Miranda Fricker
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198237907
- eISBN:
- 9780191706844
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical ...
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Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential to human value. The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, it charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: gaining knowledge by being told and making sense of our social experiences. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems. Thus, the book finds an analysis of social power; an account of prejudicial stereotypes; a characterization of two hybrid intellectual-ethical virtues; a revised account of the State of Nature used in genealogical explanations of the concept of knowledge; a discussion of objectification and ‘silencing’; and a framework for a virtue epistemological account of testimony. The book reveals epistemic injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.Less
Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential to human value. The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, it charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: gaining knowledge by being told and making sense of our social experiences. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems. Thus, the book finds an analysis of social power; an account of prejudicial stereotypes; a characterization of two hybrid intellectual-ethical virtues; a revised account of the State of Nature used in genealogical explanations of the concept of knowledge; a discussion of objectification and ‘silencing’; and a framework for a virtue epistemological account of testimony. The book reveals epistemic injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.
Brian L. Cutler (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195331974
- eISBN:
- 9780199868193
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331974.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Forensic Psychology
This book provides a contemporary review of empirical and legal issues surrounding expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification. The chapters address a variety of topics, including the ...
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This book provides a contemporary review of empirical and legal issues surrounding expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification. The chapters address a variety of topics, including the scientific base underlying this form of expert testimony, the typical content and ethical issues regarding the testimony, admissibility decisions at the trial and appellate court levels, research on whether the testimony goes beyond common sense, agreement among experts about the underlying research, and the effects of expert testimony on juror decisions. Additional chapters raise limitations associated with expert testimony and question its appropriateness. These limitations include the shortcomings with respect to the underlying research and other issues associated with admissibility. Several chapters by experienced attorneys provide prosecution and defense perspectives on expert testimony.Less
This book provides a contemporary review of empirical and legal issues surrounding expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification. The chapters address a variety of topics, including the scientific base underlying this form of expert testimony, the typical content and ethical issues regarding the testimony, admissibility decisions at the trial and appellate court levels, research on whether the testimony goes beyond common sense, agreement among experts about the underlying research, and the effects of expert testimony on juror decisions. Additional chapters raise limitations associated with expert testimony and question its appropriateness. These limitations include the shortcomings with respect to the underlying research and other issues associated with admissibility. Several chapters by experienced attorneys provide prosecution and defense perspectives on expert testimony.
Brian L. Cutler
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195331974
- eISBN:
- 9780199868193
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331974.003.012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Forensic Psychology
The Afterword summarizes the book's main aims and usefulness. This book has reviewed a substantial number of factors associated with expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification. It ...
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The Afterword summarizes the book's main aims and usefulness. This book has reviewed a substantial number of factors associated with expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification. It has provided benchmarking information about the content of testimony and information that can be used to assist in addressing admissibility and trial issues. The book has also summarized the state of knowledge and provided directions for future research on expert testimony. The book aims to help with an understanding of contemporary research findings, both strengths and limitations, and making decisions about whether experts would be useful in specific cases.Less
The Afterword summarizes the book's main aims and usefulness. This book has reviewed a substantial number of factors associated with expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification. It has provided benchmarking information about the content of testimony and information that can be used to assist in addressing admissibility and trial issues. The book has also summarized the state of knowledge and provided directions for future research on expert testimony. The book aims to help with an understanding of contemporary research findings, both strengths and limitations, and making decisions about whether experts would be useful in specific cases.
Zoe Vania Waxman
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199541546
- eISBN:
- 9780191709739
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199541546.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
The book concludes by reflecting on the future of testimony. Today survivors are still coming forward to tell their stories, leaving behind not only a record for their children and grandchildren, but ...
