Jeffrey C. King
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199226061
- eISBN:
- 9780191710377
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226061.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, ...
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Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ is distinct from the proposition that ‘Tracy loves Glenn’ yet both have the same constituents, what is it about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? This book formulates an account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, the book deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: it shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on this approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The book also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis.Less
Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that ‘Glenn loves Tracy’ is distinct from the proposition that ‘Tracy loves Glenn’ yet both have the same constituents, what is it about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions? This book formulates an account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, the book deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: it shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on this approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The book also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis.
James Higginbotham
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199239313
- eISBN:
- 9780191716904
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239313.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
James Higginbotham's work on tense, aspect, and indexicality discusses the principles governing demonstrative, temporal, and indexical expressions in natural language, and presents new ideas in the ...
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James Higginbotham's work on tense, aspect, and indexicality discusses the principles governing demonstrative, temporal, and indexical expressions in natural language, and presents new ideas in the semantics of sentence structure. The book brings together his key contributions to the fields, including his recent intervention in the debate on the roles of context and anaphora in reference. The book's chapters are presented in the form in which they were first published, with afterwords where needed, to cover points where the author's thought has developed.Less
James Higginbotham's work on tense, aspect, and indexicality discusses the principles governing demonstrative, temporal, and indexical expressions in natural language, and presents new ideas in the semantics of sentence structure. The book brings together his key contributions to the fields, including his recent intervention in the debate on the roles of context and anaphora in reference. The book's chapters are presented in the form in which they were first published, with afterwords where needed, to cover points where the author's thought has developed.
Regine Eckardt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199262601
- eISBN:
- 9780191718939
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199262601.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This book investigates meaning change in grammaticalization in terms of truth conditional semantics and a well-explicated syntax-semantics interface. Following a survey of earlier theories of ...
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This book investigates meaning change in grammaticalization in terms of truth conditional semantics and a well-explicated syntax-semantics interface. Following a survey of earlier theories of grammaticalization, particularly those that focus on the meaning side, four major case studies of meaning change in grammaticalization probe the hypothesis that this type of change is best viewed as a restructuring at the syntax-semantics interface. The case studies cover the emergence of going to future in English, the negation particles in French, the emergence of the scalar particle selbst (even) in German as well as the quasi determiner lauter (many/only) in German. Each study starts with a presentation of data that illustrates the change in question, and lists open issues about these data that could not be answered (or even formulated) in earlier theoretical frameworks. A careful investigation of the neat interplay of syntax and semantics in the phase of change demonstrates that speakers ingenuously exploit the structures of language in order to adjust it to new needs, while at the same time keeping it a well-defined tool of communication.Less
This book investigates meaning change in grammaticalization in terms of truth conditional semantics and a well-explicated syntax-semantics interface. Following a survey of earlier theories of grammaticalization, particularly those that focus on the meaning side, four major case studies of meaning change in grammaticalization probe the hypothesis that this type of change is best viewed as a restructuring at the syntax-semantics interface. The case studies cover the emergence of going to future in English, the negation particles in French, the emergence of the scalar particle selbst (even) in German as well as the quasi determiner lauter (many/only) in German. Each study starts with a presentation of data that illustrates the change in question, and lists open issues about these data that could not be answered (or even formulated) in earlier theoretical frameworks. A careful investigation of the neat interplay of syntax and semantics in the phase of change demonstrates that speakers ingenuously exploit the structures of language in order to adjust it to new needs, while at the same time keeping it a well-defined tool of communication.
Berit Brogaard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199796908
- eISBN:
- 9780199933235
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796908.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
What are the things that we assert, believe, and desire? The orthodox view among philosophers is eternalism: these are contents that have their truth-values eternally. Transient Truths provides the ...
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What are the things that we assert, believe, and desire? The orthodox view among philosophers is eternalism: these are contents that have their truth-values eternally. Transient Truths provides the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view, temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values along with changes in the world. Berit Brogaard argues that temporal contents are contents and propositions in the full sense. This project involves a thorough analysis of how we talk about and retain mental states over time, an examination of how the phenomenology of mental states bears on the content of mental states, an analysis of how we pass on information in temporally extended conversations, and a revival of a Priorian tense logic. The view suggests a broader view according to which some types of representation have a determinate truth-value only relative to features about the subject who does the representing. If this view is right, successful semantic representation requires an eye on our own position in the world.Less
What are the things that we assert, believe, and desire? The orthodox view among philosophers is eternalism: these are contents that have their truth-values eternally. Transient Truths provides the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view, temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values along with changes in the world. Berit Brogaard argues that temporal contents are contents and propositions in the full sense. This project involves a thorough analysis of how we talk about and retain mental states over time, an examination of how the phenomenology of mental states bears on the content of mental states, an analysis of how we pass on information in temporally extended conversations, and a revival of a Priorian tense logic. The view suggests a broader view according to which some types of representation have a determinate truth-value only relative to features about the subject who does the representing. If this view is right, successful semantic representation requires an eye on our own position in the world.
