Ryan Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276912
- eISBN:
- 9780191707759
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276912.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The thesis that the mind cannot directly apprehend features of the physical world — what Thomas Reid calls the Way of Ideas — is a staple of Early Modern philosophical tradition. This commitment to ...
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The thesis that the mind cannot directly apprehend features of the physical world — what Thomas Reid calls the Way of Ideas — is a staple of Early Modern philosophical tradition. This commitment to the direct awareness of, and only of, mental representations unifies the otherwise divergent philosophical systems of Rationalists and Empiricists. Thomas Reid battles against this thesis on many fronts, in particular over the nature of perception. This book lays the groundwork for Reid's theory of perception by developing Reid's unheralded argument against a representational theory of thought, which this book applies to the discussion of the intentionality of perceptual states and Reid's appeal to ‘signs’. Reid's efforts to preserve common sense epistemic commitments also lead him to adopt unique theories about our concepts of primary and secondary qualities, and about original and acquired perceptions. About the latter pair, the book argues that most perceptual beliefs depend for their justification upon inferences. The Way of Ideas holds that sensations are objects of awareness and that our senses are not robustly unified. This book develops Reid's counter-proposals by examining his discussion of the evolutionary purpose of sensations, and the nature of our awareness of sensations, as well as his intriguing affirmative answer to Molyneux's questions.Less
The thesis that the mind cannot directly apprehend features of the physical world — what Thomas Reid calls the Way of Ideas — is a staple of Early Modern philosophical tradition. This commitment to the direct awareness of, and only of, mental representations unifies the otherwise divergent philosophical systems of Rationalists and Empiricists. Thomas Reid battles against this thesis on many fronts, in particular over the nature of perception. This book lays the groundwork for Reid's theory of perception by developing Reid's unheralded argument against a representational theory of thought, which this book applies to the discussion of the intentionality of perceptual states and Reid's appeal to ‘signs’. Reid's efforts to preserve common sense epistemic commitments also lead him to adopt unique theories about our concepts of primary and secondary qualities, and about original and acquired perceptions. About the latter pair, the book argues that most perceptual beliefs depend for their justification upon inferences. The Way of Ideas holds that sensations are objects of awareness and that our senses are not robustly unified. This book develops Reid's counter-proposals by examining his discussion of the evolutionary purpose of sensations, and the nature of our awareness of sensations, as well as his intriguing affirmative answer to Molyneux's questions.
Vesna A. Wallace
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195122114
- eISBN:
- 9780199834808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195122119.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
This chapter looks at the Kālacakratantra and the Kālacakra tradition as a Buddhist gnostic system. To do this it examines the various ways in which the tantric system interprets gnosis and its ...
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This chapter looks at the Kālacakratantra and the Kālacakra tradition as a Buddhist gnostic system. To do this it examines the various ways in which the tantric system interprets gnosis and its functions, and delineates the practices for actualizing it. The different sections of the chapter discuss the individual in relation to gnosis; gnosis as the all‐pervading mind and as the four bodies of the Buddha; gnosis and mental afflictions; gnosis and karma; and gnosis and sexual bliss.Less
This chapter looks at the Kālacakratantra and the Kālacakra tradition as a Buddhist gnostic system. To do this it examines the various ways in which the tantric system interprets gnosis and its functions, and delineates the practices for actualizing it. The different sections of the chapter discuss the individual in relation to gnosis; gnosis as the all‐pervading mind and as the four bodies of the Buddha; gnosis and mental afflictions; gnosis and karma; and gnosis and sexual bliss.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199250967
- eISBN:
- 9780191603945
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250960.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter begins with the popular “Representational Theory of the Mind” (RTM), according to which a thought involves a mental representation. It then follows Fodor in arguing for the controversial ...
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This chapter begins with the popular “Representational Theory of the Mind” (RTM), according to which a thought involves a mental representation. It then follows Fodor in arguing for the controversial “Language-of-Thought Hypothesis” (LOTH), according to which representation is language-like. On the basis of LOTH, it is argued that the syntactic structure of this representation is likely to be similar to that of the sentence that expresses it in the thinker’s language. The tentative proposal is that a language is largely psychologically real in a speaker in that its rules are similar to the structure rules of her thought.Less
This chapter begins with the popular “Representational Theory of the Mind” (RTM), according to which a thought involves a mental representation. It then follows Fodor in arguing for the controversial “Language-of-Thought Hypothesis” (LOTH), according to which representation is language-like. On the basis of LOTH, it is argued that the syntactic structure of this representation is likely to be similar to that of the sentence that expresses it in the thinker’s language. The tentative proposal is that a language is largely psychologically real in a speaker in that its rules are similar to the structure rules of her thought.