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The book concludes by reflecting on the future of testimony. Today survivors are still coming forward to tell their stories, leaving behind not only a record for their children and grandchildren, but evidence for posterity. However, as the events of the Holocaust recede further into the past, it becomes increasingly important to engage in the task of active remembering. Without an understanding of the complex nature of testimony and representation, and a willingness to document fully the lives of witnesses and the diversity of their experiences, it is likely that the Holocaust will remain a dark period of history that is constantly referred to but never fully comprehended or explored.Less
The book concludes by reflecting on the future of testimony. Today survivors are still coming forward to tell their stories, leaving behind not only a record for their children and grandchildren, but evidence for posterity. However, as the events of the Holocaust recede further into the past, it becomes increasingly important to engage in the task of active remembering. Without an understanding of the complex nature of testimony and representation, and a willingness to document fully the lives of witnesses and the diversity of their experiences, it is likely that the Holocaust will remain a dark period of history that is constantly referred to but never fully comprehended or explored.
Sanford C. Goldberg
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199593248
- eISBN:
- 9780191594625
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593248.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This book concerns the role others play in our attempts to acquire knowledge of the world. Two main forms of this reliance are examined: testimony cases, where a subject aims to acquire knowledge ...
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This book concerns the role others play in our attempts to acquire knowledge of the world. Two main forms of this reliance are examined: testimony cases, where a subject aims to acquire knowledge through accepting what another tells her; and cases involving “coverage,” where a subject aims to acquire knowledge of something by reasoning that if things were not so she would have heard about it by now. It is argued that these cases challenge some cherished assumptions in epistemology. Testimony cases challenge the assumption, prominent in reliabilist epistemology, that the processes through which beliefs are formed never extend beyond the boundaries of the individual believer. And both sorts of case challenge the idea that, insofar knowledge is a cognitive achievement, it is an achievement that belongs to the knowing subject herself. The book uses results of this sort to question the broadly individualistic orthodoxy within reliabilist epistemology, and to explore what a non‐orthodox reliabilist epistemology would look like. The resulting theory is a social‐reliabilist epistemology — one that results from the application of reliabilist criteria to situations in which belief‐fixation involves epistemic reliance on others.Less
This book concerns the role others play in our attempts to acquire knowledge of the world. Two main forms of this reliance are examined: testimony cases, where a subject aims to acquire knowledge through accepting what another tells her; and cases involving “coverage,” where a subject aims to acquire knowledge of something by reasoning that if things were not so she would have heard about it by now. It is argued that these cases challenge some cherished assumptions in epistemology. Testimony cases challenge the assumption, prominent in reliabilist epistemology, that the processes through which beliefs are formed never extend beyond the boundaries of the individual believer. And both sorts of case challenge the idea that, insofar knowledge is a cognitive achievement, it is an achievement that belongs to the knowing subject herself. The book uses results of this sort to question the broadly individualistic orthodoxy within reliabilist epistemology, and to explore what a non‐orthodox reliabilist epistemology would look like. The resulting theory is a social‐reliabilist epistemology — one that results from the application of reliabilist criteria to situations in which belief‐fixation involves epistemic reliance on others.
Erik J. Olsson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199279999
- eISBN:
- 9780191602665
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199279993.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
According to the popular coherence theory of knowledge and justification, if a person's beliefs are coherent, they are also likely to be true. This book is the most extensive and detailed study of ...
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According to the popular coherence theory of knowledge and justification, if a person's beliefs are coherent, they are also likely to be true. This book is the most extensive and detailed study of coherence and probability to date. The book takes the reader through much of the history of the subject, from early theorists like A. C. Ewing and C. I. Lewis to contemporary figures like Laurence BonJour and C. A. J. Coady. The arguments presented are general enough to cover coherence between any items of information, including those deriving from belief, memory, or testimony. It is argued that coherence does not play the positive role that it is generally ascribed in the process whereby beliefs are acquired. The opposite of coherence, incoherence, is nonetheless the driving force in the process whereby beliefs are retracted.Less
According to the popular coherence theory of knowledge and justification, if a person's beliefs are coherent, they are also likely to be true. This book is the most extensive and detailed study of coherence and probability to date. The book takes the reader through much of the history of the subject, from early theorists like A. C. Ewing and C. I. Lewis to contemporary figures like Laurence BonJour and C. A. J. Coady. The arguments presented are general enough to cover coherence between any items of information, including those deriving from belief, memory, or testimony. It is argued that coherence does not play the positive role that it is generally ascribed in the process whereby beliefs are acquired. The opposite of coherence, incoherence, is nonetheless the driving force in the process whereby beliefs are retracted.
