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Chapter 8 is woven around the author's trip to Saudi Arabia six months prior to 9/11. There are two faces of Saudi Arabia: Mecca, the birthplace of Islam and the prophet Mohammed, and Riyadh in the Nadj region, the home of Mohammed bin Abd al-Wahhab and the birthplace of Osama Bin Laden. The chapter explores the tensions between the two kingdoms, and the connections between Islam and Islamist extremism, especially as manifested in Saudi understandings of jihad and tawhid. It traces the pernicious Wahhabi public theology from its origins in the 13th century to its ideological covenant with the House of Saud. The author's experiences with Saudi officials, religious minorities in the kingdom, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom and the State Department lead him to conclude that Wahhabism will remain a source of terrorism, and a threat to U.S. national security, until the Saudis contain or destroy it via political reform grounded in religious freedom.

Al-Ghazali did not present his teachings on cosmology in any cohesive way. The reason is that the details of cosmology were not one of the important matters of his theology and ethics. It is most important for humans to understand that God creates all events in this world. How he created them, either by directly creating each event of by employing others of His creatures to “generate” them cannot be known by humans. In both views, however, God is the only cause in this world. Humans must know this and they must draw the right conclusions. Despite realizing that this is a fully determined universe, they must strive to perform actions that will be rewarded in this and the next world. Knowing that good actions are the causal effects of one’s knowledge, humans must aim to acquire the right kind of knowledge that will lead them to perform good actions. Al-Ghazali’s theology is driven by the practical consequences of one’s convictions. For him it is less important to have true convictions, i.e. convictions that represent the world as it truly is, but rather right convictions, i.e. convictions that are the causes of good actions, which will be rewarded in this and the next world.

In Revival of the Religious Sciences (Ihya’ ‘ulum al-din), a work that was written after the Incoherence (Tahafut), causes and effects play a very important role. Every event in this world is considered caused by another and is also the cause of other events in the future. Yet all these events are “caused” only by the first element of the long causal chains that they are elements of, and that is God. God is the only cause in the universe, and when we talk of his creatures as causes, we do so only by metaphor. Everybody must understand that the usage of “cause” for an object of this world is purely metaphorical. At the same time, we must acknowledge that these causes represent God’s will. This is also true for human actions. The human is only the “vessel” (mahall) of God’s actions. Human actions are triggered by our volition which itself is triggered by our motives. The motives depend on the knowledge that we have and the knowledge of a human goes back to his or her experience and the effects of the active intellect in the heavens. God determines our actions by means of this causal chain. Equally, reward and punishment in this world and in the afterlife are the causal effects of our actions. God has determined the causal laws how actions in this world are rewarded or punished in the next. All these ideas about human actions are very similar to that of Avicenna and show a very strong influence of philosophical theories on human actions. Like Avicenna, al-Ghazali held that this is a fully determined universe in which God controls and determines all events.

The focus of Chapter 2 is a letter written by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to al-Qaida leaders and intercepted by coalition forces on 23 January 2004. It reveals more than just the predatory operational and strategic rationale behind the violent campaign of Tawhid wal-Jihad in Iraq. It offers vital insights into the strategic thinkers in its ranks who clearly understood the importance of soberly assessing their own capabilities and those of their adversaries while identifying opportunities ripe for exploitation via words and violent actions. While the letter’s contents likely reflect the collective wisdom of Zarqawi’s inner circle, it offers a glimpse into his mind as field commander and aspiring commander-in-chief. Within three years of writing this letter, Zarqawi would be dead, but not before he became an iconic figure of the global jihad, turned Iraq into a sectarian killing field and established a movement that would champion his legacy.

This chapter attempts to explore statehood within the so-called Islamic political theory, at the same time indicating the difficulty of such an exercise due to the fact that Islamic political thought mostly concentrates on non-state unit analysis, rather than on the state as a generic category or on the body politic as a social reality and a legal abstraction. Yet the chapter shows that one basic idea about Islamic political doctrine is the unity of religion and politics. The principle of tawhid (God's oneness) underpins this idea. In the context of Muslim political theory, tawhid implies that the community (umma) itself must reflect this unity.

This chapter continues to treat Şaban Ali Düzgün’s work, exploring his take on human agency and moving from an abstract sense of communal responsibility towards more concrete and constructive Muslim responses to the trauma of Western colonialism. By highlighting his understanding of human agency, it explores Düzgün’s theological and conceptual toolbox, showing how he draws confidently on Enlightenment and classical Islamic resources to produce a holistic vision of the individual in positive relationship with God. Specifically, this chapter shows how Düzgün finesses conceptions of human knowledge and affirms human plurality—a plurality facilitated by divine unity that does not stand in antagonistic relationship to individual agency. For Düzgün, tawḥīd, or God’s utter oneness, stands in positive and open relation to an empowered individual piously conscious of her responsibility to society and those around her.

