David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286867
- eISBN:
- 9780191603532
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286868.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The book features a collection of ten essays on themes from Aristotle’s Physics. Six of these have been previously published, and four are newly written for this volume. The first five essays are ...
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The book features a collection of ten essays on themes from Aristotle’s Physics. Six of these have been previously published, and four are newly written for this volume. The first five essays are based on single theme, namely Aristotle’s conception of substance as it appears in his physical works. The basic texts here are Physics I-II, but the essays also range quite widely over Aristotle’s other physical works, where these are relevant to his understanding of the notions of substance, matter, and form. The general view of these five essays is that Aristotle’s idea of matter was a winner, but his idea of form certainly was not. The remaining five essays are on various topics from Physics III-VI, with each confined to the text of the Physics itself. The topics covered fall broadly under the headings: space, time, and infinity.Less
The book features a collection of ten essays on themes from Aristotle’s Physics. Six of these have been previously published, and four are newly written for this volume. The first five essays are based on single theme, namely Aristotle’s conception of substance as it appears in his physical works. The basic texts here are Physics I-II, but the essays also range quite widely over Aristotle’s other physical works, where these are relevant to his understanding of the notions of substance, matter, and form. The general view of these five essays is that Aristotle’s idea of matter was a winner, but his idea of form certainly was not. The remaining five essays are on various topics from Physics III-VI, with each confined to the text of the Physics itself. The topics covered fall broadly under the headings: space, time, and infinity.
Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281688
- eISBN:
- 9780191603747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281688.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This essay considers the structure of the argument for duty in the Kantian context, in which it was most influentially formed. Kant notoriously argues that the supreme principle of morality must be ...
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This essay considers the structure of the argument for duty in the Kantian context, in which it was most influentially formed. Kant notoriously argues that the supreme principle of morality must be purely formal, by which he means that it does not direct us to act in order to achieve certain ends. Thus, any principle directed to the realization of certain ends must be merely hypothetical in character, and its motivational grounds subjective. It is shown that Kant overlooks a third possibility, namely, that there can be substantive categorical principles that objectively require us to realize certain ends regardless of our inclinations.Less
This essay considers the structure of the argument for duty in the Kantian context, in which it was most influentially formed. Kant notoriously argues that the supreme principle of morality must be purely formal, by which he means that it does not direct us to act in order to achieve certain ends. Thus, any principle directed to the realization of certain ends must be merely hypothetical in character, and its motivational grounds subjective. It is shown that Kant overlooks a third possibility, namely, that there can be substantive categorical principles that objectively require us to realize certain ends regardless of our inclinations.
Gideon Yaffe
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199268559
- eISBN:
- 9780191601415
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926855X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the ...
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Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the relation between human action and natural change. The concept of ‘active power’ stands at the centre of Reid's philosophy of action. He holds that actions are all and only the events of which some creature is the ‘efficient cause’, and he thinks a creature is the efficient cause of an event just in case it has the power to bring that event about and exerts it. Reid's conception both of human actions and changes in nature is deeply teleological. He holds that to exert a power is to direct an event towards an end, and he holds that all changes, whether actions or events in nature, flow from the exertion of power. The book explains the details of this view, Reid's reasons for holding it, and its implications to our understanding of action, agency, and our relation to the natural world.Less
Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the relation between human action and natural change. The concept of ‘active power’ stands at the centre of Reid's philosophy of action. He holds that actions are all and only the events of which some creature is the ‘efficient cause’, and he thinks a creature is the efficient cause of an event just in case it has the power to bring that event about and exerts it. Reid's conception both of human actions and changes in nature is deeply teleological. He holds that to exert a power is to direct an event towards an end, and he holds that all changes, whether actions or events in nature, flow from the exertion of power. The book explains the details of this view, Reid's reasons for holding it, and its implications to our understanding of action, agency, and our relation to the natural world.
Sarah Waterlow
- Published in print:
- 1982
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246534
- eISBN:
- 9780191680984
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246534.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book examines Aristotle’s concept of natural substance and its implications for change, process, agency, teleology, mathematical continuity, and eternal motion. It illustrates the conceptual ...
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This book examines Aristotle’s concept of natural substance and its implications for change, process, agency, teleology, mathematical continuity, and eternal motion. It illustrates the conceptual power of Aristotle’s metaphysics of nature, along with its scientific limitations and internal tensions.Less
This book examines Aristotle’s concept of natural substance and its implications for change, process, agency, teleology, mathematical continuity, and eternal motion. It illustrates the conceptual power of Aristotle’s metaphysics of nature, along with its scientific limitations and internal tensions.
