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Thought Insertion and Self-Knowledge

Jordi Fernández

in Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199664023
eISBN:
9780191748448
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664023.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter proposes an account of the thought-insertion delusion. First, it discusses three accounts in the literature; the displacement account, Graham and Stephens's agency account, and Sass's ... More


Complex Structures and Common Dynamics of Self‐Awareness

Shaun Gallager (ed.)

in How the Body Shapes the Mind

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199271948
eISBN:
9780191603112
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199271941.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Understanding the dynamics of agency and the sense of bodily ownership of action can be clarified by considering cases where these aspects of experience break down. In schizophrenic symptoms of ... More


Jaspers’ Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness

Alexandre Billon and Uriah Kriegel

in Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
May 2016
ISBN:
9780262029346
eISBN:
9780262330213
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262029346.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Alexandre Billon and Uriah Kriegel, the chapter authors, hold that our conscious states often have a distinctive subjective character, or “mine-ness,” in virtue of which they appear to us to be ours. ... More


Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge

Jordi Fernández

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199664023
eISBN:
9780191748448
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664023.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

We all seem to know what mental states we are in. At any given moment, we know, for example, what we believe, and what we want. But how do we know that? The project of Transparent Minds is to explain ... More


Is there a Sense of Agency for Thought?

Joëlle Proust

in Mental Actions

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199225989
eISBN:
9780191710339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225989.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Does awareness of agency entitle a subject to believe that she is performing a mental action? Two sorts of fact suggest a sceptical answer: the conflicting intuitions of normal (unimpaired) thinkers, ... More


The Sense of Agency, Lost and Found: Experience and Thought in Schizophrenic Delusion

Philip Gerrans

in The Measure of Madness: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Neuroscience, and Delusional Thought

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780262027557
eISBN:
9780262320979
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262027557.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter focuses on two typical symptoms of schizophrenic delusions: alien control and thought insertion. The phenomenology in question is loss of a “sense of agency” for voluntary movements, and ... More


Thought Insertion Clarified

Matthew Ratcliffe

in Real Hallucinations: Psychiatric Illness, Intentionality, and the Interpersonal World

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
May 2018
ISBN:
9780262036719
eISBN:
9780262342155
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262036719.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter begins by considering the possibility that a number of factors contribute to the sense of being in an intentional state, and that these can come into conflict. The remainder of the ... More


Experience of Agency in Schizophrenia

Joëlle Proust

in The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199602162
eISBN:
9780191758096
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199602162.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The experience of agency in patients with schizophrenia involves an interesting asymmetry. These patients have a preserved sense of ownership: there are circumstances in which, although they feel ... More


Voice of God, Sound of Self: Sources of Religious Experience and Symptoms of Illness

Robert N. McCauley and George Graham

in Hearing Voices and Other Matters of the Mind: What Mental Abnormalities Can Teach Us About Religions

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
May 2020
ISBN:
9780190091149
eISBN:
9780190091170
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190091149.003.0002
Subject:
Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Religious Studies

Humans are biologically evolved to identify sources of their own conscious experience and to distinguish between private inner speech and speech acts of external agents. So how are we to explain ... More


From Introspection to Essence: The Auditory Nature of Inner Speech

Peter Langland-Hassan

in Inner Speech: New Voices

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
October 2018
ISBN:
9780198796640
eISBN:
9780191866869
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198796640.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

To some it is a shallow platitude that inner speech always has an auditory-phonological component. To others, it is an empirical hypothesis with accumulating support. To yet others it is a false ... More


The Experience of Ownership

Jordi Fernández

in Memory: A Self-Referential Account

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
October 2019
ISBN:
9780190073008
eISBN:
9780190073039
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190073008.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 5 offers an account of the feeling that one has, when one remembers something, that the memory that one is having is one’s own. The chapter discusses the case of patient R.B., who claims to ... More


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