Michael Tooley
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250746
- eISBN:
- 9780191598623
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250746.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Defends a dynamic, or tensed, conception of time, according to which the past and the present are real while the future is not. This conception differs from traditional tensed views, according to ...
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Defends a dynamic, or tensed, conception of time, according to which the past and the present are real while the future is not. This conception differs from traditional tensed views, according to which tensed facts are more basic than tenseless ones; on the contrary, tensed facts reduce to tenseless ones.The conception of time defended is supported by arguments from causation: there can be causation only in a world where the past and the present are real, while the future is not.Further, the direction of time can be defined by the direction of causation, and causation can be used to analyse temporal relations such as the relations of simultaneity and temporal priority.The dynamic conception of time developed is contrasted with alternative views and defended against numerous philosophical objections.It is also defended against implications of the Special Theory of Relativity: A modified version of the Special Theory of Relativity that allows for absolute simultaneity is suggested.Less
Defends a dynamic, or tensed, conception of time, according to which the past and the present are real while the future is not. This conception differs from traditional tensed views, according to which tensed facts are more basic than tenseless ones; on the contrary, tensed facts reduce to tenseless ones.
The conception of time defended is supported by arguments from causation: there can be causation only in a world where the past and the present are real, while the future is not.
Further, the direction of time can be defined by the direction of causation, and causation can be used to analyse temporal relations such as the relations of simultaneity and temporal priority.
The dynamic conception of time developed is contrasted with alternative views and defended against numerous philosophical objections.
It is also defended against implications of the Special Theory of Relativity: A modified version of the Special Theory of Relativity that allows for absolute simultaneity is suggested.
Arthur Prior
- Published in print:
- 1967
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198243113
- eISBN:
- 9780191680632
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243113.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book is a sequel to Time and Modality. Many problems raised in that book have been resolved, and new ones have been raised in their turn. The author has recorded some of these developments, and ...
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This book is a sequel to Time and Modality. Many problems raised in that book have been resolved, and new ones have been raised in their turn. The author has recorded some of these developments, and carried on with some further ones. The book is self-contained, presupposing nothing but a few facts, mostly about the better-known systems of modal logic, which can easily be found in the literature. Topics discussed include the precursors of tense-logic, the Diodorean modal system, topology of time, non-standard tense-logics, the logic of successive world-states, metric tense-logic, time, determinism, and existence.Less
This book is a sequel to Time and Modality. Many problems raised in that book have been resolved, and new ones have been raised in their turn. The author has recorded some of these developments, and carried on with some further ones. The book is self-contained, presupposing nothing but a few facts, mostly about the better-known systems of modal logic, which can easily be found in the literature. Topics discussed include the precursors of tense-logic, the Diodorean modal system, topology of time, non-standard tense-logics, the logic of successive world-states, metric tense-logic, time, determinism, and existence.
Berit Brogaard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199796908
- eISBN:
- 9780199933235
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796908.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
In a recent influential paper, King offers empirical evidence against the assumption that there are tense operators in English. King argues that the metalinguistic truth-conditions for tensed ...
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In a recent influential paper, King offers empirical evidence against the assumption that there are tense operators in English. King argues that the metalinguistic truth-conditions for tensed sentences offered by eternalists are to serve as representations of the logical form of these sentences as well. A sentence like ‘John was a firefighter’ thus contains the quantified noun phrase ‘some past time’ rather than the past-tense operator ‘it was the case that’ at the level of logical form. Here I show why this argument is potentially troublesome for the temporalist and propose a solution.Less
In a recent influential paper, King offers empirical evidence against the assumption that there are tense operators in English. King argues that the metalinguistic truth-conditions for tensed sentences offered by eternalists are to serve as representations of the logical form of these sentences as well. A sentence like ‘John was a firefighter’ thus contains the quantified noun phrase ‘some past time’ rather than the past-tense operator ‘it was the case that’ at the level of logical form. Here I show why this argument is potentially troublesome for the temporalist and propose a solution.