Jürgen Matthäus
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195389159
- eISBN:
- 9780199866694
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389159.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History, Historiography
The Conclusion summarizes the book's main discussions. The chapter talks about contemporary knowledge among ordinary “people” about Auschwitz and where that knowledge comes from. The Conclusion ...
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The Conclusion summarizes the book's main discussions. The chapter talks about contemporary knowledge among ordinary “people” about Auschwitz and where that knowledge comes from. The Conclusion finally examines how best to evaluate a Holocaust testimony.Less
The Conclusion summarizes the book's main discussions. The chapter talks about contemporary knowledge among ordinary “people” about Auschwitz and where that knowledge comes from. The Conclusion finally examines how best to evaluate a Holocaust testimony.
Martin Kusch
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251223
- eISBN:
- 9780191601767
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251223.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter provides a short summary of Ch. 1–5.
This chapter provides a short summary of Ch. 1–5.
Wallace Matson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812691
- eISBN:
- 9780199919420
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812691.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Language, by making possible high beliefs, makes possible some control of belief by the believer: wishful thinking. People can decide to accept or reject testimony. This is faith, the acceptance of ...
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Language, by making possible high beliefs, makes possible some control of belief by the believer: wishful thinking. People can decide to accept or reject testimony. This is faith, the acceptance of another person's testimony without further corroboration and notwithstanding contrary evidence. Faith is transitive, usually a consequence of bonding. In the hunter-gatherer band of 40 it is ‘natural;’ will plays little or no part. Elsewhere it is generated like falling in love, indeed may be the same process. - Marxists and deconstructionists claim that all belief (except theirs) is motivated, hence a species of faith. This is too extreme. - William James's classic discussion is vitiated by confusion with self-confidence.Less
Language, by making possible high beliefs, makes possible some control of belief by the believer: wishful thinking. People can decide to accept or reject testimony. This is faith, the acceptance of another person's testimony without further corroboration and notwithstanding contrary evidence. Faith is transitive, usually a consequence of bonding. In the hunter-gatherer band of 40 it is ‘natural;’ will plays little or no part. Elsewhere it is generated like falling in love, indeed may be the same process. - Marxists and deconstructionists claim that all belief (except theirs) is motivated, hence a species of faith. This is too extreme. - William James's classic discussion is vitiated by confusion with self-confidence.
Jonardon Ganeri
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198237884
- eISBN:
- 9780191679544
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237884.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The author of this book defends a conception of language as essentially a means for the reception of knowledge through testimony. He argues that the possibility of testimony constrains the form of a ...
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The author of this book defends a conception of language as essentially a means for the reception of knowledge through testimony. He argues that the possibility of testimony constrains the form of a theory of meaning. In particular, the semantic power of a word, its ability to stand for or take the place of a thing, derives from the epistemic powers of understanders, their capacity to acquire knowledge simply by understanding what is said. The author finds this account in the work of certain Indian philosophers of language, those belonging to the late classical school of Navya-Nyāya. He presents a detailed analysis of their theories, paying particular attention to the influential 17th-century philosopher Gadādhara. The author examines the Indian account of the meaning relation and its relata, the role of modes of thought as meaning constituents, and the application of the theory to theoretical names and anaphora.Less
The author of this book defends a conception of language as essentially a means for the reception of knowledge through testimony. He argues that the possibility of testimony constrains the form of a theory of meaning. In particular, the semantic power of a word, its ability to stand for or take the place of a thing, derives from the epistemic powers of understanders, their capacity to acquire knowledge simply by understanding what is said. The author finds this account in the work of certain Indian philosophers of language, those belonging to the late classical school of Navya-Nyāya. He presents a detailed analysis of their theories, paying particular attention to the influential 17th-century philosopher Gadādhara. The author examines the Indian account of the meaning relation and its relata, the role of modes of thought as meaning constituents, and the application of the theory to theoretical names and anaphora.
