Margaret P. Battin, Leslie P. Francis, Jay A. Jacobson, and Charles B. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195335842
- eISBN:
- 9780199868926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335842.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter explores a thought-experiment imagining universal surveillance for all known communicable infectious disease, using rapid tests involving polymerase chain reactions and other methods ...
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This chapter explores a thought-experiment imagining universal surveillance for all known communicable infectious disease, using rapid tests involving polymerase chain reactions and other methods that require twenty minutes or less for results, at airports. Imagine: as you check in at the departures desk, you supply a cheek swab or other sample that is automatically assayed by the time you reach the gate: if you're negative you can board the plane, if positive you're referred to the airport clinic or local hospital for immediate treatment. This thought experiment raises substantial issues of privacy, confidentiality, and other constraints; yet—especially if expanded to other places of public contact—appears to promise a real reduction in the transmission of infectious disease.Less
This chapter explores a thought-experiment imagining universal surveillance for all known communicable infectious disease, using rapid tests involving polymerase chain reactions and other methods that require twenty minutes or less for results, at airports. Imagine: as you check in at the departures desk, you supply a cheek swab or other sample that is automatically assayed by the time you reach the gate: if you're negative you can board the plane, if positive you're referred to the airport clinic or local hospital for immediate treatment. This thought experiment raises substantial issues of privacy, confidentiality, and other constraints; yet—especially if expanded to other places of public contact—appears to promise a real reduction in the transmission of infectious disease.
Margaret P. Battin, Leslie P. Francis, Jay A. Jacobson, and Charles B. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195335842
- eISBN:
- 9780199868926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335842.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter presents the full exposition of the PVV view: that ethical problems in infectious disease should be analyzed, and clinical practices, research agendas, and public policies developed, ...
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This chapter presents the full exposition of the PVV view: that ethical problems in infectious disease should be analyzed, and clinical practices, research agendas, and public policies developed, which always take into account the possibility that a person with communicable infectious disease is both victim and vector. The PVV view works on three levels. First is ordinary life in which people are more or less aware of their actual circumstances of illness, health, and risk. Second is the population-wide view, in which patterns of disease, special risks for sub-populations, and progress or failure with respect to the overall burden of infectious disease can be observed. Third is the view of the “way-station self,” who is always in some sense at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. This third perspective is a naturalized version of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance: a thought-experiment that asks what choices and practices people would want with respect to infectious disease in light of the reality that they are always at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. These perspectives are difficult to hold in view at the same time, but each is essential to analysis of the ethical issues raised by infectious disease.Less
This chapter presents the full exposition of the PVV view: that ethical problems in infectious disease should be analyzed, and clinical practices, research agendas, and public policies developed, which always take into account the possibility that a person with communicable infectious disease is both victim and vector. The PVV view works on three levels. First is ordinary life in which people are more or less aware of their actual circumstances of illness, health, and risk. Second is the population-wide view, in which patterns of disease, special risks for sub-populations, and progress or failure with respect to the overall burden of infectious disease can be observed. Third is the view of the “way-station self,” who is always in some sense at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. This third perspective is a naturalized version of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance: a thought-experiment that asks what choices and practices people would want with respect to infectious disease in light of the reality that they are always at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. These perspectives are difficult to hold in view at the same time, but each is essential to analysis of the ethical issues raised by infectious disease.
Roy A. Sorensen
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195129137
- eISBN:
- 9780199786138
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019512913X.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This introductory chapter begins with a brief description of the purpose of this book, which is to present a general theory of thought experiments. The discussion includes thought experiments from ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a brief description of the purpose of this book, which is to present a general theory of thought experiments. The discussion includes thought experiments from many disparate fields, ranging from aesthetics to zoology. The primary goal is to establish true and interesting generalizations about them. Success here will radiate to the secondary goal of understanding philosophical thought experiments. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a brief description of the purpose of this book, which is to present a general theory of thought experiments. The discussion includes thought experiments from many disparate fields, ranging from aesthetics to zoology. The primary goal is to establish true and interesting generalizations about them. Success here will radiate to the secondary goal of understanding philosophical thought experiments. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
David F. Armstrong and Sherman E. Wilcox
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195163483
- eISBN:
- 9780199867523
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195163483.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This prologue begins with a description of an old thought experiment. The experiment imagines a situation where twenty-four human infants, twelve males and twelve females, are raised in a setting ...