Martin Laird
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199267996
- eISBN:
- 9780191601576
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199267995.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
In designating a non-discursive faculty of apophatic union, Gregory is doing nothing new. This chapter explores parallels in Middle and Neoplatonism: Celsus, The Chaldaean Oracles, Plotinus. Gregory ...
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In designating a non-discursive faculty of apophatic union, Gregory is doing nothing new. This chapter explores parallels in Middle and Neoplatonism: Celsus, The Chaldaean Oracles, Plotinus. Gregory ascribes to faith many of the same qualities as others did to faculties of union, yet Gregory differs markedly in the dynamic, exegetical, and sacramental character he accords faith as an apophatic faculty.Less
In designating a non-discursive faculty of apophatic union, Gregory is doing nothing new. This chapter explores parallels in Middle and Neoplatonism: Celsus, The Chaldaean Oracles, Plotinus. Gregory ascribes to faith many of the same qualities as others did to faculties of union, yet Gregory differs markedly in the dynamic, exegetical, and sacramental character he accords faith as an apophatic faculty.
R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695317
- eISBN:
- 9780191738531
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695317.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
How can one think about the same thing twice without knowing that it's the same thing? How can one think about nothing at all (for example Pegasus, the mythical flying horse)? Is thinking about ...
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How can one think about the same thing twice without knowing that it's the same thing? How can one think about nothing at all (for example Pegasus, the mythical flying horse)? Is thinking about oneself special? One could mistake one's car for someone else's, but it seems one could not mistake one's own headache for someone else's. Why not? This book provides an entirely new theory which answers these puzzles and more. The framework is an account of the mind that sees it as part of nature, as opposed to something with supernatural powers. This means that human beings have more opportunities to make mistakes than many have liked to think.Less
How can one think about the same thing twice without knowing that it's the same thing? How can one think about nothing at all (for example Pegasus, the mythical flying horse)? Is thinking about oneself special? One could mistake one's car for someone else's, but it seems one could not mistake one's own headache for someone else's. Why not? This book provides an entirely new theory which answers these puzzles and more. The framework is an account of the mind that sees it as part of nature, as opposed to something with supernatural powers. This means that human beings have more opportunities to make mistakes than many have liked to think.
Pieter A. M. Seuren
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199559473
- eISBN:
- 9780191721137
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559473.003.0002
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
Since speakers refer to and quantify over virtual objects as naturally as they do over actual objects, natural ontology is basically intensional, requiring acceptance of virtual realities. Each ...
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Since speakers refer to and quantify over virtual objects as naturally as they do over actual objects, natural ontology is basically intensional, requiring acceptance of virtual realities. Each language has socially shared cognitive reality. Current Russellian‐Quinean extensional ontology is criticized in favour of a more Meinongian approach, based on the Kantian epistemological dilemma.Less
Since speakers refer to and quantify over virtual objects as naturally as they do over actual objects, natural ontology is basically intensional, requiring acceptance of virtual realities. Each language has socially shared cognitive reality. Current Russellian‐Quinean extensional ontology is criticized in favour of a more Meinongian approach, based on the Kantian epistemological dilemma.
Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195310139
- eISBN:
- 9780199871209
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310139.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book is the second of a three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The book is highly interdisciplinary, and addresses such question as: to what extent are mature cognitive capacities a ...
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This book is the second of a three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The book is highly interdisciplinary, and addresses such question as: to what extent are mature cognitive capacities a reflection of particular cultures and to what extent are they a product of innate elements? How do innate elements interact with culture to achieve mature cognitive capacities? How do minds generate and shape cultures? How are cultures processed by minds?Less
This book is the second of a three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The book is highly interdisciplinary, and addresses such question as: to what extent are mature cognitive capacities a reflection of particular cultures and to what extent are they a product of innate elements? How do innate elements interact with culture to achieve mature cognitive capacities? How do minds generate and shape cultures? How are cultures processed by minds?
