Rowland Stout
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240631
- eISBN:
- 9780191680212
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240631.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Aristotle defines teleological explanation as explanation of something in terms of what that thing is for the sake of. What it is for something to be for the sake of something else is for it to be a ...
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Aristotle defines teleological explanation as explanation of something in terms of what that thing is for the sake of. What it is for something to be for the sake of something else is for it to be a means to the end of that thing — a way of achieving that thing. He does not mean that something is justified in any final way in virtue of being a means to an end. If the end is bad, then the means to that end is not ultimately justified by it. Even if the end is itself justified, the means to that end is not always ultimately justified by it, since it may be wrong for other reasons. This chapter claims that saying that something is a means to an end is a way of justifying it, even if it is not always a very good way.Less
Aristotle defines teleological explanation as explanation of something in terms of what that thing is for the sake of. What it is for something to be for the sake of something else is for it to be a means to the end of that thing — a way of achieving that thing. He does not mean that something is justified in any final way in virtue of being a means to an end. If the end is bad, then the means to that end is not ultimately justified by it. Even if the end is itself justified, the means to that end is not always ultimately justified by it, since it may be wrong for other reasons. This chapter claims that saying that something is a means to an end is a way of justifying it, even if it is not always a very good way.
G. F. Schueler
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199250370
- eISBN:
- 9780191598364
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250375.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book involves rethinking the answer to Davidson's question, ”What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what ...
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This book involves rethinking the answer to Davidson's question, ”What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?” It focuses on the thought that practical deliberation is central to explaining human action. One common version of the widely held view that explanations of actions in terms of the agent's reasons are causal explanations understands desires and beliefs as the main causal factors and says roughly that what might be called a purely causal or ’non‐purposive’ account of desire‐belief interactions underlies the surface and (apparently) purposive or teleological explanation in terms of the agent's reasons. It is argued in this book that any such view can make no sense in the end of a common, and indeed essential, element in reasons explanations, practical reasoning itself.In the alternative account suggested here, explanations of actions in terms of the agent's reasons have an ineliminable normative element, not explicable in unadorned causal terms, which stems from the central role of practical deliberation in the genesis, and thus in the explanation, of actions. Intentional actions are always done for reasons, and the agent's reasons for doing what she did, even when there is no explicit deliberation, are whatever led her to think that this action is what she should do. So her reasons for doing what she did are intelligible only as features of her actual or possible practical deliberation, which must therefore always be at least implicitly referred to in explanations of her actions in terms of her reasons. At the same time, practical deliberation is inherently normative, both in the sense that the agent must employ evaluations in her deliberation and in the sense that her reasons are automatically open to normative criticism from herself and others. It is argued here that this requires that explanations of actions that refer essentially to the agent's deliberation have a normative element as well.Less
This book involves rethinking the answer to Davidson's question, ”What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?” It focuses on the thought that practical deliberation is central to explaining human action. One common version of the widely held view that explanations of actions in terms of the agent's reasons are causal explanations understands desires and beliefs as the main causal factors and says roughly that what might be called a purely causal or ’non‐purposive’ account of desire‐belief interactions underlies the surface and (apparently) purposive or teleological explanation in terms of the agent's reasons. It is argued in this book that any such view can make no sense in the end of a common, and indeed essential, element in reasons explanations, practical reasoning itself.
In the alternative account suggested here, explanations of actions in terms of the agent's reasons have an ineliminable normative element, not explicable in unadorned causal terms, which stems from the central role of practical deliberation in the genesis, and thus in the explanation, of actions. Intentional actions are always done for reasons, and the agent's reasons for doing what she did, even when there is no explicit deliberation, are whatever led her to think that this action is what she should do. So her reasons for doing what she did are intelligible only as features of her actual or possible practical deliberation, which must therefore always be at least implicitly referred to in explanations of her actions in terms of her reasons. At the same time, practical deliberation is inherently normative, both in the sense that the agent must employ evaluations in her deliberation and in the sense that her reasons are automatically open to normative criticism from herself and others. It is argued here that this requires that explanations of actions that refer essentially to the agent's deliberation have a normative element as well.
Don Garrett
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195165418
- eISBN:
- 9780199868285
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195165411.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter seeks to establish (1) that Spinoza accepts the legitimacy of many teleological explanations; (2) that in two important respects, Leibniz's view of teleology is not more, and perhaps ...