Rowland Stout
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240631
- eISBN:
- 9780191680212
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240631.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Philosophers have usually argued that the right way to explain people's actions is in terms of their beliefs and intentions rather than in terms of objective facts. This book takes the opposite line. ...
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Philosophers have usually argued that the right way to explain people's actions is in terms of their beliefs and intentions rather than in terms of objective facts. This book takes the opposite line. Appeal to teleology is widely regarded with suspicion, but he argues that there are things in nature, namely actions, which can be teleologically explained: they happen because they serve some end. Moreover, this teleological explanation is externalist: it cites facts about the world, not beliefs and intentions which only represent the world. Such externalism about the explanation of action is a natural partner to externalism about knowledge and about reference, but has hardly ever been considered seriously before. One dramatic consequence of such a position is that it opens up the possibility of a behaviourist account of beliefs and intentions.Less
Philosophers have usually argued that the right way to explain people's actions is in terms of their beliefs and intentions rather than in terms of objective facts. This book takes the opposite line. Appeal to teleology is widely regarded with suspicion, but he argues that there are things in nature, namely actions, which can be teleologically explained: they happen because they serve some end. Moreover, this teleological explanation is externalist: it cites facts about the world, not beliefs and intentions which only represent the world. Such externalism about the explanation of action is a natural partner to externalism about knowledge and about reference, but has hardly ever been considered seriously before. One dramatic consequence of such a position is that it opens up the possibility of a behaviourist account of beliefs and intentions.
Paul F. Lurquin and Linda Stone
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195315387
- eISBN:
- 9780199785674
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195315387.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Intelligent Design (ID) thinking and older style creationism argue that evolution by natural selection is an incorrect theory. This book demonstrates that in doing so, neocreationism (Intelligent ...
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Intelligent Design (ID) thinking and older style creationism argue that evolution by natural selection is an incorrect theory. This book demonstrates that in doing so, neocreationism (Intelligent Design) and classical creationism misinterpret the meaning of scientific theories. This is because these religious doctrines imply teleology and purpose in the natural world, which are not analyzable scientifically. In addition, the concept of “irreducible complexity” often invoked by ID proponents is based on a flawed interpretation of scientific data. It also demonstrates that evolutionary thinking in the sciences is a powerful tool that can be used in the study of the origin of the universe, the origin of life and its diversification, and human evolution. Creationism and ID do not belong in the realm of science and have contributed nothing to its advancement. Further, attempts to force the teaching of creationism and ID in schools can only weaken a science curriculum which already leaves much to be desired.Less
Intelligent Design (ID) thinking and older style creationism argue that evolution by natural selection is an incorrect theory. This book demonstrates that in doing so, neocreationism (Intelligent Design) and classical creationism misinterpret the meaning of scientific theories. This is because these religious doctrines imply teleology and purpose in the natural world, which are not analyzable scientifically. In addition, the concept of “irreducible complexity” often invoked by ID proponents is based on a flawed interpretation of scientific data. It also demonstrates that evolutionary thinking in the sciences is a powerful tool that can be used in the study of the origin of the universe, the origin of life and its diversification, and human evolution. Creationism and ID do not belong in the realm of science and have contributed nothing to its advancement. Further, attempts to force the teaching of creationism and ID in schools can only weaken a science curriculum which already leaves much to be desired.
Michelle Kosch
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199289110
- eISBN:
- 9780191604003
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199289115.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter outlines Kant’s theory of freedom, his approach to the problem of freedom and determinism, and his account of the unity of reason.
This chapter outlines Kant’s theory of freedom, his approach to the problem of freedom and determinism, and his account of the unity of reason.
J. L. Mackie
- Published in print:
- 1980
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198246428
- eISBN:
- 9780191597954
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198246420.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this book, J. L. Mackie makes a careful study of several philosophical issues involved in his account of causation. Mackie follows Hume's distinction between causation as a concept and causation ...