Chapter four charts the activities of a small displaced population that settled in Mecca in the late 1780s, by concentrating upon the life and works of the prolific Shaykh Daud bin ‘Abd Allah al-Fatani. His intellectual influences are given considerable attention because they were to color the thought of the Patani communities throughout much of the century that followed. These influences include key figures in Sufism such as Ibn Arabi, al-Ghazali, among many others, as well al-Nawawi and a number of other founding figures of jurisprudence in the Shafi school.

This chapter gives a detailed background of the doctrine of Salafism since its origins. It explains the meaning of the term tawhid and the central place it has in the doctrine of Salafism. It explains the central position of sharia law and other terms that are essential in Salafism, such as aqida (creed), manhaj (program), ijtihad (individual interpretation) and shirk (giving associates to God). The chapter ends with an analysis of al-Qaeda’s creed.

This chapter examines the use of the tawhidic paradigm in feminist Qur’anic interpretation, a strategy which takes its name from the core Islamic concept of tawhid, the doctrine of God’s unity and incomparability. The chapter outlines the arguments that sexism is a form of idolatry (because it attributes a God-like role to men over women), that one can never pronounce a final interpretation of the Quran (since to do so would be to claim to have God’s knowledge and to place oneself in the role of God), and that clear distinctions must be made between the text of the Quran and its interpretation. The chapter explains how the exegetes use these arguments to counter sexist readings of the Qur’an and to confront parts of the text which create particular challenges for feminist exegesis.

This chapter identifies key individuals involved in the women’s right movement in Morocco, such as the’ulama, the monarchy, the Islamists, political parties, and women’s groups. It shows the relevance of gender to negotiations for access to a highly centralized political system, and defines gender as a field in which tensions over political legitimacy rise and may unfold. The negotiations among the key individuals portray a manipulation of gender hierarchies that limit the range of rights that women might enjoy in both the private and the public spheres. The chapter concludes with an analysis of women’s position in Islamist movements, focusing on the cases of al-Tawhīd wa-l-islāh and al-’Adl wa-l-ihsāne.

The Introduction presents the background, aims, main concepts, and structure of the study, plus the key beliefs and practices that characterize Salafi groups—such as tawhid, da’wa, tarbiya, and opposition to bid’a. It introduces the concept of ‘commitment’ and an inclusive definition of ‘conversion’ that covers the born-again experiences of many British Salafis of Muslim background. It also examines the term ‘Salafi’ and critiques attempts to categorize violent and nonviolent Islamic activists as part of a single Salafi movement (e.g., Quintan Wiktorowicz’s typology). The author associates the label with quietists in the United Kingdom and explains their differences from Jihadis and Islamists. She also describes Salafi attitudes towards non-Muslims, shari’a, fiqh, and Islamic authority (notably, the roles of the Qur’an, sunna, salaf, and ‘ulama). Finally, she demonstrates how the study fills several lacunae in the academic literature by addressing women, black converts, Somalis, and the ‘everyday’ in British Salafism.

This chapter explains how Salafi groups employ ‘circles of knowledge’ (halaqat) —gatherings for religious study—to elicit instrumental, affective, and moral commitment from followers. The author argues that male and female teachers acquired authority by virtue of their supposed participation in a chain of ‘authentic’ knowledge transmission, stemming from the Qur’an and sunna. They conveyed this by constantly referencing the ‘pure’ sources through the content, structure, and delivery of their teaching, while distinguishing themselves from ‘deviant’ Muslim groups. Crucially, they emphasized a comprehensive concept of tawhid (Islamic monotheism), and categorized all actions according to quantifiable spiritual rewards and punishments. They thus demonstrated that following Salafi teachings in all spheres of life had eternal consequences and was ultimately a matter of self-interest, as well as moral obligation. The circles also fostered a deeper sense of belonging through ‘sisterhood’ and shared etiquette, language, and identity markers.

For Jihadi-Salafi jurists and authors, the contemporary global system of nation-states and those Muslim-majority governments and nations supporting its continuance bear responsibility for the suffering and oppression faced by contemporary Muslim communities. This chapter argues that Jihadi-Salafi debates on creed (ʿaqīda) and methodology (minhāj) provide an interpretation of the causes of suffering and evil in the world—a theodicy—and contend that these are best addressed through a mode of self-renunciation patterned on the beliefs and practices of the earliest communities of Muslim faith (the Salaf). Traditions of self-renunciation (zuhd) are not unique to Jihadi-Salafis and have long been present in discussions of jihad—dating to the Kitab al-Jihad of ʿAbd Allah ibn al-Mubarak (d. 797). Framing this discussion are the anthropological, sociological, and philosophical theories of religion offered by Richard Valantasis, Peter Berger, Michel Foucault, and Gavin Flood.

