David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286867
- eISBN:
- 9780191603532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286868.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay is a commentary on Physics I, with special reference to the account of change in chapter 7. It is argued: (i) that Aristotle is mistaken when he attempts in the earlier chapters to present ...
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This essay is a commentary on Physics I, with special reference to the account of change in chapter 7. It is argued: (i) that Aristotle is mistaken when he attempts in the earlier chapters to present his account as the natural development of various Pre-Socratic views ‘on nature’; (ii) that as a result the main theme of his chapter 5 is a clear error; and (iii) that this raises an important question over how we should understand the apparent claims of chapter 6. All of this leads to the problem: How should we explain his remark at the end of chapter 7 that it is not yet clear whether the underlying thing, the thing that persists through change, is substance?Less
This essay is a commentary on Physics I, with special reference to the account of change in chapter 7. It is argued: (i) that Aristotle is mistaken when he attempts in the earlier chapters to present his account as the natural development of various Pre-Socratic views ‘on nature’; (ii) that as a result the main theme of his chapter 5 is a clear error; and (iii) that this raises an important question over how we should understand the apparent claims of chapter 6. All of this leads to the problem: How should we explain his remark at the end of chapter 7 that it is not yet clear whether the underlying thing, the thing that persists through change, is substance?
Richard Robinson
- Published in print:
- 1963
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198241607
- eISBN:
- 9780191680397
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198241607.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Language
Definition has been practised and discussed for nearly two and a half millenniums. It has been more widely adopted, and less often reviled, than any other part of the original theory of logic drawn ...
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Definition has been practised and discussed for nearly two and a half millenniums. It has been more widely adopted, and less often reviled, than any other part of the original theory of logic drawn up by Aristotle. Today it is probably the best known idea in the field of logic, except for the idea of inference. The word ‘definition’ is more often used by the general public than any other peculiarly logical term except the word ‘logic’ itself. The purpose of this book, as a whole, is to clarify our conception of definition and to improve our defining activities. Topics covered include disagreements about definition, word-thing definition, lexical definition, stipulative definition, methods of word-thing definition, real definition, and definition in mathematics.Less
Definition has been practised and discussed for nearly two and a half millenniums. It has been more widely adopted, and less often reviled, than any other part of the original theory of logic drawn up by Aristotle. Today it is probably the best known idea in the field of logic, except for the idea of inference. The word ‘definition’ is more often used by the general public than any other peculiarly logical term except the word ‘logic’ itself. The purpose of this book, as a whole, is to clarify our conception of definition and to improve our defining activities. Topics covered include disagreements about definition, word-thing definition, lexical definition, stipulative definition, methods of word-thing definition, real definition, and definition in mathematics.
Christopher Janaway
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250036
- eISBN:
- 9780191597817
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250037.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Centres on Schopenhauer's conception of the self and how it relates to the world, primarily dealing with his book The World as Will and Representation. It locates Schopenhauer in relation to Kant, of ...
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Centres on Schopenhauer's conception of the self and how it relates to the world, primarily dealing with his book The World as Will and Representation. It locates Schopenhauer in relation to Kant, of whom he was both a follower and a critic. While accepting Kant's transcendental idealism and the associated notion of the ‘I’ as a pure subject of knowledge distinct from the world of objects, Schopenhauer undercuts this notion with a conception of the self as will. The self as will is primarily active, embodied, organic, and manifests pre‐rational ends and drives. The book shows how Schopenhauer arrives at a position in which idealism and materialism are correlative positions, but where a metaphysical account of the thing in itself as will takes primacy. It explores Schopenhauer's arguments that willing is identical with acting, and that at the level of individual willing there is no freedom. The book assesses the relevance of Schopenhauer's conception of the self to recent philosophical debates, and explores its influence on Wittgenstein and on Nietzsche.Less
Centres on Schopenhauer's conception of the self and how it relates to the world, primarily dealing with his book The World as Will and Representation. It locates Schopenhauer in relation to Kant, of whom he was both a follower and a critic. While accepting Kant's transcendental idealism and the associated notion of the ‘I’ as a pure subject of knowledge distinct from the world of objects, Schopenhauer undercuts this notion with a conception of the self as will. The self as will is primarily active, embodied, organic, and manifests pre‐rational ends and drives. The book shows how Schopenhauer arrives at a position in which idealism and materialism are correlative positions, but where a metaphysical account of the thing in itself as will takes primacy. It explores Schopenhauer's arguments that willing is identical with acting, and that at the level of individual willing there is no freedom. The book assesses the relevance of Schopenhauer's conception of the self to recent philosophical debates, and explores its influence on Wittgenstein and on Nietzsche.