Howard J. Curzer
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693726
- eISBN:
- 9780191738890
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693726.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
According to Burnyeat, Aristotle thinks that people learn to identify virtuous acts by being told which acts are virtuous, habitually performing these acts, and taking pleasure in performing them. ...
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According to Burnyeat, Aristotle thinks that people learn to identify virtuous acts by being told which acts are virtuous, habitually performing these acts, and taking pleasure in performing them. This chapter raises several objections to Burnyeat’s interpretation, including the surprising observation that Aristotle stipulates that virtuous acts are not typically pleasant for learners or even for virtuous people. According to Aristotle, pain rather than pleasure drives moral progress. People come to desire virtuous acts through internalizing punishment, that is, learning to feel shame at wrongdoing. Shame not only emphasizes that certain acts in certain situations are wrong, it also sets people thinking about which acts should be performed, instead. Shame is felt with respect to acts done by others, and acts under consideration, as well as acts done. The pain of vicarious, retrospective, and prospective shame develops the ability to identify virtuous acts.Less
According to Burnyeat, Aristotle thinks that people learn to identify virtuous acts by being told which acts are virtuous, habitually performing these acts, and taking pleasure in performing them. This chapter raises several objections to Burnyeat’s interpretation, including the surprising observation that Aristotle stipulates that virtuous acts are not typically pleasant for learners or even for virtuous people. According to Aristotle, pain rather than pleasure drives moral progress. People come to desire virtuous acts through internalizing punishment, that is, learning to feel shame at wrongdoing. Shame not only emphasizes that certain acts in certain situations are wrong, it also sets people thinking about which acts should be performed, instead. Shame is felt with respect to acts done by others, and acts under consideration, as well as acts done. The pain of vicarious, retrospective, and prospective shame develops the ability to identify virtuous acts.
Anthony Kenny
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780192830708
- eISBN:
- 9780191670527
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780192830708.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The year 1989 was the centenary of the birth of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It also saw the fortieth anniversary of the publication of Gilbert Ryle's book The Concept of Mind. Their ideas have had a major ...
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The year 1989 was the centenary of the birth of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It also saw the fortieth anniversary of the publication of Gilbert Ryle's book The Concept of Mind. Their ideas have had a major influence for this book, which is founded on research exploring many aspects of the philosophy of mind. Modelled on the structure of Ryle's book, this book forges ideas on philosophical psychology into a systematic whole.Less
The year 1989 was the centenary of the birth of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It also saw the fortieth anniversary of the publication of Gilbert Ryle's book The Concept of Mind. Their ideas have had a major influence for this book, which is founded on research exploring many aspects of the philosophy of mind. Modelled on the structure of Ryle's book, this book forges ideas on philosophical psychology into a systematic whole.
Georges Dreyfus
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199593804
- eISBN:
- 9780191595691
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593804.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter uses insights of the Yogācāra Buddhist tradition to explore some questions concerning consciousness. It is first argued that the Yogācāra view of consciousness provides a middle ground ...
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This chapter uses insights of the Yogācāra Buddhist tradition to explore some questions concerning consciousness. It is first argued that the Yogācāra view of consciousness provides a middle ground between the extremes of eliminativism and Cartesianism. It is then shown that the Yogācāra view, which emphasizes the close link between the phenomenal aspect of consciousness and reflexivity, is compatible with the no-self position that is at the heart of Buddhist philosophy. The argument rests on the distinction between subjectivity, which for the Yogācāra is connected to the reflexivity intrinsic to each momentary consciousness, and a reified sense of identity. The chapter connects this momentary sense of being oneself with some ideas espoused recently by Damasio. It then concludes by using the Yogācāra idea of a basic consciousness to flesh out a notion of subjectivity that explains some of the features of our first-person perspective without positing a stable self-entity.Less
This chapter uses insights of the Yogācāra Buddhist tradition to explore some questions concerning consciousness. It is first argued that the Yogācāra view of consciousness provides a middle ground between the extremes of eliminativism and Cartesianism. It is then shown that the Yogācāra view, which emphasizes the close link between the phenomenal aspect of consciousness and reflexivity, is compatible with the no-self position that is at the heart of Buddhist philosophy. The argument rests on the distinction between subjectivity, which for the Yogācāra is connected to the reflexivity intrinsic to each momentary consciousness, and a reified sense of identity. The chapter connects this momentary sense of being oneself with some ideas espoused recently by Damasio. It then concludes by using the Yogācāra idea of a basic consciousness to flesh out a notion of subjectivity that explains some of the features of our first-person perspective without positing a stable self-entity.