The chapter examines several terrorist plots in 2000-3 which had dual ties, to al-Qaida in Afghanistan and to terrorist groups in the Middle East and North Africa. The cells discussed, which were pursuing attacks on US and Jewish targets in Europe, demonstrate how al-Qaida sought to include Europe as one front in its global jihad. The cases examined also exemplify how terrorists’ motives and actions were affected by their ties to militant movements in their country of origin.

This chapter explores the Qur’anic commentary of the African American intellectual Amina Wadud. After providing some historical and biographical background, it unpacks her interpretive method. Like Esack and Engineer, the Qur’an is the primary textual source of Wadud’s Islamic discourse. However, this chapter argues that while Esack’s method is squarely dialectical, based on praxis, Wadud’s is more linear in character, in which liberating interpretations are applied to contexts of oppression. After providing a critique of her discourse on religious authority, the chapter provides an in-depth analysis of her gender egalitarian reading of the Qur’an, engaging issues such as the origins of humankind, polygamy, and women’s leadership. Here, the dual paradigms of tawhid (monotheism) and khilafa (human trusteeship) play a central role. The chapter ends by unearthing the multi-faceted nature of Wadud’s understanding of oppression—an acutely layered experience embodied in the figure of Hagar.

This chapter explores the Qur’anic commentary of the Pakistani American intellectual Asma Barlas. After providing some historical and biographical background, it unpacks her interpretive method. Like all the commentators studied, Barlas privileges the Qur’an in her Islamic discourse, and this chapter systematically outlines the hermeneutical strategies that she uses to expound scripture. The chapter argues that although Wadud and Barlas both undertake gender egalitarian readings, Barlas is engaged in a substantively different (though complementary) project. For whereas Wadud explores the subject of woman in the Qur’an, Barlas interrogates the relationship between the text and patriarchy. After examining Barlas’ usage of tawhid (monotheism) as a core theological paradigm, the chapter critiques an essentialist tendency in her exegesis. The chapter ends by exploring her holistic approach to social justice, arguing that this approach stems from her engagement in ‘double critique’, or speaking truth to power in both Muslim and non-Muslim Western contexts.

As part of his reformism, Qursawi criticized the prevailing orthodoxy regarding the divine attributes (sifat), which was one of the central issues in Sunni theology. Qursawi rejects the position, articulated by Sa‘d al-Din Taftazani, that there are seven or eight separate attributes, dependent on God and possible of existence (mumkin). Although he accepts the basic premises of the issue in post-Avicennian kalam, Qursawi argues that Taftazani’s stance makes the attributes too distinct from God, violating God’s fundamental oneness (tawhid). He focuses on the attributes’ multiplicity (ta‘addud), differentiation (mughayara), and superaddition (ziyada) as erroneous, arguing they render the attributes contingent entities, in contrast to God’s inherent necessity (as wajib al-wujud), infringing upon His transcendence (tanzih). This stance brought accusations of Mu‘tazilism against Qursawi and led to his condemnation for heresy in Bukhara. Qursawi further criticizes kalam as too based in rational speculation, leading to error and spreading incorrect beliefs.

Since late 2014 the Islamic State has declared war on Saudi Arabia and launched a series of terrorist attacks on Saudi soil intended to start an uprising. In a further attack on the Saudi kingdom, the self-declared caliphate has claimed to be the true representative of the severe form of Islam indigenous to Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism. These two very different versions of an Islamic state are at war over a shared religious heritage and territory. The Islamic State, which draws on the teachings of the Wahhabi school of Islam, finds inspiration in the example of the first Saudi-Wahhabi state (1744–1818), which engaged in expansionary jihad and cultivated a sectarian animus toward the Shia. The Islamic State’s rise has reignited a debate in Saudi Arabia over the intolerant and aggressive nature of Wahhabism. Liberals have called for a revisionist movement, as they describe it, to expunge certain doctrines from Wahhabism.In some ways the Islamic State’s claim to the Wahhabi heritage is not unfounded. The early Wahhabis advanced an exclusivist version of Sunni Islam that was universally seen as a heresy, founded a state that waged expansionary jihad against fellow Sunni Muslims, and killed Shia Muslims because they were seen as hopeless idolaters. The Islamic State has done the same on all three counts.