Rae Langton
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199243174
- eISBN:
- 9780191597909
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199243174.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book offers a new interpretation and defence of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. Kant distinguishes things in themselves from phenomena, and in doing so he makes a metaphysical ...
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This book offers a new interpretation and defence of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. Kant distinguishes things in themselves from phenomena, and in doing so he makes a metaphysical distinction between intrinsic and relational properties of substances. Kant says that phenomena—things as we know them—consist ‘entirely of relations’. His claim that we have no knowledge of things in themselves is not idealism, but epistemic humility: we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of substances. This humility has its roots in some plausible philosophical beliefs: an empiricist belief in the receptivity of human knowledge and a metaphysical belief in the irreducibility of relational properties. The interpretation vindicates Kant's scientific realism, drawing on his theory of force, and explains the advantages of his primary–secondary quality distinction. And it answers the famous charge that Kant's tale of things in themselves is one that makes itself untellable.Less
This book offers a new interpretation and defence of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. Kant distinguishes things in themselves from phenomena, and in doing so he makes a metaphysical distinction between intrinsic and relational properties of substances. Kant says that phenomena—things as we know them—consist ‘entirely of relations’. His claim that we have no knowledge of things in themselves is not idealism, but epistemic humility: we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of substances. This humility has its roots in some plausible philosophical beliefs: an empiricist belief in the receptivity of human knowledge and a metaphysical belief in the irreducibility of relational properties. The interpretation vindicates Kant's scientific realism, drawing on his theory of force, and explains the advantages of his primary–secondary quality distinction. And it answers the famous charge that Kant's tale of things in themselves is one that makes itself untellable.
Mary Anne Warren
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250401
- eISBN:
- 9780191681295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250401.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter presents a few concluding remarks about the goal of achieving a greater consensus in our judgements of moral status. It argues that adopting a multi-criterial theory of moral status does ...
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This chapter presents a few concluding remarks about the goal of achieving a greater consensus in our judgements of moral status. It argues that adopting a multi-criterial theory of moral status does not make it easy to solve all of the moral problems arising from uncertainties about what we owe to other entities. However, it gives us a more adequate set of tools than any of the uni-criterial theories. On the multi-criterial account there are many types of moral status, and many of these come in varying degrees of strength. Moral agents, sentient human beings who are not moral agents, sentient nonhuman animals, non-sentient living things, and such other elements of the natural world as species and ecosystems — all have legitimate claims to moral consideration. Of all the entities with which we interact, only moral agents have full moral status based solely upon their mental and behavioural capacities. The rest have moral status that is partially determined by their social and other relationships to moral agents, and — in the case of entities that are not sentient human beings — by their roles within terrestrial ecosystems.Less
This chapter presents a few concluding remarks about the goal of achieving a greater consensus in our judgements of moral status. It argues that adopting a multi-criterial theory of moral status does not make it easy to solve all of the moral problems arising from uncertainties about what we owe to other entities. However, it gives us a more adequate set of tools than any of the uni-criterial theories. On the multi-criterial account there are many types of moral status, and many of these come in varying degrees of strength. Moral agents, sentient human beings who are not moral agents, sentient nonhuman animals, non-sentient living things, and such other elements of the natural world as species and ecosystems — all have legitimate claims to moral consideration. Of all the entities with which we interact, only moral agents have full moral status based solely upon their mental and behavioural capacities. The rest have moral status that is partially determined by their social and other relationships to moral agents, and — in the case of entities that are not sentient human beings — by their roles within terrestrial ecosystems.