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This prologue begins with a description of an old thought experiment. The experiment imagines a situation where twenty-four human infants, twelve males and twelve females, are raised in a setting without any face-to-face interaction with or communication from anyone other than their own experimental peers. It is argued that the children's initial attempts to communicate would involve pointing to and touching or otherwise manipulating the other children and objects in their environment. This claim is reinforced by the experience of people who have tried to communicate with people whose language they don't know. In such circumstances, people often resort to pointing and pantomime to communicate. However, deaf people who encounter other deaf people from foreign countries are able to negotiate a visual code that results in basic communication. This is interesting since the signed languages of the deaf are quite diverse and not mutually comprehensible, and just as complex grammatically as spoken languages.Less
This prologue begins with a description of an old thought experiment. The experiment imagines a situation where twenty-four human infants, twelve males and twelve females, are raised in a setting without any face-to-face interaction with or communication from anyone other than their own experimental peers. It is argued that the children's initial attempts to communicate would involve pointing to and touching or otherwise manipulating the other children and objects in their environment. This claim is reinforced by the experience of people who have tried to communicate with people whose language they don't know. In such circumstances, people often resort to pointing and pantomime to communicate. However, deaf people who encounter other deaf people from foreign countries are able to negotiate a visual code that results in basic communication. This is interesting since the signed languages of the deaf are quite diverse and not mutually comprehensible, and just as complex grammatically as spoken languages.
Herman Cappelen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199644865
- eISBN:
- 9780191739026
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our ...
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The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers’ intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of ‘intuition’-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: It has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.Less
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers’ intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of ‘intuition’-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: It has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.
Tamar Szabó Gendler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589760
- eISBN:
- 9780191595486
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter argues that thought experiments play a distinctive role in scientific inquiry. Reasoning about particular entities within the context of an imaginary scenario can lead to rationally ...
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This chapter argues that thought experiments play a distinctive role in scientific inquiry. Reasoning about particular entities within the context of an imaginary scenario can lead to rationally justified conclusions that—given the same initial information—would not be rationally justifiable on the basis of a straightforward argument. The bulk of the essay involves a careful reconstruction of one of the most famous thought experiments in the history of science—that by which Galileo is said to have refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavy bodies fall faster than lighter ones. But it also offers some more general remarks about scientific thought experiment as such, including a comparison of the author's views with those of James Robert Brown and John Norton.Less
This chapter argues that thought experiments play a distinctive role in scientific inquiry. Reasoning about particular entities within the context of an imaginary scenario can lead to rationally justified conclusions that—given the same initial information—would not be rationally justifiable on the basis of a straightforward argument. The bulk of the essay involves a careful reconstruction of one of the most famous thought experiments in the history of science—that by which Galileo is said to have refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavy bodies fall faster than lighter ones. But it also offers some more general remarks about scientific thought experiment as such, including a comparison of the author's views with those of James Robert Brown and John Norton.
Roy Sorensen
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199275731
- eISBN:
- 9780191706103
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275731.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
A meta-conception is a hypothetical one. It answers a question by imagining someone (usually a more able conceiver) answering that question via an act of imagination. Thus, meta-conceptions stand to ...