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This chapter seeks to establish (1) that Spinoza accepts the legitimacy of many teleological explanations; (2) that in two important respects, Leibniz's view of teleology is not more, and perhaps even less, Aristotleian than Descartes's; and (3) that among Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, it is Spinoza who holds the view of teleology closest to that of Aristotle. The arguments for (1) derive from examinations of Spinoza's doctrine of conatus, critical analysis of Jonathan Bennett's proposed grounds for interpreting Spinoza as denying all teleology, and the application of Spinoza's distinction of three kinds of knowledge to the distinction between mechanistic and teleological explanation. The arguments for (2) and (3) are based on an examination of the answers given by Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza to four basic questions about the nature and range of teleology and teleological explanation. These questions concern the dependence of teleology on thought, the relation of teleology to divine will or purpose, the existence of “sub‐human” teleology, and the role of teleological explanation in natural philosophy.Less
This chapter seeks to establish (1) that Spinoza accepts the legitimacy of many teleological explanations; (2) that in two important respects, Leibniz's view of teleology is not more, and perhaps even less, Aristotleian than Descartes's; and (3) that among Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, it is Spinoza who holds the view of teleology closest to that of Aristotle. The arguments for (1) derive from examinations of Spinoza's doctrine of conatus, critical analysis of Jonathan Bennett's proposed grounds for interpreting Spinoza as denying all teleology, and the application of Spinoza's distinction of three kinds of knowledge to the distinction between mechanistic and teleological explanation. The arguments for (2) and (3) are based on an examination of the answers given by Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza to four basic questions about the nature and range of teleology and teleological explanation. These questions concern the dependence of teleology on thought, the relation of teleology to divine will or purpose, the existence of “sub‐human” teleology, and the role of teleological explanation in natural philosophy.
Rowland Stout
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240631
- eISBN:
- 9780191680212
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240631.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Three reasons are used to interpolate a chapter on causal explanation into a book about agency. First, the book claims that both the Argument from False Beliefs and the Argument from the Impotence of ...
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Three reasons are used to interpolate a chapter on causal explanation into a book about agency. First, the book claims that both the Argument from False Beliefs and the Argument from the Impotence of Unrepresented Facts depend on bad theories of explanation. To make this claim convincing, the book shows what is wrong with the bad theories and provides a good theory in their place. Second, it shows that teleological explanation is a species of causal explanation, and how an account of teleological explanation emerges quite naturally from an account of causal explanation in general. Much of the philosophical literature on teleological explanation seems to be distorted for failing to take this route.Less
Three reasons are used to interpolate a chapter on causal explanation into a book about agency. First, the book claims that both the Argument from False Beliefs and the Argument from the Impotence of Unrepresented Facts depend on bad theories of explanation. To make this claim convincing, the book shows what is wrong with the bad theories and provides a good theory in their place. Second, it shows that teleological explanation is a species of causal explanation, and how an account of teleological explanation emerges quite naturally from an account of causal explanation in general. Much of the philosophical literature on teleological explanation seems to be distorted for failing to take this route.
John O. Reiss
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520258938
- eISBN:
- 9780520944404
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520258938.003.0002
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
This chapter provides the necessary philosophical background by defining teleological thinking and why it is a problem, and distinguishes conditional teleological explanations, which are acceptable, ...
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This chapter provides the necessary philosophical background by defining teleological thinking and why it is a problem, and distinguishes conditional teleological explanations, which are acceptable, from purposive and deterministic teleological explanations, which are not. It discusses Georges Cuvier's principle of the conditions for existence, arguing that this principle is a conditional teleological principle, and concludes by noting certain parallels between the principle of the conditions for existence and the weak anthropic principle.Less
This chapter provides the necessary philosophical background by defining teleological thinking and why it is a problem, and distinguishes conditional teleological explanations, which are acceptable, from purposive and deterministic teleological explanations, which are not. It discusses Georges Cuvier's principle of the conditions for existence, arguing that this principle is a conditional teleological principle, and concludes by noting certain parallels between the principle of the conditions for existence and the weak anthropic principle.
R. J. Hankinson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246564
- eISBN:
- 9780191597572
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246564.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Plato offers the first metaphysical exploration of the nature of causation and explanation, and the relationship between these and other metaphysical concepts, such as forms, properties, and the ...