Richard Gaskin
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287253
- eISBN:
- 9780191603969
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287252.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
McDowell’s view is that if infants and animals did have conscious experience, they would be confronted with private objects in Wittgenstein’s sense — bits of unstructured sensory Given. It is argued ...
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McDowell’s view is that if infants and animals did have conscious experience, they would be confronted with private objects in Wittgenstein’s sense — bits of unstructured sensory Given. It is argued that since we are obliged to accord conscious experience to infants and animals, McDowell is in effect saddled with supposing that they confront Kantian things-in-themselves, objects which are noumenal with respect to the conceptual. This fits with his location of the world at the level of sense rather than reference in the Fregean semantic hierarchy. On McDowell’s metaphysical picture, objects — the inhabitants of the realm of reference — are banished from the world to a noumenal penumbra. To unpick ourselves from this nominalistic entanglement, we need to follow Frege in locating concepts/properties at the level of reference. McDowell’s hostility to doing so, which seems to be based on a fear of an excessive platonism, must be set aside.Less
McDowell’s view is that if infants and animals did have conscious experience, they would be confronted with private objects in Wittgenstein’s sense — bits of unstructured sensory Given. It is argued that since we are obliged to accord conscious experience to infants and animals, McDowell is in effect saddled with supposing that they confront Kantian things-in-themselves, objects which are noumenal with respect to the conceptual. This fits with his location of the world at the level of sense rather than reference in the Fregean semantic hierarchy. On McDowell’s metaphysical picture, objects — the inhabitants of the realm of reference — are banished from the world to a noumenal penumbra. To unpick ourselves from this nominalistic entanglement, we need to follow Frege in locating concepts/properties at the level of reference. McDowell’s hostility to doing so, which seems to be based on a fear of an excessive platonism, must be set aside.
James Penner
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198299264
- eISBN:
- 9780191714313
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198299264.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This book vindicates the commonsense idea that the right to property is a right to things. Distinguishing between the ‘practice’ of property and the ‘practice’ of contract is essential for a proper ...
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This book vindicates the commonsense idea that the right to property is a right to things. Distinguishing between the ‘practice’ of property and the ‘practice’ of contract is essential for a proper understanding, but failure to do so is common. As the book shows, it mars both John Locke's and Georg Hegel's philosophies of property, and continues to contribute to confusion. It also obscures the central element of sharing and giving in the ownership of property, the importance of which has been generally neglected. Perhaps most controversially, the book argues that the justification of the right to property is not dependent on the justice of the reigning distribution of property — that is a question which concerns the justice of the economy (gift, command, market, or mixed) — that distributes all values, not just rights in property. The important ‘distributional’ question about property is this: to what values does the property practice apply? Why does it apply to castles and cars, books and bank balances, but not to our body parts and our labour, nor to our employment contracts and our sexuality? To address these issues the book develops a distinction between persons and our personality-rich relationships that cannot be objects of property, and ‘things’, both land and objects and personality-poor relationships like debts, which can.Less
This book vindicates the commonsense idea that the right to property is a right to things. Distinguishing between the ‘practice’ of property and the ‘practice’ of contract is essential for a proper understanding, but failure to do so is common. As the book shows, it mars both John Locke's and Georg Hegel's philosophies of property, and continues to contribute to confusion. It also obscures the central element of sharing and giving in the ownership of property, the importance of which has been generally neglected. Perhaps most controversially, the book argues that the justification of the right to property is not dependent on the justice of the reigning distribution of property — that is a question which concerns the justice of the economy (gift, command, market, or mixed) — that distributes all values, not just rights in property. The important ‘distributional’ question about property is this: to what values does the property practice apply? Why does it apply to castles and cars, books and bank balances, but not to our body parts and our labour, nor to our employment contracts and our sexuality? To address these issues the book develops a distinction between persons and our personality-rich relationships that cannot be objects of property, and ‘things’, both land and objects and personality-poor relationships like debts, which can.
