Simon Harrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198269847
- eISBN:
- 9780191713385
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free ...
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Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, taking seriously its historical and philosophical form. First, it finds that the dialogical nature of On Free Choice of the Will has been missed, as exemplified by the unhistorical and misleading modern attributions of names to the speakers. Secondly, the commonplace that Augustine changed his mind in the course of its composition is shown to be unfounded, and a case is made for its argumentative coherence. Thirdly, it is shown that it is the form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine’s theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a ‘way in to the will’ that itself instantiates a concept of will. At the heart of this structure is a particular argument that depends on an appeal to a first-person perspective, which ties the vocabulary of will to a concept of freedom and responsibility. This appeal is significantly similar to other arguments deployed by Augustine which are significantly similar to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think therefore I am’. The book goes on to investigate how Augustine’s ‘way in’ relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine’s major and most read works, the Confessions, the City of God, and On the Trinity. The relationship of Augustine’s to Descartes’ ‘cogito’ is also discussed. Augustine elucidates, within a particular Platonic theory of knowledge, a ‘theory of will’ that is grounded in a ‘way in’, which takes the conditions and limits of knowledge seriously.Less
Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, taking seriously its historical and philosophical form. First, it finds that the dialogical nature of On Free Choice of the Will has been missed, as exemplified by the unhistorical and misleading modern attributions of names to the speakers. Secondly, the commonplace that Augustine changed his mind in the course of its composition is shown to be unfounded, and a case is made for its argumentative coherence. Thirdly, it is shown that it is the form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine’s theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a ‘way in to the will’ that itself instantiates a concept of will. At the heart of this structure is a particular argument that depends on an appeal to a first-person perspective, which ties the vocabulary of will to a concept of freedom and responsibility. This appeal is significantly similar to other arguments deployed by Augustine which are significantly similar to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think therefore I am’. The book goes on to investigate how Augustine’s ‘way in’ relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine’s major and most read works, the Confessions, the City of God, and On the Trinity. The relationship of Augustine’s to Descartes’ ‘cogito’ is also discussed. Augustine elucidates, within a particular Platonic theory of knowledge, a ‘theory of will’ that is grounded in a ‘way in’, which takes the conditions and limits of knowledge seriously.
Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691531
- eISBN:
- 9780191731808
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691531.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book is a comprehensive commentary on Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). It differs from most recent commentaries in paying special attention to the structure of the work, ...
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This book is a comprehensive commentary on Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). It differs from most recent commentaries in paying special attention to the structure of the work, the historical context in which it was written, and the views to which Kant was responding. It argues that, despite its relative brevity, the Groundwork is the single most important work in modern moral philosophy and that its significance lies mainly in two closely related factors. The first is that it is here that Kant first articulates his revolutionary principle of the autonomy of the will, that is, the paradoxical thesis that moral requirements (duties) are self-imposed and that it is only in virtue of this that they can be unconditionally binding. The second is that for Kant all other moral theories are united by the assumption that the ground of moral requirements must be located in some object of the will (the good) rather than the will itself, which Kant terms heteronomy. Accordingly, what from the standpoint of previous moral theories was seen as a fundamental conflict between various views of the good is reconceived by Kant as a family quarrel between various forms of heteronomy, none of which are capable of accounting for the unconditionally binding nature of morality. Kant expresses the latter by claiming that they reduce the categorical to a merely hypothetical imperative.Less
This book is a comprehensive commentary on Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). It differs from most recent commentaries in paying special attention to the structure of the work, the historical context in which it was written, and the views to which Kant was responding. It argues that, despite its relative brevity, the Groundwork is the single most important work in modern moral philosophy and that its significance lies mainly in two closely related factors. The first is that it is here that Kant first articulates his revolutionary principle of the autonomy of the will, that is, the paradoxical thesis that moral requirements (duties) are self-imposed and that it is only in virtue of this that they can be unconditionally binding. The second is that for Kant all other moral theories are united by the assumption that the ground of moral requirements must be located in some object of the will (the good) rather than the will itself, which Kant terms heteronomy. Accordingly, what from the standpoint of previous moral theories was seen as a fundamental conflict between various views of the good is reconceived by Kant as a family quarrel between various forms of heteronomy, none of which are capable of accounting for the unconditionally binding nature of morality. Kant expresses the latter by claiming that they reduce the categorical to a merely hypothetical imperative.
