George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195389197
- eISBN:
- 9780199866724
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389197.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the ...
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To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. This book seeks to remedy that imbalance: it first criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition and then seeks to develop a more adequate alternative. The popular but inadequate view asserts that agents are responsible only for what they are consciously aware of doing or bringing about. (Because this view takes an agent's responsibility to extend only as far as the searchlight of his consciousness, the book refers to it as the searchlight view.) By contrast, on the proposed alternative, even agents who unwittingly act wrongly or foolishly can be responsible if (1) they have information that supports the conclusion that their acts are wrong or foolish, and (2) their failure to draw that conclusion on the basis of that information falls short of meeting some appropriate standard, and (3) the failure is caused by the constellation of psychological and/or physical features that makes them the persons they are. Because it integrates first- and third-personal elements, this alternative account is well suited to capture the complexity of responsible agents, who at once have their own private perspectives and live in a public world.Less
To be responsible for their acts, agents must both act voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. This book seeks to remedy that imbalance: it first criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition and then seeks to develop a more adequate alternative. The popular but inadequate view asserts that agents are responsible only for what they are consciously aware of doing or bringing about. (Because this view takes an agent's responsibility to extend only as far as the searchlight of his consciousness, the book refers to it as the searchlight view.) By contrast, on the proposed alternative, even agents who unwittingly act wrongly or foolishly can be responsible if (1) they have information that supports the conclusion that their acts are wrong or foolish, and (2) their failure to draw that conclusion on the basis of that information falls short of meeting some appropriate standard, and (3) the failure is caused by the constellation of psychological and/or physical features that makes them the persons they are. Because it integrates first- and third-personal elements, this alternative account is well suited to capture the complexity of responsible agents, who at once have their own private perspectives and live in a public world.
John Levi Martin
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199773312
- eISBN:
- 9780199897223
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199773312.003.0001
- Subject:
- Sociology, Social Theory
Chapter 1 introduces the problem by beginning with the difference between “first person” and “third person” explanations. The former refer to the world that we inhabit as ...
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Chapter 1 introduces the problem by beginning with the difference between “first person” and “third person” explanations. The former refer to the world that we inhabit as individual actors; the latter are an explanatory construct that we generally only employ when discussing others. In the social sciences, we not only privilege the latter, but we tend to think that explanations that rest with the former are somehow inadequate or second rate, if not somehow threatening the discipline itself. The great theory, on the other hand, not only does not rely on first person accounts, it transcends them, it ignores them, it may even obliterate them. That is because the great theory is one that is general, and the general theory is one that involves the linking of concepts that are relatively abstract. When two substantively disparate phenomena are explained jointly as instances of one and the same abstraction, we are satisfied that we have done a masterful job of explanation. This is especially true when we can link two or more abstractions with a relationship of causality between them.Less
Chapter 1 introduces the problem by beginning with the difference between “first person” and “third person” explanations. The former refer to the world that we inhabit as individual actors; the latter are an explanatory construct that we generally only employ when discussing others. In the social sciences, we not only privilege the latter, but we tend to think that explanations that rest with the former are somehow inadequate or second rate, if not somehow threatening the discipline itself. The great theory, on the other hand, not only does not rely on first person accounts, it transcends them, it ignores them, it may even obliterate them. That is because the great theory is one that is general, and the general theory is one that involves the linking of concepts that are relatively abstract. When two substantively disparate phenomena are explained jointly as instances of one and the same abstraction, we are satisfied that we have done a masterful job of explanation. This is especially true when we can link two or more abstractions with a relationship of causality between them.
D.N.S. BHAT
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199230242
- eISBN:
- 9780191710124
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230242.003.0006
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This chapter establishes a typological distinction between two-person and three-person languages. In the former case, third person pronouns are identical or derivationally related to demonstratives, ...