Pavel Gregoric
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199277377
- eISBN:
- 9780191707537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Since souls are forms of living beings, according to Aristotle, a scientific study of living beings requires first and foremost a systematic account of the soul. Such an account is supplied in the ...
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Since souls are forms of living beings, according to Aristotle, a scientific study of living beings requires first and foremost a systematic account of the soul. Such an account is supplied in the treatise De Anima, where the soul is divided into distinct parts or aspects. In this chapter it is argued that the soul is only conceptually divided, that is divided for the sake of analysis, whereas in reality each soul is a unity. The notion of conceptual division of the soul, its principles and consequences are examined, often in contrast with the spatial division of the soul advocated by Plato in the Timaeus. Conceptual division of the soul enables Aristotle to avoid the problems detected in Plato's division, and to preserve the unity both of each soul and of each organic body.Less
Since souls are forms of living beings, according to Aristotle, a scientific study of living beings requires first and foremost a systematic account of the soul. Such an account is supplied in the treatise De Anima, where the soul is divided into distinct parts or aspects. In this chapter it is argued that the soul is only conceptually divided, that is divided for the sake of analysis, whereas in reality each soul is a unity. The notion of conceptual division of the soul, its principles and consequences are examined, often in contrast with the spatial division of the soul advocated by Plato in the Timaeus. Conceptual division of the soul enables Aristotle to avoid the problems detected in Plato's division, and to preserve the unity both of each soul and of each organic body.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199764969
- eISBN:
- 9780199894970
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764969.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
We all have beliefs to the effect that if a certain thing were to happen a certain other thing would happen. We also believe that some things simply must be so, with no possibility of having been ...
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We all have beliefs to the effect that if a certain thing were to happen a certain other thing would happen. We also believe that some things simply must be so, with no possibility of having been otherwise. And in acting intentionally we all take certain things to be good reason to believe or do certain things. This book argues that some beliefs of each of these kinds are indispensable to our having any conception of a world at all. That means no one could consistently dismiss all beliefs of these kinds as merely ways of thinking that do not describe how things really are in the world as it is independent of us and our responses. But the unacceptability of any such negative “unmasking” view does not support a satisfyingly positive metaphysical “realism”. No metaphysical satisfaction is available either way, given the conditions of our holding the beliefs whose metaphysical status we wish to understand. This does not mean we will stop asking the metaphysical question. But we need a better understanding of how it can have whatever sense it has for us.Less
We all have beliefs to the effect that if a certain thing were to happen a certain other thing would happen. We also believe that some things simply must be so, with no possibility of having been otherwise. And in acting intentionally we all take certain things to be good reason to believe or do certain things. This book argues that some beliefs of each of these kinds are indispensable to our having any conception of a world at all. That means no one could consistently dismiss all beliefs of these kinds as merely ways of thinking that do not describe how things really are in the world as it is independent of us and our responses. But the unacceptability of any such negative “unmasking” view does not support a satisfyingly positive metaphysical “realism”. No metaphysical satisfaction is available either way, given the conditions of our holding the beliefs whose metaphysical status we wish to understand. This does not mean we will stop asking the metaphysical question. But we need a better understanding of how it can have whatever sense it has for us.
Christopher Janaway
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199279692
- eISBN:
- 9780191707407
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199279692.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter argues that Nietzsche's conception of will to power underlies his explanations of moral values, and that its manifestations may be outward-directed or inward-directed, achieve genuine ...
