J. R. LUCAS
- Published in print:
- 1970
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198243434
- eISBN:
- 9780191680687
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243434.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
Four sorts of determinism have at various times been put forward, and have been felt to threaten the freedom of the will and human responsibility. They are: logical determinism, theological ...
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Four sorts of determinism have at various times been put forward, and have been felt to threaten the freedom of the will and human responsibility. They are: logical determinism, theological determinism, psychological determinism, and physical determinism. Logical determinism maintains that the future is already fixed as unalterably as the past. Theological determinism argues that since God is omniscient, He knows everything, the future included. Psychological determinism maintains that there are certain psychological laws which we are beginning to discover, enabling us to predict, usually on the basis of his experiences in early infancy, how a man will respond to different situations throughout his later life. Physical determinism is based on there being physical laws of nature, many of which have actually been discovered, and of whose truth we can reasonably hope to be quite certain, together with the claim that all other features of the world are dependent on physical factors.Less
Four sorts of determinism have at various times been put forward, and have been felt to threaten the freedom of the will and human responsibility. They are: logical determinism, theological determinism, psychological determinism, and physical determinism. Logical determinism maintains that the future is already fixed as unalterably as the past. Theological determinism argues that since God is omniscient, He knows everything, the future included. Psychological determinism maintains that there are certain psychological laws which we are beginning to discover, enabling us to predict, usually on the basis of his experiences in early infancy, how a man will respond to different situations throughout his later life. Physical determinism is based on there being physical laws of nature, many of which have actually been discovered, and of whose truth we can reasonably hope to be quite certain, together with the claim that all other features of the world are dependent on physical factors.
D. Jason Slone
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195169263
- eISBN:
- 9780199835256
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169263.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
People believe that human beings or other mundane agents (mechanical processes, other people, etc.) cause most of life’s events, despite their religious beliefs. Thus, there is tension between ...
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People believe that human beings or other mundane agents (mechanical processes, other people, etc.) cause most of life’s events, despite their religious beliefs. Thus, there is tension between theological determinism (events are controlled by God), and free will (events are controlled by human beings). It is argued that this tension results from the ambiguity of agency.Less
People believe that human beings or other mundane agents (mechanical processes, other people, etc.) cause most of life’s events, despite their religious beliefs. Thus, there is tension between theological determinism (events are controlled by God), and free will (events are controlled by human beings). It is argued that this tension results from the ambiguity of agency.
J. R. Lucas
- Published in print:
- 1970
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198243434
- eISBN:
- 9780191680687
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243434.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
The chief theological argument for determinism is the argument from omniscience, although other arguments, from omnipotence and from grace are also invoked. Many thinkers have been reluctant to ...
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The chief theological argument for determinism is the argument from omniscience, although other arguments, from omnipotence and from grace are also invoked. Many thinkers have been reluctant to accept the implications of theological determinism. For, however much a Christian may believe in the omniscience of God, he also is committed to the freedom of man. Many different devices have been adopted to preserve freedom and responsibility in the face of omniscience.Less
The chief theological argument for determinism is the argument from omniscience, although other arguments, from omnipotence and from grace are also invoked. Many thinkers have been reluctant to accept the implications of theological determinism. For, however much a Christian may believe in the omniscience of God, he also is committed to the freedom of man. Many different devices have been adopted to preserve freedom and responsibility in the face of omniscience.
Derk Pereboom
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- June 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198743958
- eISBN:
- 9780191803956
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743958.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the fact that one cannot rationally accept both theological determinism and the libertarian conception of free will, and asks which of the two is preferable. The main reason to ...