Paul Helm
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199255696
- eISBN:
- 9780191602429
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199255695.003.0012
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Develops the theme of divine power raised in the previous chapter. Is God for Calvin a tyrant, a God of pure will? In the light of a consideration of the mediaeval 'power dialectic between God's ...
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Develops the theme of divine power raised in the previous chapter. Is God for Calvin a tyrant, a God of pure will? In the light of a consideration of the mediaeval 'power dialectic between God's 'absolute' and ordained' power, it is shown how Calvin upholds the essence of this distinction but deplores separating God's power from his righteousness. There is a discussion of the relation between the will of God and the atonement of Christ, and of the extent to which it is reasonable to think that Calvin was a 'Scotist'.Less
Develops the theme of divine power raised in the previous chapter. Is God for Calvin a tyrant, a God of pure will? In the light of a consideration of the mediaeval 'power dialectic between God's 'absolute' and ordained' power, it is shown how Calvin upholds the essence of this distinction but deplores separating God's power from his righteousness. There is a discussion of the relation between the will of God and the atonement of Christ, and of the extent to which it is reasonable to think that Calvin was a 'Scotist'.
Paul Helm
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199532186
- eISBN:
- 9780191714580
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199532186.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Although Calvin does not avow compatibilism in so many words, his views on providence and predestination, as well as his doctrine of the bondage of the will to sin and the need for efficacious grace, ...
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Although Calvin does not avow compatibilism in so many words, his views on providence and predestination, as well as his doctrine of the bondage of the will to sin and the need for efficacious grace, fit snugly with compatibilism. Calvin is also a resolute opponent of ‘Stoic fate’, arguing that in that scheme God himself is subject to fate. Nevertheless, there is some historical evidence (via Calvin's reading of Cicero and of Augustine) but also considerable evidence in terms of the coincidence of his ideas, that when he considers human action he thinks like a Stoic. Stoic views are explored at some length, and the points of coincidence established; for example, the idea of the locus of responsibility being the human person; his use of the ‘lazy argument’; and more generally the causal interconnection of means and ends. But there are also elements of ‘hard determinism’ in Calvin's views, notably in the area of the reception of divine grace. For, while a person is to be blamed for his sins, only God is to be praised for any gracious action.Less
Although Calvin does not avow compatibilism in so many words, his views on providence and predestination, as well as his doctrine of the bondage of the will to sin and the need for efficacious grace, fit snugly with compatibilism. Calvin is also a resolute opponent of ‘Stoic fate’, arguing that in that scheme God himself is subject to fate. Nevertheless, there is some historical evidence (via Calvin's reading of Cicero and of Augustine) but also considerable evidence in terms of the coincidence of his ideas, that when he considers human action he thinks like a Stoic. Stoic views are explored at some length, and the points of coincidence established; for example, the idea of the locus of responsibility being the human person; his use of the ‘lazy argument’; and more generally the causal interconnection of means and ends. But there are also elements of ‘hard determinism’ in Calvin's views, notably in the area of the reception of divine grace. For, while a person is to be blamed for his sins, only God is to be praised for any gracious action.
Paul Helm
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199255696
- eISBN:
- 9780191602429
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199255695.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
For Calvin there are 'two issues', the fallenness of humanity and God's providence over all, which must be kept separate in our thinking. Using his The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, this ...
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For Calvin there are 'two issues', the fallenness of humanity and God's providence over all, which must be kept separate in our thinking. Using his The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, this Chapter shows for Calvin how the Fall results in the loss of free will in the sense that mankind is no longer able to choose the good. But his ability to choose between alternatives in 'earthly things' is unimpaired. How far the 'two issues' can be kept separate is considered, and the deterministic implications of Calvin's general approach are considered further.Less
For Calvin there are 'two issues', the fallenness of humanity and God's providence over all, which must be kept separate in our thinking. Using his The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, this Chapter shows for Calvin how the Fall results in the loss of free will in the sense that mankind is no longer able to choose the good. But his ability to choose between alternatives in 'earthly things' is unimpaired. How far the 'two issues' can be kept separate is considered, and the deterministic implications of Calvin's general approach are considered further.