Udo Thiel
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199542499
- eISBN:
- 9780191730917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542499.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The Chapter begins with a discussion of objections to the bundle view of the mind in Hume's Scottish critics, such as Beattie and Reid. It examines claims that the bundle view was anticipated in ...
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The Chapter begins with a discussion of objections to the bundle view of the mind in Hume's Scottish critics, such as Beattie and Reid. It examines claims that the bundle view was anticipated in thinkers prior to Hume, such as Hutcheson, Bayle, Berkeley, Regis, Boulainviller and Deschamps. There is in fact little evidence for such anticipation. No early modern philosopher prior to Hume seems to have argued for the view that the real nature of the mind consists in a subject-less collection of perceptions or experiences. Contrary to the standard view, Hume himself does not subscribe to this view. Hume does not deny the existence of a self apart from the perceptions. Rather, Hume says that the self, insofar as it is accessible through inner experience consists of nothing but the perceptions and that, therefore, any knowledge-claims about the nature of the mind and its identity that go beyond the ‘bundle of perceptions’ view cannot be justified. According to Hume, the essence of the mind cannot be known to us. Hume is not committed to the view that there is no persisting self beyond the perceptions. With this interpretation in hand, it is clear that many standard objections against Hume miss the mark. This interpretation is supported by taking into account the practical and emotional side of Hume's account as well as his correspondence with his kinsman Henry Home, Lord Kames. Despite their undeniable differences, Hume's position is actually closer to that of some of his Scottish critics on the issues of self-consciousness and personal identity than is assumed by most commentators. The chapter ends with preliminary reflections on the way in which Hume's account relates to Kantian thought on the self. Kant need not be seen as rejecting Hume's position in toto, but instead as completing it from a different systematic perspective.Less
The Chapter begins with a discussion of objections to the bundle view of the mind in Hume's Scottish critics, such as Beattie and Reid. It examines claims that the bundle view was anticipated in thinkers prior to Hume, such as Hutcheson, Bayle, Berkeley, Regis, Boulainviller and Deschamps. There is in fact little evidence for such anticipation. No early modern philosopher prior to Hume seems to have argued for the view that the real nature of the mind consists in a subject-less collection of perceptions or experiences. Contrary to the standard view, Hume himself does not subscribe to this view. Hume does not deny the existence of a self apart from the perceptions. Rather, Hume says that the self, insofar as it is accessible through inner experience consists of nothing but the perceptions and that, therefore, any knowledge-claims about the nature of the mind and its identity that go beyond the ‘bundle of perceptions’ view cannot be justified. According to Hume, the essence of the mind cannot be known to us. Hume is not committed to the view that there is no persisting self beyond the perceptions. With this interpretation in hand, it is clear that many standard objections against Hume miss the mark. This interpretation is supported by taking into account the practical and emotional side of Hume's account as well as his correspondence with his kinsman Henry Home, Lord Kames. Despite their undeniable differences, Hume's position is actually closer to that of some of his Scottish critics on the issues of self-consciousness and personal identity than is assumed by most commentators. The chapter ends with preliminary reflections on the way in which Hume's account relates to Kantian thought on the self. Kant need not be seen as rejecting Hume's position in toto, but instead as completing it from a different systematic perspective.
Sylvia Jenkins Cook
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195327809
- eISBN:
- 9780199870547
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327809.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, American, 19th Century Literature
This chapter focuses on the factory women's magazine, the Lowell Offering (1840-45), as one of the primary emanations of the phenomenon of “mind amongst the spindles”. It examines the controversial ...