Moses N. Moore, Jr.
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195167979
- eISBN:
- 9780199784981
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019516797X.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, World Religions
Autobiographical narratives and related materials such as journals and diaries have proved to be valuable, but often problematic, resources for the studying and teaching of African American religious ...
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Autobiographical narratives and related materials such as journals and diaries have proved to be valuable, but often problematic, resources for the studying and teaching of African American religious experiences. This chapter identifies a number of these resources and illustrates some of the historiographical and pedagogical issues related to their use. In this chapter, “testifying” alludes to the confessional tradition within the black religious experience and is used in reference to the “subjective” self-representations, interpretations, and experiences found in autobiographical narratives and related materials. “Testimony”, meanwhile, has more “factual” connotations and refers to resources and interpretations that are ostensibly more “objective” and hence subject to critical historical assessment. Both types of material are presented as valid, valuable, and complementary resources for studying the African American religious experience. This chapter also includes pedagogical reflections on varied classroom experiences that incorporate both types of resources in courses situated in two university departments of religious studies.Less
Autobiographical narratives and related materials such as journals and diaries have proved to be valuable, but often problematic, resources for the studying and teaching of African American religious experiences. This chapter identifies a number of these resources and illustrates some of the historiographical and pedagogical issues related to their use. In this chapter, “testifying” alludes to the confessional tradition within the black religious experience and is used in reference to the “subjective” self-representations, interpretations, and experiences found in autobiographical narratives and related materials. “Testimony”, meanwhile, has more “factual” connotations and refers to resources and interpretations that are ostensibly more “objective” and hence subject to critical historical assessment. Both types of material are presented as valid, valuable, and complementary resources for studying the African American religious experience. This chapter also includes pedagogical reflections on varied classroom experiences that incorporate both types of resources in courses situated in two university departments of religious studies.
Lorraine Code
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195159431
- eISBN:
- 9780199786411
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195159438.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter shows how ecology, literally and metaphorically, affords a model for rethinking the established theories of knowledge, and relations between humanity and the other-than-human, that ...
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This chapter shows how ecology, literally and metaphorically, affords a model for rethinking the established theories of knowledge, and relations between humanity and the other-than-human, that characterize the social imaginary of the post-Enlightenment western world. Ecology figures as a study of habitats where people can live well together; of the ethos and habitus enacted in the customs, social organizations, and creative-regulative principles by which they strive or fail to achieve this end. Focusing on a shift in Rachel Carson’s thinking from geographical to ecological, and drawing on Kristin Shrader-Frechette’s analysis of ecological science, the chapter draws a parallel between Carson’s tacit epistemology and that of biologist Karen Messing to develop the working conception of ecology that informs the argument of the book. A reclamation of testimony as a source of evidence is central to the argument.Less
This chapter shows how ecology, literally and metaphorically, affords a model for rethinking the established theories of knowledge, and relations between humanity and the other-than-human, that characterize the social imaginary of the post-Enlightenment western world. Ecology figures as a study of habitats where people can live well together; of the ethos and habitus enacted in the customs, social organizations, and creative-regulative principles by which they strive or fail to achieve this end. Focusing on a shift in Rachel Carson’s thinking from geographical to ecological, and drawing on Kristin Shrader-Frechette’s analysis of ecological science, the chapter draws a parallel between Carson’s tacit epistemology and that of biologist Karen Messing to develop the working conception of ecology that informs the argument of the book. A reclamation of testimony as a source of evidence is central to the argument.
