Jerrold Levinson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199206179
- eISBN:
- 9780191709982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206179.003.0025
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This essay explores the notion of intrinsic value. It is argued thata richly sentient life being a certain wayis the only possible subject of a defensible judgement of intrinsic value. One ...
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This essay explores the notion of intrinsic value. It is argued thata richly sentient life being a certain wayis the only possible subject of a defensible judgement of intrinsic value. One consequence of this thesis is a disagreement with G. E. Moore regarding the intrinsic value of a beautiful world devoid of sentience, a famous thought experiment from hisPrincipia Ethica. But a more important consequence is the underlining of an intimate connection between the notion of a richly sentient life and the very idea of intrinsic value.Less
This essay explores the notion of intrinsic value. It is argued thata richly sentient life being a certain wayis the only possible subject of a defensible judgement of intrinsic value. One consequence of this thesis is a disagreement with G. E. Moore regarding the intrinsic value of a beautiful world devoid of sentience, a famous thought experiment from hisPrincipia Ethica. But a more important consequence is the underlining of an intimate connection between the notion of a richly sentient life and the very idea of intrinsic value.
John Broome
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199243761
- eISBN:
- 9780191602900
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924376X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
People are often faced with decisions that involve weighing the lives of some people against the lives of others, or weighing lives against other goods. This book aims to develop a moral theory that ...
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People are often faced with decisions that involve weighing the lives of some people against the lives of others, or weighing lives against other goods. This book aims to develop a moral theory that can help with making these practical decisions. It is a theory of value, which includes an account of how good it is to extend a person’s life, and also an account of how good it is to have new lives in the world — of the value of adding a new person to the world’s population. It is a theory about the aggregation of people’s wellbeing: of how the wellbeing that comes to a person at different times in her life comes together to determine the overall value of her life, and of how different people’s wellbeing comes together to determine the overall value of the world. The book pays particular attention to the common intuition that adding people to the population is ethically neutral, but eventually rejects it. The book’s conclusion is a version of utilitarianism. The method is formal, but the presentation is as informal as possible.Less
People are often faced with decisions that involve weighing the lives of some people against the lives of others, or weighing lives against other goods. This book aims to develop a moral theory that can help with making these practical decisions. It is a theory of value, which includes an account of how good it is to extend a person’s life, and also an account of how good it is to have new lives in the world — of the value of adding a new person to the world’s population. It is a theory about the aggregation of people’s wellbeing: of how the wellbeing that comes to a person at different times in her life comes together to determine the overall value of her life, and of how different people’s wellbeing comes together to determine the overall value of the world. The book pays particular attention to the common intuition that adding people to the population is ethically neutral, but eventually rejects it. The book’s conclusion is a version of utilitarianism. The method is formal, but the presentation is as informal as possible.
Frederick C. Beiser
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691555
- eISBN:
- 9780191731839
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691555.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is a close examination of the philosophy of value of Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936). The philosophy of value was an attempt to define and secure an ahistorical realm of values against the ...
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This chapter is a close examination of the philosophy of value of Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936). The philosophy of value was an attempt to define and secure an ahistorical realm of values against the threats of naturalism and historicism. It placed values in an “irreal realm,” one independent of mental or physical reality. The chapter discusses Rickert's attempts to explain the meaning of this realm and its relation to reality. It also considers Rickert's early views regarding historical explanation and the limits of naturalism.Less
This chapter is a close examination of the philosophy of value of Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936). The philosophy of value was an attempt to define and secure an ahistorical realm of values against the threats of naturalism and historicism. It placed values in an “irreal realm,” one independent of mental or physical reality. The chapter discusses Rickert's attempts to explain the meaning of this realm and its relation to reality. It also considers Rickert's early views regarding historical explanation and the limits of naturalism.
Athol Fitzgibbons
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292883
- eISBN:
- 9780191596247
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292880.003.0012
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
Laments that many economists are ignorant of Smith's ideas. It explains that Smith's objective was not to increase international trade, and briefly considers his theories of value and money.