Paul Helm
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199255696
- eISBN:
- 9780191602429
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199255695.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Calvin has a strong dualist view of the human person. His understanding of the immortality of the soul is considered. The main sections of the Chapter are involved in considering three contemporary ...
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Calvin has a strong dualist view of the human person. His understanding of the immortality of the soul is considered. The main sections of the Chapter are involved in considering three contemporary misunderstandings of Calvin's view of the soul. These concern various ways in which the Fall has affected its workings.Less
Calvin has a strong dualist view of the human person. His understanding of the immortality of the soul is considered. The main sections of the Chapter are involved in considering three contemporary misunderstandings of Calvin's view of the soul. These concern various ways in which the Fall has affected its workings.
Thomas E. Hill Jr.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199692002
- eISBN:
- 9780191741241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692002.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter reviews the background in Kant’s moral psychology, suggests how weakness of will might be understood in Kant’s theory, and comments on the implications for moral responsibility. In ...
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This chapter reviews the background in Kant’s moral psychology, suggests how weakness of will might be understood in Kant’s theory, and comments on the implications for moral responsibility. In brief, the proposal is this. For Kant, weakness of will is not a physical incapacity or disability but contrasts with virtue understood as developed strength of will to do our duty despite obstacles. The will is not literally a force, strong or weak, but is conceived as either law-giving practical reason (Wille) or choice to act on a maxim (Willkür). Morally weak persons choose to act on particular maxims in conflict with both practical reason and their general maxim to act as they should. Our general life-governing maxims, like laws of the state, may be weak in content (vague and indeterminate) or willed weakly (with little provision for implementation). Moral weakness mitigates culpability without excusing. Contrary to some interpretations, weak-willed bad acts are, in an important sense, freely chosen and not necessarily failed efforts to act well. How this is possible, in Kant’s view, cannot be explained empirically or metaphysically.Less
This chapter reviews the background in Kant’s moral psychology, suggests how weakness of will might be understood in Kant’s theory, and comments on the implications for moral responsibility. In brief, the proposal is this. For Kant, weakness of will is not a physical incapacity or disability but contrasts with virtue understood as developed strength of will to do our duty despite obstacles. The will is not literally a force, strong or weak, but is conceived as either law-giving practical reason (Wille) or choice to act on a maxim (Willkür). Morally weak persons choose to act on particular maxims in conflict with both practical reason and their general maxim to act as they should. Our general life-governing maxims, like laws of the state, may be weak in content (vague and indeterminate) or willed weakly (with little provision for implementation). Moral weakness mitigates culpability without excusing. Contrary to some interpretations, weak-willed bad acts are, in an important sense, freely chosen and not necessarily failed efforts to act well. How this is possible, in Kant’s view, cannot be explained empirically or metaphysically.
Rödl Sebastian
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195382440
- eISBN:
- 9780199870158
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382440.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
She who is doing something intentionally represents doing it as good. The chapter argues that this describes the logical form of a practical representation. A practical representation is, formally, a ...
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She who is doing something intentionally represents doing it as good. The chapter argues that this describes the logical form of a practical representation. A practical representation is, formally, a conclusion of practical reasoning; it is practical in that it is a representation according to which its subject acts. The thesis, then, expresses the unity of practical reasoning and acting according to a representation. This explains why it has met with incomprehension: It articulates a conception of reason as practical that is out of reach of the empiricism that strangles much of contemporary philosophy.Less
She who is doing something intentionally represents doing it as good. The chapter argues that this describes the logical form of a practical representation. A practical representation is, formally, a conclusion of practical reasoning; it is practical in that it is a representation according to which its subject acts. The thesis, then, expresses the unity of practical reasoning and acting according to a representation. This explains why it has met with incomprehension: It articulates a conception of reason as practical that is out of reach of the empiricism that strangles much of contemporary philosophy.
Joseph Raz
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199248001
- eISBN:
- 9780191598272
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199248001.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The book offers a penetrating examination of a set of fundamental questions about human thought and action. In these essays, Joseph Raz examines the nature of normativity, reason, and the will; the ...