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A meta-conception is a hypothetical one. It answers a question by imagining someone (usually a more able conceiver) answering that question via an act of imagination. Thus, meta-conceptions stand to thought experiments as thought experiments stand to executed experiments. If conceivability entails possibility, then meta-conceiving entails possibility. Meta-conceptions would then work as well as thought experiments. But they do not work as well, giving fresh doubt about ‘Conceivability entails possibility’. Some of what passes for conceiving is really meta-conceiving, so these concerns affect modal epistemology. This chapter considers meta-conceptions as legitimate modes of inquiry but ranks them lower than thought experiments.Less
A meta-conception is a hypothetical one. It answers a question by imagining someone (usually a more able conceiver) answering that question via an act of imagination. Thus, meta-conceptions stand to thought experiments as thought experiments stand to executed experiments. If conceivability entails possibility, then meta-conceiving entails possibility. Meta-conceptions would then work as well as thought experiments. But they do not work as well, giving fresh doubt about ‘Conceivability entails possibility’. Some of what passes for conceiving is really meta-conceiving, so these concerns affect modal epistemology. This chapter considers meta-conceptions as legitimate modes of inquiry but ranks them lower than thought experiments.
Gary Ebbs
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557936
- eISBN:
- 9780191721403
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557936.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter further elucidates the new conception of truth and words described in Chapter 4 by showing how it dissolves the apparent puzzle raised by the thought experiment of Chapter 6; ...
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This chapter further elucidates the new conception of truth and words described in Chapter 4 by showing how it dissolves the apparent puzzle raised by the thought experiment of Chapter 6; investigating and rejecting what Henry Jackman calls temporal externalism — the thesis that the extension of an utterance or inscription of a word-token w at time t can be determined by facts about how other tokens of the same word-type are used at some time after t; and explaining why temporal externalism does not become more plausible if it is combined with John MacFarlane's sophisticated new framework for making sense of the notion of assessment-sensitive truth. The chapter ends by explaining how the new conception of truth and words described in Chapter 4 and elucidated by the thought experiments and arguments of Chapters 6℃8 captures what Quine calls the realist semantics of the predicate ‘true’.Less
This chapter further elucidates the new conception of truth and words described in Chapter 4 by showing how it dissolves the apparent puzzle raised by the thought experiment of Chapter 6; investigating and rejecting what Henry Jackman calls temporal externalism — the thesis that the extension of an utterance or inscription of a word-token w at time t can be determined by facts about how other tokens of the same word-type are used at some time after t; and explaining why temporal externalism does not become more plausible if it is combined with John MacFarlane's sophisticated new framework for making sense of the notion of assessment-sensitive truth. The chapter ends by explaining how the new conception of truth and words described in Chapter 4 and elucidated by the thought experiments and arguments of Chapters 6℃8 captures what Quine calls the realist semantics of the predicate ‘true’.
Paul F. A. Bartha
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195325539
- eISBN:
- 9780199776313
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195325539.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This concluding chapter outlines how my theory of analogical arguments can be extended to analogies in scientific revolutions and, more generally, outside science. As an example, Hacking's analogical ...
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This concluding chapter outlines how my theory of analogical arguments can be extended to analogies in scientific revolutions and, more generally, outside science. As an example, Hacking's analogical argument for entity realism is presented and evaluated. The chapter also argues that a solid understanding of analogical arguments sheds light on thought experiments. Finally, it is argued that a good normative theory of analogical arguments has specific implications for current empirical and computational work on analogical reasoning.Less
This concluding chapter outlines how my theory of analogical arguments can be extended to analogies in scientific revolutions and, more generally, outside science. As an example, Hacking's analogical argument for entity realism is presented and evaluated. The chapter also argues that a solid understanding of analogical arguments sheds light on thought experiments. Finally, it is argued that a good normative theory of analogical arguments has specific implications for current empirical and computational work on analogical reasoning.
Roy A. Sorensen
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195129137
- eISBN:
- 9780199786138
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019512913X.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter focuses on armchair inquiry. Thought experiment has the feel of clairvoyance, thus eliciting awe in some and suspicion in others. But the wonder of thought experiment is just a special ...
