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Davidson replies to critics (in particular Hartry Field and Gilbert Harman) who have objected that truth theories cannot do the duty of meaning theories if they fail to elucidate the concept of reference on which they rely (Hartry Field, Gilbert Harman). In response, Davidson explains precisely why truth theories do not and need not explain or analyse the concepts of satisfaction and denotation (cf Essay 14) once these are characterized recursively (which requires that the basic vocabulary is finite, as Essay 1 had demanded on grounds of the language's learnability). He further shows how taking the relation of reference as being central when explaining the relation of language to world collapses into a discredited ‘building‐block theory’ of language (see Essay 1) and neglects the semantic primacy of the sentence. This primacy, argues Davidson, can only be acknowledged by making truth and sentential structure one's central semantic concepts; further, truth theories are testable only at the sentential level, not at that of subsentential reference.

This chapter focuses on the process of building theory from the concepts and categories developed in open coding. It introduces and illustrates the concepts of axial coding and selective coding, the final stage of grounded theory coding. A variety of techniques to stimulate thinking in the later stages of coding, such as the use of matrices and diagrams, are illustrated. The chapter emphasizes how these techniques fit into the multistage abductive process of grounded theory. The use of these techniques is illustrated in the exemplar grounded theory social work studies. The chapter concludes with exercises that students and researchers can use to apply the material in this chapter.

This chapter discusses the long-term effect of positive emotions on a person's well-being. A brief history on the research done on positive emotions is reviewed and several trends are identified. First, positive emotions have been neglected relative to negative emotions. Second, positive emotions have often been confused with related affective states. Third, the functions of positive emotions are identified as facilitating approach behaviour. The author then proposes an alternative model, the broaden-and-build theory, to better capture the unique effects of positive emotions. This is then contrasted with traditional models based on specific action tendencies. The chapter ends with a discussion on the research findings which reveal that positive emotions broaden thought-action repertoires, undo lingering negative emotions, fuel psychological resiliency, build personal resources, promote physical and psychological well-being, and engender the complex dynamics that enable humans to thrive and flourish in their day-to-day lives.

Davidson asks what properties a language must have to be learnable. He criticizes a (then) popular response that models the order of language acquisition on the epistemological priority of the types of expressions learnt; he labels this position the ‘building‐block theory’ (see further Essay 16). He discusses Strawson's critique of Quine's elimination of singular terms and shows how it is likewise premissed on the questionable derivation of claims about language learning from purely a priori considerations. On the positive side, Davidson proposes that a language is learnable by a creature with finite means if the language's number of semantic primitives or undefinables is finite. Using this criterion, he demonstrates that various theories in the philosophy of language introduce an infinite number of semantic primitives into the language and thus make it unlearnable; theories he alleges of this error (1) model quotations on names of expressions (Tarski, Quine; cf Essay 6), (2) analyse belief attributions in terms of linguistic marks (Scheffler, Carnap) or distinct one‐place predicates for each attributed belief (Quine; cf Essay 7), or (3) postulate intensional entities into their overall semantic framework (Frege, Church).

This chapter addresses the question: What do we mean by a theory of ecology? To do so, several others are first addressed: What is a theory? What are the special challenges ecology poses for theory building and testing? Does theory have to be based on mechanisms to be scientific? What do we actually mean by ‘mechanism’? Can theories based on manifestly incorrect assumptions be of value in science? Addressing these questions leads to a sharper idea of the nature of the theory to be developed in the subsequent chapters.

This chapter revisits the empirical findings of the volume, seeking to discern common themes regarding each facet of representation. Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo consider possible connections between methodology and conclusions. They then delve into variations, comparing insights across sections to explore how features beyond the presence of a quota may shape the effects observed, including (1) quota design, adoption, and implementation, (2) political institutions and context, and (3) learning over time. Putting these elements together, the final part draws on the case study evidence to theorize and illustrate how patterns with regard to one facet of representation may shape outcomes related to another facet of representation. Based on this collective theory-building exercise, the volume concludes with some thoughts on avenues for future research, emphasizing the importance of generating both cumulative and comparative frameworks for studying the impact of gender quota policies.