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This chapter establishes a typological distinction between two-person and three-person languages. In the former case, third person pronouns are identical or derivationally related to demonstratives, whereas in the latter, the two are quite distinct from one another. Languages that show gender distinction among their third person pronouns tend to be two-person languages, whereas the ones that manifest person-oriented (rather than distance-oriented) demonstrative systems tend to be three-person languages.Less
This chapter establishes a typological distinction between two-person and three-person languages. In the former case, third person pronouns are identical or derivationally related to demonstratives, whereas in the latter, the two are quite distinct from one another. Languages that show gender distinction among their third person pronouns tend to be two-person languages, whereas the ones that manifest person-oriented (rather than distance-oriented) demonstrative systems tend to be three-person languages.
David J. Chalmers
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195311105
- eISBN:
- 9780199870851
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In recent years there has been an explosion of scientific work on consciousness in cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and other fields. It has become possible to think that we are moving toward a ...
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In recent years there has been an explosion of scientific work on consciousness in cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and other fields. It has become possible to think that we are moving toward a genuine scientific understanding of conscious experience. But what is the science of consciousness all about, and what form should such a science take? This chapter gives an overview of the agenda.Less
In recent years there has been an explosion of scientific work on consciousness in cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and other fields. It has become possible to think that we are moving toward a genuine scientific understanding of conscious experience. But what is the science of consciousness all about, and what form should such a science take? This chapter gives an overview of the agenda.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239443
- eISBN:
- 9780191717000
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The question of what it is to possess the concept of perception is also of interest to the philosophy of mind more generally. A perceiving thinker who has the capacity to appreciate that others also ...
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The question of what it is to possess the concept of perception is also of interest to the philosophy of mind more generally. A perceiving thinker who has the capacity to appreciate that others also perceive is on the way to thinking of others as subjects like himself — to thinking of another person as ‘another I’, in Zeno's phrase. The chapter begins by considering the first-person case, that in which a thinker judges that he himself sees. After proposing a treatment of the first-person case, and some of its epistemic and metaphysical ramifications, it goes on to compare it with Evans's account. It discusses the relation between first-person and third-person ascription, and explains some developmental phenomena. Finally, the extension of the model presented to the self-ascription and other-ascription of action and intentionality is discussed.Less
The question of what it is to possess the concept of perception is also of interest to the philosophy of mind more generally. A perceiving thinker who has the capacity to appreciate that others also perceive is on the way to thinking of others as subjects like himself — to thinking of another person as ‘another I’, in Zeno's phrase. The chapter begins by considering the first-person case, that in which a thinker judges that he himself sees. After proposing a treatment of the first-person case, and some of its epistemic and metaphysical ramifications, it goes on to compare it with Evans's account. It discusses the relation between first-person and third-person ascription, and explains some developmental phenomena. Finally, the extension of the model presented to the self-ascription and other-ascription of action and intentionality is discussed.
Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199532889
- eISBN:
- 9780191714450
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199532889.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter deals with the two sections that Hume devotes to the mind or self: the first to its nature (material or immaterial), the second to its identity (personal identity). Hume's account of the ...
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This chapter deals with the two sections that Hume devotes to the mind or self: the first to its nature (material or immaterial), the second to its identity (personal identity). Hume's account of the first is seen to involve a dialectic issuing in a sceptical impasse, wherein each party successfully yields the same weapons against the other. The discussion of personal identity considers both Hume's analysis in the text and his second thoughts in the Appendix. It argues that Hume's problems stem from application of a third-person analysis (that of an observer), which is appropriate for considering the identity of objects to the identity of the mind or self, where a first-person approach is required. Finally, it is suggested that Hume'second thoughts may have arisen from a belated awareness of this.Less
This chapter deals with the two sections that Hume devotes to the mind or self: the first to its nature (material or immaterial), the second to its identity (personal identity). Hume's account of the first is seen to involve a dialectic issuing in a sceptical impasse, wherein each party successfully yields the same weapons against the other. The discussion of personal identity considers both Hume's analysis in the text and his second thoughts in the Appendix. It argues that Hume's problems stem from application of a third-person analysis (that of an observer), which is appropriate for considering the identity of objects to the identity of the mind or self, where a first-person approach is required. Finally, it is suggested that Hume'second thoughts may have arisen from a belated awareness of this.