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This chapter focuses on armchair inquiry. Thought experiment has the feel of clairvoyance, thus eliciting awe in some and suspicion in others. But the wonder of thought experiment is just a special case of our vague puzzlement about how a question could be answered by merely thinking. There is no mystery when investigators look, measure, and manipulate. Their answers come from the news borne by observation and experiment. But if you just ponder, then the information you have leaving the armchair is the same as the information you had when you sat down. It is argued that part of our wonder is based on a modal fallacy. The theories of armchair inquiry that promise answers to the legitimate portion of our wonder are surveyed. Finally, a cleansing model of rationality that sets the stage for a detailed analysis of how thought experiments work is developed.Less
This chapter focuses on armchair inquiry. Thought experiment has the feel of clairvoyance, thus eliciting awe in some and suspicion in others. But the wonder of thought experiment is just a special case of our vague puzzlement about how a question could be answered by merely thinking. There is no mystery when investigators look, measure, and manipulate. Their answers come from the news borne by observation and experiment. But if you just ponder, then the information you have leaving the armchair is the same as the information you had when you sat down. It is argued that part of our wonder is based on a modal fallacy. The theories of armchair inquiry that promise answers to the legitimate portion of our wonder are surveyed. Finally, a cleansing model of rationality that sets the stage for a detailed analysis of how thought experiments work is developed.
Roy A. Sorensen
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195129137
- eISBN:
- 9780199786138
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019512913X.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter examines the hazards and pseudohazards of thought experiment. It attacks most skepticism about thought experiment as arbitrary. It argues that once the standards that are customary for ...
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This chapter examines the hazards and pseudohazards of thought experiment. It attacks most skepticism about thought experiment as arbitrary. It argues that once the standards that are customary for compasses, stethoscopes, and other testing devices are applied, thought experiments measure up. They should be used as part of a diversified portfolio of techniques. Although all these devices are individually susceptible to abuse, fallacy, and error, they provide a network of cross-checks that make for impressive collective reliability.Less
This chapter examines the hazards and pseudohazards of thought experiment. It attacks most skepticism about thought experiment as arbitrary. It argues that once the standards that are customary for compasses, stethoscopes, and other testing devices are applied, thought experiments measure up. They should be used as part of a diversified portfolio of techniques. Although all these devices are individually susceptible to abuse, fallacy, and error, they provide a network of cross-checks that make for impressive collective reliability.
Kathleen V. Wilkes
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240808
- eISBN:
- 9780191680281
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240808.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book focuses upon the sorts of things that can happen to the object called a person and the implications that can be drawn from those things. Personal identity has been the ground for bizarre, ...
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This book focuses upon the sorts of things that can happen to the object called a person and the implications that can be drawn from those things. Personal identity has been the ground for bizarre, entertaining, confusing, and inconclusive thought experiments. The study aims to use science fact rather than science fiction of fantasy. It contends that the conclusions will be more plausible since they are based in the real world and that they are more credible than the impassioned imagination dreams from a philosopher. This chapter questions the methodology of thought-experimentation if it is deployed without stringent controls.Less
This book focuses upon the sorts of things that can happen to the object called a person and the implications that can be drawn from those things. Personal identity has been the ground for bizarre, entertaining, confusing, and inconclusive thought experiments. The study aims to use science fact rather than science fiction of fantasy. It contends that the conclusions will be more plausible since they are based in the real world and that they are more credible than the impassioned imagination dreams from a philosopher. This chapter questions the methodology of thought-experimentation if it is deployed without stringent controls.
Jessica Brown
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693702
- eISBN:
- 9780191741265
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the relation between the subject matter and methodology of epistemology. According to a currently popular conception, the subject matter of epistemology is nonconceptual and ...