Lorraine Code
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195159431
- eISBN:
- 9780199786411
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195159438.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter addresses the covert capacity of autonomy — the goal of moral-political life in liberal-democratic societies — to oppress women and others who fail to fulfill its requirements. Taking ...
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This chapter addresses the covert capacity of autonomy — the goal of moral-political life in liberal-democratic societies — to oppress women and others who fail to fulfill its requirements. Taking the collapse of the welfare state as a locus of analysis, it shows how ecological citizenship and collective responsibility work toward reconfiguring the inequalities and injustices enacted under the aegis of a too-rigorous veneration of autonomy. One of the projects of the chapter is to reevaluate practices of advocacy in knowledge: a point that arises in chapter three with reference to medicine and is further developed here, both in connection with medicine and across a wider range of examples. Contrary to entrenched conceptions of epistemic self-reliance, the contention is that advocacy often makes knowledge possible: indeed, more radically, that without advocacy certain knowings are not possible. Trust is important to good advocacy, and testimony again plays a central part.Less
This chapter addresses the covert capacity of autonomy — the goal of moral-political life in liberal-democratic societies — to oppress women and others who fail to fulfill its requirements. Taking the collapse of the welfare state as a locus of analysis, it shows how ecological citizenship and collective responsibility work toward reconfiguring the inequalities and injustices enacted under the aegis of a too-rigorous veneration of autonomy. One of the projects of the chapter is to reevaluate practices of advocacy in knowledge: a point that arises in chapter three with reference to medicine and is further developed here, both in connection with medicine and across a wider range of examples. Contrary to entrenched conceptions of epistemic self-reliance, the contention is that advocacy often makes knowledge possible: indeed, more radically, that without advocacy certain knowings are not possible. Trust is important to good advocacy, and testimony again plays a central part.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078640
- eISBN:
- 9780199872213
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078640.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge ...
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In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In Warrant: The Current Debate, the first volume in this series, I considered some of the main contemporary views of warrant. In this book, the second in the series, I present my own account of warrant, arguing that the best way to construe warrant is in terms of proper function. In my view, a belief has warrant for a person if it is produced by her cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief. In the first two chapters of this volume, I fill out, develop, qualify, and defend this view, exploring along the way some of the convoluted contours of the notion of proper function. In the next seven chapters, I consider how the proposed account works in the main areas of our cognitive design plan: memory, introspection, knowledge of other minds, testimony, perception, a priori belief, induction, and probability. Then, in Ch. 10, I consider broader, structural questions of coherentism and foundationalism. My account of warrant meets the conditions for being a naturalistic account; but in Chs. 11 and 12, I claim that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. For, as I argue in Ch. 11, there appears to be no successful naturalistic account of the notion of proper function. In Ch. 12, I argue, further, that metaphysical naturalism when combined with contemporary evolutionary accounts of the origin and provenance of human life is an irrational stance; it provides for itself an ultimately undefeated defeater.Less
In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In Warrant: The Current Debate, the first volume in this series, I considered some of the main contemporary views of warrant. In this book, the second in the series, I present my own account of warrant, arguing that the best way to construe warrant is in terms of proper function. In my view, a belief has warrant for a person if it is produced by her cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief. In the first two chapters of this volume, I fill out, develop, qualify, and defend this view, exploring along the way some of the convoluted contours of the notion of proper function. In the next seven chapters, I consider how the proposed account works in the main areas of our cognitive design plan: memory, introspection, knowledge of other minds, testimony, perception, a priori belief, induction, and probability. Then, in Ch. 10, I consider broader, structural questions of coherentism and foundationalism. My account of warrant meets the conditions for being a naturalistic account; but in Chs. 11 and 12, I claim that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. For, as I argue in Ch. 11, there appears to be no successful naturalistic account of the notion of proper function. In Ch. 12, I argue, further, that metaphysical naturalism when combined with contemporary evolutionary accounts of the origin and provenance of human life is an irrational stance; it provides for itself an ultimately undefeated defeater.
