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This introductory chapter begins by setting out the purpose of the book, which is to argue that Hume was largely right about the architecture of the cognitive mind. Hume saw that accepting (what historians of philosophy call) the ‘Theory of Ideas’is central to constructing an empirically adequate account of cognition; indeed, that it is primarily the commitment to the Theory of Ideas that determines what form an empirically adequate cognitive psychology must take. For Hume, as for our contemporary cognitive science, the mind is preeminently the locus of mental representation and mental causation. In this respect, Hume's cognitive science is a footnote to Descartes's, and ours is a footnote to his. It is further argued that Hume's view is essentially Cartesian: concepts are species of mental representations, and are distinguished by what they mentally represent.

This chapter examines the relation between Gilles Deleuze's theory of Ideas and the theme of immanence, particularly with regard to the theory of Ideas found in Immanuel Kant's three critiques. It argues that if the theory of Ideas can be seen as the thread that unites Kant's critical project, Deleuze's own differential and immanent theory of Ideas can similarly be seen as the ‘rhizome’ that gathers together the diverse strands of Deleuze's own philosophical project. It highlights the similarities between Deleuze's Difference and Repetition and Anti-Oedipus with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason.

Hume's Treatise is the foundational document of modern cognitive science: it made explicit, for the first time, the project of constructing an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational theory of mind; in effect, on the basis of the Theory of Ideas. Saving only some retrospectively embarrassing behaviourist interludes, the pursuit of this program has been the main work of the last two hundred years of research on cognition. This chapter surveys a number of problems about the mind for which the Theory of Ideas offers what appear to be viable solutions; some that Hume suggested and some that he didn't but (save for the anachronisms) perfectly well could have, consonant with what is considered to be his sense of the enterprise. Although it cannot be proven that the Theory of Ideas is the right approach, there are still a striking number of barriers.

Plato carefully explored the nature of what he saw as truth and its importance for life. To try to understand Plato's specific exploration of truth is therefore to try to understand the nature of truth and its importance for life. Plato is often ironic, saying or doing one thing in order to say or do another very different and often directly opposed thing. His irony is usually understood to occur in the context of a non-ironic doctrine about, or understanding of, or attitude toward the world and the place of people in it. In keeping with Plato's possible use of irony, it is arguable that there are strong similarities in the ways in which Plato and Aristotle used the theory of Ideas, each using it to say something else for his very different ends. If so, Plato was much more subtle about it. This subtlety runs to the root and core of his philosophy.

J. S. Mill’s emotional investment in the Utilitarian program is discussed, and accounted for as an aesthetic response to Benthamism. Associationist psychology is introduced, and it is argued that the young Mill lacked the theoretical resources to explain his own commitment to and identification with the Utilitarian agenda.