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In this book, J. L. Mackie makes a careful study of several philosophical issues involved in his account of causation. Mackie follows Hume's distinction between causation as a concept and causation as it is ‘in the objects’ and attempts to provide an account of both aspects. Mackie examines the treatment of causation by philosophers such as Hume, Kant, Mill, Russell, Ducasse, Kneale, Hart and Honore, and von Wright. Mackie's own account involves an analysis of causal statements in terms of counterfactual conditionals though these are judged to be incapable of giving a complete account of causation. Mackie argues that regularity theory too can only offer an incomplete picture of the nature of causation. In the course of his analysis, Mackie critically examines the account of causation offered by Kant, as well as the contemporary Kantian approaches offered by philosophers such as Bennett and Strawson. Also addressed are issues such as the direction of causation, the relation of statistical laws and functional laws, the role of causal statements in legal contexts, and the understanding of causes both as ‘facts’ and ‘events’. Throughout the discussion of these topics, Mackie develops his own complex account of the nature of causation, finally bringing his analysis to bear in regard to the topic of teleology and the question of whether final causes can be justifiably reduced to efficient causes.Less
In this book, J. L. Mackie makes a careful study of several philosophical issues involved in his account of causation. Mackie follows Hume's distinction between causation as a concept and causation as it is ‘in the objects’ and attempts to provide an account of both aspects. Mackie examines the treatment of causation by philosophers such as Hume, Kant, Mill, Russell, Ducasse, Kneale, Hart and Honore, and von Wright. Mackie's own account involves an analysis of causal statements in terms of counterfactual conditionals though these are judged to be incapable of giving a complete account of causation. Mackie argues that regularity theory too can only offer an incomplete picture of the nature of causation. In the course of his analysis, Mackie critically examines the account of causation offered by Kant, as well as the contemporary Kantian approaches offered by philosophers such as Bennett and Strawson. Also addressed are issues such as the direction of causation, the relation of statistical laws and functional laws, the role of causal statements in legal contexts, and the understanding of causes both as ‘facts’ and ‘events’. Throughout the discussion of these topics, Mackie develops his own complex account of the nature of causation, finally bringing his analysis to bear in regard to the topic of teleology and the question of whether final causes can be justifiably reduced to efficient causes.
Roger D. Spegele
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199265206
- eISBN:
- 9780191601866
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199265208.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Part Two of the book begins with a discussion of realist and English School of International Relations approaches to writing international history, in which the author argues that the appreciation of ...
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Part Two of the book begins with a discussion of realist and English School of International Relations approaches to writing international history, in which the author argues that the appreciation of history that underpinned early English School thinking was reminiscent of that which also framed ‘traditional classical’ realist approaches to the subject. The author refutes D. C. Copeland's (2003) structuralist critique of the English School and argues that the School's early thinkers may provide a teleological account of agent‐led historical change that could enable traditional realists to regain ground lost to the structuralists in the past few decades. Focusing on the conceptions of history of two distinguished members of the English School, E. H. Carr and Herbert Butterfield (although their views are in some respects diametrically opposed), he argues that both implicitly accepted different renditions of a teleological view of history. He advances a case for treating human actions as directed to the agent's – both individual and collective – goals and purposes, an idea that scientific empiricism would be obliged to reject but which may unite the English School and traditional political realism. In addition, he suggests that the mix of English School and political realism provided by Carr and Butterfield offers an understanding of history that can challenge dominant neorealist and neoliberal accounts in two principal ways: first, in that it offers an account of history that focuses on the intentional actions of actors, and second, because it provides a convincing method for identifying the causes of historical change by focusing on the reasons for change.Less
Part Two of the book begins with a discussion of realist and English School of International Relations approaches to writing international history, in which the author argues that the appreciation of history that underpinned early English School thinking was reminiscent of that which also framed ‘traditional classical’ realist approaches to the subject. The author refutes D. C. Copeland's (2003) structuralist critique of the English School and argues that the School's early thinkers may provide a teleological account of agent‐led historical change that could enable traditional realists to regain ground lost to the structuralists in the past few decades. Focusing on the conceptions of history of two distinguished members of the English School, E. H. Carr and Herbert Butterfield (although their views are in some respects diametrically opposed), he argues that both implicitly accepted different renditions of a teleological view of history. He advances a case for treating human actions as directed to the agent's – both individual and collective – goals and purposes, an idea that scientific empiricism would be obliged to reject but which may unite the English School and traditional political realism. In addition, he suggests that the mix of English School and political realism provided by Carr and Butterfield offers an understanding of history that can challenge dominant neorealist and neoliberal accounts in two principal ways: first, in that it offers an account of history that focuses on the intentional actions of actors, and second, because it provides a convincing method for identifying the causes of historical change by focusing on the reasons for change.