Laments that many economists are ignorant of Smith's ideas. It explains that Smith's objective was not to increase international trade, and briefly considers his theories of value and money.
W. D. Ross
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252657
- eISBN:
- 9780191598333
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252653.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This is the second of five chapters on good, and starts by making the point that it is around the question of the intrinsically good that the chief controversies about the nature of goodness or value ...
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This is the second of five chapters on good, and starts by making the point that it is around the question of the intrinsically good that the chief controversies about the nature of goodness or value revolve, for most theories of value may be divided into those that treat it as a quality and those that treat it as a relation between that which has value and something else (which is usually some state of mind); Ross says that it seems clear that any view that treats goodness as a relation between that which is good and something else denies that anything is intrinsically good. The chapter first discusses R. B. Perry's relational view of value—in the sense of good, and other theories that also identify goodness with some relation, either as a relation between that which is good and some or all of its elements, or as a relation between some or all of its elements, or as a relation between it or some or all of its elements and something else. Next, the psychological theories of good are discussed; these, as a rule, hold that a thing being good means either that some person or persons have some feelings towards it, or some person or persons think it to be good; this is an objective view of good. The rest of the chapter looks at both R. B. Perry's and G. E. Moore's arguments on these theories, at Ross's own views, at badness as incompatible with goodness or as an element of a good thing, at W. M. Urban's work on the question of values (value often being considered as qualities of goodness or badness), and at B. Croce's arguments on value judgements. Ross concludes that the arguments in favour of thinking of value as an objective are no more successful than those in favour of treating it as a relation, and presents a lengthy validation of his conclusion, based largely on discussion of beauty and goodness.Less
This is the second of five chapters on good, and starts by making the point that it is around the question of the intrinsically good that the chief controversies about the nature of goodness or value revolve, for most theories of value may be divided into those that treat it as a quality and those that treat it as a relation between that which has value and something else (which is usually some state of mind); Ross says that it seems clear that any view that treats goodness as a relation between that which is good and something else denies that anything is intrinsically good. The chapter first discusses R. B. Perry's relational view of value—in the sense of good, and other theories that also identify goodness with some relation, either as a relation between that which is good and some or all of its elements, or as a relation between some or all of its elements, or as a relation between it or some or all of its elements and something else. Next, the psychological theories of good are discussed; these, as a rule, hold that a thing being good means either that some person or persons have some feelings towards it, or some person or persons think it to be good; this is an objective view of good. The rest of the chapter looks at both R. B. Perry's and G. E. Moore's arguments on these theories, at Ross's own views, at badness as incompatible with goodness or as an element of a good thing, at W. M. Urban's work on the question of values (value often being considered as qualities of goodness or badness), and at B. Croce's arguments on value judgements. Ross concludes that the arguments in favour of thinking of value as an objective are no more successful than those in favour of treating it as a relation, and presents a lengthy validation of his conclusion, based largely on discussion of beauty and goodness.
Elizabeth Anderson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195305104
- eISBN:
- 9780199850556
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305104.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
This chapter examines some of the tensions among animal welfare, animal rights, and environmental protection ethics. It explains that while animal rights advocates object to animal experimentation, ...
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This chapter examines some of the tensions among animal welfare, animal rights, and environmental protection ethics. It explains that while animal rights advocates object to animal experimentation, this practice is acceptable to those who believe in animal welfare. The chapter shows that those who believe in environmental ethics might support the hunting of deer and rabbits when this is necessary to protect ecological well-being. It proposes an alternative approach to understanding the evaluative claims of the three perspectives, called rational attitude theory of value.Less
This chapter examines some of the tensions among animal welfare, animal rights, and environmental protection ethics. It explains that while animal rights advocates object to animal experimentation, this practice is acceptable to those who believe in animal welfare. The chapter shows that those who believe in environmental ethics might support the hunting of deer and rabbits when this is necessary to protect ecological well-being. It proposes an alternative approach to understanding the evaluative claims of the three perspectives, called rational attitude theory of value.
