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Focuses on the costs of market fragmentation in Europe. It reviews the economic impact of removing barriers to trade as a result of divergent national standards, testing, and certification requirements. Ranked by business as the most important barrier to trade, these domestic regulations can prevent firms from engaging in cross‐border competition and hinder market access. Like other forms of trade protection, such non‐tariff barriers impact the importing country through higher domestic prices, higher cost margins and productive inefficiencies. This chapter also highlights the impact of trade barriers on firm strategies, and provides some empirical evidence of the benefits expected to accrue from market integration.

This chapter reviews methods used to identify and quantify barriers to international trade in services. Barriers typically take the form of regulations that either restrict supply or make it more costly. The economic impact of barriers can, in principle, be quantified as a ‘tariff equivalent’, defined as the percentage tax on foreign suppliers that would have the same effect on the domestic market for the service as is caused by the barrier. Barriers to trade in services can be those that restrict entry of firms versus those that affect firms' operations, and those that discriminate against foreign-service providers versus those that do not. The measurement of services barriers are either direct or indirect. Direct measurement involves documenting barriers that are known to exist, either by extracting information about them from government documents or by questioning those market participants who confront them. Indirect measurement attempts to infer the presence of barriers from their market effects, much as non-tariff barriers on trade in goods are often inferred from price differences across borders. Approaches to measuring services barriers are illustrated by citing a number of studies that have been carried out. The chapter concludes with a presentation of guideline principles and recommended procedures for measuring services barriers and assessing the consequences of their liberalization.

Describes the collapse of the international economic system during the 1930s as governments disrupted the flow of international trade and turned trade increasingly into bilateral channels. Section 1 analyses the move to higher tariffs, especially following the 1930 tariff increase by the USA and Britain's abandonment of free trade in 1931. Section 2 analyses the growing use of non‐tariff barriers to international trade, including exchange controls. Section 3 addresses the revival of Imperial Preference among the British dominions and colonies at the 1932 Ottawa Conference. Section 4 analyses the consequences of 1930s trade policies in terms of increased bilateralism and regionalization of trade. Section 5 looks ahead by describing moves already underway by the late 1930s to reverse the trade policy errors of the decade.

The previous chapter showed how transnational activity, the adjudication of the European Community (EC) law, and EC lawmaking had developed symbiotically to determine much of what is important about European integration. This chapter provides a more detailed sectoral account of how the adjudication of one class of trading disputes gradually, but authoritatively, undermined the intergovernmental aspects of the EC, while enhancing the polity's supranational, or federal, character. Assesses the impact of adjudicating the freer movement of goods provisions of the Treaty of Rome on integration and supranational governance, focusing on the problem of non‐tariff barriers, as governed by Arts. 28–30 (EC). Proceeds as follows: first, the treaty rules on intra‐EC trade are examined, hypotheses derived about how the domain could be expected to evolve, and the argument advanced is contrasted with alternatives; second, in a section ‘Judicial Governance and Market‐Building’, the emergence is tracked of the basic doctrinal framework (the Dassonville framework) governing the domain, an analysis made of the aggregate data on adjudication in the sector, and the impact traced of the European Court of Justice's case law on the decision‐making of other actors, including the European Commission and Member State governments; third, the mutation of the framework that occurred in the 1990s is discussed – an event that was heavily conditioned by the endogenous development of the law itself; the chapter concludes with an assessment of the findings in light of the pertinent scholarly debates about the impact of the European legal system on the greater course of market‐building and political integration.

Focuses on the efforts to create a single market in Europe in the post‐war period, a process with many similarities to the creation of a single market in the US. Drawing on this historical comparison, the European Union has sought to foster the removal of barriers to trade through sustained regulatory intervention, acknowledging that markets are never self‐organized but always operate within a political and legal framework. Even though the single market was conceptualized as an economic project, the political and institutional design of the market is important in understanding the governance structures needed to shape the single market. In addressing the political economy of regulation, this chapter argues that three factors are crucially important to understanding why the regulatory role of the European Union is central to explaining the construction of a European market: (1) the need to limit the ability of member states to exercise regulatory sovereignty; (2) the role of law in striking down mercantilistic economic regulation and freeing consequent market activity of many non‐tariff barriers; and (3) using private non‐state actors to achieve their objectives, by delegating certain regulatory functions to the private sector and promoting self‐regulation as an alternative mode of economic governance.