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286867
- eISBN:
- 9780191603532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286868.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay begins by approving Aristotle’s general argument for teleology in Physics II.8. It then explores his use of teleological explanations in the biological works, distinguishing his practice ...
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This essay begins by approving Aristotle’s general argument for teleology in Physics II.8. It then explores his use of teleological explanations in the biological works, distinguishing his practice when actually giving explanations from his theory of how these explanations work. It is argued that while the practical instances usually make good sense, the theoretical explanation which identifies telos with form is wholly misleading. This brings the discussion back to the very puzzling chapter 9 of Physics II, and thence to a consideration of the idea that absolutely everything in nature is for some purpose. There are places where Aristotle seems to endorse this, although a more sober view would also assign a role to what may be called ‘laws of matter’, independent of teleology. The essay ends with some general reflections on Aristotle’s view of explanation in the natural sciences.Less
This essay begins by approving Aristotle’s general argument for teleology in Physics II.8. It then explores his use of teleological explanations in the biological works, distinguishing his practice when actually giving explanations from his theory of how these explanations work. It is argued that while the practical instances usually make good sense, the theoretical explanation which identifies telos with form is wholly misleading. This brings the discussion back to the very puzzling chapter 9 of Physics II, and thence to a consideration of the idea that absolutely everything in nature is for some purpose. There are places where Aristotle seems to endorse this, although a more sober view would also assign a role to what may be called ‘laws of matter’, independent of teleology. The essay ends with some general reflections on Aristotle’s view of explanation in the natural sciences.
Anthony Rudd
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199660049
- eISBN:
- 9780191744976
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660049.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Moral Philosophy
This book defends an account of the self it calls the NEST (Narrative, Evaluative, Self-Constitutive, Teleological) theory. It argues that the self, rather than being a wholly given entity, at least ...
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This book defends an account of the self it calls the NEST (Narrative, Evaluative, Self-Constitutive, Teleological) theory. It argues that the self, rather than being a wholly given entity, at least in part ‘constitutes’ or shapes itself, and does this by endorsing some desires or dispositions and repudiating others. As it is therefore inherently a self-evaluating being it must view itself teleologically, as standing in relation to a standard of value, which it must conceive as having objective authority. Furthermore, as a temporal self-evaluating agent, it must understand itself in narrative terms, though this does not mean that it has complete authorial mastery over its own narrative. Versions of some or all of these ideas have been developed by various influential writers (including Frankfurt, Korsgaard, MacIntyre, Ricoeur, and Taylor) but, while drawing extensively on them and replying to some of their critics, this book develops a version of NEST that is importantly different from others familiar in the literature. It takes its main inspiration from Kierkegaard’s account of the self, which it (controversially) argues belongs in the Platonic rather than the Aristotelian tradition of teleological thinking. So the book makes a case, through close engagement with much contemporary philosophical work, for an ancient and currently unfashionable view; that the polarities and tensions that are constitutive of selfhood can only be reconciled through an orientation of the self as a whole to an objective Good.Less
This book defends an account of the self it calls the NEST (Narrative, Evaluative, Self-Constitutive, Teleological) theory. It argues that the self, rather than being a wholly given entity, at least in part ‘constitutes’ or shapes itself, and does this by endorsing some desires or dispositions and repudiating others. As it is therefore inherently a self-evaluating being it must view itself teleologically, as standing in relation to a standard of value, which it must conceive as having objective authority. Furthermore, as a temporal self-evaluating agent, it must understand itself in narrative terms, though this does not mean that it has complete authorial mastery over its own narrative. Versions of some or all of these ideas have been developed by various influential writers (including Frankfurt, Korsgaard, MacIntyre, Ricoeur, and Taylor) but, while drawing extensively on them and replying to some of their critics, this book develops a version of NEST that is importantly different from others familiar in the literature. It takes its main inspiration from Kierkegaard’s account of the self, which it (controversially) argues belongs in the Platonic rather than the Aristotelian tradition of teleological thinking. So the book makes a case, through close engagement with much contemporary philosophical work, for an ancient and currently unfashionable view; that the polarities and tensions that are constitutive of selfhood can only be reconciled through an orientation of the self as a whole to an objective Good.
BRENT WATERS
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199271962
- eISBN:
- 9780191709883
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271962.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter summarizes the analyses and criticisms of the preceding chapters, and identifies the key themes to be developed in the following chapters. The chief argument to be developed in ...