Kit Fine
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199278701
- eISBN:
- 9780191603105
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199278709.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book is collection of the the author’s previously published papers on the philosophy of modality and tense and it also includes three unpublished papers. The author provides an exposition and ...
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This book is collection of the the author’s previously published papers on the philosophy of modality and tense and it also includes three unpublished papers. The author provides an exposition and defence of certain positions for which he is well-known: the intelligibility of modality de re; the primitiveness of the modal; and the primacy of the actual over the possible. He also argues for some less familiar positions: the existence of distinctive forms of natural and normative necessity, not reducible to any form of metaphysical necessity; the need to make a distinction between the worldly and unworldly, analogous to the distinction between the tensed and the tenseless; and the viability of a nonstandard form of realism about tense, which recognizes the tensed character of reality without conceding there is any privileged standpoint from which it is to be viewed.Less
This book is collection of the the author’s previously published papers on the philosophy of modality and tense and it also includes three unpublished papers. The author provides an exposition and defence of certain positions for which he is well-known: the intelligibility of modality de re; the primitiveness of the modal; and the primacy of the actual over the possible. He also argues for some less familiar positions: the existence of distinctive forms of natural and normative necessity, not reducible to any form of metaphysical necessity; the need to make a distinction between the worldly and unworldly, analogous to the distinction between the tensed and the tenseless; and the viability of a nonstandard form of realism about tense, which recognizes the tensed character of reality without conceding there is any privileged standpoint from which it is to be viewed.
Thomas Sattig
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199279524
- eISBN:
- 9780191604041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199279527.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter serves as an introduction to the themes of the book. The thesis of temporal supervenience is that all facts about ordinary time, all facts shaped by our ordinary temporal discourse, ...
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This chapter serves as an introduction to the themes of the book. The thesis of temporal supervenience is that all facts about ordinary time, all facts shaped by our ordinary temporal discourse, logically supervene on facts about spacetime; what goes on in spacetime fully determines what goes on in ordinary time. Temporal supervenience has many aspects, corresponding to various kinds of supervenient temporal phenomena. Among the most basic phenomena are persistence and change through ordinary time. The problem of temporal supervenience with respect to these phenomena has two components. The first component is to specify the spatiotemporal supervenience base of persistence and change. How do objects occupy spacetime? And how are properties instantiated across occupied spacetime? The second component is to build an explanatory bridge from the supervenience base to the supervenient phenomena. Such a bridge requires an ‘analysis’ of temporal existence and temporal instantiation, that is, a semantic account of ordinary temporal predications such as ‘a was F’. The problem of temporal supervenience thus connects the metaphysics of time with the semantics of temporal discourse. Before the supervenience of ordinary temporal facts on spacetime facts can be explained, the shape of ordinary time needs to be clarified. This is a further task of Chapter 1. Tenserism and A-time are criticized in the context of temporal supervenience with the aim of promoting detenserism as the correct account of tense and B-time as the true shape of ordinary time.Less
This chapter serves as an introduction to the themes of the book. The thesis of temporal supervenience is that all facts about ordinary time, all facts shaped by our ordinary temporal discourse, logically supervene on facts about spacetime; what goes on in spacetime fully determines what goes on in ordinary time. Temporal supervenience has many aspects, corresponding to various kinds of supervenient temporal phenomena. Among the most basic phenomena are persistence and change through ordinary time. The problem of temporal supervenience with respect to these phenomena has two components. The first component is to specify the spatiotemporal supervenience base of persistence and change. How do objects occupy spacetime? And how are properties instantiated across occupied spacetime? The second component is to build an explanatory bridge from the supervenience base to the supervenient phenomena. Such a bridge requires an ‘analysis’ of temporal existence and temporal instantiation, that is, a semantic account of ordinary temporal predications such as ‘a was F’. The problem of temporal supervenience thus connects the metaphysics of time with the semantics of temporal discourse. Before the supervenience of ordinary temporal facts on spacetime facts can be explained, the shape of ordinary time needs to be clarified. This is a further task of Chapter 1. Tenserism and A-time are criticized in the context of temporal supervenience with the aim of promoting detenserism as the correct account of tense and B-time as the true shape of ordinary time.