The impact of the completion of the European Internal Market Programme (IMP) on the geographical distribution of economic activity within the European Community (now Union) is considered. More particularly, the empirical validity of a number of hypotheses, drawn from foreign direct investment (FDI) theory, on the likely effect of the removal of tariff barriers on intra‐EC and extra‐EC trade and FDI flows and the relationship between the two are considered. The evidence strongly suggests that the twin forces of regionalization and localization have been accelerated by recent European integration, and that the balance between the two is strongly determined by the knowledge intensity and mobility of the economic activities involved.

Analyses the new regionalism that emerged in the mid‐1980s. By downplaying the significance of trade diversion and emphasizing scale‐based and pro‐competitive benefits of integration, the new regionalism had a more positive vision of RTAs than mainstream customs union theory had. Section 1 introduces economies of scale and imperfect competition. Section 2 analyses non‐tariff barriers to trade. Section 3 covers ‘new areas’ of foreign investment, competition policy, and monetary integration, which had not featured in mainstream customs union theory. Section 4 deals with rules of origin, which had emerged as a major trade policy issue in the 1980s and 1990s.

Arvid Lukauskas explores the political underpinnings of protectionism and trade liberalization. Lukauskas argues that political factors fundamentally influence commercial policy design and implementation, including the decisions to impose or remove barriers to trade such as tariffs, quotas, and non-tariff barriers. Trade liberalization is most likely to occur when protected industries themselves no longer desire trade barriers or politicians determine that the political costs of protectionism have increased. Deepening globalization has increased the costs of maintaining highly protected markets, giving public officials an incentive to undertake trade reform. To be successful, liberalization must be accompanied by complementary reforms in other economic policy areas, particularly those concerning factor markets. Lukauskas also shows that the international political and economic context in which trade takes place is critical for understanding trade policy as it generates a powerful set of constraints and incentives that policymakers must consider when formulating strategy.

Geoff Jehle examines the primary instruments of national trade policy, often termed commercial policy, including quantitative restrictions (e.g., quotas), tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and export taxes. He focuses on the implications of the various policy instruments for aggregate national social welfare; the distribution of rents among various groups, notably, producers, consumers, and the government; and the relative value of using trade policy instruments versus other means of government intervention to achieve various policy objectives. Jehle demonstrates the distortions that various types of protectionist barriers create in the domestic economy. He highlights the fact that the typical cascading tariff schedule found in many countries implies very high rates of effective protection for producers of finished goods.

This chapter evaluates the book’s main argument developed in chapter 2 which posits that political competition in new democracies leads to trade reforms when domestic labor market conditions ensure that workers in these states are receptive to globalization. Data on democratization and the occupational mobility of workers for more than 120 developing countries is gathered from 1972 to 2008 to evaluate this argument. Results from a variety of statistical models corroborate the key theoretical predictions about democratization and liberalization of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Assessment of some cross-national survey-response data shows that democratization discourages lobbying for trade protection by capital. Finally, detailed examination of data from 120 developing countries (1972-2008) reveals that trade reforms decreases the propensity for electoral fraud in newly democratized states.

The regulation of trade in goods is at the heart of the EU-Korea FTA. This chapter analyses the provisions of the Agreement relating to market access, including rules on customs duties, classification, valuation, rules of origin, quantitative restrictions, and trade facilitation. The chapter also looks at the innovative ways in which the FTA addresses non-tariff barriers through its provisions on market regulation. The author highlights the sectoral approach of the FTA to market regulation, with its specific provisions on consumer electronics, motor vehicles and parts, chemicals, and pharmaceutical products. It is explained how the degree of integration differs in each of these sectors. Moreover, the author also notes that the FTA is a living instrument, as lacunae in the field of domestic regulation must be dealt with in the future through cooperation and consultations within the different committees and working groups.

