Kevin Madigan
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195322743
- eISBN:
- 9780199785407
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195322743.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
Theologians have always struggled to understand how humanity and divinity coexisted in the person of Christ. Proponents of the Arian heresy, which held that Jesus could not have been fully divine, ...
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Theologians have always struggled to understand how humanity and divinity coexisted in the person of Christ. Proponents of the Arian heresy, which held that Jesus could not have been fully divine, found significant scriptural evidence of their position. The defenders of orthodoxy, such as Hilary of Poitiers, Ambrose of Milan, Jerome, and Augustine, believed that these biblical passages could be reconciled with Christ's divinity. Medieval theologians such as Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, and Bonaventure, also grappled with these texts when confronting the rising threat of Arian heresy. They too faced the need to preserve Jesus' authentic humanity and to describe a mode of experiencing the passions that cast no doubt upon the perfect divinity of the Incarnate Word. However, they also confronted an additional obstacle. The medieval theologians had inherited from the Greek and Latin fathers a body of opinion on the passages in question, which by this time had achieved normative cultural status in the Christian tradition. However, the Greek and Latin fathers wrote in a polemical situation, responding to the threat to orthodoxy posed by the Arians. As a consequence, they sometimes found themselves driven to extreme and sometimes contradictory statements. These statements seemed to their medieval successors either to compromise the true divinity of Christ, his true humanity, or the possibility that the divine and human were in communication with or metaphysically linked to one another. As a result, medieval theologians also needed to demonstrate how two equally authoritative but apparently contradictory statements could be reconciled. This book examines the arguments that resulted from these dual pressures and finds that, under the guise of unchanging assimilation and transmission of a unanimous tradition, there were in fact many fissures and discontinuities between the two bodies of thought, ancient and medieval. Rather than organic change or development, the book finds radical change, trial, novelty, and even heterodoxy.Less
Theologians have always struggled to understand how humanity and divinity coexisted in the person of Christ. Proponents of the Arian heresy, which held that Jesus could not have been fully divine, found significant scriptural evidence of their position. The defenders of orthodoxy, such as Hilary of Poitiers, Ambrose of Milan, Jerome, and Augustine, believed that these biblical passages could be reconciled with Christ's divinity. Medieval theologians such as Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, and Bonaventure, also grappled with these texts when confronting the rising threat of Arian heresy. They too faced the need to preserve Jesus' authentic humanity and to describe a mode of experiencing the passions that cast no doubt upon the perfect divinity of the Incarnate Word. However, they also confronted an additional obstacle. The medieval theologians had inherited from the Greek and Latin fathers a body of opinion on the passages in question, which by this time had achieved normative cultural status in the Christian tradition. However, the Greek and Latin fathers wrote in a polemical situation, responding to the threat to orthodoxy posed by the Arians. As a consequence, they sometimes found themselves driven to extreme and sometimes contradictory statements. These statements seemed to their medieval successors either to compromise the true divinity of Christ, his true humanity, or the possibility that the divine and human were in communication with or metaphysically linked to one another. As a result, medieval theologians also needed to demonstrate how two equally authoritative but apparently contradictory statements could be reconciled. This book examines the arguments that resulted from these dual pressures and finds that, under the guise of unchanging assimilation and transmission of a unanimous tradition, there were in fact many fissures and discontinuities between the two bodies of thought, ancient and medieval. Rather than organic change or development, the book finds radical change, trial, novelty, and even heterodoxy.
Bonnie Mann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187458
- eISBN:
- 9780199786565
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187458.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
In the 1980s, this book contends, an uncritical affirmation of anti-essentialism turned this important feminist critique into a disciplinary dogmatism that constrained and homogenized feminist ...
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In the 1980s, this book contends, an uncritical affirmation of anti-essentialism turned this important feminist critique into a disciplinary dogmatism that constrained and homogenized feminist thinking. Feminist work in the academy became forgetful of both women and nature, and began to exchange an engaged politics for the intensity of sublime experience in its postmodern form. This book works between the modern and postmodern notions of the sublime to show that the gendered politics and effacement of nature, central to the modern sublime, especially in Kant's account, are at the heart of the postmodern sublime as well. It turns to Lyotard's postmodern sublime to argue that this sublime is hard at work in feminist poststructuralism, especially the early texts of Judith Butler. The melting away of the extra-discursively real in these accounts tends to make feminist thinking incapable of meaningfully articulating our relations to the natural world and to one another. Yet these very relations are necessarily tied to powerful aesthetic experiences of beauty and sublimity.Less
In the 1980s, this book contends, an uncritical affirmation of anti-essentialism turned this important feminist critique into a disciplinary dogmatism that constrained and homogenized feminist thinking. Feminist work in the academy became forgetful of both women and nature, and began to exchange an engaged politics for the intensity of sublime experience in its postmodern form. This book works between the modern and postmodern notions of the sublime to show that the gendered politics and effacement of nature, central to the modern sublime, especially in Kant's account, are at the heart of the postmodern sublime as well. It turns to Lyotard's postmodern sublime to argue that this sublime is hard at work in feminist poststructuralism, especially the early texts of Judith Butler. The melting away of the extra-discursively real in these accounts tends to make feminist thinking incapable of meaningfully articulating our relations to the natural world and to one another. Yet these very relations are necessarily tied to powerful aesthetic experiences of beauty and sublimity.