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This chapter argues that Nietzsche's conception of will to power underlies his explanations of moral values, and that its manifestations may be outward-directed or inward-directed, achieve genuine power or the feeling of power, and result in healthy or unhealthy states. In Genealogy II Nietzsche presents his historiographical principle concerning interpretation and origin, in which he implicates will to power: all interpretation is one thing exerting power over another, and Nietzsche blurs distinctions between natural and intentional explanation. The notion that the natural world is will to power is then discussed. Nietzsche does not propound a metaphysics of the world as thing in itself, but does explain all natural processes in terms of relations of dominance, in the human case the interaction of sub-personal drives or ‘under-wills’. Maudemarie Clark's reading of ‘the world as will to power’ as a projection of Nietzsche's values rather than a genuine assertion is examined and rejected.Less
This chapter argues that Nietzsche's conception of will to power underlies his explanations of moral values, and that its manifestations may be outward-directed or inward-directed, achieve genuine power or the feeling of power, and result in healthy or unhealthy states. In Genealogy II Nietzsche presents his historiographical principle concerning interpretation and origin, in which he implicates will to power: all interpretation is one thing exerting power over another, and Nietzsche blurs distinctions between natural and intentional explanation. The notion that the natural world is will to power is then discussed. Nietzsche does not propound a metaphysics of the world as thing in itself, but does explain all natural processes in terms of relations of dominance, in the human case the interaction of sub-personal drives or ‘under-wills’. Maudemarie Clark's reading of ‘the world as will to power’ as a projection of Nietzsche's values rather than a genuine assertion is examined and rejected.
Ronald W. Langacker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331967
- eISBN:
- 9780199868209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331967.003.0004
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
The standard doctrine that basic grammatical classes (parts of speech) are not semantically definable rests on erroneous assumptions about the nature of linguistic meaning. With a proper view of ...
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The standard doctrine that basic grammatical classes (parts of speech) are not semantically definable rests on erroneous assumptions about the nature of linguistic meaning. With a proper view of meaning, basic categories—notably noun and verb—have plausible conceptual characterizations at both the prototype level (for typical examples) and the schema level (valid for all instances). The prototypes are based on conceptual archetypes: objects for nouns, and actions for verbs. The schemas are independent of any particular conceptual content, residing instead in basic cognitive abilities immanent in the archetypes: for nouns, grouping and reification; in the case of verbs, the ability to apprend relationships and to track their evolution through time. An expression's grammatical category specifically depends on the nature of its profile (not its overall content). Thus a noun profiles a thing (defined abstractly as any product of grouping and reification), while a verb profiles a process (a relationship tracked through time). Expressions that profile non-processual relationships include adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, infinitives, and participles. Relational expressions can be categorized in different ways, depending on factors like the number and type of focused participants, whether the profiled relation is simplex or complex, and whether it is apprehended holistically or sequentially. These characterizations prove efficacious in describing how relational expressions function as noun modifiers and in clausal organization.Less
The standard doctrine that basic grammatical classes (parts of speech) are not semantically definable rests on erroneous assumptions about the nature of linguistic meaning. With a proper view of meaning, basic categories—notably noun and verb—have plausible conceptual characterizations at both the prototype level (for typical examples) and the schema level (valid for all instances). The prototypes are based on conceptual archetypes: objects for nouns, and actions for verbs. The schemas are independent of any particular conceptual content, residing instead in basic cognitive abilities immanent in the archetypes: for nouns, grouping and reification; in the case of verbs, the ability to apprend relationships and to track their evolution through time. An expression's grammatical category specifically depends on the nature of its profile (not its overall content). Thus a noun profiles a thing (defined abstractly as any product of grouping and reification), while a verb profiles a process (a relationship tracked through time). Expressions that profile non-processual relationships include adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, infinitives, and participles. Relational expressions can be categorized in different ways, depending on factors like the number and type of focused participants, whether the profiled relation is simplex or complex, and whether it is apprehended holistically or sequentially. These characterizations prove efficacious in describing how relational expressions function as noun modifiers and in clausal organization.