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Plato offers the first metaphysical exploration of the nature of causation and explanation, and the relationship between these and other metaphysical concepts, such as forms, properties, and the soul. Hankinson focuses on two dialogues, the Phaedo and the Timaeus; in the first of these, Plato rejects the materialism of natural science, in favour of the good as the ground of teleological explanations, and he invokes forms as invariable causal properties. Plato explores the notion of an archê, or ultimate principle, in his argument for the immortality of the soul; this notion comes together with the concept of hypothetical investigation and the casual account of knowledge in the Timaeus. Here, Plato offers a cosmogony invoking a divine artificer who fashions the universe from a receptacle, a material substratum that can receive all forms. In Plato's philosophy, there is the emergence of a concern with the correct form that an explanation ought to take, and also an emphasis on teleological explanation.Less
Plato offers the first metaphysical exploration of the nature of causation and explanation, and the relationship between these and other metaphysical concepts, such as forms, properties, and the soul. Hankinson focuses on two dialogues, the Phaedo and the Timaeus; in the first of these, Plato rejects the materialism of natural science, in favour of the good as the ground of teleological explanations, and he invokes forms as invariable causal properties. Plato explores the notion of an archê, or ultimate principle, in his argument for the immortality of the soul; this notion comes together with the concept of hypothetical investigation and the casual account of knowledge in the Timaeus. Here, Plato offers a cosmogony invoking a divine artificer who fashions the universe from a receptacle, a material substratum that can receive all forms. In Plato's philosophy, there is the emergence of a concern with the correct form that an explanation ought to take, and also an emphasis on teleological explanation.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195156171
- eISBN:
- 9780199833467
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515617X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Argues for a constraint on a proper theory of motivation – namely, that proper motivational explanations of goal‐directed actions are causal explanations. The chapter criticizes the thesis that ...
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Argues for a constraint on a proper theory of motivation – namely, that proper motivational explanations of goal‐directed actions are causal explanations. The chapter criticizes the thesis that acceptable teleological explanations of actions are not causal explanations and it offers a solution to a problem that deviant causal chains pose for a causal theory of action.Less
Argues for a constraint on a proper theory of motivation – namely, that proper motivational explanations of goal‐directed actions are causal explanations. The chapter criticizes the thesis that acceptable teleological explanations of actions are not causal explanations and it offers a solution to a problem that deviant causal chains pose for a causal theory of action.
Angus Ritchie
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199652518
- eISBN:
- 9780191745850
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652518.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter develops a positive argument for theism, claiming it is capable (in a way secular accounts are not) of bridging the explanatory gap described in Chapter 2. It begins by defending agent ...
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This chapter develops a positive argument for theism, claiming it is capable (in a way secular accounts are not) of bridging the explanatory gap described in Chapter 2. It begins by defending agent explanation as the a form of teleological explanation. Having argued that theism would be able to explain the reliability of human moral cognition, the chapter goes on to objections to such an explanation by Hugh Rice (who argues against a personal deity, but in favour of teleology) and Stephen Law (who argues an evil God would explain phenomena as well as a benevolent deity, and offers this as a reductio ad absurdum of theism). The chapter defends a personal conception of God, outlines how this might plausibly relate to objective goodness, and argues that Law's ‘evil God hypothesis’ offers a less adequate explanation of human moral cognition.Less
This chapter develops a positive argument for theism, claiming it is capable (in a way secular accounts are not) of bridging the explanatory gap described in Chapter 2. It begins by defending agent explanation as the a form of teleological explanation. Having argued that theism would be able to explain the reliability of human moral cognition, the chapter goes on to objections to such an explanation by Hugh Rice (who argues against a personal deity, but in favour of teleology) and Stephen Law (who argues an evil God would explain phenomena as well as a benevolent deity, and offers this as a reductio ad absurdum of theism). The chapter defends a personal conception of God, outlines how this might plausibly relate to objective goodness, and argues that Law's ‘evil God hypothesis’ offers a less adequate explanation of human moral cognition.
Rüdiger Bittner
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195143645
- eISBN:
- 9780199833085
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195143647.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The chapter tries to account for two kinds of cases that raise difficulties for the present conception of reasons for which people do things, namely, things done for a purpose, where the reason seems ...