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This chapter focuses on the factory women's magazine, the Lowell Offering (1840-45), as one of the primary emanations of the phenomenon of “mind amongst the spindles”. It examines the controversial role of its main editor, Harriet Farley, as a champion of factory opportunities, defender of operatives' morality, and ardent advocate and model of working-woman's literacy. The Offering has been frequently criticized, in its own day and ever since, for its lack of political militancy in challenging the abuses of the factory system and for its ladylike gentility. Critics have noted the absence of opposition in the magazine to industrial conditions and its seeming preference for traditional modes of demure literariness. An investigation of the entire run of the magazine shows not only the impact of new experiences and conflicting obligations on working women, but also their experimentation with the literary forms most appropriate to their self-representation. Although many of the contributions to the Offering are conventional in the extreme, some of the authors show a keen awareness of the romantic literary context of the times while others begin to develop incipient modes of literary realism that allow them to explore the paradoxes of their situation.Less
This chapter focuses on the factory women's magazine, the Lowell Offering (1840-45), as one of the primary emanations of the phenomenon of “mind amongst the spindles”. It examines the controversial role of its main editor, Harriet Farley, as a champion of factory opportunities, defender of operatives' morality, and ardent advocate and model of working-woman's literacy. The Offering has been frequently criticized, in its own day and ever since, for its lack of political militancy in challenging the abuses of the factory system and for its ladylike gentility. Critics have noted the absence of opposition in the magazine to industrial conditions and its seeming preference for traditional modes of demure literariness. An investigation of the entire run of the magazine shows not only the impact of new experiences and conflicting obligations on working women, but also their experimentation with the literary forms most appropriate to their self-representation. Although many of the contributions to the Offering are conventional in the extreme, some of the authors show a keen awareness of the romantic literary context of the times while others begin to develop incipient modes of literary realism that allow them to explore the paradoxes of their situation.
Uttara Natarajan
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198184379
- eISBN:
- 9780191674235
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198184379.003.0005
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century Literature and Romanticism, Criticism/Theory
This chapter examines the moral implications of Hazlitt's construct of the self-affirming tendency of the mind, of which the fullest and most powerful manifestation is termed ‘genius’. It notes that ...
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This chapter examines the moral implications of Hazlitt's construct of the self-affirming tendency of the mind, of which the fullest and most powerful manifestation is termed ‘genius’. It notes that Hazlitt's concerns are insistently moral, and it is a strong moral emphasis that adds to the polemical thrust of his epistemology. It examines, again, Hazlitt's philosophy, specifically as moral philosophy. It explains that like his epistemology and indeed, inseparable from it, Hazlitt's theory of morals is all pervasive, reaching far beyond the immediate context of the philosophical lectures and essays into the fundamentals of his literary and social criticism.Less
This chapter examines the moral implications of Hazlitt's construct of the self-affirming tendency of the mind, of which the fullest and most powerful manifestation is termed ‘genius’. It notes that Hazlitt's concerns are insistently moral, and it is a strong moral emphasis that adds to the polemical thrust of his epistemology. It examines, again, Hazlitt's philosophy, specifically as moral philosophy. It explains that like his epistemology and indeed, inseparable from it, Hazlitt's theory of morals is all pervasive, reaching far beyond the immediate context of the philosophical lectures and essays into the fundamentals of his literary and social criticism.
Scott O. Lilienfeld, Steven Jay Lynn, and Barry L. Beyerstein
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195182231
- eISBN:
- 9780199870684
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195182231.003.0015
- Subject:
- Psychology, Clinical Psychology
This chapter argues that misconceptions concerning the human mind are legion even among highly intelligent and well-educated members of the general public, and that these misconceptions can interfere ...
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This chapter argues that misconceptions concerning the human mind are legion even among highly intelligent and well-educated members of the general public, and that these misconceptions can interfere with effective treatment planning and execution. These misconceptions can impede effective coping with everyday life problems outside of the therapy room and contribute to a search for futile solutions to psychological distress. It is further argued that the best remedy for combating these misconceptions in clinical settings is straightforward: education. Psychotherapists must often do more than administer efficacious treatments. In many instances, they must also function as good teachers of psychology, disabusing their clients of misconceptions concerning the human mind and imparting correct information in its stead.Less
This chapter argues that misconceptions concerning the human mind are legion even among highly intelligent and well-educated members of the general public, and that these misconceptions can interfere with effective treatment planning and execution. These misconceptions can impede effective coping with everyday life problems outside of the therapy room and contribute to a search for futile solutions to psychological distress. It is further argued that the best remedy for combating these misconceptions in clinical settings is straightforward: education. Psychotherapists must often do more than administer efficacious treatments. In many instances, they must also function as good teachers of psychology, disabusing their clients of misconceptions concerning the human mind and imparting correct information in its stead.