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This chapter examines the relation between the subject matter and methodology of epistemology. According to a currently popular conception, the subject matter of epistemology is nonconceptual and nonlinguistic. As it sometimes put, epistemologists are interested in the nature of knowledge itself, not the concept of knowledge or the word ‘knowledge’. Despite this, contemporary epistemologists continue to make central appeal to linguistic considerations and judgements about thought experiments. Some argue that the nature of epistemology’s subject matter undermines the appeal to linguistic considerations and thought-experiment judgements whether studied from the armchair or empirically (e.g. Kornblith). Others seem to detect no tension between the subject matter claim and the methodology of the discipline (e.g. Jackson and Williamson). The task of this chapter is to clarify the subject matter claim and examine whether it undermines the appeal to linguistic considerations and thought-experiment judgements in epistemology.Less
This chapter examines the relation between the subject matter and methodology of epistemology. According to a currently popular conception, the subject matter of epistemology is nonconceptual and nonlinguistic. As it sometimes put, epistemologists are interested in the nature of knowledge itself, not the concept of knowledge or the word ‘knowledge’. Despite this, contemporary epistemologists continue to make central appeal to linguistic considerations and judgements about thought experiments. Some argue that the nature of epistemology’s subject matter undermines the appeal to linguistic considerations and thought-experiment judgements whether studied from the armchair or empirically (e.g. Kornblith). Others seem to detect no tension between the subject matter claim and the methodology of the discipline (e.g. Jackson and Williamson). The task of this chapter is to clarify the subject matter claim and examine whether it undermines the appeal to linguistic considerations and thought-experiment judgements in epistemology.
Tamar Szabó Gendler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589760
- eISBN:
- 9780191595486
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This volume consists of fourteen chapters that focus on a trio of interrelated themes. First: what are the powers and limits of appeals to intuition in supporting or refuting various sorts of claims? ...
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This volume consists of fourteen chapters that focus on a trio of interrelated themes. First: what are the powers and limits of appeals to intuition in supporting or refuting various sorts of claims? Second: what are the cognitive consequences of engaging with content that is represented as imaginary or otherwise unreal? Third: what are the implications of these issues for the methodology of philosophy more generally? These themes are explored in a variety of cases, including thought experiments in science and philosophy, early childhood pretense, self‐deception, cognitive and emotional engagement with fiction, mental and motor imagery, automatic and habitual behavior, and social categorization. The chapters are organized into two large sections. Those in Part I—six in all—explore the role of intuition and thought experiment in science and philosophy; those in Part II—the remaining eight—look more generally at the role of imagination in a range of domains. Within each section, the chapters are grouped into pairs. In Part I, the first two look at the role of thought experiments in science; the next two at the role of thought experiments in exploring philosophical questions about personal identity; and the final two at a number of issues concerning intuitions and philosophical methodology more generally. In Part II, the first two chapters explore the relation between pretense and belief; the next two look at the phenomenon of imaginative resistance; the next two consider issues of imagination and emotion; and the final two introduce and discuss an attitude that the book calls alief.Less
This volume consists of fourteen chapters that focus on a trio of interrelated themes. First: what are the powers and limits of appeals to intuition in supporting or refuting various sorts of claims? Second: what are the cognitive consequences of engaging with content that is represented as imaginary or otherwise unreal? Third: what are the implications of these issues for the methodology of philosophy more generally? These themes are explored in a variety of cases, including thought experiments in science and philosophy, early childhood pretense, self‐deception, cognitive and emotional engagement with fiction, mental and motor imagery, automatic and habitual behavior, and social categorization. The chapters are organized into two large sections. Those in Part I—six in all—explore the role of intuition and thought experiment in science and philosophy; those in Part II—the remaining eight—look more generally at the role of imagination in a range of domains. Within each section, the chapters are grouped into pairs. In Part I, the first two look at the role of thought experiments in science; the next two at the role of thought experiments in exploring philosophical questions about personal identity; and the final two at a number of issues concerning intuitions and philosophical methodology more generally. In Part II, the first two chapters explore the relation between pretense and belief; the next two look at the phenomenon of imaginative resistance; the next two consider issues of imagination and emotion; and the final two introduce and discuss an attitude that the book calls alief.