Alexander Samely
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199296736
- eISBN:
- 9780191712067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296736.003.0012
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
The preceding chapters show that rabbinic thought is intertwined with the nature of its texts, with rabbinic textuality. In the absence of a compelling textual Gestalt, the formal self sufficiency ...
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The preceding chapters show that rabbinic thought is intertwined with the nature of its texts, with rabbinic textuality. In the absence of a compelling textual Gestalt, the formal self sufficiency and independence of the single statement allows it to enter into many diverse relationships with other statements, so that it can be difficult to determine its exact scope and import. Direct knowledge of the halakhic practice of a text's own time and place, which would resolve many such ambiguities, is mostly not available. Nevertheless, the absence of a sentence-connecting Gestalt is not a mere lack. It is, like all sustained text formation, an achievement and a contrivance: Gestalt of another order. Several factors are discussed in detail, which contribute to this outcome in various measure.Less
The preceding chapters show that rabbinic thought is intertwined with the nature of its texts, with rabbinic textuality. In the absence of a compelling textual Gestalt, the formal self sufficiency and independence of the single statement allows it to enter into many diverse relationships with other statements, so that it can be difficult to determine its exact scope and import. Direct knowledge of the halakhic practice of a text's own time and place, which would resolve many such ambiguities, is mostly not available. Nevertheless, the absence of a sentence-connecting Gestalt is not a mere lack. It is, like all sustained text formation, an achievement and a contrivance: Gestalt of another order. Several factors are discussed in detail, which contribute to this outcome in various measure.
Joseph V. Femia
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198280637
- eISBN:
- 9780191599231
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198280637.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Given the almost universal assumption that democracy is a ‘good thing’, the goal of mankind, it is easy to forget that ‘rule by the people’ has been vehemently opposed by some of the most ...
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Given the almost universal assumption that democracy is a ‘good thing’, the goal of mankind, it is easy to forget that ‘rule by the people’ has been vehemently opposed by some of the most distinguished thinkers in the Western tradition. The book attempts to combat collective amnesia by systematically exploring the evaluating anti‐democratic thought since the French Revolution. Using categories first introduced by A. O. Hirschman in The Rhetoric of Reaction, it examines the various arguments under the headings of ‘perversity’, ‘futility’, and ‘jeopardy’. This classification scheme makes it possible to highlight the fatalism and pessimism of anti‐democratic thinkers, their conviction that democratic reform would be either pointless or destructive. They failed to understand the adaptability of democracy, its ability to coexist with traditional and elitist values. Nevertheless, it must be granted that some of their predictions and observations have been confirmed by history.Less
Given the almost universal assumption that democracy is a ‘good thing’, the goal of mankind, it is easy to forget that ‘rule by the people’ has been vehemently opposed by some of the most distinguished thinkers in the Western tradition. The book attempts to combat collective amnesia by systematically exploring the evaluating anti‐democratic thought since the French Revolution. Using categories first introduced by A. O. Hirschman in The Rhetoric of Reaction, it examines the various arguments under the headings of ‘perversity’, ‘futility’, and ‘jeopardy’. This classification scheme makes it possible to highlight the fatalism and pessimism of anti‐democratic thinkers, their conviction that democratic reform would be either pointless or destructive. They failed to understand the adaptability of democracy, its ability to coexist with traditional and elitist values. Nevertheless, it must be granted that some of their predictions and observations have been confirmed by history.
Terence Ball
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198279952
- eISBN:
- 9780191598753
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198279957.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The book—the second volume of my trilogy Political Theory and the Human Sciences—is divided into two sections. The first and shorter section (Chs. 1 and 2) deals with methodological and interpretive ...