Emily Van Buskirk
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691166797
- eISBN:
- 9781400873777
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691166797.003.0006
- Subject:
- Literature, Women's Literature
This chapter treats Notes of a Blockade Person, a heterogeneous narrative in multiple parts that is not only Ginzburg's most important and famous “single” work, but also her most misinterpreted in ...
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This chapter treats Notes of a Blockade Person, a heterogeneous narrative in multiple parts that is not only Ginzburg's most important and famous “single” work, but also her most misinterpreted in terms of its genre—it is often taken for a diary or memoir. It conducts a detailed exploration of the layers of this palimpsest in order to identify more precisely the genre of Notes, an undertaking that crystallizes the central features of Ginzburg's writings as investigated throughout this book. Her techniques of self-distancing create a third-person narrative about a slightly generalized other, in a well-defined historical situation.Less
This chapter treats Notes of a Blockade Person, a heterogeneous narrative in multiple parts that is not only Ginzburg's most important and famous “single” work, but also her most misinterpreted in terms of its genre—it is often taken for a diary or memoir. It conducts a detailed exploration of the layers of this palimpsest in order to identify more precisely the genre of Notes, an undertaking that crystallizes the central features of Ginzburg's writings as investigated throughout this book. Her techniques of self-distancing create a third-person narrative about a slightly generalized other, in a well-defined historical situation.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199248964
- eISBN:
- 9780191719387
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248964.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
This chapter explores how we think about conscious perceptual experience, both our own and that of others. It begins by considering the first-person case, that in which a thinker judges that he ...
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This chapter explores how we think about conscious perceptual experience, both our own and that of others. It begins by considering the first-person case, that in which a thinker judges that he himself sees. The case falls within a general area to which Gareth Evans made original, important, and influential contributions, notably on the self-ascription of belief. After considering the first-person case and some of the epistemic and metaphysical ramifications of the treatment offered, the chapter goes on to compare it with Evans's account. It then discusses the relation between first-person and third-person ascription and to the explanation of some developmental phenomena. It concludes with a discussion of the extension of the model presented to the self-ascription and other-ascription of action and intentionality.Less
This chapter explores how we think about conscious perceptual experience, both our own and that of others. It begins by considering the first-person case, that in which a thinker judges that he himself sees. The case falls within a general area to which Gareth Evans made original, important, and influential contributions, notably on the self-ascription of belief. After considering the first-person case and some of the epistemic and metaphysical ramifications of the treatment offered, the chapter goes on to compare it with Evans's account. It then discusses the relation between first-person and third-person ascription and to the explanation of some developmental phenomena. It concludes with a discussion of the extension of the model presented to the self-ascription and other-ascription of action and intentionality.
Max Saunders
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579761
- eISBN:
- 9780191722882
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579761.003.0009
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century Literature and Romanticism, 20th-century Literature and Modernism
This chapter discusses the taxonomy of imaginary literary works (supplementing the taxonomy of fictionalized life‐writings proposed in Chapter 5), and their scarcity during the nineteenth century. It ...
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This chapter discusses the taxonomy of imaginary literary works (supplementing the taxonomy of fictionalized life‐writings proposed in Chapter 5), and their scarcity during the nineteenth century. It concludes the discussion of Joyce, and ends with an account of Stein's Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas as an indisputable example of a fictionally authored auto/biography.Less
This chapter discusses the taxonomy of imaginary literary works (supplementing the taxonomy of fictionalized life‐writings proposed in Chapter 5), and their scarcity during the nineteenth century. It concludes the discussion of Joyce, and ends with an account of Stein's Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas as an indisputable example of a fictionally authored auto/biography.
Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251346
- eISBN:
- 9780191602634
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251347.003.0024
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Reviews a number of interconnected arguments concerned with the question whether the third person stance of the radical interpreter is conceptually basic in understanding language. These include ...