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The book offers a penetrating examination of a set of fundamental questions about human thought and action. In these essays, Joseph Raz examines the nature of normativity, reason, and the will; the justification of reason; and the objectivity of value. He argues for the centrality, but also demonstrates the limits of reason in action and belief. He suggests that our life is most truly our own when our various emotions, hopes, desires, intentions, and actions are guided by reason. He explores the universality of value and of principles of reason on one side and their dependence on social practices on the other side, and their susceptibility to change and improvement. He concludes with an illuminating explanation of self‐interest and its relation to impersonal values, in general, and to morality, in particular.Less
The book offers a penetrating examination of a set of fundamental questions about human thought and action. In these essays, Joseph Raz examines the nature of normativity, reason, and the will; the justification of reason; and the objectivity of value. He argues for the centrality, but also demonstrates the limits of reason in action and belief. He suggests that our life is most truly our own when our various emotions, hopes, desires, intentions, and actions are guided by reason. He explores the universality of value and of principles of reason on one side and their dependence on social practices on the other side, and their susceptibility to change and improvement. He concludes with an illuminating explanation of self‐interest and its relation to impersonal values, in general, and to morality, in particular.
David A. Hollinger
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691158426
- eISBN:
- 9781400845996
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691158426.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, American History: early to 18th Century
This chapter presents a comparative reading of W. K. Clifford's 1877 treatise, “The Ethics of Belief,” and William James' 1897 essay, “The Will to Believe.” It provides an interpretation of each in ...
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This chapter presents a comparative reading of W. K. Clifford's 1877 treatise, “The Ethics of Belief,” and William James' 1897 essay, “The Will to Believe.” It provides an interpretation of each in the distinctive contexts of England in the 1870s and New England in the 1890s. It argues that Clifford displayed more sensitivity than James did to the consequences of belief. This is an ironic reversal of roles in the story of a great pragmatist who insisted that “the whole defense of religious faith hinges upon” the action that faith requires or inspires. James' “The Will to Believe” should be understood not only as an artifact of its author's agony about the fate of Christianity in the age of science, but also as a product of his political complacency. Clifford had a much more modern understanding than James did of the function of belief systems in society and politics.Less
This chapter presents a comparative reading of W. K. Clifford's 1877 treatise, “The Ethics of Belief,” and William James' 1897 essay, “The Will to Believe.” It provides an interpretation of each in the distinctive contexts of England in the 1870s and New England in the 1890s. It argues that Clifford displayed more sensitivity than James did to the consequences of belief. This is an ironic reversal of roles in the story of a great pragmatist who insisted that “the whole defense of religious faith hinges upon” the action that faith requires or inspires. James' “The Will to Believe” should be understood not only as an artifact of its author's agony about the fate of Christianity in the age of science, but also as a product of his political complacency. Clifford had a much more modern understanding than James did of the function of belief systems in society and politics.
Chris Chun
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195373431
- eISBN:
- 9780199871681
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195373431.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
This chapter discusses Edwards’s influence on British religious thinkers and particularly the English Dissenters and Scottish evangelicals, focusing on two oft-neglected works in this context: ...
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This chapter discusses Edwards’s influence on British religious thinkers and particularly the English Dissenters and Scottish evangelicals, focusing on two oft-neglected works in this context: Freedom of the Will and Humble Attempt.Less
This chapter discusses Edwards’s influence on British religious thinkers and particularly the English Dissenters and Scottish evangelicals, focusing on two oft-neglected works in this context: Freedom of the Will and Humble Attempt.
Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691531
- eISBN:
- 9780191731808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691531.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter considers Kant’s claim that “It is not possible to think of anything in the world, or indeed out of it, that can be held to be good without limitation except a good will.” Kant ...
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This chapter considers Kant’s claim that “It is not possible to think of anything in the world, or indeed out of it, that can be held to be good without limitation except a good will.” Kant maintained that this judgment is implicit in the common human understanding and he argued for it by excluding all other viable candidates, including “gifts of nature,” e.g., health and intelligence, “gifts of fortune,” e.g., wealth and happiness, on the grounds that they are not good without limitation, since there are circumstances when they would judged bad by the common human understanding. It is argued that by a good will Kant understood an agent’s underlying character rather than her state of mind in performing a particular action and in light of this it defends Kant’s claim against the standard objections.Less
This chapter considers Kant’s claim that “It is not possible to think of anything in the world, or indeed out of it, that can be held to be good without limitation except a good will.” Kant maintained that this judgment is implicit in the common human understanding and he argued for it by excluding all other viable candidates, including “gifts of nature,” e.g., health and intelligence, “gifts of fortune,” e.g., wealth and happiness, on the grounds that they are not good without limitation, since there are circumstances when they would judged bad by the common human understanding. It is argued that by a good will Kant understood an agent’s underlying character rather than her state of mind in performing a particular action and in light of this it defends Kant’s claim against the standard objections.
