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While tax competition is widely regarded as a major fiscal constraint on the welfare state, in fact, very little is known about its real impact. How have advanced industrialized states reacted to the growing mobility of parts of their tax base? To what extent has tax competition resulted in a shift of burdens to less mobile tax bases? In answering these questions, the article identifies the different shape and force of tax competition in different areas of taxation, and the differing ways in which countries have responded. The conclusion is that the pressures of international tax competition are real, but so are countervailing economic and political pressures that work against a general ‘race to the bottom’ in the taxation of potentially mobile bases. At the same time, revenue‐preserving adjustment strategies have prevented large‐scale revenue losses at the price of creating politically more controversial structures of taxation.

Discusses tax policy and its relationship with social security. Sets out trends in taxation in the UK over the last 25 years, how these compare with those in other countries, and the relationship between the totals of tax and public spending. Describes Britain’s overall tax structure, the changing role of tax reliefs and what are now known as ‘tax credits’, and at how much tax people at different points in the income distribution pay. Looks at the changing interaction between tax and social security, at how the reforms of the last few years have affected incomes, and the implications of these changes for work incentives. The final section presents public attitudes towards taxation, in terms of its overall level, its links to particular spending items, and its progressivity – the evidence suggests some important differences between how people think the tax system works, how they think it ought to work, and how it actually does.

This chapter examines whether the extreme differences in inequality that were present across the economies of the Americas soon after colonization also affected the ways tax institutions evolved. It sets forth a brief history of the emergence of extreme differences in inequality across the Americas not long after the Europeans began to colonize the hemisphere, examining the tax systems in Latin America and North America in the nineteenth century. The chapter discusses how these tax structures evolved over the twentieth century. It offers some tentative conclusions about what the legacy of extreme inequality in Latin America meant for the long-run pattern of tax design and expenditure policy in that region, and several salient patterns emerge. The United States and Canada (like Britain, France, Germany, and even Spain) were much more inclined to tax wealth and income during their early stages of growth, and into the twentieth century, than were their neighbors to the south.

This chapter begins a series of four which evaluate both a Citizen's Income and the current tax and benefits structure against a series of seven criteria for a good tax and benefits structure. Chapter 6 tackles the first two criteria. The tax and benefits structure should be coherent: that is, its different parts should fit together. The tax and benefits structure should be simple to administer: to reduce employment disincentives, to reduce administrative costs, and because democratic accountability requires comprehensibility. The chapter finds that the current benefits system creates an incoherent structure, whereas a Citizen's Income would reduce complexity and would provide a basis for a more coherent tax and benefits structure, particularly in relation to individuals’ experience of it. It also finds that a Citizen's Income would be very simple to administer, that it would create an overall system easier and cheaper to administer than the current one, and that it would therefore impose fewer employment disincentives, and would reduce errors, fraud, and criminalisation

This chapter describes New York's housing policies, exploring how and why they differ from those in Los Angeles and other large cities, and whether they have shaped how New York's housing market has weathered the recent downturn. The policies considered are public housing, in rem properties, other subsidized housing, rent control, housing allowances, city capital subsidies for construction and rehabilitation, special needs housing, local tax structures, and building codes. The chapter is organized as follows. Section I describes the city's housing policies and contrasts them with those in Los Angeles and other large cities in the U.S. Section II compares how the housing markets in New York and Los Angeles have fared during the recent downturn and considers whether differences in policies have shaped differences in outcomes. Section III explores some likely explanations for New York's set of housing policies, while the final section concludes.

This chapter looks at how agencies of the state in Manipur perform in terms of their basic functions. In Manipur, the state's failure to dominate the rule system and provide secure property rights has undermined its centrality in the lives of its citizens. Community-specific ‘tribal’ organizations have obtained de facto authority in society, undermining state leaders' social control. Quality of revenue governance, including poor performance of tax collection machinery and a poor tax structure, are some of the reasons contributing to poor revenue extraction in Manipur. Rising unemployment sets up the issue of conflicts over opportunities, resources, and power that fuelled the breakdown in Manipur. A variety of factors have led to the reduced ability of state agencies to monopolize security in Manipur and provide protection to its citizens. Paralysis of state agencies, their weaknesses, and poor authority have undermined the state's role in resolving intercommunity conflicts.