S. N. Afriat
- Published in print:
- 1987
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198284611
- eISBN:
- 9780191595844
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198284616.003.0007
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This is the first of six chapters in Part II about demand and utility cost, a typical area for what is understood as choice theory. It discusses utility hypothesis and the theory of value. Its five ...
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This is the first of six chapters in Part II about demand and utility cost, a typical area for what is understood as choice theory. It discusses utility hypothesis and the theory of value. Its five sections are: needs of measurement (of utility); common practice and (William) Fleetwood; parallels in theory (as applied to utility construction); revealed preference (as applied to demand functions); and the classical case (of the utility function).Less
This is the first of six chapters in Part II about demand and utility cost, a typical area for what is understood as choice theory. It discusses utility hypothesis and the theory of value. Its five sections are: needs of measurement (of utility); common practice and (William) Fleetwood; parallels in theory (as applied to utility construction); revealed preference (as applied to demand functions); and the classical case (of the utility function).
Chris Heathwood
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199606375
- eISBN:
- 9780191729478
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606375.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
One of the most important disputes in the foundations of ethics concerns the source of practical reasons. On the desire-based view, only one's desires (broadly construed) provide one with reasons to ...
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One of the most important disputes in the foundations of ethics concerns the source of practical reasons. On the desire-based view, only one's desires (broadly construed) provide one with reasons to act. On the value-based view, reasons are instead provided by the objective evaluative facts, and never by our desires. Similarly, there are desire-based and non-desired-based theories of two other phenomena: pleasure and welfare. It has been argued, and is natural to think, that holding a desire-based theory about either pleasure or welfare commits one to recognizing that desires do provide reasons for action – i.e., commits one to abandoning the value-based theory of reasons. The purpose of this chapter is to show that this is not so. All of the following can be true: pleasure and welfare provide reasons; pleasure and welfare are to be understood in terms of desire; desires never provide reasons, in the relevant way.Less
One of the most important disputes in the foundations of ethics concerns the source of practical reasons. On the desire-based view, only one's desires (broadly construed) provide one with reasons to act. On the value-based view, reasons are instead provided by the objective evaluative facts, and never by our desires. Similarly, there are desire-based and non-desired-based theories of two other phenomena: pleasure and welfare. It has been argued, and is natural to think, that holding a desire-based theory about either pleasure or welfare commits one to recognizing that desires do provide reasons for action – i.e., commits one to abandoning the value-based theory of reasons. The purpose of this chapter is to show that this is not so. All of the following can be true: pleasure and welfare provide reasons; pleasure and welfare are to be understood in terms of desire; desires never provide reasons, in the relevant way.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199583676
- eISBN:
- 9780191745294
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583676.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter assesses Nadeem Hussain's well-known moral fictionalist interpretation of Nietzsche. It also evaluates moral fictionalism as a free standing meta-ethical view. It distinguishes different ...
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This chapter assesses Nadeem Hussain's well-known moral fictionalist interpretation of Nietzsche. It also evaluates moral fictionalism as a free standing meta-ethical view. It distinguishes different forms of subjective realism about the truth conditions of moral statements. It is argued that Nietzsche's influence on contemporary meta-ethics is not that of a pioneer of a novel meta-ethical approach to our ethical commitments such as fictionalism. Instead he defends a plausible form of subjective realism in a way that connects with his primarily normative interests. Nietzsche is interested in the subjective conditions for valuation, not necessarily scepticism about value as a whole, with the ultimate aim of diagnosing a nihilism that fails to take any existing values as worthwhile ends.Less
This chapter assesses Nadeem Hussain's well-known moral fictionalist interpretation of Nietzsche. It also evaluates moral fictionalism as a free standing meta-ethical view. It distinguishes different forms of subjective realism about the truth conditions of moral statements. It is argued that Nietzsche's influence on contemporary meta-ethics is not that of a pioneer of a novel meta-ethical approach to our ethical commitments such as fictionalism. Instead he defends a plausible form of subjective realism in a way that connects with his primarily normative interests. Nietzsche is interested in the subjective conditions for valuation, not necessarily scepticism about value as a whole, with the ultimate aim of diagnosing a nihilism that fails to take any existing values as worthwhile ends.