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Reviews a number of interconnected arguments concerned with the question whether the third person stance of the radical interpreter is conceptually basic in understanding language. These include Davidson’s argument for the necessity of possessing the concepts of belief, truth, and error for possessing propositional attitudes, the argument from the necessity of language for possessing the concept of error, and the argument from triangulation for the necessity of communication with others to fix what thoughts are about. Argues that the crucial arguments for the necessity of communication for the concept of error and the argument from triangulation fail, and that this undercuts the last hope for an a priori grounding for the assumption that radical interpretation is possible.Less
Reviews a number of interconnected arguments concerned with the question whether the third person stance of the radical interpreter is conceptually basic in understanding language. These include Davidson’s argument for the necessity of possessing the concepts of belief, truth, and error for possessing propositional attitudes, the argument from the necessity of language for possessing the concept of error, and the argument from triangulation for the necessity of communication with others to fix what thoughts are about. Argues that the crucial arguments for the necessity of communication for the concept of error and the argument from triangulation fail, and that this undercuts the last hope for an a priori grounding for the assumption that radical interpretation is possible.
Jaegwon Kim
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585878
- eISBN:
- 9780191595349
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585878.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
“Taking the Agent's Point of View Seriously in Action Explanation” takes the ideas adumbrated in Essay 5 a step further and develops a first‐person normative account of action explanation. The paper ...
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“Taking the Agent's Point of View Seriously in Action Explanation” takes the ideas adumbrated in Essay 5 a step further and develops a first‐person normative account of action explanation. The paper takes as its starting point a dispute, in the mid‐20th century, between Carl G. Hempel and William Dray, on historical explanation, and builds an agent‐centered account of understanding actions along the lines indicated by Dray. One corollary of the proposed account is that we can understand the actions of only those agents who are “like ourselves” (in Dray's expression) in that they share with us similar principles of rational action. This result is compared with Davidson's thesis concerning radical interpretation to the effect that we can only interpret those subjects with whom we share most of our beliefs.Less
“Taking the Agent's Point of View Seriously in Action Explanation” takes the ideas adumbrated in Essay 5 a step further and develops a first‐person normative account of action explanation. The paper takes as its starting point a dispute, in the mid‐20th century, between Carl G. Hempel and William Dray, on historical explanation, and builds an agent‐centered account of understanding actions along the lines indicated by Dray. One corollary of the proposed account is that we can understand the actions of only those agents who are “like ourselves” (in Dray's expression) in that they share with us similar principles of rational action. This result is compared with Davidson's thesis concerning radical interpretation to the effect that we can only interpret those subjects with whom we share most of our beliefs.
Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251346
- eISBN:
- 9780191602634
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251347.003.0022
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Takes up the question whether an account of meaning and the propositional attitudes that takes the third person standpoint of the radical interpreter as methodologically and conceptually basic can ...
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Takes up the question whether an account of meaning and the propositional attitudes that takes the third person standpoint of the radical interpreter as methodologically and conceptually basic can accommodate our special epistemic position with respect to our own thoughts. Examines Davidson’s most extended argument for this in ’First Person Authority’ and concludes that the argument falls short of explaining the relevant asymmetry in the knowledge one has of one’s own thoughts and the knowledge that other people do.Less
Takes up the question whether an account of meaning and the propositional attitudes that takes the third person standpoint of the radical interpreter as methodologically and conceptually basic can accommodate our special epistemic position with respect to our own thoughts. Examines Davidson’s most extended argument for this in ’First Person Authority’ and concludes that the argument falls short of explaining the relevant asymmetry in the knowledge one has of one’s own thoughts and the knowledge that other people do.
Nicholas Lossky
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198261858
- eISBN:
- 9780191682223
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198261858.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
This chapter discusses the fifteen Whitsun sermons of Andrewes which were prepared during the Jacobean period and Andrewes's bishopric. These Whitsun sermons were preached during 1606 to 1621, with ...