Geoff Mulgan
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691165745
- eISBN:
- 9781400866199
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691165745.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
This chapter details capitalism's dual character, its bees and its locusts. The first face of capitalism is productive, creating better products and services, from smarter looms for textiles to ...
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This chapter details capitalism's dual character, its bees and its locusts. The first face of capitalism is productive, creating better products and services, from smarter looms for textiles to smarter ways of running a shop. This side of capitalism has transformed living conditions through millions of small improvements and thousands of big ones. It is the capitalism that offers fair rewards in place of expropriation by oppressive states or feudal lords. The other face of capitalism is that of a predator, taking value from people or nature and giving little or nothing back. Moreover, the forms of predation change—and are now as much about minds and hopes as about material things. But the presence of predation in capitalism has not changed, and explains its dubious legitimacy.Less
This chapter details capitalism's dual character, its bees and its locusts. The first face of capitalism is productive, creating better products and services, from smarter looms for textiles to smarter ways of running a shop. This side of capitalism has transformed living conditions through millions of small improvements and thousands of big ones. It is the capitalism that offers fair rewards in place of expropriation by oppressive states or feudal lords. The other face of capitalism is that of a predator, taking value from people or nature and giving little or nothing back. Moreover, the forms of predation change—and are now as much about minds and hopes as about material things. But the presence of predation in capitalism has not changed, and explains its dubious legitimacy.
Marilyn McCord Adams
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199591053
- eISBN:
- 9780191595554
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591053.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Philosophy of Religion
Aristotelian philosophy gave Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Scotus, and Ockham the philosophical tools they needed to formulate real presence and sacramental causality precisely. This chapter orients by ...
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Aristotelian philosophy gave Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Scotus, and Ockham the philosophical tools they needed to formulate real presence and sacramental causality precisely. This chapter orients by explaining and motivating Aristotelian understandings of the metaphysical structure of corporeal things and Aristotelian ideas of place. Topics surveyed include atomism vs matter/form composition, unity vs plurality of substantial forms, the reification of accidents, universals and individuation, three-dimensional place vs place as two-dimensional container, formal vs material place and their relevance to locomotion.Less
Aristotelian philosophy gave Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Scotus, and Ockham the philosophical tools they needed to formulate real presence and sacramental causality precisely. This chapter orients by explaining and motivating Aristotelian understandings of the metaphysical structure of corporeal things and Aristotelian ideas of place. Topics surveyed include atomism vs matter/form composition, unity vs plurality of substantial forms, the reification of accidents, universals and individuation, three-dimensional place vs place as two-dimensional container, formal vs material place and their relevance to locomotion.
Marilyn McCord Adams
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199591053
- eISBN:
- 9780191595554
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591053.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Philosophy of Religion
New understandings of bodily placement and varieties of causal connections were provoked by a theological context in which the human being is thought of as having not only a nature but also a ...
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New understandings of bodily placement and varieties of causal connections were provoked by a theological context in which the human being is thought of as having not only a nature but also a history, stretching between paradise and heaven. Sacraments — sensible signs of sacred things — are seen to be skillful means for Adam's fallen race. This chapter overviews such topics as the creation and the fall, the saving work of Christ, differences between old- vs new-law sacraments, and rationales for the seven new-law sacraments. Sacraments fit participants for worship and constitute acts of worship. The real presence of Christ's Body and Blood makes the eucharist pre-eminent by ushering the faithful into the throne room of the king. Reception brings the suitably prepared into deeper union with the mystical Body of Christ.Less
New understandings of bodily placement and varieties of causal connections were provoked by a theological context in which the human being is thought of as having not only a nature but also a history, stretching between paradise and heaven. Sacraments — sensible signs of sacred things — are seen to be skillful means for Adam's fallen race. This chapter overviews such topics as the creation and the fall, the saving work of Christ, differences between old- vs new-law sacraments, and rationales for the seven new-law sacraments. Sacraments fit participants for worship and constitute acts of worship. The real presence of Christ's Body and Blood makes the eucharist pre-eminent by ushering the faithful into the throne room of the king. Reception brings the suitably prepared into deeper union with the mystical Body of Christ.