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The book—the second volume of my trilogy Political Theory and the Human Sciences—is divided into two sections. The first and shorter section (Chs. 1 and 2) deals with methodological and interpretive questions and advocates a methodologically `pluralist’ and `problem‐driven’ approach to the interpretation and reappraisal of works of political theory. The second and much longer section (Chs. 3–12), applying the method outlined and defended in the first, consists of a series of reinterpretations and reappraisals of thinkers, texts, themes, and topics in political theory.Less
The book—the second volume of my trilogy Political Theory and the Human Sciences—is divided into two sections. The first and shorter section (Chs. 1 and 2) deals with methodological and interpretive questions and advocates a methodologically `pluralist’ and `problem‐driven’ approach to the interpretation and reappraisal of works of political theory. The second and much longer section (Chs. 3–12), applying the method outlined and defended in the first, consists of a series of reinterpretations and reappraisals of thinkers, texts, themes, and topics in political theory.
Margaret P. Battin, Leslie P. Francis, Jay A. Jacobson, and Charles B. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195335842
- eISBN:
- 9780199868926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335842.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter explores a thought-experiment imagining universal surveillance for all known communicable infectious disease, using rapid tests involving polymerase chain reactions and other methods ...
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This chapter explores a thought-experiment imagining universal surveillance for all known communicable infectious disease, using rapid tests involving polymerase chain reactions and other methods that require twenty minutes or less for results, at airports. Imagine: as you check in at the departures desk, you supply a cheek swab or other sample that is automatically assayed by the time you reach the gate: if you're negative you can board the plane, if positive you're referred to the airport clinic or local hospital for immediate treatment. This thought experiment raises substantial issues of privacy, confidentiality, and other constraints; yet—especially if expanded to other places of public contact—appears to promise a real reduction in the transmission of infectious disease.Less
This chapter explores a thought-experiment imagining universal surveillance for all known communicable infectious disease, using rapid tests involving polymerase chain reactions and other methods that require twenty minutes or less for results, at airports. Imagine: as you check in at the departures desk, you supply a cheek swab or other sample that is automatically assayed by the time you reach the gate: if you're negative you can board the plane, if positive you're referred to the airport clinic or local hospital for immediate treatment. This thought experiment raises substantial issues of privacy, confidentiality, and other constraints; yet—especially if expanded to other places of public contact—appears to promise a real reduction in the transmission of infectious disease.
Karma Nabulsi
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294078
- eISBN:
- 9780191599972
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294077.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This short introduction describes the approach taken by the book and gives a brief outline of its contents. The story is about wars and military occupation, and the ideas underlying them, and the ...
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This short introduction describes the approach taken by the book and gives a brief outline of its contents. The story is about wars and military occupation, and the ideas underlying them, and the search for these ideas is carried out in the domain of the laws of war by addressing the challenge posed by a particular principle in these laws: the distinction between combatant and non-combatant, a concept which has been recognized as the fundamental principle upon which the entire notion of ‘humanity in warfare’ rests (and has also been acknowledged as the most fragile). The forces underpinning this distinction (more precisely, a distinction between the lawful and unlawful combatant) are explored by presenting three ideologies, each representing a distinct political tradition of war, and each rooted in incommensurable conceptions of the good life; the overall argument of the book is that this incommensurability lay at the source of the failure fully to resolve the problem of distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants between 1874 and 1949. The book makes use of concepts and methods borrowed from a range of intellectual disciplines: political thought, history, and the ‘classical’ traditions of international theory. In the case of the latter, it examines the influence of key thinkers on war, such as Machiavelli, Grotius, and Rousseau, but differs from this orthodox approach in two ways: first, it is not seeking to ascertain the ‘true’ meaning of their philosophies, but rather to find how their political thoughts were interpreted and shaped by later generations; second, the examination is not restricted to abstract theorists and philosophers but is centrally concerned with paradigms constructed by practitioners of war, both professional and civilian.Less
This short introduction describes the approach taken by the book and gives a brief outline of its contents. The story is about wars and military occupation, and the ideas underlying them, and the search for these ideas is carried out in the domain of the laws of war by addressing the challenge posed by a particular principle in these laws: the distinction between combatant and non-combatant, a concept which has been recognized as the fundamental principle upon which the entire notion of ‘humanity in warfare’ rests (and has also been acknowledged as the most fragile). The forces underpinning this distinction (more precisely, a distinction between the lawful and unlawful combatant) are explored by presenting three ideologies, each representing a distinct political tradition of war, and each rooted in incommensurable conceptions of the good life; the overall argument of the book is that this incommensurability lay at the source of the failure fully to resolve the problem of distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants between 1874 and 1949. The book makes use of concepts and methods borrowed from a range of intellectual disciplines: political thought, history, and the ‘classical’ traditions of international theory. In the case of the latter, it examines the influence of key thinkers on war, such as Machiavelli, Grotius, and Rousseau, but differs from this orthodox approach in two ways: first, it is not seeking to ascertain the ‘true’ meaning of their philosophies, but rather to find how their political thoughts were interpreted and shaped by later generations; second, the examination is not restricted to abstract theorists and philosophers but is centrally concerned with paradigms constructed by practitioners of war, both professional and civilian.