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This chapter discusses the fifteen Whitsun sermons of Andrewes which were prepared during the Jacobean period and Andrewes's bishopric. These Whitsun sermons were preached during 1606 to 1621, with two years off, and the last sermon was never delivered. Like the Nativity and Resurrection sermons, the Whitsun sermons also display a sense of unity. Andrewes treated the subject of Whitsun in a delicate manner. For him, it was the period of giving back to the Holy Spirit His true place amidst the tendency of minimizing the role of the third Person of the Holy Trinity in the economy of salvation dominated by a hypertrophied Christocentrism.Less
This chapter discusses the fifteen Whitsun sermons of Andrewes which were prepared during the Jacobean period and Andrewes's bishopric. These Whitsun sermons were preached during 1606 to 1621, with two years off, and the last sermon was never delivered. Like the Nativity and Resurrection sermons, the Whitsun sermons also display a sense of unity. Andrewes treated the subject of Whitsun in a delicate manner. For him, it was the period of giving back to the Holy Spirit His true place amidst the tendency of minimizing the role of the third Person of the Holy Trinity in the economy of salvation dominated by a hypertrophied Christocentrism.
Geralyn Hynes
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199644155
- eISBN:
- 9780191749094
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644155.003.0005
- Subject:
- Palliative Care, Palliative Medicine Research, Patient Care and End-of-Life Decision Making
This chapter outlines first, second and third person in action research from different theoretical perspectives. First, second and third person inquiry bring different but complementary aspects to an ...
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This chapter outlines first, second and third person in action research from different theoretical perspectives. First, second and third person inquiry bring different but complementary aspects to an action research project that facilitate both knowledge generation and change. First person inquiry provides an important basis for inquiring into one's own engagement with the value-laden and political nature of action research. Second person inquiry focuses on inquiry with others while third person inquiry looks to dissemination of findings to a wider audience. In palliative care, the nature of engagement, participation and second person inquiry present particular challenges for action researchers. However, engaging with these challenges will help address important impediments to developing palliative care practice. Attending to third person inquiry is crucial for strengthening the potential of practice-based research to influence policy.Less
This chapter outlines first, second and third person in action research from different theoretical perspectives. First, second and third person inquiry bring different but complementary aspects to an action research project that facilitate both knowledge generation and change. First person inquiry provides an important basis for inquiring into one's own engagement with the value-laden and political nature of action research. Second person inquiry focuses on inquiry with others while third person inquiry looks to dissemination of findings to a wider audience. In palliative care, the nature of engagement, participation and second person inquiry present particular challenges for action researchers. However, engaging with these challenges will help address important impediments to developing palliative care practice. Attending to third person inquiry is crucial for strengthening the potential of practice-based research to influence policy.
Jim Hopkins
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199737666
- eISBN:
- 9780199933372
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737666.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
This chapter puts Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following and privacy to novel use in an argument for physicalism about the mind. The chapter proceeds with evident concern to keep controversy and ...
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This chapter puts Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following and privacy to novel use in an argument for physicalism about the mind. The chapter proceeds with evident concern to keep controversy and complications regarding the issues of rule-following and privacy to a minimum. It thus lays down what he takes to be more or less common ground on these topics and attempts to derive from it a physicalist thesis. The chapter makes interesting use of the distinction Wittgenstein draws between the first-person and third-person perspectives. Only if we attend to this distinction, this chapter argues, will we see that Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of the difficulties concerning rule-following and privacy ultimately supports a kind of mind-brain identity thesis. This is so, the chapter notes, even if Wittgenstein did not himself espouse physicalism.Less
This chapter puts Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following and privacy to novel use in an argument for physicalism about the mind. The chapter proceeds with evident concern to keep controversy and complications regarding the issues of rule-following and privacy to a minimum. It thus lays down what he takes to be more or less common ground on these topics and attempts to derive from it a physicalist thesis. The chapter makes interesting use of the distinction Wittgenstein draws between the first-person and third-person perspectives. Only if we attend to this distinction, this chapter argues, will we see that Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of the difficulties concerning rule-following and privacy ultimately supports a kind of mind-brain identity thesis. This is so, the chapter notes, even if Wittgenstein did not himself espouse physicalism.