Kathleen Blake
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199563265
- eISBN:
- 9780191721809
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563265.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century and Victorian Literature
Benthamites and economists acknowledge a principle of pain in work. But there is to be no self‐sacrifice that outruns self‐interest. Indeed in contemplating work, these writers communicate an element ...
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Benthamites and economists acknowledge a principle of pain in work. But there is to be no self‐sacrifice that outruns self‐interest. Indeed in contemplating work, these writers communicate an element of gratification. Heeding German Romantic influences on Carlyle, which have received much attention, the chapter explores overlooked Utilitarian‐economic influences as well. It shows how the labor theory of value comes together with Romantic ideas on creation, vocation, and everyday work (in this era encompassing industrial production) to form Carlyle's Gospel of Work. The chapter treats Sartor Resartus, Carlyle's annotations of Mill's Principles of Political Economy, and the application of a new‐forged work ethic to the topical cause of work‐reform in the Church of England, as represented in Anthony Trollope's novel The Warden. Thematically and by means of their styles, Carlyle and Trollope affirm work‐as‐pain but only so far as it serves and eventuates in pleasure.Less
Benthamites and economists acknowledge a principle of pain in work. But there is to be no self‐sacrifice that outruns self‐interest. Indeed in contemplating work, these writers communicate an element of gratification. Heeding German Romantic influences on Carlyle, which have received much attention, the chapter explores overlooked Utilitarian‐economic influences as well. It shows how the labor theory of value comes together with Romantic ideas on creation, vocation, and everyday work (in this era encompassing industrial production) to form Carlyle's Gospel of Work. The chapter treats Sartor Resartus, Carlyle's annotations of Mill's Principles of Political Economy, and the application of a new‐forged work ethic to the topical cause of work‐reform in the Church of England, as represented in Anthony Trollope's novel The Warden. Thematically and by means of their styles, Carlyle and Trollope affirm work‐as‐pain but only so far as it serves and eventuates in pleasure.
Jeanette Kennett
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199266302
- eISBN:
- 9780191699146
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266302.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter describes Gary Watson's view of human psychology and the account of weakness which he derives from it. The chapter starts by examining an approach, rooted in the Platonic view of human ...
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This chapter describes Gary Watson's view of human psychology and the account of weakness which he derives from it. The chapter starts by examining an approach, rooted in the Platonic view of human psychology, which distinguishes between valuing and mere desiring. The chapter's thesis is that the evaluation cannot be understood in isolation from the notion of justification. In explicating the distinction between valuing and desiring, it focuses on deliberation itself. The latter part of the chapter examines how response-dispositional theories of value make the connection between these evaluative judgements and desire. It suggests a Kantian modification to underwrite the defeasible link between normative judgement and desire. The solution points to the rational centrality of the capacity from self-control.Less
This chapter describes Gary Watson's view of human psychology and the account of weakness which he derives from it. The chapter starts by examining an approach, rooted in the Platonic view of human psychology, which distinguishes between valuing and mere desiring. The chapter's thesis is that the evaluation cannot be understood in isolation from the notion of justification. In explicating the distinction between valuing and desiring, it focuses on deliberation itself. The latter part of the chapter examines how response-dispositional theories of value make the connection between these evaluative judgements and desire. It suggests a Kantian modification to underwrite the defeasible link between normative judgement and desire. The solution points to the rational centrality of the capacity from self-control.