Glenn Parsons and Allen Carlson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199205240
- eISBN:
- 9780191709296
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205240.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter outlines some of the ways in which the concept of Functional Beauty can be applied to natural things. It begins with a somewhat neglected topic in nature aesthetics: the aesthetics of ...
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This chapter outlines some of the ways in which the concept of Functional Beauty can be applied to natural things. It begins with a somewhat neglected topic in nature aesthetics: the aesthetics of living organisms, especially animals. The first section surveys some common approaches to the appreciation of living organisms. It then describes a difficulty facing these approaches, which seems to explain the lack of attention given to the topic by aestheticians, and argues that a form of appreciation employing Functional Beauty can avoid this difficulty. The second half of the chapter turns to the aesthetics of natural things other than living organisms, including individual natural objects such as stones and rivers as well as larger natural entities, such as ecosystems and environments. It argues that Functional Beauty not only has a role to play in this area, but also that deploying the concept here sheds light on a central but controversial thesis in recent discussions of the aesthetics of nature: positive aesthetics. In doing so, Functional Beauty provides the basis for a richer conception of nature as an aesthetic object.Less
This chapter outlines some of the ways in which the concept of Functional Beauty can be applied to natural things. It begins with a somewhat neglected topic in nature aesthetics: the aesthetics of living organisms, especially animals. The first section surveys some common approaches to the appreciation of living organisms. It then describes a difficulty facing these approaches, which seems to explain the lack of attention given to the topic by aestheticians, and argues that a form of appreciation employing Functional Beauty can avoid this difficulty. The second half of the chapter turns to the aesthetics of natural things other than living organisms, including individual natural objects such as stones and rivers as well as larger natural entities, such as ecosystems and environments. It argues that Functional Beauty not only has a role to play in this area, but also that deploying the concept here sheds light on a central but controversial thesis in recent discussions of the aesthetics of nature: positive aesthetics. In doing so, Functional Beauty provides the basis for a richer conception of nature as an aesthetic object.
Stephen Yablo
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199266463
- eISBN:
- 9780191709111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266463.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter pursues two ideas. The first is that Descartes' argument cannot be faulted simply for relying on an inference from de re conceivability to de re possibility; that inference is implicated ...
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This chapter pursues two ideas. The first is that Descartes' argument cannot be faulted simply for relying on an inference from de re conceivability to de re possibility; that inference is implicated in too many de re modal claims routinely accepted without qualm or question. So the standard objection needs refinement: even if some de re conceivability intuitions justify de re modal conclusions, others do not, and when the differences are spelled out, Descartes' argument emerges as unpersuasive. The second idea is that, to the contrary, the more the differences are spelled out, the better Descartes' argument looks.Less
This chapter pursues two ideas. The first is that Descartes' argument cannot be faulted simply for relying on an inference from de re conceivability to de re possibility; that inference is implicated in too many de re modal claims routinely accepted without qualm or question. So the standard objection needs refinement: even if some de re conceivability intuitions justify de re modal conclusions, others do not, and when the differences are spelled out, Descartes' argument emerges as unpersuasive. The second idea is that, to the contrary, the more the differences are spelled out, the better Descartes' argument looks.
C. Stephen Evans
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199272174
- eISBN:
- 9780191602061
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272174.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Unlike Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard affixes his name to Concluding Unscientific Postscript, as the ‘editor’, thereby signalling his close affinity to the position outlined by the book’s pseudonym ...