Christopher Janaway
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250036
- eISBN:
- 9780191597817
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250037.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Gives some of the background to the reception of Schopenhauer's philosophy by both Wittgenstein and Nietzsche, and then examines the influence on each of them of Schopenhauer's conceptions of self ...
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Gives some of the background to the reception of Schopenhauer's philosophy by both Wittgenstein and Nietzsche, and then examines the influence on each of them of Schopenhauer's conceptions of self and will. In Wittgenstein's early notebooks and Tractatus, the notion of the subject's not being a part of the world and of happiness lying in not willing are distinctly Schopenhauerian notions. Wittgenstein's later pre‐occupation with the relation of willing and acting show a lasting influence from Schopenhauer. In Nietzsche's case, The Birth of Tragedy is transparently influenced by Schopenhauer's views on the thing in itself and individuation, while the later doctrine of will to power is designed as an alternative to Schopenhauer's will to life. Nietzsche's later philosophy makes continual reference to Schopenhauer even in its determination to oppose metaphysics and the unitary ‘I’.Less
Gives some of the background to the reception of Schopenhauer's philosophy by both Wittgenstein and Nietzsche, and then examines the influence on each of them of Schopenhauer's conceptions of self and will. In Wittgenstein's early notebooks and Tractatus, the notion of the subject's not being a part of the world and of happiness lying in not willing are distinctly Schopenhauerian notions. Wittgenstein's later pre‐occupation with the relation of willing and acting show a lasting influence from Schopenhauer. In Nietzsche's case, The Birth of Tragedy is transparently influenced by Schopenhauer's views on the thing in itself and individuation, while the later doctrine of will to power is designed as an alternative to Schopenhauer's will to life. Nietzsche's later philosophy makes continual reference to Schopenhauer even in its determination to oppose metaphysics and the unitary ‘I’.
F. H. Buckley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195341263
- eISBN:
- 9780199866892
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341263.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
Akrasia is weakness of the will, where a person knows what choice is in his best interest, but lacks the strength of will to make it. The akrates might be in the grip of an overpowering passion; he ...
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Akrasia is weakness of the will, where a person knows what choice is in his best interest, but lacks the strength of will to make it. The akrates might be in the grip of an overpowering passion; he might be an addict; he might be self-deceived about his strength of will; he might be a divided self, where a strong- and weak-willed person battle for control, or undergo a reversal of preferences in which a later self regrets choices made by a prior self. Finally, he might be a hyperbolic discounter who over-consumes in the present and doesn't save enough for the future. None of this makes a case for paternalism if the person might remove temptation from his path through self-binding strategies.Less
Akrasia is weakness of the will, where a person knows what choice is in his best interest, but lacks the strength of will to make it. The akrates might be in the grip of an overpowering passion; he might be an addict; he might be self-deceived about his strength of will; he might be a divided self, where a strong- and weak-willed person battle for control, or undergo a reversal of preferences in which a later self regrets choices made by a prior self. Finally, he might be a hyperbolic discounter who over-consumes in the present and doesn't save enough for the future. None of this makes a case for paternalism if the person might remove temptation from his path through self-binding strategies.
Bryan Magee
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237228
- eISBN:
- 9780191706233
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237227.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This material object, my body, is no different in the constitution of its matter from the rest of the physical universe. And my knowledge of it uniquely from inside has led us to the conclusion that ...