Jennifer Lackey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199219162
- eISBN:
- 9780191711824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219162.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter develops an alternative picture of testimonial knowledge and justification — called the Statement View of Testimony — that focuses on the epistemic status of the statements of speakers, ...
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This chapter develops an alternative picture of testimonial knowledge and justification — called the Statement View of Testimony — that focuses on the epistemic status of the statements of speakers, not of their beliefs. This new conception of testimonial knowledge shows that, strictly speaking, we do not learn from one another's beliefs; we learn from one another's words. The remainder of this chapter is then devoted to defending this view of testimony from three different kinds of objections that have been raised in the recent literature: one that focuses on the counterexamples to the Belief View of Testimony, one that targets the positive Statement View of Testimony, and one that attacks the overall approach to theorizing about the epistemic status of testimony. It is concluded that all three objections fail to pose a problem for the view of the epistemology of testimony developed in this book.Less
This chapter develops an alternative picture of testimonial knowledge and justification — called the Statement View of Testimony — that focuses on the epistemic status of the statements of speakers, not of their beliefs. This new conception of testimonial knowledge shows that, strictly speaking, we do not learn from one another's beliefs; we learn from one another's words. The remainder of this chapter is then devoted to defending this view of testimony from three different kinds of objections that have been raised in the recent literature: one that focuses on the counterexamples to the Belief View of Testimony, one that targets the positive Statement View of Testimony, and one that attacks the overall approach to theorizing about the epistemic status of testimony. It is concluded that all three objections fail to pose a problem for the view of the epistemology of testimony developed in this book.
Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199269754
- eISBN:
- 9780191601705
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199269750.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Probabilistic models have much to offer to epistemology and philosophy of science. Arguably, the coherence theory of justification claims that the more coherent a set of propositions is, the more ...
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Probabilistic models have much to offer to epistemology and philosophy of science. Arguably, the coherence theory of justification claims that the more coherent a set of propositions is, the more confident one ought to be in its content, ceteris paribus. An impossibility result shows that there cannot exist a coherence ordering. A coherence quasi-ordering can be constructed that respects this claim and is relevant to scientific-theory choice. Bayesian-Network models of the reliability of information sources are made applicable to Condorcet-style jury voting, Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda puzzle, the variety-of-evidence thesis, the Duhem–Quine thesis, and the informational value of testimony.Less
Probabilistic models have much to offer to epistemology and philosophy of science. Arguably, the coherence theory of justification claims that the more coherent a set of propositions is, the more confident one ought to be in its content, ceteris paribus. An impossibility result shows that there cannot exist a coherence ordering. A coherence quasi-ordering can be constructed that respects this claim and is relevant to scientific-theory choice. Bayesian-Network models of the reliability of information sources are made applicable to Condorcet-style jury voting, Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda puzzle, the variety-of-evidence thesis, the Duhem–Quine thesis, and the informational value of testimony.
Christopher Slobogin
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195189957
- eISBN:
- 9780199893980
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189957.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Forensic Psychology
Culpability and dangerousness are the two central issues raised by any sensible societal attempt to deal with antisocial behavior. For the past century, mental health professionals have been heavily ...