Andrej A. Kibrik
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199215805
- eISBN:
- 9780191728426
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215805.003.0003
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This chapter outlines the cross-linguistic diversity of reduced referential devices. These devices are specifically employed in human languages to mention those referents that currently enjoy high ...
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This chapter outlines the cross-linguistic diversity of reduced referential devices. These devices are specifically employed in human languages to mention those referents that currently enjoy high activation in the speaker's and addressee's minds. Reduced referential devices are a central and integral part of any language's grammar and naturally lend themselves to a typological analysis. It is shown that a language's preference for a certain kind of reduced referential device is a part of the language's typological profile and correlates with its other grammatical features. Among the reduced referential devices, the chapter primarily focuses on non-locutor (third person) referential devices. It differentiates between three fundamental kinds of reduced referential devices found in the world's languages: free pronouns, bound pronouns, and zero reference. Each of the fundamental devices is discussed in turn. In accordance with this threefold distinction, three groups of languages are identified, each predominantly inclined to using one of these devices. The representation of such internally consistent languages of the world, and the relation between the language's preferred referential device and morphological complexity are discussed.Less
This chapter outlines the cross-linguistic diversity of reduced referential devices. These devices are specifically employed in human languages to mention those referents that currently enjoy high activation in the speaker's and addressee's minds. Reduced referential devices are a central and integral part of any language's grammar and naturally lend themselves to a typological analysis. It is shown that a language's preference for a certain kind of reduced referential device is a part of the language's typological profile and correlates with its other grammatical features. Among the reduced referential devices, the chapter primarily focuses on non-locutor (third person) referential devices. It differentiates between three fundamental kinds of reduced referential devices found in the world's languages: free pronouns, bound pronouns, and zero reference. Each of the fundamental devices is discussed in turn. In accordance with this threefold distinction, three groups of languages are identified, each predominantly inclined to using one of these devices. The representation of such internally consistent languages of the world, and the relation between the language's preferred referential device and morphological complexity are discussed.
Edward Craig
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238799
- eISBN:
- 9780191597237
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238797.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Participates in the internalism–externalism debate and offers broad support to the latter. If we consider evaluating others as potential informants (the third‐person perspective), externalism seems ...
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Participates in the internalism–externalism debate and offers broad support to the latter. If we consider evaluating others as potential informants (the third‐person perspective), externalism seems right, for the subject's awareness of her fulfilment of the third condition for knowledge is neither necessary for her to be a good informant nor for her to be regarded as an informant at all. If the inquirer judges her own trustworthiness as an informant (the first‐person perspective), then she will be in that extra state, which internalism adds to the externalist account. Yet the extra state need not be built into the concept of knowledge, for being a good informant does not require being aware of fulfilling the third condition; relatedly, one can know without knowing that one knows.Less
Participates in the internalism–externalism debate and offers broad support to the latter. If we consider evaluating others as potential informants (the third‐person perspective), externalism seems right, for the subject's awareness of her fulfilment of the third condition for knowledge is neither necessary for her to be a good informant nor for her to be regarded as an informant at all. If the inquirer judges her own trustworthiness as an informant (the first‐person perspective), then she will be in that extra state, which internalism adds to the externalist account. Yet the extra state need not be built into the concept of knowledge, for being a good informant does not require being aware of fulfilling the third condition; relatedly, one can know without knowing that one knows.
Marjorie Garber
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780823242047
- eISBN:
- 9780823242085
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823242047.003.0010
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
This chapter examines the concept of interruption in the third person by revisiting one of the most canonical moments of apparent interruption in English literary history: Samuel Taylor Coleridge's ...