Margaret P. Battin, Leslie P. Francis, Jay A. Jacobson, and Charles B. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195335842
- eISBN:
- 9780199868926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335842.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter presents the full exposition of the PVV view: that ethical problems in infectious disease should be analyzed, and clinical practices, research agendas, and public policies developed, ...
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This chapter presents the full exposition of the PVV view: that ethical problems in infectious disease should be analyzed, and clinical practices, research agendas, and public policies developed, which always take into account the possibility that a person with communicable infectious disease is both victim and vector. The PVV view works on three levels. First is ordinary life in which people are more or less aware of their actual circumstances of illness, health, and risk. Second is the population-wide view, in which patterns of disease, special risks for sub-populations, and progress or failure with respect to the overall burden of infectious disease can be observed. Third is the view of the “way-station self,” who is always in some sense at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. This third perspective is a naturalized version of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance: a thought-experiment that asks what choices and practices people would want with respect to infectious disease in light of the reality that they are always at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. These perspectives are difficult to hold in view at the same time, but each is essential to analysis of the ethical issues raised by infectious disease.Less
This chapter presents the full exposition of the PVV view: that ethical problems in infectious disease should be analyzed, and clinical practices, research agendas, and public policies developed, which always take into account the possibility that a person with communicable infectious disease is both victim and vector. The PVV view works on three levels. First is ordinary life in which people are more or less aware of their actual circumstances of illness, health, and risk. Second is the population-wide view, in which patterns of disease, special risks for sub-populations, and progress or failure with respect to the overall burden of infectious disease can be observed. Third is the view of the “way-station self,” who is always in some sense at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. This third perspective is a naturalized version of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance: a thought-experiment that asks what choices and practices people would want with respect to infectious disease in light of the reality that they are always at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. These perspectives are difficult to hold in view at the same time, but each is essential to analysis of the ethical issues raised by infectious disease.
Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199281701
- eISBN:
- 9780191713088
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281701.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This book focuses on Plotinus' notion of Intellect. Intellect comes second in Plotinus' hierarchical model of reality, after the One, which is an unknowable first cause of everything. Intellect is ...
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This book focuses on Plotinus' notion of Intellect. Intellect comes second in Plotinus' hierarchical model of reality, after the One, which is an unknowable first cause of everything. Intellect is also the sphere of being, the Platonic Ideas, which exist as its thoughts. Plotinus' doctrine of Intellect raises a host of questions that the book seeks to answer: Intellect's thought is described as an attempt to grasp the One and at the same time as self-thought. How are these two claims related? How are they compatible? What lies in Plotinus' insistence that Intellect's thought is a thought of itself? The minimal requirements thought must satisfy according to Plotinus is that it must involve a distinction between thinker and object of thought, and the object itself must be varied. How are these two claims which amount to holding that Intellect is plural in two different ways related? What is the relation between Intellect as a thinker and Intellect as an object of thought? Plotinus' position here seems to amount to a form of idealism, a claim that is explored in the book. As opposed to ordinary human discursive thinking, Intellect's thought is all-at-once, timeless, truthful, and a direct intuition into ‘the things themselves’; it is presumably not even propositional. This strong notion of non-discursive thought is discussed and explained as well as Plotinus' claim that this must be the primary form of thought. The main conclusion of the book is that though clearly dependent on the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, Plotinus' theory of Intellect contains very significant innovations.Less
This book focuses on Plotinus' notion of Intellect. Intellect comes second in Plotinus' hierarchical model of reality, after the One, which is an unknowable first cause of everything. Intellect is also the sphere of being, the Platonic Ideas, which exist as its thoughts. Plotinus' doctrine of Intellect raises a host of questions that the book seeks to answer: Intellect's thought is described as an attempt to grasp the One and at the same time as self-thought. How are these two claims related? How are they compatible? What lies in Plotinus' insistence that Intellect's thought is a thought of itself? The minimal requirements thought must satisfy according to Plotinus is that it must involve a distinction between thinker and object of thought, and the object itself must be varied. How are these two claims which amount to holding that Intellect is plural in two different ways related? What is the relation between Intellect as a thinker and Intellect as an object of thought? Plotinus' position here seems to amount to a form of idealism, a claim that is explored in the book. As opposed to ordinary human discursive thinking, Intellect's thought is all-at-once, timeless, truthful, and a direct intuition into ‘the things themselves’; it is presumably not even propositional. This strong notion of non-discursive thought is discussed and explained as well as Plotinus' claim that this must be the primary form of thought. The main conclusion of the book is that though clearly dependent on the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, Plotinus' theory of Intellect contains very significant innovations.
Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199251247
- eISBN:
- 9780191603983
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925124X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The broad aim of this work is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental/neural symbols are able to capture the world, that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean ...
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The broad aim of this work is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental/neural symbols are able to capture the world, that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean what they do, to stand for certain things, to be true or false of reality. Paul Horwich’s answer takes off from Wittgenstein’s appealingly demystifying remark, that the meaning of a term is nothing over and above its use, and proceeds with a groundbreaking articulation and defence of that idea, showing how it can deal successfully with Quinean and Kripkean forms of scepticism about meaning, with the various normative features of thought and language, with the paradoxical phenomenon of vagueness, with the way that word-meanings combine to yield sentence-meanings, and with Chomsky-style models of the language faculty. The main lines of this theory were first suggested in Horwich’s 1998 book, Meaning. The present volume (which requires no familiarity with its predecessor) provides a host of improved, formulations, fresh arguments, responses to criticism, and extensions of the position into new areas.Less
The broad aim of this work is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental/neural symbols are able to capture the world, that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean what they do, to stand for certain things, to be true or false of reality. Paul Horwich’s answer takes off from Wittgenstein’s appealingly demystifying remark, that the meaning of a term is nothing over and above its use, and proceeds with a groundbreaking articulation and defence of that idea, showing how it can deal successfully with Quinean and Kripkean forms of scepticism about meaning, with the various normative features of thought and language, with the paradoxical phenomenon of vagueness, with the way that word-meanings combine to yield sentence-meanings, and with Chomsky-style models of the language faculty. The main lines of this theory were first suggested in Horwich’s 1998 book, Meaning. The present volume (which requires no familiarity with its predecessor) provides a host of improved, formulations, fresh arguments, responses to criticism, and extensions of the position into new areas.
Denis McManus
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199288021
- eISBN:
- 9780191713446
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288021.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book is a study of Wittgenstein’s early masterpiece, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It argues that Wittgenstein’s aim in that deeply puzzling work is to show that the ‘intelligibility of ...
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This book is a study of Wittgenstein’s early masterpiece, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It argues that Wittgenstein’s aim in that deeply puzzling work is to show that the ‘intelligibility of thought’ and the ‘meaningfulness of language’, which logical truths would delimit, and metaphysics and the philosophy of mind and language would explain are issues constituted by confusions. What is exposed is a mirage of a kind of self-consciousness, a misperception of the ways in which we happen to think, talk, and act as reasons why we ought to think, talk, and act as we do. The root of that misperception is our confusedly endowing words with a life of their own: we enchant and are enchanted by words, colluding in a confusion that transposes on to them and the world which we then see them as ‘fitting’, responsibilities that are actually ours to bear. Such words promise to spare us the trouble not only of thinking, but of living. In presenting this view, the book offers readings of all of the major themes of the Tractatus, including its discussion of logical truth, objects, names, inferential relations, subjectivity, solipsism, and the inexpressible. It offers novel explanations of what is at stake in Wittgenstein’s comparison of propositions with pictures, of why Wittgenstein declared the point of the Tractatus to be ethical, of how a book — which infamously declares itself to be nonsensical— can clarify our thoughts and require of us that we exercise our capacity to reason in reading it, and of how Wittgenstein later came to re-evaluate the achievement of the Tractatus.Less
This book is a study of Wittgenstein’s early masterpiece, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It argues that Wittgenstein’s aim in that deeply puzzling work is to show that the ‘intelligibility of thought’ and the ‘meaningfulness of language’, which logical truths would delimit, and metaphysics and the philosophy of mind and language would explain are issues constituted by confusions. What is exposed is a mirage of a kind of self-consciousness, a misperception of the ways in which we happen to think, talk, and act as reasons why we ought to think, talk, and act as we do. The root of that misperception is our confusedly endowing words with a life of their own: we enchant and are enchanted by words, colluding in a confusion that transposes on to them and the world which we then see them as ‘fitting’, responsibilities that are actually ours to bear. Such words promise to spare us the trouble not only of thinking, but of living. In presenting this view, the book offers readings of all of the major themes of the Tractatus, including its discussion of logical truth, objects, names, inferential relations, subjectivity, solipsism, and the inexpressible. It offers novel explanations of what is at stake in Wittgenstein’s comparison of propositions with pictures, of why Wittgenstein declared the point of the Tractatus to be ethical, of how a book — which infamously declares itself to be nonsensical— can clarify our thoughts and require of us that we exercise our capacity to reason in reading it, and of how Wittgenstein later came to re-evaluate the achievement of the Tractatus.
