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This chapter discusses the theory of nested security. The theory holds that protracted low-intensity conflicts are very often nested in rivalries between states or conflict-prone regions. Moreover, it considers that external events and actors have an asymmetric impact on domestic-level conflicts. This means that major powers must “nest” domestic conflicts in a stable regional environment, which in turn should be nested in a stable hegemonic or systemic environment. In the absence of these critical background conditions, third-party mediation efforts are likely to fail. The chapter then outlines the research design used to test this model against competing theories of mediation success using cases from interwar and post-Cold War Europe.

This chapter examines the 1999 Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan, and establishes that what may otherwise be construed as a classic limited war where major conflict was avoided due to nuclear deterrence was in reality a display of brokered bargaining. This entailed the United States and other major powers ignoring Pakistan’s effort to manipulate the risk of war and its pleas for support to help terminate the crisis while it was in possession of forcibly occupied territory in Indian Kashmir. They deemed Pakistan’s unilateral withdrawal to be the most realistic and efficient way of ensuring crisis termination. India reacted militarily to Pakistan’s provocation but kept its actions limited to retain international goodwill and get the third party to make efforts to ensure Pakistan’s withdrawal. The chapter also analyzes the several risks of escalation introduced due to India’s and Pakistan’s misperceptions of the third party’s outlook toward the crisis.

This chapter examines the 2001–2002 military standoff that kept India and Pakistan on the verge of war for ten months. Brokered bargaining characterized crisis behavior of the rivals and the U.S.-led third party. India threatened to use military force but pulled back at critical junctures as the United States acted as a guarantor of Pakistan’s promises of curbing cross-border terrorism and raised India’s costs of defying third-party demands to de-escalate. Pakistan promised retaliation against India and harmed the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan by withdrawing forces from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, but this “autonomous” behavior was trumped by its propensity to oblige the United States by accepting some responsibility for anti-India terrorism and acting tangibly against militants. The chapter also analyzes the several risks of escalation introduced by India’s and Pakistan’s misperceptions of the third party’s leverage over the opponent.

This chapter examines the 2008 Mumbai crisis and shows that brokered bargaining characterized crisis behavior of the rivals and the U.S.-led third party. In a situation that could have boiled over given the spectacular nature of the terrorist attacks that triggered the crisis, India, Pakistan, and the United States exhibited an even greater sense of familiarity with the opportunities and limitations associated with the trilateral bargaining framework. Despite threatening military action at times, India relied almost exclusively on the United States to pursue its crisis objectives. Without boxing it in completely, the United States pressured Pakistan and forced it to take actions against terrorists believed to be linked to the attacks, and used this to pacify India. The centrality of the third-party strand of crisis management helps explain the prudence both sides exhibited in avoiding brinkmanship.

This chapter presents a new theory of union behavior that helps to explain the motivations of union leaders in restraining worker protest. It argues that democracy influences industrial relations in two ways. First, political competition has compelled major parties to deepen union-party ties because historically parties have relied on union organizational capacity and the vote of the industrial working class to win elections. Second, democracy facilitates industrial peace by encouraging institutionalized grievance resolution through the promotion of freedom of association and collective bargaining (FACB) rights. The chapter begins with a discussion of the incentives for individual union leaders to engage in militant protest and aggressive bargaining. It then explains the role of democracy in reducing industrial conflict; how partisan ties encourage union leaders to restrain worker protest and how this impetus is common across the ideological spectrum; and how labor legislation promotes economic performance by enhancing third-party mediation and promoting worker rights.

The Introduction lays the groundwork for the rest of the book by introducing the need for a theory of nuclear crisis behavior centered on third-party mediation. Specifically, how does the presence of the unipole and stronger third parties alter the crisis behavior of regional nuclear powers situated within a unipolar world? And what implications does this have for crisis management, stability, and outcomes? The chapter introduces the puzzle and explains the book’s empirical focus on South Asia by highlighting that India and Pakistan are the only regional nuclear powers to have experienced major crises since the end of the Cold War. The chapter also summarizes the key findings from the three case studies, the 1999 Kargil conflict, the 2001–2002 military standoff, and the 2008 Mumbai crisis, and confirms evidence in line with the proposed theory of brokered bargaining.

This chapter addresses the general applicability of brokered bargaining beyond South Asia, focusing on four prototypes of rivalries: between countries that are considered friends of the unipole (futuristic crisis scenarios involving Israel versus a nuclear Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or Egypt); between a friend and foe of the unipole (Israel versus a nuclear Iran); between a foe of the unipole and an ally with formally extended deterrence guarantees (Korean peninsula); and between a friend and a presumptive great power rival of the unipole (India versus China). The discussion establishes the similarities and differences of these prototypes with the South Asian cases. While each presents a somewhat distinct set of challenges for third-party actors, the fundamental crisis dynamic whereby the third party works to secure de-escalation without seeking to alienate either conflicting party completely and the antagonists feel compelled not to defy it outright remains valid in each case.

This chapter examines the impact of the provision of worker rights on economic performance through an analysis of labor legislation enacted in the Indian states. It demonstrates that laws that promote third-party mediation and institutionalized grievance facilitate economic growth. Enhancing the voice function of unions not only boosts investment, it decreases employer reliance on sweated labor, thereby promoting capital-intensive production. Regulation that squelches the voice of workers has the opposite effect. Prohibiting routine protest produces instability in industrial relations that, in turn, hampers productivity and induces capital flight. Such regulation also emboldens employers to engage in despotic labor relations, thereby reducing the incentive to invest in productivity-enhancing technology.