Robert Hanna
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199272044
- eISBN:
- 9780191699573
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272044.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, General
This chapter argues that the key explanatory notion in Immanuel Kant's general cognitive semantics is his epigenetic or generative/productive theory of the mind, according to which object-directed ...
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This chapter argues that the key explanatory notion in Immanuel Kant's general cognitive semantics is his epigenetic or generative/productive theory of the mind, according to which object-directed representations — including intuitions, concepts, schemata of the imagination, and, most centrally, judgements — are created by the rule-guided application of our innate capacities for spontaneous synthesis to raw sensory intake under the original synthetic unity of apperception. This chapter explores the precise conditions under which all cognitive meaning creation is possible. Broadly speaking, these conditions split into two types: formal or logical conditions and material conditions, or conditions specially relevant to the objective validity. The topic of objective validity leads directly to a discussion of what is clearly the explanatory foundation of all objective mental representations or meanings for Kant: transcendental idealism.Less
This chapter argues that the key explanatory notion in Immanuel Kant's general cognitive semantics is his epigenetic or generative/productive theory of the mind, according to which object-directed representations — including intuitions, concepts, schemata of the imagination, and, most centrally, judgements — are created by the rule-guided application of our innate capacities for spontaneous synthesis to raw sensory intake under the original synthetic unity of apperception. This chapter explores the precise conditions under which all cognitive meaning creation is possible. Broadly speaking, these conditions split into two types: formal or logical conditions and material conditions, or conditions specially relevant to the objective validity. The topic of objective validity leads directly to a discussion of what is clearly the explanatory foundation of all objective mental representations or meanings for Kant: transcendental idealism.
Thomas C. Vinci
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195113297
- eISBN:
- 9780199833825
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195113292.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Basic Cartesian intuitions are directed at simple natures, not truths; but intuitions are also a foundation for propositional knowledge. There are two basic objectives of this chapter: (1) to show ...
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Basic Cartesian intuitions are directed at simple natures, not truths; but intuitions are also a foundation for propositional knowledge. There are two basic objectives of this chapter: (1) to show how Descartes gets from intuitions to propositional knowledge, and (2) to show how his solution to this problem structures his thinking on the main issues in Cartesian epistemology. I maintain that the solution to (1) is to be found in the principle if we perceive the presence of an attribute A, there must be an actually existing substance to which A is attributed. This principle gets its clearest expression in the Principles of Philosophy but also appears in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind and in the Meditations where, I argue, it appears in the form of the Rule of Truth. I show how this principle is derived from the cogito, understood both as inference and as intuition, how this principle plays a role in Descartes theory of consciousness and self‐knowledge, in the case for substance dualism, and in the theory of clear and distinct ideas.Less
Basic Cartesian intuitions are directed at simple natures, not truths; but intuitions are also a foundation for propositional knowledge. There are two basic objectives of this chapter: (1) to show how Descartes gets from intuitions to propositional knowledge, and (2) to show how his solution to this problem structures his thinking on the main issues in Cartesian epistemology. I maintain that the solution to (1) is to be found in the principle if we perceive the presence of an attribute A, there must be an actually existing substance to which A is attributed. This principle gets its clearest expression in the Principles of Philosophy but also appears in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind and in the Meditations where, I argue, it appears in the form of the Rule of Truth. I show how this principle is derived from the cogito, understood both as inference and as intuition, how this principle plays a role in Descartes theory of consciousness and self‐knowledge, in the case for substance dualism, and in the theory of clear and distinct ideas.
Daniel Brown
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198183532
- eISBN:
- 9780191674051
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198183532.003.0004
- Subject:
- Literature, Poetry, 19th-century and Victorian Literature
This chapter examines the moral philosophy of English poet Gerald Manley Hopkins. It suggests that Hopkins attributed to the mind a radical capacity for making a priori judgements but he does so ...
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This chapter examines the moral philosophy of English poet Gerald Manley Hopkins. It suggests that Hopkins attributed to the mind a radical capacity for making a priori judgements but he does so without fixing the form of this objectivity to the bureaucratic process of the Kantian faculty psychology. In his Oxford essay titled Causation, Hopkins explained that the mind ties together all conditions it sees in making a choice and he used a quatrefoil or the Maltese cross to demonstrate the choice process between two equally valid interpretations.Less
This chapter examines the moral philosophy of English poet Gerald Manley Hopkins. It suggests that Hopkins attributed to the mind a radical capacity for making a priori judgements but he does so without fixing the form of this objectivity to the bureaucratic process of the Kantian faculty psychology. In his Oxford essay titled Causation, Hopkins explained that the mind ties together all conditions it sees in making a choice and he used a quatrefoil or the Maltese cross to demonstrate the choice process between two equally valid interpretations.