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This chapter examines the concept of interruption in the third person by revisiting one of the most canonical moments of apparent interruption in English literary history: Samuel Taylor Coleridge's poem “Kubla Khan.” It was the twentieth-century poet Stevie Smith who made a kind of hero of Coleridge's “person from Porlock” and unforgettably tied him to the question of interruption, and, by implication, of the surcease of death. A “person” is one of the three modes of the Holy Trinity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), and a grammatical class of personal pronouns (first person, second person, third person). It is in this curious conjunction of triads, the three Persons of the Trinity and the three persons of grammar, that we may find some speculative space for imagining a theory of interruption. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Sigmund Freud explores that impulse to continuity without undue excitation that he calls the death drive, and the sexual instincts which excite and disrupt that orderly process.Less
This chapter examines the concept of interruption in the third person by revisiting one of the most canonical moments of apparent interruption in English literary history: Samuel Taylor Coleridge's poem “Kubla Khan.” It was the twentieth-century poet Stevie Smith who made a kind of hero of Coleridge's “person from Porlock” and unforgettably tied him to the question of interruption, and, by implication, of the surcease of death. A “person” is one of the three modes of the Holy Trinity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), and a grammatical class of personal pronouns (first person, second person, third person). It is in this curious conjunction of triads, the three Persons of the Trinity and the three persons of grammar, that we may find some speculative space for imagining a theory of interruption. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Sigmund Freud explores that impulse to continuity without undue excitation that he calls the death drive, and the sexual instincts which excite and disrupt that orderly process.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195389197
- eISBN:
- 9780199866724
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389197.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter raises the question of how we are to understand the epistemic condition for responsibility. It introduces the searchlight view, which asserts that agents are responsible only for those ...
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This chapter raises the question of how we are to understand the epistemic condition for responsibility. It introduces the searchlight view, which asserts that agents are responsible only for those features and results of their acts of which they are aware when they perform the acts, and it documents that view's prominence. It then suggests that the searchlight view is problematic because it draws on a conception of the responsible agent that is closely linked to the first-personal perspective while purporting to specify a necessary condition for the applicability of a concept—responsibility—whose natural context is third-personal. The chapter ends with an outline of the book's main arguments.Less
This chapter raises the question of how we are to understand the epistemic condition for responsibility. It introduces the searchlight view, which asserts that agents are responsible only for those features and results of their acts of which they are aware when they perform the acts, and it documents that view's prominence. It then suggests that the searchlight view is problematic because it draws on a conception of the responsible agent that is closely linked to the first-personal perspective while purporting to specify a necessary condition for the applicability of a concept—responsibility—whose natural context is third-personal. The chapter ends with an outline of the book's main arguments.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195389197
- eISBN:
- 9780199866724
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389197.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter continues the quest for a positive rationale for the searchlight view. It extends the attempt made in Chapter 3 to derive the view from the deliberative perspective by introducing the ...
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This chapter continues the quest for a positive rationale for the searchlight view. It extends the attempt made in Chapter 3 to derive the view from the deliberative perspective by introducing the principle that it is unfair to hold people responsible for features or results of their acts that they did not foresee. The central problem for this strategy is to articulate and defend the relevant notion of fairness, here dubbed “Kantian fairness” because of its affinities with Kant's views about moral worth. Although any demand that an agent cannot see how to meet is bound to seem unfair from his perspective, the crucial question is why the agent's perspective should be authoritative in determining whether it is fair for others, who occupy different perspectives, to hold him responsible. Although several possible answers to this question are examined, none is found to succeed.Less
This chapter continues the quest for a positive rationale for the searchlight view. It extends the attempt made in Chapter 3 to derive the view from the deliberative perspective by introducing the principle that it is unfair to hold people responsible for features or results of their acts that they did not foresee. The central problem for this strategy is to articulate and defend the relevant notion of fairness, here dubbed “Kantian fairness” because of its affinities with Kant's views about moral worth. Although any demand that an agent cannot see how to meet is bound to seem unfair from his perspective, the crucial question is why the agent's perspective should be authoritative in determining whether it is fair for others, who occupy different perspectives, to hold him responsible. Although several possible answers to this question are examined, none is found to succeed.