David Kazanjian
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520224384
- eISBN:
- 9780520925267
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520224384.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter introduces Olaudah Equiano and examines the concept of U.S. mercantilism. It begins by suggesting that Equiano's text urges people to consider how mercantilism worked to produce and to ...
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This chapter introduces Olaudah Equiano and examines the concept of U.S. mercantilism. It begins by suggesting that Equiano's text urges people to consider how mercantilism worked to produce and to touch practices and discourses of “nation”, “equality”, and “race” during the late-eighteenth century. This is followed by a discussion on how Karl Marx's theory of value led to a critique of mercantilism's expression of formal and abstract equality with national and racial codification. The chapter then reviews Equiano's text before studying its representation of the expression of formal and abstract equality in the mercantilist conjuncture during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.Less
This chapter introduces Olaudah Equiano and examines the concept of U.S. mercantilism. It begins by suggesting that Equiano's text urges people to consider how mercantilism worked to produce and to touch practices and discourses of “nation”, “equality”, and “race” during the late-eighteenth century. This is followed by a discussion on how Karl Marx's theory of value led to a critique of mercantilism's expression of formal and abstract equality with national and racial codification. The chapter then reviews Equiano's text before studying its representation of the expression of formal and abstract equality in the mercantilist conjuncture during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.
Alec Nove
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198278665
- eISBN:
- 9780191684227
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198278665.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter suggests that Bukharin was one of the few Bolsheviks familiar with ‘bourgeois’ economics. It considers The Political Rentier (1914), in which he counterposed the labour theory of value ...
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This chapter suggests that Bukharin was one of the few Bolsheviks familiar with ‘bourgeois’ economics. It considers The Political Rentier (1914), in which he counterposed the labour theory of value to marginal-utility theory, arguing that it reflected the shift of emphasis in ‘bourgeois’ theory from production to consumption, from entrepreneurs to rentiers.Less
This chapter suggests that Bukharin was one of the few Bolsheviks familiar with ‘bourgeois’ economics. It considers The Political Rentier (1914), in which he counterposed the labour theory of value to marginal-utility theory, arguing that it reflected the shift of emphasis in ‘bourgeois’ theory from production to consumption, from entrepreneurs to rentiers.
André Orléan
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262026970
- eISBN:
- 9780262323901
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026970.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
Resolving the enigma of what is called market isolation—how the activities of agents who are strangers to one another, as neoclassical theory supposes, come to be reliably coordinated—depends on ...
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Resolving the enigma of what is called market isolation—how the activities of agents who are strangers to one another, as neoclassical theory supposes, come to be reliably coordinated—depends on recognizing value as the fundamental principle of market activity. Labor and utility theories of value both conceive of it as an objective magnitude that preexists market exchange. This basic assumption, called the substance hypothesis, underlies both the orthodox refusal to acknowledge the role of money and the undervaluing of exchange itself. How order is traditionally imagined to emerge from disorder is discussed, together with the Marxian concept of the fetishism of the commodity. Finally, the singular status of economics in relation to the other social sciences, which emphasize the role of subjective judgment in determining value, is insisted upon.Less
Resolving the enigma of what is called market isolation—how the activities of agents who are strangers to one another, as neoclassical theory supposes, come to be reliably coordinated—depends on recognizing value as the fundamental principle of market activity. Labor and utility theories of value both conceive of it as an objective magnitude that preexists market exchange. This basic assumption, called the substance hypothesis, underlies both the orthodox refusal to acknowledge the role of money and the undervaluing of exchange itself. How order is traditionally imagined to emerge from disorder is discussed, together with the Marxian concept of the fetishism of the commodity. Finally, the singular status of economics in relation to the other social sciences, which emphasize the role of subjective judgment in determining value, is insisted upon.
Robert Stern
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199608553
- eISBN:
- 9780191729645
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608553.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This article considers Christine Korsgaard's argument for the value of humanity, and the role that her transcendental argument plays in this, to the effect that an agent must value her own humanity. ...