John Hawthorne
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195171655
- eISBN:
- 9780199871339
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter argues that there is a tension in the semantic views held by certain antiphysicalists. These philosophers accept Fregean arguments against direct-reference theories of ordinary proper ...
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This chapter argues that there is a tension in the semantic views held by certain antiphysicalists. These philosophers accept Fregean arguments against direct-reference theories of ordinary proper names but maintain that phenomenal concepts refer directly. Against this semantic package, it is argued that the thought experiments that motivate a sense-reference distinction for ordinary proper names — roughly, Hesperus-Phosphorus stories — can be replicated at the level of direct phenomenal concepts. (A Hesperus-Phosphorus story is one in which one rationally believes both that object a has a property P and that object b lacks P, even though a = b.)Less
This chapter argues that there is a tension in the semantic views held by certain antiphysicalists. These philosophers accept Fregean arguments against direct-reference theories of ordinary proper names but maintain that phenomenal concepts refer directly. Against this semantic package, it is argued that the thought experiments that motivate a sense-reference distinction for ordinary proper names — roughly, Hesperus-Phosphorus stories — can be replicated at the level of direct phenomenal concepts. (A Hesperus-Phosphorus story is one in which one rationally believes both that object a has a property P and that object b lacks P, even though a = b.)
Tamar Szabó Gendler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589760
- eISBN:
- 9780191595486
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter provides an overview of the chapters collected in the volume. It describes how each of the chapters in Part I addresses the question of how thought experiments and appeals to intuition ...
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This chapter provides an overview of the chapters collected in the volume. It describes how each of the chapters in Part I addresses the question of how thought experiments and appeals to intuition can serve as mechanisms for supporting or refuting scientific or philosophical claims. It explains how each of the chapters in Part II explores, more generally, how engagement with subject matter that we take to be imaginary may affect our actions and perceptions. And it shows how each of the chapters in the volume both explicitly concerns itself with philosophical methodology as a subject of investigation and self‐consciously exhibits a particular philosophical methodology: one that recognizes a continuity between classic texts in the Western philosophical tradition—particularly the work of Aristotle and Hume—and contemporary empirical findings in psychology and neuroscience.Less
This chapter provides an overview of the chapters collected in the volume. It describes how each of the chapters in Part I addresses the question of how thought experiments and appeals to intuition can serve as mechanisms for supporting or refuting scientific or philosophical claims. It explains how each of the chapters in Part II explores, more generally, how engagement with subject matter that we take to be imaginary may affect our actions and perceptions. And it shows how each of the chapters in the volume both explicitly concerns itself with philosophical methodology as a subject of investigation and self‐consciously exhibits a particular philosophical methodology: one that recognizes a continuity between classic texts in the Western philosophical tradition—particularly the work of Aristotle and Hume—and contemporary empirical findings in psychology and neuroscience.
John M. Doris and Stephen Stich
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199733477
- eISBN:
- 9780199949823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733477.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter discusses character and virtue ethics, moral motivation, moral disagreement, and the role of thought experiments in ethics. Though it covers a lot of ground, the leitmotif that runs ...
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This chapter discusses character and virtue ethics, moral motivation, moral disagreement, and the role of thought experiments in ethics. Though it covers a lot of ground, the leitmotif that runs through the chapter is that there is a growing body of empirical evidence in psychology and neuroscience that philosophers interested in these issues cannot afford to ignore.Less
This chapter discusses character and virtue ethics, moral motivation, moral disagreement, and the role of thought experiments in ethics. Though it covers a lot of ground, the leitmotif that runs through the chapter is that there is a growing body of empirical evidence in psychology and neuroscience that philosophers interested in these issues cannot afford to ignore.