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This chapter summarizes the analyses and criticisms of the preceding chapters, and identifies the key themes to be developed in the following chapters. The chief argument to be developed in subsequent chapters is that the failure of late liberalism to adequately preserve the nature of the familial association is the result of an inadequate theoretical account of social and political ordering. To correct this inadequacy, the following chapters develop a theological and teleological account of the family, and its normative implications for the tasks of social and political ordering.Less
This chapter summarizes the analyses and criticisms of the preceding chapters, and identifies the key themes to be developed in the following chapters. The chief argument to be developed in subsequent chapters is that the failure of late liberalism to adequately preserve the nature of the familial association is the result of an inadequate theoretical account of social and political ordering. To correct this inadequacy, the following chapters develop a theological and teleological account of the family, and its normative implications for the tasks of social and political ordering.
BRENT WATERS
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199271962
- eISBN:
- 9780191709883
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271962.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter initiates the book's constructive task by developing alternative philosophical, theological, and moral themes to those offered by late liberalism. The first section uses Herman ...
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This chapter initiates the book's constructive task by developing alternative philosophical, theological, and moral themes to those offered by late liberalism. The first section uses Herman Dooyeweerd's concept of sphere sovereignty to examine the relation between nature and history as two related spheres of human activity. It is argued, however, that this philosophical concept has severe limitations which must be corrected by employing theological themes. The second section uses the work of Oliver O'Donovan to develop the theological themes of a vindicated created order, relation between providence and eschatology, and dominion and stewardship. The third section, drawing upon the work of George Grant, develops a series of moral themes regarding the family as a form of human association. These themes include the household as a place of timely belonging within the temporal confines of created order, an unfolding and enfolding familial love that orients family members toward broader forms of human association, and the teleological ordering of the familial association toward its destiny in Christ.Less
This chapter initiates the book's constructive task by developing alternative philosophical, theological, and moral themes to those offered by late liberalism. The first section uses Herman Dooyeweerd's concept of sphere sovereignty to examine the relation between nature and history as two related spheres of human activity. It is argued, however, that this philosophical concept has severe limitations which must be corrected by employing theological themes. The second section uses the work of Oliver O'Donovan to develop the theological themes of a vindicated created order, relation between providence and eschatology, and dominion and stewardship. The third section, drawing upon the work of George Grant, develops a series of moral themes regarding the family as a form of human association. These themes include the household as a place of timely belonging within the temporal confines of created order, an unfolding and enfolding familial love that orients family members toward broader forms of human association, and the teleological ordering of the familial association toward its destiny in Christ.
Brent Waters
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199271962
- eISBN:
- 9780191709883
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271962.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter describes the normative contours of the family with respect to its teleological and eschatological orientation toward broader spheres of social and political affinities. The principal ...
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This chapter describes the normative contours of the family with respect to its teleological and eschatological orientation toward broader spheres of social and political affinities. The principal foci of this account includes the temporal and timely ordering of these affinities, the providential movement of the family through history, and the witness of the family within a vindicated creation being drawn toward its destiny in Christ by focusing on the related tasks of procreation and social reproduction.Less
This chapter describes the normative contours of the family with respect to its teleological and eschatological orientation toward broader spheres of social and political affinities. The principal foci of this account includes the temporal and timely ordering of these affinities, the providential movement of the family through history, and the witness of the family within a vindicated creation being drawn toward its destiny in Christ by focusing on the related tasks of procreation and social reproduction.
Martin Schöneld
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195132182
- eISBN:
- 9780199786336
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195132181.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter explores Kant’s third book, The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of God’s Existence (1764). Section 1 surveys Kant’s development after his professorial thesis (1756): ...
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This chapter explores Kant’s third book, The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of God’s Existence (1764). Section 1 surveys Kant’s development after his professorial thesis (1756): the West Winds essay (1757); Motion and Rest (1758) and its sequel Directions in Space (1768); the Optimism essay (1759), the project of a “Children’s Physics” (1759), and the False Subtlety treatise (1762). Section 2 explains the organization of Kant’s third book and how the two arguments for God’s existence derive from a joint demonstrative basis. Section 3 analyzes Kant’s conceptual proof for God’s existence and the rigor of its logical structure.Less
This chapter explores Kant’s third book, The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of God’s Existence (1764). Section 1 surveys Kant’s development after his professorial thesis (1756): the West Winds essay (1757); Motion and Rest (1758) and its sequel Directions in Space (1768); the Optimism essay (1759), the project of a “Children’s Physics” (1759), and the False Subtlety treatise (1762). Section 2 explains the organization of Kant’s third book and how the two arguments for God’s existence derive from a joint demonstrative basis. Section 3 analyzes Kant’s conceptual proof for God’s existence and the rigor of its logical structure.