Craig Bourne
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199212804
- eISBN:
- 9780191707094
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212804.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
I begin by discussing what a theory of time is and what it should aim to do. Then discusses the initial plausible candidates for a theory of time; shows how best to frame the debate between tensed ...
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I begin by discussing what a theory of time is and what it should aim to do. Then discusses the initial plausible candidates for a theory of time; shows how best to frame the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time; and discusses the tenseless theory, and the various tense theories, such as the growing block view of Tooley, the branching‐future view of McCall, and presentism.Less
I begin by discussing what a theory of time is and what it should aim to do. Then discusses the initial plausible candidates for a theory of time; shows how best to frame the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time; and discusses the tenseless theory, and the various tense theories, such as the growing block view of Tooley, the branching‐future view of McCall, and presentism.
Craig Bourne
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199212804
- eISBN:
- 9780191707094
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212804.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
I introduce the Present Problem: how can a theory of time guarantee the infallible knowledge that we have that we are present? I show that only presentism and the tenseless theory can satisfy this ...
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I introduce the Present Problem: how can a theory of time guarantee the infallible knowledge that we have that we are present? I show that only presentism and the tenseless theory can satisfy this requirement, and thus all other theories, such as Tooley's growing block theory and McCall's branching‐future theory, should be rejected.Less
I introduce the Present Problem: how can a theory of time guarantee the infallible knowledge that we have that we are present? I show that only presentism and the tenseless theory can satisfy this requirement, and thus all other theories, such as Tooley's growing block theory and McCall's branching‐future theory, should be rejected.
Olga Borik
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199291298
- eISBN:
- 9780191710711
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291298.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
This book investigates the temporal structure of language. It deals with central issues in the understanding of tense and aspect, proposes a new approach to the main problems in the area, and seeks ...
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This book investigates the temporal structure of language. It deals with central issues in the understanding of tense and aspect, proposes a new approach to the main problems in the area, and seeks to establish the universal semantic properties of two important and contentious aspectual categories: perfectivity and imperfectivity. The book develops an original theory of aspect. It shows how this accounts for aspectual categories in Russian, and that it can used to compare Russian to other languages where similar aspectual issues arise. The book devotes particular attention to English, a language which appears to have no grammatical categories of perfectivity and imperfectivity. It argues that the semantic properties established for the Russian tense-aspect system are reflected in English, and reveals parallels in the expression of temporal and aspectual information in the two languages.Less
This book investigates the temporal structure of language. It deals with central issues in the understanding of tense and aspect, proposes a new approach to the main problems in the area, and seeks to establish the universal semantic properties of two important and contentious aspectual categories: perfectivity and imperfectivity. The book develops an original theory of aspect. It shows how this accounts for aspectual categories in Russian, and that it can used to compare Russian to other languages where similar aspectual issues arise. The book devotes particular attention to English, a language which appears to have no grammatical categories of perfectivity and imperfectivity. It argues that the semantic properties established for the Russian tense-aspect system are reflected in English, and reveals parallels in the expression of temporal and aspectual information in the two languages.
James Higginbotham
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199239313
- eISBN:
- 9780191716904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239313.003.0005
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
This chapter discusses the sequence of tense in complement clauses and object relative clauses. It shows how, given very simple semantic principles, the basic semantic phenomena associated with ...
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This chapter discusses the sequence of tense in complement clauses and object relative clauses. It shows how, given very simple semantic principles, the basic semantic phenomena associated with sequence of tense will follow. It then takes up the fundamental question of this chapter — the asymmetry between complement clauses and object relatives — and argues that an answer proposed since 1993, indebted to the proposal of Ogihara (1989), is incorrect. Finally, the chapter provides an alternative answer and remarks some questions that remain open.Less
This chapter discusses the sequence of tense in complement clauses and object relative clauses. It shows how, given very simple semantic principles, the basic semantic phenomena associated with sequence of tense will follow. It then takes up the fundamental question of this chapter — the asymmetry between complement clauses and object relatives — and argues that an answer proposed since 1993, indebted to the proposal of Ogihara (1989), is incorrect. Finally, the chapter provides an alternative answer and remarks some questions that remain open.
Berit Brogaard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199796908
- eISBN:
- 9780199933235
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796908.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
David Kaplan was one of the most vivid supporters of the view that there are temporal contents which tense operators operate on. The conclusion that the truth-value of sentence content may be ...