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Culpability and dangerousness are the two central issues raised by any sensible societal attempt to deal with antisocial behavior. For the past century, mental health professionals have been heavily involved in helping the law address these issues. But critics deride clinical testimony about culpability as disguised storytelling and tar expert predictions by comparing them unfavorably to coin flipping. They have been aided in these efforts by a series of decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court that appear to impose a relatively high threshold for expert testimony, one that requires that the testimony’s underlying assumptions be verified as reliable through scientific or other testing. Although many courts have yet to consider the implications of those decisions for behavioral science testimony, an increasing number of lower court decisions suggest that a more restrictive evidentiary regime is in the offing. This book is an effort to sort out whether that development would be a good thing. How we should go about proving culpability and dangerousness depends on a number of variables, including the governing substantive law, our ability to answer the questions that this law generates, the extent to which judges and juries can arrive at sensible conclusions without the help of experts, and whether the testimony proffered is from the government or from the person whose liberty is at stake. The book concludes that culpability and dangerousness are socially constructed concepts that probably cannot, and in any event should not, be determined solely through the scientific method.Less
Culpability and dangerousness are the two central issues raised by any sensible societal attempt to deal with antisocial behavior. For the past century, mental health professionals have been heavily involved in helping the law address these issues. But critics deride clinical testimony about culpability as disguised storytelling and tar expert predictions by comparing them unfavorably to coin flipping. They have been aided in these efforts by a series of decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court that appear to impose a relatively high threshold for expert testimony, one that requires that the testimony’s underlying assumptions be verified as reliable through scientific or other testing. Although many courts have yet to consider the implications of those decisions for behavioral science testimony, an increasing number of lower court decisions suggest that a more restrictive evidentiary regime is in the offing. This book is an effort to sort out whether that development would be a good thing. How we should go about proving culpability and dangerousness depends on a number of variables, including the governing substantive law, our ability to answer the questions that this law generates, the extent to which judges and juries can arrive at sensible conclusions without the help of experts, and whether the testimony proffered is from the government or from the person whose liberty is at stake. The book concludes that culpability and dangerousness are socially constructed concepts that probably cannot, and in any event should not, be determined solely through the scientific method.
Martin Kusch
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251223
- eISBN:
- 9780191601767
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251223.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Knowledge by Agreement defends the ideas that knowledge is a social status (like money, or marriage), and that knowledge is primarily the possession of groups rather than individuals. ...
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Knowledge by Agreement defends the ideas that knowledge is a social status (like money, or marriage), and that knowledge is primarily the possession of groups rather than individuals. Ch. 1–6 develop a new theory of testimony. They break with the traditional view according to which testimony is not, except accidentally, a generative source of knowledge. One important consequence of the new theory is a rejection of attempts to globally justify trust in the words of others. Ch. 7–12 propose a communitarian theory of empirical knowledge. It is argued that empirical belief can acquire the status of knowledge only by being shared with others, and that all empirical beliefs presuppose social institutions. As a result all knowledge is essentially political. Ch. 13–20 defend some of the controversial premises and consequences of Chs 1–12: the community‐dependence of normativity, epistemological and semantic relativism, and anti‐realism, and a social conception of objectivity.Less
Knowledge by Agreement defends the ideas that knowledge is a social status (like money, or marriage), and that knowledge is primarily the possession of groups rather than individuals. Ch. 1–6 develop a new theory of testimony. They break with the traditional view according to which testimony is not, except accidentally, a generative source of knowledge. One important consequence of the new theory is a rejection of attempts to globally justify trust in the words of others. Ch. 7–12 propose a communitarian theory of empirical knowledge. It is argued that empirical belief can acquire the status of knowledge only by being shared with others, and that all empirical beliefs presuppose social institutions. As a result all knowledge is essentially political. Ch. 13–20 defend some of the controversial premises and consequences of Chs 1–12: the community‐dependence of normativity, epistemological and semantic relativism, and anti‐realism, and a social conception of objectivity.
Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199207077
- eISBN:
- 9780191708909
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207077.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter sketches a modularist account of the human capacity for abduction (or ‘inference to the best explanation’), which Fodor has argued must provide a decisive stumbling block to progress in ...