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The chapter tries to account for two kinds of cases that raise difficulties for the present conception of reasons for which people do things, namely, things done for a purpose, where the reason seems to be a future state or event, and things done for fun, which do not seem to be supported by reasons at all. As for things done for a purpose, it is argued here that we do not need teleological explanation as a special kind of explanation of action, and that these cases can be accommodated on the present conception by taking the reason for the action to lie, not in the end state the agent is said to be aiming at, but in the current state of affairs that prompts the agent to change or, as the case may be, to preserve it. As for things done for fun, it is argued that they are indeed done for a reason, which lies, generally speaking, in the special character of what it is like to do them.Less
The chapter tries to account for two kinds of cases that raise difficulties for the present conception of reasons for which people do things, namely, things done for a purpose, where the reason seems to be a future state or event, and things done for fun, which do not seem to be supported by reasons at all. As for things done for a purpose, it is argued here that we do not need teleological explanation as a special kind of explanation of action, and that these cases can be accommodated on the present conception by taking the reason for the action to lie, not in the end state the agent is said to be aiming at, but in the current state of affairs that prompts the agent to change or, as the case may be, to preserve it. As for things done for fun, it is argued that they are indeed done for a reason, which lies, generally speaking, in the special character of what it is like to do them.
Christopher Janaway
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250036
- eISBN:
- 9780191597817
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250037.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Schopenhauer conceives the will as metaphysically primary, as the thing in itself that underlies all phenomena, but also as having primacy over the intellect in human psychology. Experience is a ...
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Schopenhauer conceives the will as metaphysically primary, as the thing in itself that underlies all phenomena, but also as having primacy over the intellect in human psychology. Experience is a function of the brain, which receives a teleological explanation as furthering the life of the organism. This is one example of Schopenhauer's conception of will to life, a blindly striving principle that manifests itself throughout individuals in the empirical world. The chapter examines the coherence of Schopenhauer's philosophy of the self as will with his notion of the pure subject or ‘I’.Less
Schopenhauer conceives the will as metaphysically primary, as the thing in itself that underlies all phenomena, but also as having primacy over the intellect in human psychology. Experience is a function of the brain, which receives a teleological explanation as furthering the life of the organism. This is one example of Schopenhauer's conception of will to life, a blindly striving principle that manifests itself throughout individuals in the empirical world. The chapter examines the coherence of Schopenhauer's philosophy of the self as will with his notion of the pure subject or ‘I’.
Angus Ritchie
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199652518
- eISBN:
- 9780191745850
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652518.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter considers the axiarchic account advanced by John Leslie and Hugh Rice. Against axiarchism, it argues that the goodness of a state of affairs is something that cries out for an ...
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This chapter considers the axiarchic account advanced by John Leslie and Hugh Rice. Against axiarchism, it argues that the goodness of a state of affairs is something that cries out for an explanation, rather than being something which can be invoked as the explanation. The chapter then evaluates non-axiarchic Neoplatonism — in which a non-personal power is postulated as the cause of good states of affairs. It argues that such a view would close the ‘explanatory gap’ described in Chapter 2, but not in as satisfying a way as theism.Less
This chapter considers the axiarchic account advanced by John Leslie and Hugh Rice. Against axiarchism, it argues that the goodness of a state of affairs is something that cries out for an explanation, rather than being something which can be invoked as the explanation. The chapter then evaluates non-axiarchic Neoplatonism — in which a non-personal power is postulated as the cause of good states of affairs. It argues that such a view would close the ‘explanatory gap’ described in Chapter 2, but not in as satisfying a way as theism.
Ishtiyaque Haji
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- September 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190050856
- eISBN:
- 9780190050887
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190050856.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Chapter 2 addresses the deterministic horn. Whether determinism threatens obligation turns partly but pivotally on whether the alternatives obligation requires are of the sort that one can have even ...