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David Kaplan was one of the most vivid supporters of the view that there are temporal contents which tense operators operate on. The conclusion that the truth-value of sentence content may be sensitive to time shifts does not by itself qualify as temporalism. If there are tense operators in English, then Kaplan’s argument succeeds in establishing that temporal contents satisfy the condition that they are contents that some intensional operators operate on. Since we have already argued that temporal contents satisfy the other conditions for being a proposition, we could take Kaplan’s argument to show that temporal contents are propositions. In response to Kaplan’s argument, several eternalists have defended the view that sentences have two kinds of content, temporal and eternal, but that only eternal content has proposition-status. The two kinds of content are also known as ‘compositional content’ and ‘assertoric content’. Rather than simply referring back to the general objections to eternalism provided in the first three chapters, I shall here offer independent arguments against each of the double-content strategies.Less
David Kaplan was one of the most vivid supporters of the view that there are temporal contents which tense operators operate on. The conclusion that the truth-value of sentence content may be sensitive to time shifts does not by itself qualify as temporalism. If there are tense operators in English, then Kaplan’s argument succeeds in establishing that temporal contents satisfy the condition that they are contents that some intensional operators operate on. Since we have already argued that temporal contents satisfy the other conditions for being a proposition, we could take Kaplan’s argument to show that temporal contents are propositions. In response to Kaplan’s argument, several eternalists have defended the view that sentences have two kinds of content, temporal and eternal, but that only eternal content has proposition-status. The two kinds of content are also known as ‘compositional content’ and ‘assertoric content’. Rather than simply referring back to the general objections to eternalism provided in the first three chapters, I shall here offer independent arguments against each of the double-content strategies.
Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199290932
- eISBN:
- 9780191710445
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290932.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter takes up the treatment of the simple tenses, past, present, future, and the progressive. Tense is treated as introducing a restricted indexical quantifier over times which binds an ...
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This chapter takes up the treatment of the simple tenses, past, present, future, and the progressive. Tense is treated as introducing a restricted indexical quantifier over times which binds an implicit argument place in tensed verbs. It is also argued that the progressive is not properly treated as a tense of the verb from which it is derived.Less
This chapter takes up the treatment of the simple tenses, past, present, future, and the progressive. Tense is treated as introducing a restricted indexical quantifier over times which binds an implicit argument place in tensed verbs. It is also argued that the progressive is not properly treated as a tense of the verb from which it is derived.
James Higginbotham
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199239313
- eISBN:
- 9780191716904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239313.003.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
This chapter focuses on two main issues: the issue of indexicality, and the extension of the notions of logic to indexical languages; and the issue of the notation itself. It begins with a discussion ...
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This chapter focuses on two main issues: the issue of indexicality, and the extension of the notions of logic to indexical languages; and the issue of the notation itself. It begins with a discussion of logical syntax, and then turns from there to possible characterizations of the notion of consequence. It concludes with a discussion of some further semantic phenomena, which underscore the need to take context and language together.Less
This chapter focuses on two main issues: the issue of indexicality, and the extension of the notions of logic to indexical languages; and the issue of the notation itself. It begins with a discussion of logical syntax, and then turns from there to possible characterizations of the notion of consequence. It concludes with a discussion of some further semantic phenomena, which underscore the need to take context and language together.
James Higginbotham
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199239313
- eISBN:
- 9780191716904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239313.003.0003
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
This chapter considers the question of how tensed thoughts differ from tenseless ones, and cites certain parallels between tense in thought and tense in language, with consequences for semantic ...
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This chapter considers the question of how tensed thoughts differ from tenseless ones, and cites certain parallels between tense in thought and tense in language, with consequences for semantic theory. On some proposals for the semantics of tense and temporal indexicals (words like ‘now’ and ‘then’), the difference between tensed thoughts and tenseless thoughts either cannot be made out or, if it does come in, requires special attention. These proposals have their rationale in the behaviour of tense and temporal indexicals in conjunction with modality, as discussed most prominently in David Kaplan (1977). It is argued that the behaviour of modals should be re-evaluated in light of the distinction between tensed thoughts and tenseless thoughts. It this is true then what requires explaining is not how tensed thoughts are to be constructed, but rather the peculiar behaviour of modality, in that it may efface distinctions among thoughts.Less
This chapter considers the question of how tensed thoughts differ from tenseless ones, and cites certain parallels between tense in thought and tense in language, with consequences for semantic theory. On some proposals for the semantics of tense and temporal indexicals (words like ‘now’ and ‘then’), the difference between tensed thoughts and tenseless thoughts either cannot be made out or, if it does come in, requires special attention. These proposals have their rationale in the behaviour of tense and temporal indexicals in conjunction with modality, as discussed most prominently in David Kaplan (1977). It is argued that the behaviour of modals should be re-evaluated in light of the distinction between tensed thoughts and tenseless thoughts. It this is true then what requires explaining is not how tensed thoughts are to be constructed, but rather the peculiar behaviour of modality, in that it may efface distinctions among thoughts.