This chapter provides an account of liberal economics in Germany during the Weimar period. It presents a history of the economic activity of Germany from the late 15th and 16th century to the present century. In the first half of the 19th century, German liberals hoped that unification would lead to the abolition of restrictions on industry and trade. The free-market mechanism had no sense of liberation when the new currency was introduced, on the contrary, stabilization brought drastic cuts in public spending and large-scale unemployment. Germany's financial and economic problems came to the fore after the humiliating terms imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty in June 1919, which as a result lead to protectionist trade-policies to be temporarily abandoned when the treaty forbade Germany to erect tariff barriers against her former enemies. German economic depression after 1929 attacked all forms of government intervention, including unemployment benefit. Despite these unfortunate political circumstances, there were many economists who defended the old canons of laissez-faireliberalism.

This chapter focuses on an economy that was recently opened and which has been the subject of many of the empirical studies: Mexico's. Mexico substantially reduced its tariff and non-tariff barriers, starting in the mid-1980s, and later on, in the early 1990s, joined the North American Free Trade Agreement, effectively developing a very open economy. However, despite the fact that the Mexican economy was relatively closed in the early 1980s, it is not quite clear how long that had been the case. The chapter argues that, even though Mexican industry has been protected for a long period, which in some cases goes back to the late nineteenth century, the structure of protection that existed in the Mexican economy in the second half of the twentieth century came from an important modification to its commercial policy which took place around 1947.

This introductory chapter provides a background to the nature, purposes, and mode of operation of the customs union as one special form of tariff unification. The customs union is a type of arrangement that eliminates or reduces the tariff barriers between two or more political units while maintaining tariff barriers against imports from outside regions. The historical importance of customs union derives largely from the fact that in the 19th century the widespread existence of contractual obligations not to resort to tariff discrimination tended to restrict the field for special tariff arrangements between independent countries.

The rhetoric of the ‘right to emigrate’ enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not an illogical or a clumsy attempt to foster mobility of people but in fact is a serious limitation by design. There is a need to dispel the myth of the ‘sense of crises’ that countries in the Global North anticipate. The fear that hordes of the poor might arrive at their gates is unfounded. Data shows that the existing migration reality across various corridors seriously challenges this rhetoric. The ‘selection’ of migrants and increasing securitization of borders has raised the tariff and non-tariff barriers against economic migration. Another reality is that there is a tacit approval of ‘shadow economies’ alongside the rhetoric of the ‘battle against irregular migration’. Finally we also need to recognise the limitations of the existing multilateral agreements especially GATS Mode 4.

Recent generations of international trade agreements have attempted to address non-tariff barriers in various ways, including by encouraging the adoption of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) by national governments. This chapter examines the benefits of RIA for trade in light of experience over the past several decades. It argues that, although misunderstanding of the nature of RIA has likely led to some false hopes, given the right institutional setting, RIA can help avoid irrational regulatory conflict that unnecessarily hampers trade. Specifically, RIA is unlikely to advance the goals of increasing regulatory harmonization, supporting mutual recognition, or reducing regulatory burdens. On the other hand, RIA can enhance the transparency and trade rationality of regulatory decision-making. These two goals can be further advanced if RIA is paired with institutional reforms, such as international secondments, appropriate roles for domestic offices of trade policy in the regulatory process, and sharing best practices and resources, especially with developing countries.

Bangladesh and the India’s North East are much more than next door neighbours. Being geographically contiguous, they are ‘natural markets’ for each other. India and Bangladesh are now working together to widen and strengthen their cooperation. In the field of security, they have made significant progress in recent years. Now they could build on that foundation of cooperation and remove the bottlenecks affecting improved trade and connectivity. While India can help develop Bangladesh’s export and investment climate, Bangladesh can let India use its infrastructure for surface and maritime connectivity to move men and material to the Northeast . Equally important is the need to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers, develop and modernize the infrastructure along the border, and facilitate connectivity bilaterally and within the sub-region and beyond.