Ronald de Sousa
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195189858
- eISBN:
- 9780199868377
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189858.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In a world where natural selection has shaped adaptations of astonishing ingenuity, what is the scope and unique power of rational thinking? This book looks at the twin set of issues surrounding the ...
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In a world where natural selection has shaped adaptations of astonishing ingenuity, what is the scope and unique power of rational thinking? This book looks at the twin set of issues surrounding the power of natural selection to mimic rational design, and rational thinking as itself a product of natural selection. While we commonly deem ourselves superior to other species, the logic of natural selection should not lead us to expect that nature does everything for the best. Similarly, rational action does not always promote the best possible outcomes. So what is the difference? Is the pursuit of rationality actually an effective strategy? Part of the answer lies in language, including mathematics and science. Language is the most striking device by which we have made ourselves smarter than our nearest primate cousins. Sometimes the purely instinctual responses we share with other animals put explicit reasoning to shame: the movements of a trained athlete are faster and more accurate than anything she could explicitly calculate. Language, however, with its power to abstract from concrete experience and to range over all aspects of nature, enables breathtakingly precise calculations, which have taken us to the moon and beyond. Most importantly, however, language enables us to formulate an endless multiplicity of values, in potential conflict with one another as well as with instinctual imperatives. This book shows how our rationality and our irrationality are inextricably intertwined. It explores the true ramifications of being human in the natural world.Less
In a world where natural selection has shaped adaptations of astonishing ingenuity, what is the scope and unique power of rational thinking? This book looks at the twin set of issues surrounding the power of natural selection to mimic rational design, and rational thinking as itself a product of natural selection. While we commonly deem ourselves superior to other species, the logic of natural selection should not lead us to expect that nature does everything for the best. Similarly, rational action does not always promote the best possible outcomes. So what is the difference? Is the pursuit of rationality actually an effective strategy? Part of the answer lies in language, including mathematics and science. Language is the most striking device by which we have made ourselves smarter than our nearest primate cousins. Sometimes the purely instinctual responses we share with other animals put explicit reasoning to shame: the movements of a trained athlete are faster and more accurate than anything she could explicitly calculate. Language, however, with its power to abstract from concrete experience and to range over all aspects of nature, enables breathtakingly precise calculations, which have taken us to the moon and beyond. Most importantly, however, language enables us to formulate an endless multiplicity of values, in potential conflict with one another as well as with instinctual imperatives. This book shows how our rationality and our irrationality are inextricably intertwined. It explores the true ramifications of being human in the natural world.
Ryan Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276912
- eISBN:
- 9780191707759
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276912.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The thesis that the mind cannot directly apprehend features of the physical world — what Thomas Reid calls the Way of Ideas — is a staple of Early Modern philosophical tradition. This commitment to ...
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The thesis that the mind cannot directly apprehend features of the physical world — what Thomas Reid calls the Way of Ideas — is a staple of Early Modern philosophical tradition. This commitment to the direct awareness of, and only of, mental representations unifies the otherwise divergent philosophical systems of Rationalists and Empiricists. Thomas Reid battles against this thesis on many fronts, in particular over the nature of perception. This book lays the groundwork for Reid's theory of perception by developing Reid's unheralded argument against a representational theory of thought, which this book applies to the discussion of the intentionality of perceptual states and Reid's appeal to ‘signs’. Reid's efforts to preserve common sense epistemic commitments also lead him to adopt unique theories about our concepts of primary and secondary qualities, and about original and acquired perceptions. About the latter pair, the book argues that most perceptual beliefs depend for their justification upon inferences. The Way of Ideas holds that sensations are objects of awareness and that our senses are not robustly unified. This book develops Reid's counter-proposals by examining his discussion of the evolutionary purpose of sensations, and the nature of our awareness of sensations, as well as his intriguing affirmative answer to Molyneux's questions.Less
The thesis that the mind cannot directly apprehend features of the physical world — what Thomas Reid calls the Way of Ideas — is a staple of Early Modern philosophical tradition. This commitment to the direct awareness of, and only of, mental representations unifies the otherwise divergent philosophical systems of Rationalists and Empiricists. Thomas Reid battles against this thesis on many fronts, in particular over the nature of perception. This book lays the groundwork for Reid's theory of perception by developing Reid's unheralded argument against a representational theory of thought, which this book applies to the discussion of the intentionality of perceptual states and Reid's appeal to ‘signs’. Reid's efforts to preserve common sense epistemic commitments also lead him to adopt unique theories about our concepts of primary and secondary qualities, and about original and acquired perceptions. About the latter pair, the book argues that most perceptual beliefs depend for their justification upon inferences. The Way of Ideas holds that sensations are objects of awareness and that our senses are not robustly unified. This book develops Reid's counter-proposals by examining his discussion of the evolutionary purpose of sensations, and the nature of our awareness of sensations, as well as his intriguing affirmative answer to Molyneux's questions.
