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This chapter discusses the case of USA, in which economic catch‐up with such European countries as Britain and Germany occurred during the final decades of the nineteenth century. Throughout this catch‐up process, its growth trajectory changed from the one that relied on expanding capital and labor inputs to a more knowledge‐intensive one. It acquired knowledge needed for this transition from outside as well as from within. The patent law was enacted in 1790, soon after its independence, and influenced the development of corporate structure and strategy. The chapter discusses the technology transfer and intellectual property protection in the textile industry that occurred mainly in 1810–60, the “Golden Age” of the independent inventor, such as Edison, in 1860–1900, the patent regime and economic catch‐up in organic chemicals in 1900–30, and the relationship between patent policy, antitrust policy, and the structure of industrial R&D.

This chapter first points out that, for Argentina, the twentieth century was the period of falling behind. Although catch‐up occurred during 1860–1929, the economy at the time was mainly based on agriculture. By contrast, industrialization and technological capability building took place while the overall economy was falling behind following the government's import substitution policy and macro instability. The chapter examines technology transfer, learning, and innovation in the country's catch‐up and falling‐behind processes, and the role of intellectual property regime. It is argued that the IPR regime had little impact except for on agriculture and pharmaceuticals. These two industries are analyzed in detail to suggest that the domestic pharmaceutical firms failed to accumulate technological capabilities even in the absence of product patents and that genetically modified soybeans diffused widely because the American inventor, Monsanto, failed to secure a patent for it in Argentina.

This chapter first argues that catch‐up is a complex process and that developing countries rely on diverse means to acquire technologies from advanced countries and build their own capabilities. Then, after briefly describing the history of the patent and other intellectual property right (IPR) system and the TRIPS agreement, the chapter surveys past studies on the role of IPR, particularly in relation to technology transfer. It is emphasized, however, that to understand the role of IPR in catch‐up an in‐depth analysis of individual countries is essential. The chapter then gives a brief account of the long‐term economic growth record of ten countries and one region (Nordic) that are discussed in this book and summarizes briefly each of the following chapters.

This chapter attempts to explain empirically the initial technological base for the spin-off new enterprise. It focuses on the extent to which the technology used to start new firms is drawn from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) labs and academic departments and other entrepreneurial source organizations, and assesses the influence upon this technology transfer. A conceptual model is presented of a variety of hypothesized influences on the flow of technology from an advanced R&D source organization into a newly founded company. In this chapter, the measure utilized to examine the final technology transferred is a four-point scale of importance of the technology to the new firm: direct, partial, vague, and none.

Recent analyses of the dynamics of Europe's long boom after the Second World War have generally accorded a leading role to the transfer of American technology and organizational practices within a broad process of ‘catch-up and convergence’. Within this process, American multinational companies are generally seen as central actors of diffusing technology and management practices. This chapter examines the core elements of strategy, organization, technology, and product policy. It stresses the role of continuity and long-run dynamics in the transfer process (rather than seeing ‘Americanization’ as an epiphenomenon of post-war reconstruction). It focuses primarily on inside the firm rather than on the discourses of agencies and observers about the transfer and dissemination of broad elements and processes.

This chapter reviews and synthesizes research on the antecedents and consequences of university-based technology transfer, and explores the implications for practice and future research in this domain. It illustrates the role and importance of university technology transfer on innovation, entrepreneurship, and technological change. It argues that successful technology transfer requires university administrators to think strategically about that process. Most of the academic studies strongly suggest that university administrators are often more concerned about protecting intellectual property and appropriating the fruits of the transfer than they are about creating the appropriate context or environment in which such activities are to take place.

In theory, technology transfer should enable a backward country to achieve world productivity norms, but in practice, because technology is ‘tacit’, and never completely codifiable, the best technology transfer rarely achieves productivity parity between buyer and seller. The more tacit a technology is, the more difficult it is to transfer, and the more monopolistic the power of the seller and the lower the skills and organizational capabilities of the buyer, the worse the transfer. A shyness of foreign investors left the successful late industrializing countries (the rest) with a serious skill deficit that grew over time relative to that of the North Atlantic and Japan. The tacitness problem arose early because of the sectoral composition of the manufacturing output of the rest; whatever the source of manufacturing experience, all countries tended to share the same sequential industry mix based on natural resources, and because the specific properties of a natural resource vary by location, a successful technology transfer requires substantial investments in local learning and adaptation. Japan set a benchmark for learners that began with technology transfer; it started to industrialize rapidly only in the 1890s, at about the same time as China, and slightly after Brazil, India, and Mexico, but, given its engineering capabilities and basic knowledge, its absorption of foreign know‐how was more proactive, systematic, and thoroughgoing than that of other countries, and is analysed below in the case of the silk industry.

In recent years, there has been a steady expansion in the literature that relates the internationalization of production to the development and transfer of technology by multinational enterprises (MNEs). The first section of this chapter discusses this, and notes the current shift of attention away from technology transfer per se, and the parallel shift in the terms in which technology is now defined and conceptualized. The latter is further addressed in the second section, which considers technology in relation to MNEs in its broadest sense of international technology creation and innovation. The third section examines the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and the construction of corporate technological capabilities in the MNE, and the fourth examines intra‐ and inter‐firm international networks for technological development. The fifth section extends the discussion to the role of information and communications technology (ICT) within such international MNE networks.