PIERRE JACOB and MARC JEANNEROD
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198509219
- eISBN:
- 9780191584909
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198509219.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter sketches and argues for a view called the ‘representational theory of the visual mind’ (RTVM). RTVM is not so much a scientific theory that leads to testable predictions, as a picture or ...
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This chapter sketches and argues for a view called the ‘representational theory of the visual mind’ (RTVM). RTVM is not so much a scientific theory that leads to testable predictions, as a picture or a framework. According to this theory, the mind is at bottom a representational device: in Dretske's terms, ‘all mental facts are representational facts’. In this view, mental processes consist of the formation and the transformation of mental representations. Section 2 contrasts RTVM with two alternatives: ‘sense-datum theory’ and ‘disjunctivism’. Section 3 presents reasons for thinking that visual percepts have non-conceptual content. Section 4 sketches the basis of an approach labelled as ‘cognitive dynamics’. Section 5 considers three implications of RTVM for the control of visually guided actions. It argues that RTVM has the resources to clarify the puzzle of visually guided actions. It examines the nature of actions and argues that actions involve mental representations.Less
This chapter sketches and argues for a view called the ‘representational theory of the visual mind’ (RTVM). RTVM is not so much a scientific theory that leads to testable predictions, as a picture or a framework. According to this theory, the mind is at bottom a representational device: in Dretske's terms, ‘all mental facts are representational facts’. In this view, mental processes consist of the formation and the transformation of mental representations. Section 2 contrasts RTVM with two alternatives: ‘sense-datum theory’ and ‘disjunctivism’. Section 3 presents reasons for thinking that visual percepts have non-conceptual content. Section 4 sketches the basis of an approach labelled as ‘cognitive dynamics’. Section 5 considers three implications of RTVM for the control of visually guided actions. It argues that RTVM has the resources to clarify the puzzle of visually guided actions. It examines the nature of actions and argues that actions involve mental representations.
Benjamin R. Barber
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195091540
- eISBN:
- 9780199854172
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195091540.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Political History
This chapter comments on Allan Bloom's critique of democracy in his book The Closing of the American Mind. It examines why this anti-democratic book has been championed by conservatives, and why it ...
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This chapter comments on Allan Bloom's critique of democracy in his book The Closing of the American Mind. It examines why this anti-democratic book has been championed by conservatives, and why it was supported by democratic educators when Bloom's views were clearly incompatible with modern democratic education. This chapter suggests that despite its anti-democratic objectives, this book was as smooth and painless a polemic from a critic of democracy. It contends that the leading characteristic of the book was its commitment to closed communication, to esoteric meaning and rhetorical ambivalence.Less
This chapter comments on Allan Bloom's critique of democracy in his book The Closing of the American Mind. It examines why this anti-democratic book has been championed by conservatives, and why it was supported by democratic educators when Bloom's views were clearly incompatible with modern democratic education. This chapter suggests that despite its anti-democratic objectives, this book was as smooth and painless a polemic from a critic of democracy. It contends that the leading characteristic of the book was its commitment to closed communication, to esoteric meaning and rhetorical ambivalence.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237532
- eISBN:
- 9780191597312
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237537.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Is an attempt to resolve the following apparent difficulty: given that the contents of our minds are in part determined by external factors of which we are ignorant, how is it possible for us to know ...
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Is an attempt to resolve the following apparent difficulty: given that the contents of our minds are in part determined by external factors of which we are ignorant, how is it possible for us to know these contents without the need to appeal to evidence? Davidson resolves this difficulty by, among other things, giving up the idea of ‘objects before the mind’, for the attributes of such objects cannot be hidden from the agent.Less
Is an attempt to resolve the following apparent difficulty: given that the contents of our minds are in part determined by external factors of which we are ignorant, how is it possible for us to know these contents without the need to appeal to evidence? Davidson resolves this difficulty by, among other things, giving up the idea of ‘objects before the mind’, for the attributes of such objects cannot be hidden from the agent.