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Unlike Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard affixes his name to Concluding Unscientific Postscript, as the ‘editor’, thereby signalling his close affinity to the position outlined by the book’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus. Kierkegaard himself, in The Point of View for My Work as an Author, tells us that he placed his name on the title page as a signal of the similarity of Climacus’s views to his own. Indeed, Climacus provides a formal structure that can be used to illuminate what Kierkegaard says in his own voice in Works of Love and elsewhere. From Climacus in Concluding Unscientific Postscript – and from Kierkegaard himself in Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing – we have a conception of the ethical life as a life that involves a relationship with God. This knowledge of God, however, is not rooted in God’s revelation in history but is, instead, rooted in the individual’s own conscience.Less
Unlike Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard affixes his name to Concluding Unscientific Postscript, as the ‘editor’, thereby signalling his close affinity to the position outlined by the book’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus. Kierkegaard himself, in The Point of View for My Work as an Author, tells us that he placed his name on the title page as a signal of the similarity of Climacus’s views to his own. Indeed, Climacus provides a formal structure that can be used to illuminate what Kierkegaard says in his own voice in Works of Love and elsewhere. From Climacus in Concluding Unscientific Postscript – and from Kierkegaard himself in Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing – we have a conception of the ethical life as a life that involves a relationship with God. This knowledge of God, however, is not rooted in God’s revelation in history but is, instead, rooted in the individual’s own conscience.
James Bergin
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280292
- eISBN:
- 9780191602498
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199280290.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Deals with decision theory. The coverage includes decision making under risk and uncertainty. The theories of vonNeumann–Morgenstern and Savage are reviewed, along with recent developments in the ...
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Deals with decision theory. The coverage includes decision making under risk and uncertainty. The theories of vonNeumann–Morgenstern and Savage are reviewed, along with recent developments in the field.Less
Deals with decision theory. The coverage includes decision making under risk and uncertainty. The theories of vonNeumann–Morgenstern and Savage are reviewed, along with recent developments in the field.
Adam T. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691163239
- eISBN:
- 9781400866502
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691163239.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, Ancient History / Archaeology
This chapter examines the role of things in the reproduction of a public—the first condition of sovereignty defined in Chapter 2—during the Early Bronze Age in the South Caucasus. “A public” here ...
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This chapter examines the role of things in the reproduction of a public—the first condition of sovereignty defined in Chapter 2—during the Early Bronze Age in the South Caucasus. “A public” here means a self-recognizing community that is not maintained exclusively through face-to-face interaction. It is thus in large part an assembly of strangers who are made familiar to one another through an assemblage of publicity—forms of mass mediation and sites of encounter, such as those Benedict Anderson described as fundamental to the imagination of modern nations. The suggestion that material things are critical to the creation of a public follows closely Hannah Arendt's conception of humanity as Homo faber.Less
This chapter examines the role of things in the reproduction of a public—the first condition of sovereignty defined in Chapter 2—during the Early Bronze Age in the South Caucasus. “A public” here means a self-recognizing community that is not maintained exclusively through face-to-face interaction. It is thus in large part an assembly of strangers who are made familiar to one another through an assemblage of publicity—forms of mass mediation and sites of encounter, such as those Benedict Anderson described as fundamental to the imagination of modern nations. The suggestion that material things are critical to the creation of a public follows closely Hannah Arendt's conception of humanity as Homo faber.
Thomas Docherty
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198183570
- eISBN:
- 9780191674075
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198183570.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
Literary modernism is always concerned with the activity of ‘seeing things’ in the sense of attending to objects of everyday life. This chapter argues for a renewed attention to the status of the ...
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Literary modernism is always concerned with the activity of ‘seeing things’ in the sense of attending to objects of everyday life. This chapter argues for a renewed attention to the status of the literary in poetry and that such a renewed attention is consonant with a postmodern critical attitude. It focuses on imagist poetry, where there is the implication of a point of view from which the objects make sense, and from which they can be inserted into a meaningful and necessary narrative.Less
Literary modernism is always concerned with the activity of ‘seeing things’ in the sense of attending to objects of everyday life. This chapter argues for a renewed attention to the status of the literary in poetry and that such a renewed attention is consonant with a postmodern critical attitude. It focuses on imagist poetry, where there is the implication of a point of view from which the objects make sense, and from which they can be inserted into a meaningful and necessary narrative.