Douglas W. Portmore
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199794539
- eISBN:
- 9780199919260
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794539.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Commonsense Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both ...
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Commonsense Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons. Broadly construed, consequentialism is the view that an act's deontic status is determined by how its outcome ranks relative to those of the available alternatives on some evaluative ranking. Portmore argues that outcomes should be ranked, not according to their impersonal value, but according to how much reason the agent has to desire that each outcome obtains and that, when outcomes are ranked in this way, we arrive at a version of consequentialism that can better account for our commonsense moral intuitions than even many forms of deontology can. What's more, Portmore argues that we should accept this version of consequentialism, because we should accept both that an agent can be morally required to do only what she has most reason to do and that what she has most reason to do is to perform the act that would produce the outcome that she has most reason to want to obtain. Although the primary aim of the book is to defend a particular consequentialist theory (viz., commonsense consequentialism), Portmore defends this theory as part of a coherent whole concerning our commonsense views about the nature and substance of both morality and rationality. Thus, it will be of interest not only to those working in normative ethics, but also to those working in metaethics.Less
Commonsense Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons. Broadly construed, consequentialism is the view that an act's deontic status is determined by how its outcome ranks relative to those of the available alternatives on some evaluative ranking. Portmore argues that outcomes should be ranked, not according to their impersonal value, but according to how much reason the agent has to desire that each outcome obtains and that, when outcomes are ranked in this way, we arrive at a version of consequentialism that can better account for our commonsense moral intuitions than even many forms of deontology can. What's more, Portmore argues that we should accept this version of consequentialism, because we should accept both that an agent can be morally required to do only what she has most reason to do and that what she has most reason to do is to perform the act that would produce the outcome that she has most reason to want to obtain. Although the primary aim of the book is to defend a particular consequentialist theory (viz., commonsense consequentialism), Portmore defends this theory as part of a coherent whole concerning our commonsense views about the nature and substance of both morality and rationality. Thus, it will be of interest not only to those working in normative ethics, but also to those working in metaethics.
Allan Gotthelf
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199287956
- eISBN:
- 9780191738296
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287956.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Starting from the premise that Aristotelian explanation proceeds via the concepts of natures and potentials (and not, say, laws), this chapter argues that for Aristotle the generation of a living ...
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Starting from the premise that Aristotelian explanation proceeds via the concepts of natures and potentials (and not, say, laws), this chapter argues that for Aristotle the generation of a living organism is not the actualization of the natures and potentials of the materials from which organisms develop, but rather the actualization of a primitive, irreducible potential to produce out of the appropriate materials an organism of a certain form. Each of the major texts in which Aristotle defends his natural teleology is shown to argue for or presuppose that material causes are insufficient to produce such an end. Aristotle's teleology is thus is an empirical thesis and not an a priori one brought to nature. A Postscript articulates various aspects of this view more precisely, showing that a part is for the sake of something only if it has come to be for the sake of something.Less
Starting from the premise that Aristotelian explanation proceeds via the concepts of natures and potentials (and not, say, laws), this chapter argues that for Aristotle the generation of a living organism is not the actualization of the natures and potentials of the materials from which organisms develop, but rather the actualization of a primitive, irreducible potential to produce out of the appropriate materials an organism of a certain form. Each of the major texts in which Aristotle defends his natural teleology is shown to argue for or presuppose that material causes are insufficient to produce such an end. Aristotle's teleology is thus is an empirical thesis and not an a priori one brought to nature. A Postscript articulates various aspects of this view more precisely, showing that a part is for the sake of something only if it has come to be for the sake of something.
Ronald de Sousa
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195189858
- eISBN:
- 9780199868377
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189858.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Adaptation of organs to their function, and of organisms to their ecological niches, is a particularly striking feature of the living world. The observation of this, however, often encourages a hasty ...