James Higginbotham
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199239313
- eISBN:
- 9780191716904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239313.003.0006
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
This chapter extends the discussion of sequence of tense so as to include some properties of the English Perfect, and so as to clarify some pieces of the construction thus far left open. It calls ...
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This chapter extends the discussion of sequence of tense so as to include some properties of the English Perfect, and so as to clarify some pieces of the construction thus far left open. It calls attention to some features referred to as indexical mismatch between adverbials and tenses, a phenomenon that may well extend in a number of directions, both within individual languages and cross-linguistically. In large part, however, the purpose is to show that anaphoric theories of tense do exactly what needs to be done to explain the dependencies of c-commanded tenses upon c-commanding ones, and that alternatives — notably those of the sort proposed in Ogihara (1995), von Stechow (1995), and Abusch (1994; 1997) — must build back into their respective accounts the anaphoric properties of sequence of tense if those accounts are to be part of an empirically adequate system.Less
This chapter extends the discussion of sequence of tense so as to include some properties of the English Perfect, and so as to clarify some pieces of the construction thus far left open. It calls attention to some features referred to as indexical mismatch between adverbials and tenses, a phenomenon that may well extend in a number of directions, both within individual languages and cross-linguistically. In large part, however, the purpose is to show that anaphoric theories of tense do exactly what needs to be done to explain the dependencies of c-commanded tenses upon c-commanding ones, and that alternatives — notably those of the sort proposed in Ogihara (1995), von Stechow (1995), and Abusch (1994; 1997) — must build back into their respective accounts the anaphoric properties of sequence of tense if those accounts are to be part of an empirically adequate system.
James Higginbotham
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199239313
- eISBN:
- 9780191716904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239313.003.0008
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
This chapter examines the English Progressive, concentrating upon the issues surrounding what David Dowty (1977) dubbed the ‘imperfective paradox’. The discussion concerns a single part of the ...
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This chapter examines the English Progressive, concentrating upon the issues surrounding what David Dowty (1977) dubbed the ‘imperfective paradox’. The discussion concerns a single part of the general problem of tense and aspect, both within languages and cross-linguistically. That general problem has three pieces, namely: (i) what is the interpretation of tense and aspect?; (ii) what is the nature of the syntactic structures to be interpreted?; and (iii) what are the principles through which the mapping from these structures to the meaning is effected? None of these pieces can be assumed in advance: all must be solved simultaneously.Less
This chapter examines the English Progressive, concentrating upon the issues surrounding what David Dowty (1977) dubbed the ‘imperfective paradox’. The discussion concerns a single part of the general problem of tense and aspect, both within languages and cross-linguistically. That general problem has three pieces, namely: (i) what is the interpretation of tense and aspect?; (ii) what is the nature of the syntactic structures to be interpreted?; and (iii) what are the principles through which the mapping from these structures to the meaning is effected? None of these pieces can be assumed in advance: all must be solved simultaneously.
James Higginbotham
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199239313
- eISBN:
- 9780191716904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239313.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
This chapter explores the general thesis that the English Perfect is purely aspectual, serving to shift from a predicate of events e to a predicate of events that are results of e. To the extent that ...
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This chapter explores the general thesis that the English Perfect is purely aspectual, serving to shift from a predicate of events e to a predicate of events that are results of e. To the extent that this thesis is defensible, the Perfect is not involved in the Tense system at all, except derivatively (because Tense applies to the Perfect itself). The investigation of the Perfect interlocks with a number of metaphysical questions concerning the nature of events and situations, and further issues in the syntax and semantics of sequence of tense in English.Less
This chapter explores the general thesis that the English Perfect is purely aspectual, serving to shift from a predicate of events e to a predicate of events that are results of e. To the extent that this thesis is defensible, the Perfect is not involved in the Tense system at all, except derivatively (because Tense applies to the Perfect itself). The investigation of the Perfect interlocks with a number of metaphysical questions concerning the nature of events and situations, and further issues in the syntax and semantics of sequence of tense in English.