Tariq Ramadan
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195331714
- eISBN:
- 9780191720987
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331714.003.0018
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
This chapter presents some concluding thoughts. The transformation reform proposed in the book involves multiple requirements: a new outlook on texts and human and social contexts, mobilizing ...
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This chapter presents some concluding thoughts. The transformation reform proposed in the book involves multiple requirements: a new outlook on texts and human and social contexts, mobilizing knowledge and skills, and rebalancing legitimacy and authority in the production of norms and ethics. It means refusing immobilism, formalism, blind imitation (of all kinds), or fatalism.Less
This chapter presents some concluding thoughts. The transformation reform proposed in the book involves multiple requirements: a new outlook on texts and human and social contexts, mobilizing knowledge and skills, and rebalancing legitimacy and authority in the production of norms and ethics. It means refusing immobilism, formalism, blind imitation (of all kinds), or fatalism.
Tariq Ramadan
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195331714
- eISBN:
- 9780191720987
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331714.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
This chapter presents a synthesis of discussions in the preceding chapters. It reviews the various classical schools of the fundamentals of usûl al-fiqh. It then proposes a new geography of the ...
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This chapter presents a synthesis of discussions in the preceding chapters. It reviews the various classical schools of the fundamentals of usûl al-fiqh. It then proposes a new geography of the sources of Islamic law and jurisprudence.Less
This chapter presents a synthesis of discussions in the preceding chapters. It reviews the various classical schools of the fundamentals of usûl al-fiqh. It then proposes a new geography of the sources of Islamic law and jurisprudence.
James Halteman and Edd Noell
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199763702
- eISBN:
- 9780199932252
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199763702.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
The moral reflections of the medieval Scholastics on trade and loans are discussed in this chapter. Institutional change in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Europe facilitated specialization, the ...
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The moral reflections of the medieval Scholastics on trade and loans are discussed in this chapter. Institutional change in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Europe facilitated specialization, the widening of markets, and the spread of monetary exchange. Thomas Aquinas and others respond to these developments with instruction on the Christian duties of merchants, borrowers, and lenders. Drawing on Aristotle, Roman law, and the Scriptures, they identify the criteria for justice in a particular product exchange by focusing on its purpose and identifying practices of fraud and economic compulsion. Scholastic opposition to usury is grounded in the phenomenon of economic duress, though several extrinsic titles to interest are eventually extended. By the sixteenth century, Scholastics are laying greater stress on the impersonal dimensions of exchange and the manner in which competition fosters commutative justice in product and labor markets. The vignette “Medieval Scholastics and Moral Values for the Subprime Mortgage Crisis” is included.Less
The moral reflections of the medieval Scholastics on trade and loans are discussed in this chapter. Institutional change in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Europe facilitated specialization, the widening of markets, and the spread of monetary exchange. Thomas Aquinas and others respond to these developments with instruction on the Christian duties of merchants, borrowers, and lenders. Drawing on Aristotle, Roman law, and the Scriptures, they identify the criteria for justice in a particular product exchange by focusing on its purpose and identifying practices of fraud and economic compulsion. Scholastic opposition to usury is grounded in the phenomenon of economic duress, though several extrinsic titles to interest are eventually extended. By the sixteenth century, Scholastics are laying greater stress on the impersonal dimensions of exchange and the manner in which competition fosters commutative justice in product and labor markets. The vignette “Medieval Scholastics and Moral Values for the Subprime Mortgage Crisis” is included.
Antony Black
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199281695
- eISBN:
- 9780191713101
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281695.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
All our political values were invented in ancient times. Social contract, for example, was invented, though not developed philosophically. Western/European thought drew the idea of nation from the ...
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All our political values were invented in ancient times. Social contract, for example, was invented, though not developed philosophically. Western/European thought drew the idea of nation from the Old Testament, of monarchy and the state from Rome as well, and of liberty from Greece and Rome. Democracy was long forgotten and only revived in different form. Both Confucianism and, implicitly, the political realism of ‘Legalism’ have remained imporant in China.Less
All our political values were invented in ancient times. Social contract, for example, was invented, though not developed philosophically. Western/European thought drew the idea of nation from the Old Testament, of monarchy and the state from Rome as well, and of liberty from Greece and Rome. Democracy was long forgotten and only revived in different form. Both Confucianism and, implicitly, the political realism of ‘Legalism’ have remained imporant in China.