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This material object, my body, is no different in the constitution of its matter from the rest of the physical universe. And my knowledge of it uniquely from inside has led us to the conclusion that what in its outer nature is matter in motion is, in its inner nature, activity of will. This puts into my hand the key to understanding the inner nature of the world: the whole empirical world, what we have called the phenomenal, appears to be matter in motion, but in its hidden inner nature it is will. The noumenal will, however, is unknowable, not self‐experiencing but a blind, purposeless force, such as moves the galaxies. In keeping with this, in human beings it is the Unconscious.Less
This material object, my body, is no different in the constitution of its matter from the rest of the physical universe. And my knowledge of it uniquely from inside has led us to the conclusion that what in its outer nature is matter in motion is, in its inner nature, activity of will. This puts into my hand the key to understanding the inner nature of the world: the whole empirical world, what we have called the phenomenal, appears to be matter in motion, but in its hidden inner nature it is will. The noumenal will, however, is unknowable, not self‐experiencing but a blind, purposeless force, such as moves the galaxies. In keeping with this, in human beings it is the Unconscious.
Barbara Hannan
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195378948
- eISBN:
- 9780199869589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195378948.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter considers Schopenhauer's pessimism and his doctrine of salvation as denial of the will. Schopenhauer's “single thought,” the insight at the heart of his philosophy, is supposedly ...
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This chapter considers Schopenhauer's pessimism and his doctrine of salvation as denial of the will. Schopenhauer's “single thought,” the insight at the heart of his philosophy, is supposedly revealed both in aesthetic experience and in such salvation. This thought cannot be expressed directly in language, since it touches on the thing-in-itself. Parallels between this doctrine and Wittgenstein's remarks on the “unsayable” are explored. Also, an investigation into Schopenhauer's psychology is undertaken, utilizing facts recorded in his biography and memoirs. Schopenhauer clearly suffered from depression, and it is argued that this experience contributed significantly to his pessimism, but that his pessimism as a philosophical orientation is as objectively justified as its opposite, optimism, and is not necessarily pathological. The pessimistic “wisdom of Silenus” is discussed, according to which “never to be born is best.” The danger of the fundamental attribution fallacy is discussed. It is argued that salvation can be understood as recovery from depression through affirmation of the will. Schopenhauer himself indicates awareness of this variety of salvation in his discussion of the “acquired character.”Less
This chapter considers Schopenhauer's pessimism and his doctrine of salvation as denial of the will. Schopenhauer's “single thought,” the insight at the heart of his philosophy, is supposedly revealed both in aesthetic experience and in such salvation. This thought cannot be expressed directly in language, since it touches on the thing-in-itself. Parallels between this doctrine and Wittgenstein's remarks on the “unsayable” are explored. Also, an investigation into Schopenhauer's psychology is undertaken, utilizing facts recorded in his biography and memoirs. Schopenhauer clearly suffered from depression, and it is argued that this experience contributed significantly to his pessimism, but that his pessimism as a philosophical orientation is as objectively justified as its opposite, optimism, and is not necessarily pathological. The pessimistic “wisdom of Silenus” is discussed, according to which “never to be born is best.” The danger of the fundamental attribution fallacy is discussed. It is argued that salvation can be understood as recovery from depression through affirmation of the will. Schopenhauer himself indicates awareness of this variety of salvation in his discussion of the “acquired character.”
Brian O'Shaughnessy
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256723
- eISBN:
- 9780191598135
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256721.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Typically our perceptions occur in the setting of an active perceptual process. This chapter attempts to analyse active attending, and in particular, active perceptual attending. The exemplar ...
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Typically our perceptions occur in the setting of an active perceptual process. This chapter attempts to analyse active attending, and in particular, active perceptual attending. The exemplar phenomenon discussed is listening, which is a mental activity. Now mental actions fall into three different structural kinds, exemplified in soliloquy/recollecting/active attending, and the aim is the structural analysis of the latter. Theories as to the relation between listening and hearing are examined, and the conclusion reached is that listening encompasses that part of the co‐present hearing that owes its existence to the will, a sector that inevitably has no more than a probabilistic measure. But how could hearing (of realities) immediately derive from willing? This puzzle finds its resolution in the character of the special causal situation realized in listening. While will and sound are distinct existents with non‐identical causal powers, they are token‐identical causal agencies in the generation of the hearing sector of listening. This strange analysis vindicates the concept of active attending.Less
Typically our perceptions occur in the setting of an active perceptual process. This chapter attempts to analyse active attending, and in particular, active perceptual attending. The exemplar phenomenon discussed is listening, which is a mental activity. Now mental actions fall into three different structural kinds, exemplified in soliloquy/recollecting/active attending, and the aim is the structural analysis of the latter. Theories as to the relation between listening and hearing are examined, and the conclusion reached is that listening encompasses that part of the co‐present hearing that owes its existence to the will, a sector that inevitably has no more than a probabilistic measure. But how could hearing (of realities) immediately derive from willing? This puzzle finds its resolution in the character of the special causal situation realized in listening. While will and sound are distinct existents with non‐identical causal powers, they are token‐identical causal agencies in the generation of the hearing sector of listening. This strange analysis vindicates the concept of active attending.