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Adaptation of organs to their function, and of organisms to their ecological niches, is a particularly striking feature of the living world. The observation of this, however, often encourages a hasty inference to the conclusion that teleology is ineliminable from biology. It can seem undeniable that in order to explain the behavior of every organ and every member of a biological community — organism, hive, or ecological web — we must refer to the teleological aspects of its organization. This chapter examines that presumption of teleology. It argues that although teleology is not entirely banned from biology, it subsists only in what is referred to as a “vestigial” form. In that vestigial or degenerate form, why nature produces such a powerful impression of being pervaded by inherent teleology can still be explained. But teleology in that form is wholly distinct from that which is in question when we speak of the goals, purposes, and values of individual human agents.Less
Adaptation of organs to their function, and of organisms to their ecological niches, is a particularly striking feature of the living world. The observation of this, however, often encourages a hasty inference to the conclusion that teleology is ineliminable from biology. It can seem undeniable that in order to explain the behavior of every organ and every member of a biological community — organism, hive, or ecological web — we must refer to the teleological aspects of its organization. This chapter examines that presumption of teleology. It argues that although teleology is not entirely banned from biology, it subsists only in what is referred to as a “vestigial” form. In that vestigial or degenerate form, why nature produces such a powerful impression of being pervaded by inherent teleology can still be explained. But teleology in that form is wholly distinct from that which is in question when we speak of the goals, purposes, and values of individual human agents.
Ronald de Sousa
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199216840
- eISBN:
- 9780191712043
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216840.003.0016
- Subject:
- Biology, Animal Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
Philosophers interested in meaning have tended to look at the extremes of mere causality on one side and full fledged ‘non-natural meaning’ in human language on the other. But the former (though not ...
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Philosophers interested in meaning have tended to look at the extremes of mere causality on one side and full fledged ‘non-natural meaning’ in human language on the other. But the former (though not simple, as attested by the long and largely vain attempt of philosophers to analyze it) is too simple to count as information, while the complexity of the latter places it far beyond many other forms of genuine communication found in the living world, from bacteria to mammals. Those other forms of communication involve ‘Shannon-information’ but aren't wholly captured by that notion. This chapter looks at some of the work that biologists have done to construct a coherent concept of information able to span a wide spectrum of communication from such phenomena as ‘quorum sensing’ among bacteria to sophisticated infra-linguistic signalling in primates.Less
Philosophers interested in meaning have tended to look at the extremes of mere causality on one side and full fledged ‘non-natural meaning’ in human language on the other. But the former (though not simple, as attested by the long and largely vain attempt of philosophers to analyze it) is too simple to count as information, while the complexity of the latter places it far beyond many other forms of genuine communication found in the living world, from bacteria to mammals. Those other forms of communication involve ‘Shannon-information’ but aren't wholly captured by that notion. This chapter looks at some of the work that biologists have done to construct a coherent concept of information able to span a wide spectrum of communication from such phenomena as ‘quorum sensing’ among bacteria to sophisticated infra-linguistic signalling in primates.
Anver M. Emon
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579006
- eISBN:
- 9780191722639
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579006.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History
This chapter introduces the reader to three different approaches to a particular type of Islamic natural law theory, herein called Hard Natural Law. It reviews the writings of three premodern Sunni ...
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This chapter introduces the reader to three different approaches to a particular type of Islamic natural law theory, herein called Hard Natural Law. It reviews the writings of three premodern Sunni Muslim jurists, all of whom are concerned with whether empirical evaluations of the good and the bad can lead to Shari'a norms, whose authority participates in or draws upon the authority of the Divine Will. Their theoretical approaches show how nature provides the foundation for the authority of reason as a source of Shari'a. The three Hard Natural Law jurists fuse fact and value in nature, and situate their use of reason within a natural teleology directed to the telos of human fulfillment in both this world and the hereafter. Their version of natural law is called ‘hard’ because their conception of nature as a bounty to humanity is fixed and not vulnerable to a divine ‘change of mind’.Less
This chapter introduces the reader to three different approaches to a particular type of Islamic natural law theory, herein called Hard Natural Law. It reviews the writings of three premodern Sunni Muslim jurists, all of whom are concerned with whether empirical evaluations of the good and the bad can lead to Shari'a norms, whose authority participates in or draws upon the authority of the Divine Will. Their theoretical approaches show how nature provides the foundation for the authority of reason as a source of Shari'a. The three Hard Natural Law jurists fuse fact and value in nature, and situate their use of reason within a natural teleology directed to the telos of human fulfillment in both this world and the hereafter. Their version of natural law is called ‘hard’ because their conception of nature as a bounty to humanity is fixed and not vulnerable to a divine ‘change of mind’.
