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Chapter abstract: This chapter develops cross-case analyses of the politics of urban violence in Colombia to highlight how the variables and mechanisms identified in the analytic framework yield insights into the nature and trajectory of political projects in response to violence across cities. The chapter explores the generalizability of the framework’s core dimensions through a brief analysis of the case of Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, where drug trafficking-related violence has increased in recent years. The analysis finds support for three key elements of the framework: (1) business is a pivotal actor in the politics of urban violence, (2) clientelism shapes political preferences regarding responses to urban violence, and (3) patterns of armed territorial control influence the fortunes of political projects in response to violence. The chapter concludes by outlining next steps in the study of urban violence and, more broadly, urban politics in the developing world.

A comparison of city‐states north and south of the Alps reveals more dissimilarities (over the role of the church, landholding versus jurisdictional lordship, rural citizenship, and jurisdictional exclusivity) than congruities. Typologies of the city‐state drawn from political and social science are too schematic, too chronologically static, and too likely to privilege capital accumulation over territorial consolidation. The city‐states survived despite fewer resources and smaller size than monarchical states: they did not ‘lose at war’. City‐states continued, regardless of nomenclature: both regional and dynastic city‐states remained embedded in a world of civic and mercantile values. The framework for understanding invites a regional model combining chronology and spatiality, in which over time fiscal and military imperatives outweighed commercial and political‐legal ones, though northern cities often continued to exert power through jurisdictional rights rather than control of territory.

Chapter abstract: This chapter outlines the challenges that urban violence poses for development and establishes why existing analytical approaches to this area of study offer limited leverage for explaining the politics of urban violence. To develop a stronger analytic approach the chapter develops a framework in response to three overarching questions: (1) What shapes the preferences of both the private sector and city mayors regarding responses to urban violence? (2) How do distinct types of local government-business relations condition the ability of other political and social actors to influence the politics of urban violence? and (3) How do patterns of armed territorial control that vary in their levels of homicides and coordination in criminal leadership facilitate or constrain distinct types of responses to urban violence? The chapter previews the research design, methodology, and the comparative empirical analyses focused on Colombia’s three principal cities: Medellin, Cali, and Bogota.

Chapter abstract: This chapter provides a within-case analysis of contrasting outcomes in the politics of urban violence in Medellin. In the early 1990s disengaged relations between local government and business coupled with fragmented armed territorial control derailed the city’s first participatory political project in response to urban violence. A decade collaborative relations emerged between business and a local government led by mayor Sergio Fajardo, and territorial control shifted into a monopoly under the authority of a former paramilitary leader. This combination helped to successfully sustain a second participatory political project that was used to rebrand Medellin as an emerging global city. The analysis shows that the reality of the Medellin miracle is far more complex than either its political architects or international donors concede, and is emblematic of the significant ways in which the politics of urban violence can reshape political order in major developing world cities.

Chapter abstract: This chapter shows that Bogota’s first participatory project in response to urban violence emerged out of the surprise electoral victory of Antanas Mockus to the mayor’s office. Strong support from the city’s business community coupled with the atomized nature of armed territorial control with low lethal violence and limited coordination in criminal leadership sustained Bogota’s participatory project. A decade later the election to the mayor’s office of a political leftist, Luis Eduardo Garzón, generated tensions between local government and business regarding proposed amendments to the participatory project’s stance on public space and informal vendors. The chapter reveals how mutual dependence between the public and private sectors and overall alignment in preferences facilitated compromise on this issue while the continued atomized territorial control shielded the mayor against criticism. Today Bogota is considered a model of urban governance in the developing world.

This chapter discusses different aspects of the Mafia in Italy, first by describing the organisation in itself, as an institution parallel to and independent of the state. The focus is on the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, although some comparisons are made with other Italian Mafia groupings. The chapter argues that the relation between the Mafia and the state should be understood as an exchange relation, although some sectors are more penetrated by Mafia interests than others. The chapter then looks at the Mafia's territorial control and the weakness of the state and shows that the Mafia's power is closely related to its control over a specific territory, including control over the citizens who are living in that area. It also considers the Mafia's mental control and argues that the Mafia has actively used some Sicilian values as a means to render its activities more legitimate. The sway of the Mafia is not only a consequence of distrust: it is also a promoter of distrust. The chapter concludes by discussing the Mafia and its role in politics.