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This chapter sketches a modularist account of the human capacity for abduction (or ‘inference to the best explanation’), which Fodor has argued must provide a decisive stumbling block to progress in cognitive science for the foreseeable future. It first isolates the main cognitive ingredients in scientific ability, which include a capacity for creative hypothesis formation and for flexible System 2 reasoning in addition to abduction. It argues that these are all displayed by contemporary (and presumably ancestral) hunter-gatherers in their tracking of prey animals while hunting, but that they are not displayed in human infants, contrary to what has been claimed by many developmental psychologists. The chapter suggests that abduction may piggy-back on capacities that evolved for the evaluation of linguistic testimony, and on preferences that evolved to govern efficiency and relevance in communication.Less
This chapter sketches a modularist account of the human capacity for abduction (or ‘inference to the best explanation’), which Fodor has argued must provide a decisive stumbling block to progress in cognitive science for the foreseeable future. It first isolates the main cognitive ingredients in scientific ability, which include a capacity for creative hypothesis formation and for flexible System 2 reasoning in addition to abduction. It argues that these are all displayed by contemporary (and presumably ancestral) hunter-gatherers in their tracking of prey animals while hunting, but that they are not displayed in human infants, contrary to what has been claimed by many developmental psychologists. The chapter suggests that abduction may piggy-back on capacities that evolved for the evaluation of linguistic testimony, and on preferences that evolved to govern efficiency and relevance in communication.
C. A. J. Coady
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198235514
- eISBN:
- 9780191597220
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235518.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is about a topic in epistemology that had been much neglected until its publication, but has subsequently become much more discussed. That topic is testimony, or, less technically, the ...
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This book is about a topic in epistemology that had been much neglected until its publication, but has subsequently become much more discussed. That topic is testimony, or, less technically, the conveying of information by telling. Coady argues that reliance upon the word of others plays a crucial role in the economy of knowledge, though the extent and depth of this reliance have gone largely unrecognized in the philosophical tradition. He discusses those efforts that have been made to explain and justify the role of testimony in the getting and sustaining of knowledge or reliable belief, and concludes that, with the partial exception of Thomas Reid's discussion in the eighteenth century, they have been unsuccessful. This widespread failure, he argues, stems from a reductive approach with an individualist bias that fails to appreciate just how fundamental are our cognitive debts to one another. Indeed, he argues, the very possibility of linguistic communication rests upon some basic reliability of testimony. He spells out an alternative to the reductive way of understanding the links between testimony, perception, memory, and inference. In the latter part of the book, Coady explores several puzzles generated by our reliance on testimony, including those created by the tension between prior probabilities and testimony to astonishing events, the supposed increase in unreliability of testimonial chains of transmission as they expand, and a puzzle about competence and transmission of knowledge. He also discusses certain implications of his view of testimony for important issues in history, psychology, mathematics, and the law.Less
This book is about a topic in epistemology that had been much neglected until its publication, but has subsequently become much more discussed. That topic is testimony, or, less technically, the conveying of information by telling. Coady argues that reliance upon the word of others plays a crucial role in the economy of knowledge, though the extent and depth of this reliance have gone largely unrecognized in the philosophical tradition. He discusses those efforts that have been made to explain and justify the role of testimony in the getting and sustaining of knowledge or reliable belief, and concludes that, with the partial exception of Thomas Reid's discussion in the eighteenth century, they have been unsuccessful. This widespread failure, he argues, stems from a reductive approach with an individualist bias that fails to appreciate just how fundamental are our cognitive debts to one another. Indeed, he argues, the very possibility of linguistic communication rests upon some basic reliability of testimony. He spells out an alternative to the reductive way of understanding the links between testimony, perception, memory, and inference. In the latter part of the book, Coady explores several puzzles generated by our reliance on testimony, including those created by the tension between prior probabilities and testimony to astonishing events, the supposed increase in unreliability of testimonial chains of transmission as they expand, and a puzzle about competence and transmission of knowledge. He also discusses certain implications of his view of testimony for important issues in history, psychology, mathematics, and the law.