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This chapter examines the fact that one cannot rationally accept both theological determinism and the libertarian conception of free will, and asks which of the two is preferable. The main reason to opt for theological determinism is that it provides an uncontroversial route to a strong notion of divine providence. The only proposal for securing such a conception of providence absent theological determinism is Molinism, and its status is uncertain. Libertarianism would provide us with basic desert moral responsibility, and also a promising response to the problem of evil. But theistic religion can do without basic desert moral responsibility, and responses to the problem of evil that essentially involve free will on the libertarian conception turn out to be ineffective when it comes to horrendous evils. Accordingly, this chapter contends that theological determinism is preferable, and regards the libertarian conception of free will as dispensable.Less
This chapter examines the fact that one cannot rationally accept both theological determinism and the libertarian conception of free will, and asks which of the two is preferable. The main reason to opt for theological determinism is that it provides an uncontroversial route to a strong notion of divine providence. The only proposal for securing such a conception of providence absent theological determinism is Molinism, and its status is uncertain. Libertarianism would provide us with basic desert moral responsibility, and also a promising response to the problem of evil. But theistic religion can do without basic desert moral responsibility, and responses to the problem of evil that essentially involve free will on the libertarian conception turn out to be ineffective when it comes to horrendous evils. Accordingly, this chapter contends that theological determinism is preferable, and regards the libertarian conception of free will as dispensable.
Derk Pereboom
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190611200
- eISBN:
- 9780190611224
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190611200.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion
Increasingly, theists have come to see their relationship with God as anological to an exemplary human relationship. Seeing it this way would be difficult, supposing a traditional theological ...
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Increasingly, theists have come to see their relationship with God as anological to an exemplary human relationship. Seeing it this way would be difficult, supposing a traditional theological determinist view of providence in which God elects some to salvation in heaven and others to eternal damnation. But, as Derk Pereboom explains in this esssay, if one accepts universal salvation and denies divine retribution, both libertarianism and theological determinism accommodate a good relationship with God. Each of these positions can secure trust in God by a developmental account for why God permits evil, and by a sufficiently strong notion of divine providence can be used to respond to the problem of evil. The challenge that valuable love for God is ruled out by theological determinism can be answered by reflecting on what sorts of loving responses we ordinarily cherish.Less
Increasingly, theists have come to see their relationship with God as anological to an exemplary human relationship. Seeing it this way would be difficult, supposing a traditional theological determinist view of providence in which God elects some to salvation in heaven and others to eternal damnation. But, as Derk Pereboom explains in this esssay, if one accepts universal salvation and denies divine retribution, both libertarianism and theological determinism accommodate a good relationship with God. Each of these positions can secure trust in God by a developmental account for why God permits evil, and by a sufficiently strong notion of divine providence can be used to respond to the problem of evil. The challenge that valuable love for God is ruled out by theological determinism can be answered by reflecting on what sorts of loving responses we ordinarily cherish.
W. Matthews Grant
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- June 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198743958
- eISBN:
- 9780191803956
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743958.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
According to the traditional doctrine of divine universal causality (DUC), God directly causes all being distinct from himself, with the implication that God directly causes all creaturely actions. ...
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According to the traditional doctrine of divine universal causality (DUC), God directly causes all being distinct from himself, with the implication that God directly causes all creaturely actions. Prevailing opinion holds that, if God causes our actions, then they cannot be free in the libertarian sense. This chapter argues to the contrary, showing that, given a certain account of divine agency, God’s causing our actions is perfectly consistent with libertarian freedom. It shows, moreover, that DUC, together with some common theistic assumptions, actually precludes those accounts of divine agency on which libertarian freedom is ruled out by God’s causing our actions.Less
According to the traditional doctrine of divine universal causality (DUC), God directly causes all being distinct from himself, with the implication that God directly causes all creaturely actions. Prevailing opinion holds that, if God causes our actions, then they cannot be free in the libertarian sense. This chapter argues to the contrary, showing that, given a certain account of divine agency, God’s causing our actions is perfectly consistent with libertarian freedom. It shows, moreover, that DUC, together with some common theistic assumptions, actually precludes those accounts of divine agency on which libertarian freedom is ruled out by God’s causing our actions.