In 1945, the Italian industrial sector was well prepared to measure itself against the American model. In the engineering sector, direct contacts between technical experts on the two sides were established around the turn of the century, and these had intensified during the First World War. During the Fascist period, the diffusion of American methods met with resistance from the traditionalist approach to technology and organization of most Italian industrialists, who preferred low wages and a strongly authoritarian form of paternalism. Nonetheless, the most innovative managers and entrepreneurs continued to look up to America as the most efficient technical and productive model.

The ability of the US economy to generate new technology industries, such as biotechnology, provides support to the contention that liberal market economies (LMEs) have a comparative institutional advantage in generating radically innovative firms. However, the link between varieties of capitalism and innovation within LMEs has not been systematically explored. This chapter explores the link between institutions and the management of innovative competencies within a successful US biotechnology cluster — San Diego, California. It empirically examines whether national institutional frameworks within the US generate patterns of economic coordination in the areas of finance, employee incentive structures, and labor market organization that benefit firms, and are consistent with predictions of the varieties of capitalism approach. The policy context surrounding the US biotechnology industry is also discussed.

Universities are a rich source of scientific innovations. Translating these innovations into high-impact products and services involves commercialization of the innovation. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 gave universities control over the commercialization process. As such, technology transfer offices (TTO) have been established at most universities. Their role is to both protect the innovation through patents and copyrights and license the innovation to an entity for commercialization. Heretofore, most of TTO’s have focused on licensing to large, established companies. Only in recent years have they turned to licensing to startups, many of which are founded by the inventor-faculty. Furthermore, many universities are going beyond licensing to develop programs supporting these faculty-founded startups, with the hope of achieving return on their investment, retaining and recruiting talented faculty, creating jobs, and fulfilling their mission by helping to solve significant problems such as un-met medical needs.

This chapter examines the role Japanese universities have played in Japan's innovation system. It shows how, until recently, the Japanese system of university-industry technology transfer impeded the formation of startups. Recent reforms have improved the environment for academic collaboration with large and small companies alike. Although the legal framework governing technology transfer from universities to industry is now amenable to startup formation, the system still favours transfer of university discoveries to large rather than new companies. The chapter also shows how other institutional and social factors — for example career paths in academia, the system of research funding, and uncertainties related to conflicts of interest — contribute to an environment more suitable for large companies than for startups.

National institutional frameworks within the UK are oriented towards the promotion of radically innovative industries such as biotechnology. While the UK does have the best performing European biotechnology industry, it lags far behind the productivity of the US industry. The chapter argues that national institutional incentives within the UK are appropriate for biotechnology. However, public policy within the country has not developed an adequate system of commercializing science. Drawing on a case study of the Cambridge UK technology cluster, potential policies that could improve the performance of UK biotechnology sector are discussed.

This chapter explores the technology-related focus of the IP-development linkage and outlines WIPO's role in the initial development paradigm, which prevailed from 1964 to 2004 when a proposal for a WIPO Development Agenda was first submitted. It then examines the WIPO Development Agenda in light of this history and identifies possible paradigm shifts discernible both in the structure of the Agenda and in preliminary considerations regarding its implementation. Finally, the chapter suggests a number of ways to interpret the WIPO Development Agenda and reflects briefly on how these different “faces” of the Agenda might inform WIPO's institutional role in responding to a spectrum of development interests in an era of rapid technological transformation.

This chapter analyses international systems of governance for transnational corporations (TNCs) and for technology transfer in the emerging world. This world provides a very different setting for industrial growth from that of half a century ago, when much of the ‘development strategy’ was launched. Technical change is now more rapid and pervasive, affecting most activities in developing countries. It is shrinking economic distance dramatically, exposing enterprises to intense and immediate competition so far unprecedented in history. Trade plays a much larger role in economic life, and much of it is handled by large transnationals and an increasing proportion of trade and production is integrated across national boundaries under the aegis of the TNC. Technology and direct investment flows are now not subject to much direct regulation at the international level, traditional controls on these flows are one of the casualties of liberalisation and globalisation.

To manage its intellectual property, most research universities have technology transfer offices. Their responsibilities include evaluating inventions for possible patent applications, applying for patents, licensing of intellectual property, and enforcing intellectual property agreements. According to the Bayh-Dole Act, if the university claims intellectual property ownership, it must file a patent application within one year. Factors influencing the decision to claim or waive ownership are discussed. If the university claims ownership, then the technology transfer office files a non-provisional or provisional patent application and negotiates licensing agreements. Universities also generate tangible research property, such novel biological organisms and engineering prototypes. Tangible research property developed using federal funds must be shared openly with all other qualified investigators. Universities usually distribute tangible research property by using material transfer agreements that specify how the material may be used. To facilitate technology transfer from federal laboratories to non-federal partners, including universities, the government established cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs), which require the university to provide the funds needed to conduct a specific research project. The chapter ends with a consideration of intellectual property generation as a tenure and promotion criterion.

Only the most rabid opponents deny the potential for MNCs and FDI to provide significant benefits for large numbers of people and countries. This chapter is the equivalent of a law brief, one-sidedly expounding on the merits of one side of a case being litigated. As such, it deliberately drops the emphasis in previous chapters on the need for a balanced, objective approach to a subject dominated by heterogeneity, complexity, and subjectivity. The virtues of MNCs and FDI are discussed in terms of their demonstrable contributions to the overall economic growth and prosperity of most host countries as well as their emphasis on efficiency and product innovation. More specific contributions such as creation of relatively well-paying jobs, enhancement of workers' skills, transfer of new technology, and generation of both tax revenue and hard currency earnings through increased exports, are also discussed.