Roy A. Sorensen
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195129137
- eISBN:
- 9780199786138
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019512913X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter illustrates the power of thought experiments by assembling influential thought experiments from the history of science. It lays out the book's plan to understand philosophical thought ...
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This chapter illustrates the power of thought experiments by assembling influential thought experiments from the history of science. It lays out the book's plan to understand philosophical thought experiments by concentrating on their resemblance to scientific relatives. Points of difference between philosophical and scientific thought experiments give a preview of obstacles that must be overcome in the course of the campaign. Naive and sophisticated reservations about the philosophical cases are registered for the same purpose.Less
This chapter illustrates the power of thought experiments by assembling influential thought experiments from the history of science. It lays out the book's plan to understand philosophical thought experiments by concentrating on their resemblance to scientific relatives. Points of difference between philosophical and scientific thought experiments give a preview of obstacles that must be overcome in the course of the campaign. Naive and sophisticated reservations about the philosophical cases are registered for the same purpose.
Herman Cappelen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199644865
- eISBN:
- 9780191739026
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter sets about testing empirically the claim that philosophical practice involves an implicit reliance on intuitions. It does this by examining ten philosophical thought experiments in ...
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This chapter sets about testing empirically the claim that philosophical practice involves an implicit reliance on intuitions. It does this by examining ten philosophical thought experiments in argumentative context: Perry’s cases in “The Essential Indexical”, Burge’s arthritis cases in “Individualism and the Mental”, Thomson’s violinist, Thomson’s and Foot’s trolley cases, Cohen’s lottery cases, Lehrer’s Truetemp, Goldman’s fake barn cases, Cappelen and Hawthorne’s cases on judgments of taste, Williams’ cases on personal identity, and Chalmers’ zombies. Relying on the diagnostics developed in the previous chapter, it is shown that none of the judgments involved have the special features that methodologists typically take as characteristic of intuitions.Less
This chapter sets about testing empirically the claim that philosophical practice involves an implicit reliance on intuitions. It does this by examining ten philosophical thought experiments in argumentative context: Perry’s cases in “The Essential Indexical”, Burge’s arthritis cases in “Individualism and the Mental”, Thomson’s violinist, Thomson’s and Foot’s trolley cases, Cohen’s lottery cases, Lehrer’s Truetemp, Goldman’s fake barn cases, Cappelen and Hawthorne’s cases on judgments of taste, Williams’ cases on personal identity, and Chalmers’ zombies. Relying on the diagnostics developed in the previous chapter, it is shown that none of the judgments involved have the special features that methodologists typically take as characteristic of intuitions.
David M. Wilkinson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198568469
- eISBN:
- 9780191717611
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198568469.003.0001
- Subject:
- Biology, Ecology
This introductory chapter sets out the books central thought experiment: ‘For any planet with carbon-based life, which persists over geological time-scales, what is the minimum set of ecological ...
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This introductory chapter sets out the books central thought experiment: ‘For any planet with carbon-based life, which persists over geological time-scales, what is the minimum set of ecological processes that must be present?’. It contrasts this process base approach with the more conventional ‘entity’-based approach used by most university level ecology texts — where entities are things such as individuals, populations, species, communities, ecosystems, and the biosphere. The chapter also introduces the concept of the ‘Gaian effect’: the long term effect of any given process on the persistence of life on a planet. The key ‘fundamental processes’ described in the following chapters are summarized.Less
This introductory chapter sets out the books central thought experiment: ‘For any planet with carbon-based life, which persists over geological time-scales, what is the minimum set of ecological processes that must be present?’. It contrasts this process base approach with the more conventional ‘entity’-based approach used by most university level ecology texts — where entities are things such as individuals, populations, species, communities, ecosystems, and the biosphere. The chapter also introduces the concept of the ‘Gaian effect’: the long term effect of any given process on the persistence of life on a planet. The key ‘fundamental processes’ described in the following chapters are summarized.