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This article considers Christine Korsgaard's argument for the value of humanity, and the role that her transcendental argument plays in this, to the effect that an agent must value her own humanity. Two forms of that argument are considered, and the second is defended. The analysis of her position is also put in the context of debates about transcendental arguments more generally.Less
This article considers Christine Korsgaard's argument for the value of humanity, and the role that her transcendental argument plays in this, to the effect that an agent must value her own humanity. Two forms of that argument are considered, and the second is defended. The analysis of her position is also put in the context of debates about transcendental arguments more generally.
Matt Price
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226136806
- eISBN:
- 9780226136820
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226136820.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
This chapter explores a specifically twentieth- (and now twenty-first) century conundrum: how to assess the value of nature and natural goods, and to weigh that value against other goods in a moral ...
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This chapter explores a specifically twentieth- (and now twenty-first) century conundrum: how to assess the value of nature and natural goods, and to weigh that value against other goods in a moral calculus. The contemporary obsession with nature's value reopens a question that John Locke thought he had solved in the seventeenth century. Indeed, modern economics begins with his all-but-categorical denial of the value of nature's works. The labor theory of value required it: Locke needed to show that human activity was the true source of all value, thereby grounding his theory of property, his liberal version of the social contract, and his arguments on political authority. If the lands untouched by human toil, and their value, had to be sacrificed on the altar of property, that was hardly controversial in an era when “wilderness” was a term of abuse. But ever since the hedonic theory of utilitarianism captured political economy from the dismal scientists, economists have rejected toil in favor of pleasure, and spaces once called wastelands are now more often named wetlands.Less
This chapter explores a specifically twentieth- (and now twenty-first) century conundrum: how to assess the value of nature and natural goods, and to weigh that value against other goods in a moral calculus. The contemporary obsession with nature's value reopens a question that John Locke thought he had solved in the seventeenth century. Indeed, modern economics begins with his all-but-categorical denial of the value of nature's works. The labor theory of value required it: Locke needed to show that human activity was the true source of all value, thereby grounding his theory of property, his liberal version of the social contract, and his arguments on political authority. If the lands untouched by human toil, and their value, had to be sacrificed on the altar of property, that was hardly controversial in an era when “wilderness” was a term of abuse. But ever since the hedonic theory of utilitarianism captured political economy from the dismal scientists, economists have rejected toil in favor of pleasure, and spaces once called wastelands are now more often named wetlands.
Mark R. Reiff
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199664009
- eISBN:
- 9780191751400
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664009.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter examines the distinction between a gift and an exchange, explains how concerns over the commodification of goods, the legality of transactions, and the capacity of the parties relate to ...
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This chapter examines the distinction between a gift and an exchange, explains how concerns over the commodification of goods, the legality of transactions, and the capacity of the parties relate to the conception of exploitation the book presents, and explores the meaning of value and voluntariness, two critical elements of this conception. The chapter also discusses the acceptability of the labor theory of value, which up until now has been treated as the only serious candidate for an objective measure of value, and suggests that we replace the labor theory of value with an alternative objective measure based on the legal concept of consideration. Finally, the chapter explains why there is no need to root the conception of exploitation employed in the book in some notion of coercion.Less
This chapter examines the distinction between a gift and an exchange, explains how concerns over the commodification of goods, the legality of transactions, and the capacity of the parties relate to the conception of exploitation the book presents, and explores the meaning of value and voluntariness, two critical elements of this conception. The chapter also discusses the acceptability of the labor theory of value, which up until now has been treated as the only serious candidate for an objective measure of value, and suggests that we replace the labor theory of value with an alternative objective measure based on the legal concept of consideration. Finally, the chapter explains why there is no need to root the conception of exploitation employed in the book in some notion of coercion.