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Chapter 2 addresses the deterministic horn. Whether determinism threatens obligation turns partly but pivotally on whether the alternatives obligation requires are of the sort that one can have even if determinism is true (weak alternatives) or of the sort determinism precludes one from having (strong alternatives). A line of reasoning for the view that obligation presupposes only that that agents have weak alternatives is evaluated. The chapter concludes with the argument that even if a teleological account of reasons explanation, according to which actions are to be explained in terms of the goals of agents and not in terms of whether they are caused by appropriate mental items (or their neural realizers), is true, determinism still threatens obligation if obligation requires strong alternatives.Less
Chapter 2 addresses the deterministic horn. Whether determinism threatens obligation turns partly but pivotally on whether the alternatives obligation requires are of the sort that one can have even if determinism is true (weak alternatives) or of the sort determinism precludes one from having (strong alternatives). A line of reasoning for the view that obligation presupposes only that that agents have weak alternatives is evaluated. The chapter concludes with the argument that even if a teleological account of reasons explanation, according to which actions are to be explained in terms of the goals of agents and not in terms of whether they are caused by appropriate mental items (or their neural realizers), is true, determinism still threatens obligation if obligation requires strong alternatives.
Marilyn McCord Adams
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- December 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198732648
- eISBN:
- 9780191796869
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732648.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter uses a comparison and contrast of Swinburne’s dualism and medieval hylomorphisms to expose some strategic theoretical choices that Swinburne has made. Among other things, he forwards a ...
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This chapter uses a comparison and contrast of Swinburne’s dualism and medieval hylomorphisms to expose some strategic theoretical choices that Swinburne has made. Among other things, he forwards a thin view of substance, a reduction of natural kinds to res cogitans and res extensa, and an isolation of teleological explanation to the plans and choices of Divine and human rational agents. Where Nagel wants to make a theory of everything the goal of human inquiry, Swinburne’s dualism forfeits any attempt to find a natural explanation of mind–body interactions. For Swinburne, what explains everything is Divine providence. The chapter closes with the suggestion that alternative choices—such as those embraced by medieval hylomorphisms—might make it easier to avoid marginalizing the biological, explain the unity of human being, and solve the problem of evil.Less
This chapter uses a comparison and contrast of Swinburne’s dualism and medieval hylomorphisms to expose some strategic theoretical choices that Swinburne has made. Among other things, he forwards a thin view of substance, a reduction of natural kinds to res cogitans and res extensa, and an isolation of teleological explanation to the plans and choices of Divine and human rational agents. Where Nagel wants to make a theory of everything the goal of human inquiry, Swinburne’s dualism forfeits any attempt to find a natural explanation of mind–body interactions. For Swinburne, what explains everything is Divine providence. The chapter closes with the suggestion that alternative choices—such as those embraced by medieval hylomorphisms—might make it easier to avoid marginalizing the biological, explain the unity of human being, and solve the problem of evil.
Jennifer McKitrick
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- March 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198791973
- eISBN:
- 9780191834196
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198791973.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Nick Kroll’s Teleological Approach to Dispositions (TAD) promises to explain the sense in which dispositions are directed at manifesting. However, Kroll’s explanation of directedness is problematic ...
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Nick Kroll’s Teleological Approach to Dispositions (TAD) promises to explain the sense in which dispositions are directed at manifesting. However, Kroll’s explanation of directedness is problematic for a number of reasons. First, TAD depends on a distinction between a disposition being stimulated and it being “activated,” but Kroll’s obscure notion of activation seems incapable of solving the problems for which it was introduced. Second, TAD does not attribute directedness to the disposition itself, but to a distinct state of the disposed object. Third, TAD either implies the implausible view that a disposed object is in a state directed at having its disposition stimulated, or it does not account for a disposition’s directedness when it is not in stimulating circumstances. Finally, if TAD does give us directedness, it is liable to give too much, for it is likely to entail that everything is constantly directed in innumerably many different directions.Less
Nick Kroll’s Teleological Approach to Dispositions (TAD) promises to explain the sense in which dispositions are directed at manifesting. However, Kroll’s explanation of directedness is problematic for a number of reasons. First, TAD depends on a distinction between a disposition being stimulated and it being “activated,” but Kroll’s obscure notion of activation seems incapable of solving the problems for which it was introduced. Second, TAD does not attribute directedness to the disposition itself, but to a distinct state of the disposed object. Third, TAD either implies the implausible view that a disposed object is in a state directed at having its disposition stimulated, or it does not account for a disposition’s directedness when it is not in stimulating circumstances. Finally, if TAD does give us directedness, it is liable to give too much, for it is likely to entail that everything is constantly directed in innumerably many different directions.
