difficult or costly, or who are subjected to coercion, generally suffer reductions in their degrees of overall freedom. Further analysis of the notion of constraints shows that this liberal conception of freedom is not, as is often supposed, ultimately distinguishable either from traditionally socialist conceptions or from the republican conception recently proposed by Philip Pettit.

Discusses the expansion of the cooperation established between the US and Western Europe in the period 1950–1962, and analyses the Atlantic community, Germany's role in the relationship, and Western European integration. The first section looks at the dominant status that America had achieved in Europe by 1950, and at Europe's centrality to American–European cooperation—the shared assumption that Europe was the area of the world that mattered most, and that the struggle between East and West was primarily a struggle over Europe. The second section discusses the (North) Atlantic community in terms of balance of power (notably the threat of Soviet communism), the domestic threat from communists and other anti‐democratic groups, and from Germany, and the third discusses European integration in relation to this Atlantic framework. The fourth and fifth sections examine the motives for America's support of European integration, and the European economic challenge to the Atlantic framework. The sixth section analyses the development of the ‘special relationships’ formed between the US and various European countries, notably Britain, but also West Germany, Norway, Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, and Yugoslavia. The last section looks at some of the concessions that the US had to make, and some of its defeats, in its relationship with Western Europe.

The freedom of a group of individuals is best understood as the sum of the degrees of freedom of its individual members. G. A. Cohen has opposed this view, arguing that a group (e.g. the proletariat) can suffer from “collective unfreedom”, where collective unfreedom signifies the incompossibility of given actions of different individuals, and can coexist with the individual freedom of each to perform her respective action. A closer analysis of the notion of collective unfreedom suggests that what is true in claims about collective unfreedom can be stated in terms of individual unfreedom. Cohen is nevertheless right in suggesting that degrees of group freedom can vary depending, among other things, on the structure of property rights. This contradicts Hillel Steiner’s claim that group freedom is constant-sum, a claim which arises out of a failure to distinguish between the number of actions a possible world can contain and the number of freedoms it can contain.

This chapter looks at how to implement management plans, monitor their conservation effectiveness and value for money, and ensure that they are resilient for the long term. Effective decision-making requires information on the state of the system, and cost effective ways of monitoring are discussed, including participatory monitoring. However, even with good information, some uncertainty about the system will always remain, and decisions must be made in the face of this. Methods of dealing with uncertainty through decision analysis are discussed, and placed in the context of adaptive management, in which the outcomes of management actions are used to learn about the system. Finally, external threats are discussed, considering ways to buffer against changes in the ecological, economic, and institutional context that are beyond control.

The idea of collective security and the drive to increase the collective element in the management of violence and insecurity have long been fundamental elements of the liberal solidarist conception of international society. This chapter examines the role of collective security in contemporary international society and the recurring dilemmas to which it gives rise. It highlights and explains the vast gulf that continues to exist between the normative ambitions of international society in the field of security and the power-political structures on which effective responses have depended; and between the increased demands for security from a growing range of subjects against a growing range of threats and the very modest degree of protection that is all too often available.

This chapter distinguishes among a variety of morally different types of threatening individual — for example, those who are culpable, those who are excused, those who are partially excused, those who are justified, and so on. It argues that the moral basis of liability to defensive violence is moral responsibility for a threat of wrongful harm and claims that on this criterion virtually all who fight in wars that lack a just cause are liable to military attack. It then considers whether these combatants are also liable to punishment in the aftermath of war and discusses whether the excuses available to them may impose a requirement of restraint in fighting against them. It concludes by discussing the moral status of child soldiers.

This chapter develops a new account of the types of social relations that principles of justice are meant to assess. It argues that the function of justice is to limit the ways in which we may permissibly coerce one another and distinguishes between two types of coercion: interactional (directly perpetrated by agents) and systemic (occurring through systems of rules). Two key insights underpin this coercion-based normative framework. First, from a liberal perspective, certain restrictions of freedom – those defined here as coercive – need special justification. The principles articulating the required justification are those that should be called principles of justice. Second, the relevant restrictions of freedom need not be direct, that is, perpetrated by an agent – collective or individual – against other agents. They can also be indirect, resulting from formal and informal social rules, supported by a large enough number of agents. This conclusion has important implications for our thinking about justice in the global realm, where there clearly are pervasive systems of formal and informal social rules, but no overarching, state-like group agent.

The parameters of power politics have changed in Europe, and the EU exports the rule of law, democracy, and human rights worldwide. The threat of force is needed to ensure equal rights for all but can only find justification when used to protect human rights. Hence the defining feature of a legitimate polity cannot be the absence of military force. The criterion for judging the polity's normative quality should rather be derived from cosmopolitanism, that is, whether it subjects its actions to the constraints of a higher‐ranking law. This chapter establishes this criterion, its theoretical and institutional underpinnings, and provisionally assesses whether the EU in fact complies with it.

This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of people's responses to peril, and the need to understand both the literature — the editorials and essays, fiction, poetry, personal accounts, and reports — that has been generated to make sense of peril and the organizations that produce them. It identifies four crises that humanity currently faces or has faced in recent years: the threat of a nuclear holocaust, weapons of mass destruction, concern about a global pandemic, and the threat of global climate change. The prevailing narratives about these perils concern themselves with defining the problem, discussing possible solutions, and then calling on citizens to live up to their moral obligations to help protect the common well-being and to be good stewards of the earth. Nothing, it appears, evokes discussion of moral responsibility quite as clearly as the prospect of impending doom. The picture of humanity that emerges in this literature is one of can-do problem solvers. Doing something, almost anything, affirms our humanity.

This chapter argues that peril has become manageable only to the extent that large-scale organizations are considered capable of managing it. Individuals may imagine that their chances of survival are greater if they have a basement bomb shelter than if they do not; but in reality, few people build such shelters because they know the effect will be minuscule compared to the ability of people in power to start or avoid a nuclear holocaust. Having come to that realization about nuclear destruction, the ordinary person adopts a similar response to other threats. Terrorism, environmental threats, mass disease: all depend on the hope that experts somewhere will provide answers.

This chapter focuses on people's responses to the nuclear era. The ebb and flow of public concern has been noted by nearly all historians of the nuclear era. What is more interesting is how the public came to view nuclear weapons as a problem — not only in the negative sense, but often as a positive opportunity to be exploited — and how rolling up its collective sleeves to work on this problem became the accepted way of coexisting with the threat of nuclear annihilation. Unlike the prospect of one's own death and the death of a loved one, and even unlike the occasional airplane crash or earthquake that takes dozens or hundreds of lives, the possibility of a nuclear conflagration — a holocaust from having unlocked the basic power of the universe and creating weaponry capable of putting the world in danger of sudden destruction — was anything but normal. Yet it became normal. After the initial emotional shock, when Americans inescapably experienced bewilderment, uncertainty, and some level of grief for those who had died, attention turned to more practical concerns. The nuclear era became one of problem solving. People decided that whatever it had taken to produce such powerful weapons could surely be harnessed for other commendable purposes. They looked to government officials to protect them and occasionally searched for better measures to protect themselves.