Christopher Janaway
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250036
- eISBN:
- 9780191597817
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250037.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Schopenhauer conceives the will as metaphysically primary, as the thing in itself that underlies all phenomena, but also as having primacy over the intellect in human psychology. Experience is a ...
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Schopenhauer conceives the will as metaphysically primary, as the thing in itself that underlies all phenomena, but also as having primacy over the intellect in human psychology. Experience is a function of the brain, which receives a teleological explanation as furthering the life of the organism. This is one example of Schopenhauer's conception of will to life, a blindly striving principle that manifests itself throughout individuals in the empirical world. The chapter examines the coherence of Schopenhauer's philosophy of the self as will with his notion of the pure subject or ‘I’.Less
Schopenhauer conceives the will as metaphysically primary, as the thing in itself that underlies all phenomena, but also as having primacy over the intellect in human psychology. Experience is a function of the brain, which receives a teleological explanation as furthering the life of the organism. This is one example of Schopenhauer's conception of will to life, a blindly striving principle that manifests itself throughout individuals in the empirical world. The chapter examines the coherence of Schopenhauer's philosophy of the self as will with his notion of the pure subject or ‘I’.
Joseph Raz
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199248001
- eISBN:
- 9780191598272
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199248001.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The relation between reason and the will is explored in reference to the nature of reasons and of normativity. Must we hold beliefs for decisive reasons? Can we be unreflectively motivated by ...
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The relation between reason and the will is explored in reference to the nature of reasons and of normativity. Must we hold beliefs for decisive reasons? Can we be unreflectively motivated by reasons? It is maintained that one need not necessarily be motivated by all the reasons that apply to an agent (i.e. to conform to reason does not entail knowing all the reasons that apply to you). Reasons are argued to be optional to the extent that the fact that there are reasons for a certain response make it an eligible response, but not one that is wrong not to adopt. The mediation of the will helps to explain how we are governed by our rationality.Less
The relation between reason and the will is explored in reference to the nature of reasons and of normativity. Must we hold beliefs for decisive reasons? Can we be unreflectively motivated by reasons? It is maintained that one need not necessarily be motivated by all the reasons that apply to an agent (i.e. to conform to reason does not entail knowing all the reasons that apply to you). Reasons are argued to be optional to the extent that the fact that there are reasons for a certain response make it an eligible response, but not one that is wrong not to adopt. The mediation of the will helps to explain how we are governed by our rationality.
Richard Harries
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199263134
- eISBN:
- 9780191600616
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199263132.003.0011
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
One of the encouraging features of recent scholarship has been the recovery of Jesus as a Jew, work particularly associated with Geza Vermes. Christians as well as Jews now see Jesus as fully Jewish ...
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One of the encouraging features of recent scholarship has been the recovery of Jesus as a Jew, work particularly associated with Geza Vermes. Christians as well as Jews now see Jesus as fully Jewish in his Jewish context. But what is there in the life and teaching of Jesus that might make a valid foundation for claims made later in the New Testament about his divine status, claims developed in the doctrines of the church? Even if, from a Christian point of view, one believes that there is such a foundation, Jesus himself emphasized that ultimate salvation depends upon doing the will of the Father, an emphasis on action rather than belief entirely in accord with Judaism itself.Less
One of the encouraging features of recent scholarship has been the recovery of Jesus as a Jew, work particularly associated with Geza Vermes. Christians as well as Jews now see Jesus as fully Jewish in his Jewish context. But what is there in the life and teaching of Jesus that might make a valid foundation for claims made later in the New Testament about his divine status, claims developed in the doctrines of the church? Even if, from a Christian point of view, one believes that there is such a foundation, Jesus himself emphasized that ultimate salvation depends upon doing the will of the Father, an emphasis on action rather than belief entirely in accord with Judaism itself.