Chapter 6 proposes a three-pronged approach to possible human rights obligations of armed groups by distinguishing between (i) human rights obligations of groups exercising quasi-governmental authority in defined territory; (ii) human rights obligations of groups exercising de facto control over territory and population; and (iii) human rights obligations of groups not controlling territory or populations. This not only reflects contemporary international practice, but also the different capacities of armed groups and the varying circumstances in which they operate. This chapter examines each type of armed group separately. For each type, it shows to what extent human rights obligations for armed groups are needed; it provides international practice showing that a number of states and human rights experts consider the respective type of groups to have human rights obligations; it considers which sources of international law could bind the type of group in question; and suggests which scope of obligations should bind them.

This chapter illustrates how the 1783 Treaty of Paris reintroduced chaotic conditions along the border between American Georgia and Spanish Florida, a hostile environment directly and adversely affecting the Florida Indians. Since 1763, British ownership of both territories allowed for more efficient control over the region, thus keeping disorder to a minimum. But, once Florida reverted to Spanish control and Georgia became an independent republic, an international border once again separated the peoples residing in the area.

This chapter analyzes Britain’s informal empire in Argentina, Egypt, and China during the nineteenth century. The evidence is overwhelming that Britain’s primary concern in these regions was economic gain, without force if possible, but with force if necessary. The main mechanism of influence was to create and sustain stable-but-subservient governments in the peripheral countries. Once such regimes were established in client states, informal empire was sustained via a degree of cooperation between the metropolitan and the peripheral elite. The British gained handsomely from such arrangements, especially because they facilitated profitable trade, investments, and loans. Peripheral countries in turn experienced some economic growth but the pattern of development was lop-sided; these countries became commodity exporters without undergoing much industrialization.

This chapter distinguishes between war and peace and examines the dynamics of turbulent transitions. Despite the assumption that transitions involve a clean break between war and peace, contemporary conflict does not end neatly in a single moment. Even after victory, the counterinsurgent focuses on building the rule of law, justice, and reconciliation, developing effective governance, humanitarian aid, and economic development. Understanding this is vital in successful civil affairs programs. The dynamics of turbulent transitions include backsliding, segmentation of territorial control, organic evolution, popular support and backlash, and the principle of impartiality. Together, they recognize the overlap of war and peace and the interplay between warfighting and peacebuilding.

Bern’s newssheet gave a justification for its aggression, couched as a defence of Protestantism in Geneva (though Catholic Valais’s expansion was mentioned), but also to give reassurance that the geopolitical balance of power remained intact, given that the French conquest of Savoy was a fait accompli. The role of Fribourg for control of the Vaud has been underplayed by historians, concerned to emphasize Bern’s unremittingly aggressive intentions. But were not Bern’s motives primarily to neuter Savoy by holding strategic fortresses in pawn, and milking the Vaud financially, rather than controlling swathes of territory? But French designs upon Geneva and Savoy obliged Bern to switch tack. After the conquest, of course, defence of Protestantism did require territorial control. Fribourg’s motives combined territorial expansion and safeguarding Catholicism, while seeking to avoid encirclement by Bern.

This chapter briefly charts the emerge of the violent Islamist group Boko Haram in Nigeria before detailing its international connections and interactions with Al-Qaeda and, more significantly, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It goes on to discuss the group’s successful attempts at territorial control in the north east and its leader’s ambition to establish an Islamic state. The text explains how the Nigerians converged with ISIS, pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and rebranded Boko Haram as Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP). This is complemented by an analysis of the practical manifestations of this allegiance, the remaining differences between ISWAP and ISIL/ISIS, and the possibly opportunistic reasons that may have motivated this move and that, in the future, could make the Nigerian outfit look elsewhere for more productive partnerships.