Commencing with a state-of-the-science overview by Professor Barbara Fredrickson, this chapter explores the broaden-and-build theory and the role that positive emotions play in triggering upward spirals to wellbeing. It is proposed that helping students and staff to develop skills and knowledge that enable them to anticipate, initiate, experience, prolong, and build positive emotions is central to their experience of school as well as their effective learning. The chapter then explores how positive emotions such as love, hope, contentment, and pride can be infused into daily school life. It showcases the role that gratitude and savoring play in creating thriving schools, and explores how “hunting the good stuff” and celebrating “what went well” are implemented throughout the Geelong Grammar School community. Also discussed are skills and strategies for promoting the emotional health of students and staff.

This chapter critiques a number of standard ways of understanding the role of the metalanguage in a semantic theory for natural language, including the idea that disquotation plays a nontrivial role in any explanatory natural language semantics. It then proposes that the best way to understand the role of a semantic metalanguage involves recognizing that semantics is a model-based science. The metalanguage of semantics is language for articulating features of the theorist’s model. Models are understood as mediating instruments—idealized structures used to represent select aspects of the world, aspects the theorist is seeking some theoretical understanding of. The aspect of reality we are seeking some understanding of in semantics is a dimension of human linguistic competence—informally, knowledge of meaning.

This chapter discusses the influence of Esping-Andersen’s work in comparative analyses of the welfare state in East Asia. On the one hand, it has led to an enormous increase of social scientific interest beyond the once dominant intellectual terrain of economic development. On the other hand, while we now know much more about the East Asian welfare systems and their uniqueness and similarities than before, there has been lack of progress towards a more nuanced theory-building process. Limited in ambition, perhaps, little is available about East Asian welfare development that can parallel some of the path-breaking contributions concerning the development of welfare states in the West. As such, the focus on typologising that has been prompted by The three worlds of welfare capitalism might have produced a blind alley at the expense of the bigger and arguably more important question of why welfare regimes develop.

This chapter addresses the question of whether experimental economics is living up to its promise of an informing theory, discovering new facts, and enlightening policy. By and large the answer is yes and examples are provided where, with the help of experiments, theory has gone through a process of creative destruction from theory testing, to exploring unpredicted regularities, to theory building and testing again.

Chapter 1 outlines the key principles that guide interview-based research and highlights the unique contributions this can yield. Conducting depth interviews places each participant’s voice at the heart of the study, giving participants an opportunity to tell their stories in their own words and to think more deeply about their experiences than is usually possible with other methods. Through careful questioning, concentrated listening, and focused follow-up probing, interviewers invite further exploration that encourages people to share their life experiences, describe the social contexts surrounding these experiences, and consider their personal reactions to them, including the meaning they attribute to life events and the accounts, motivations, and actions these events engender. Then, through systematic analysis of how each piece of information stands in relationship to the other information offered by that participant and all the others, it becomes possible to chart the dynamic processes that shape life trajectories and link individual actions to larger social structures. This enables interviewers to address their original question(s) and any new ones that emerge to discover empirical patterns and develop theoretical insights.

Andy Clark has been an agenda-setting figure since the dawn of his career, and, in book after book, he has laid out grand theories that invite his readers to see the human mind in new ways. With each book, Clark delivers a new and exciting vision of how the mind works. His fans can hardly keep up, and each is left wondering which of Clark’s theories to sign up for. Are they progressive stages in one grand narrative? A protracted plea for pluralism? Or a succession of new paradigms that displace their predecessors? Some noted philosophers have early, late, and even middle periods. With Clark, one might ask if each book is a metamorphosis. If so, how do we decide which Clark to follow? This chapter is about that question, and about the broader issue, which it begs: What is a theory of mind?