James Higginbotham
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199239313
- eISBN:
- 9780191716904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239313.003.0004
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
This chapter presents the author's comments on Mark Richard's interpretation of his views about the state of relief. It argues that the account of the truth conditions of utterances expressing relief ...
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This chapter presents the author's comments on Mark Richard's interpretation of his views about the state of relief. It argues that the account of the truth conditions of utterances expressing relief that some painful episode lies in one's past carries over to the thought itself, that one is relieved. The state of being relieved involves the state itself as a constituent of the object of relief, and demands also the location of that state as present; that is, as coincident with one's own self-consciousness of the state.Less
This chapter presents the author's comments on Mark Richard's interpretation of his views about the state of relief. It argues that the account of the truth conditions of utterances expressing relief that some painful episode lies in one's past carries over to the thought itself, that one is relieved. The state of being relieved involves the state itself as a constituent of the object of relief, and demands also the location of that state as present; that is, as coincident with one's own self-consciousness of the state.
Jessica Waldoff
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195151978
- eISBN:
- 9780199870387
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195151978.003.0010
- Subject:
- Music, Opera
The Afterword opens with a letter of 1791 in which Mozart relates an experience he has while attending a performance of Die Zauberflöte. He represents the episode as a recognition narrative in ...
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The Afterword opens with a letter of 1791 in which Mozart relates an experience he has while attending a performance of Die Zauberflöte. He represents the episode as a recognition narrative in miniature that illuminates the opera's dependence on recognition as a vehicle for enlightenment. A final section makes two observations about the workings of recognition in the operatic context: the first concerning the almost unfailing optimism of the operas of Mozart and his contemporaries, and the second concerning the power of recognition in contexts beyond Mozart. The book concludes with the thought that critical thinking about recognition has much to tell us about operas of other types and periods.Less
The Afterword opens with a letter of 1791 in which Mozart relates an experience he has while attending a performance of Die Zauberflöte. He represents the episode as a recognition narrative in miniature that illuminates the opera's dependence on recognition as a vehicle for enlightenment. A final section makes two observations about the workings of recognition in the operatic context: the first concerning the almost unfailing optimism of the operas of Mozart and his contemporaries, and the second concerning the power of recognition in contexts beyond Mozart. The book concludes with the thought that critical thinking about recognition has much to tell us about operas of other types and periods.
Joseph Almog
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195337716
- eISBN:
- 9780199868704
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195337716.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Decartes' maxim Cogito, Ergo Sum (from his Meditations) is perhaps the most famous philosophical expression ever coined. The author of this book, Joseph Almog, is a Descartes scholar whose last book ...
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Decartes' maxim Cogito, Ergo Sum (from his Meditations) is perhaps the most famous philosophical expression ever coined. The author of this book, Joseph Almog, is a Descartes scholar whose last book What Am I? focused on the second half of this expression asking who is the “I”, who is thinking, and how does this entity somehow incorporate both body and mind? This book looks at the first half of the proposition — cogito. The book calls this the “thinking man's paradox”: how can there be, in and part of the natural world, a creature that thinks? Descartes' proposition declares that such a fact maintains and is self-evident; but as this book points out, from the point of view of Descartes' own skepticism it is far from obvious. How can it be that a thinking human can be both part of the natural world and yet somehow distinct and separate from it? How did “thinking” arise in an otherwise “thoughtless” universe and what does it mean for beings like us to be thinkers? The book goes back to the Meditations, and using Descartes' own methodology — and his naturalistic, scientific worldview — tries to answer the question.Less
Decartes' maxim Cogito, Ergo Sum (from his Meditations) is perhaps the most famous philosophical expression ever coined. The author of this book, Joseph Almog, is a Descartes scholar whose last book What Am I? focused on the second half of this expression asking who is the “I”, who is thinking, and how does this entity somehow incorporate both body and mind? This book looks at the first half of the proposition — cogito. The book calls this the “thinking man's paradox”: how can there be, in and part of the natural world, a creature that thinks? Descartes' proposition declares that such a fact maintains and is self-evident; but as this book points out, from the point of view of Descartes' own skepticism it is far from obvious. How can it be that a thinking human can be both part of the natural world and yet somehow distinct and separate from it? How did “thinking” arise in an otherwise “thoughtless” universe and what does it mean for beings like us to be thinkers? The book goes back to the Meditations, and using Descartes' own methodology — and his naturalistic, scientific worldview — tries to answer the question.