Ernesto Screpanti and Stefano Zamagni
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198774556
- eISBN:
- 9780191717383
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198774559.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
Deals with the consolidation of Smithian orthodoxy in the age of Ricardo, Malthus, and J. S. Mill. The Ricardian theories of rent and of the decreasing returns are utilized to explain the contrast ...
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Deals with the consolidation of Smithian orthodoxy in the age of Ricardo, Malthus, and J. S. Mill. The Ricardian theories of rent and of the decreasing returns are utilized to explain the contrast with Malthus on the corn laws. Some emphasis is given to the English monetary theories of H. Thorton and J. S. Mill. Finally, the rise of the German Historical School is put into perspective.Less
Deals with the consolidation of Smithian orthodoxy in the age of Ricardo, Malthus, and J. S. Mill. The Ricardian theories of rent and of the decreasing returns are utilized to explain the contrast with Malthus on the corn laws. Some emphasis is given to the English monetary theories of H. Thorton and J. S. Mill. Finally, the rise of the German Historical School is put into perspective.
Mark Harvey and Norman Geras
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781526114020
- eISBN:
- 9781526136046
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9781526114020.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter presents the central argument of the book, jointly written by Mark Harvey and Norman Geras. It develops a systematic critique of Marx’s foundational theory of class division and ...
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This chapter presents the central argument of the book, jointly written by Mark Harvey and Norman Geras. It develops a systematic critique of Marx’s foundational theory of class division and inequality, the Labour Theory of Value. It presents an alternative, neo-Polanyian, framework for analysing inequalities and how they are generated at different times in different societies. It argues for a broader concept of just distribution to include both market and public goods.Less
This chapter presents the central argument of the book, jointly written by Mark Harvey and Norman Geras. It develops a systematic critique of Marx’s foundational theory of class division and inequality, the Labour Theory of Value. It presents an alternative, neo-Polanyian, framework for analysing inequalities and how they are generated at different times in different societies. It argues for a broader concept of just distribution to include both market and public goods.
Russell Daylight
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748641970
- eISBN:
- 9780748671564
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748641970.003.0003
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Theoretical Linguistics
This chapter attempts to establish the originality which Jacques Derrida grants to Ferdinand de Saussure within the epoch of the sign. Such originality stands or falls on the status of Saussure's ...
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This chapter attempts to establish the originality which Jacques Derrida grants to Ferdinand de Saussure within the epoch of the sign. Such originality stands or falls on the status of Saussure's theory of linguistic value. While Derrida never explicitly addresses this theory, his comments on Saussure's maintenance of ‘a transcendental signified’ would seem to neutralise the possibility of such a theory, as Saussure describes it. What is the evidence for determining Derrida's position on the originality of Saussure? From the very first time that Saussure is mentioned in Speech and Phenomena, in which Derrida suggests that the only innovation of the Saussurean signifier is to make it mental, Derrida's engagement with Saussure is frequently punctuated with the question of Saussure's originality. In Speech and Phenomena, Derrida appears to be applying a very Saussurean argument against the text of Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations. This chapter also looks at Max Weber's views on Saussure's theory of value as well as the impediment and progress of Saussurean linguistics.Less
This chapter attempts to establish the originality which Jacques Derrida grants to Ferdinand de Saussure within the epoch of the sign. Such originality stands or falls on the status of Saussure's theory of linguistic value. While Derrida never explicitly addresses this theory, his comments on Saussure's maintenance of ‘a transcendental signified’ would seem to neutralise the possibility of such a theory, as Saussure describes it. What is the evidence for determining Derrida's position on the originality of Saussure? From the very first time that Saussure is mentioned in Speech and Phenomena, in which Derrida suggests that the only innovation of the Saussurean signifier is to make it mental, Derrida's engagement with Saussure is frequently punctuated with the question of Saussure's originality. In Speech and Phenomena, Derrida appears to be applying a very Saussurean argument against the text of Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations. This chapter also looks at Max Weber's views on Saussure's theory of value as well as the impediment and progress of Saussurean linguistics.