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Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder characterized by impairments in three discrete domains: communication, social abilities, and imagination (resulting in repetitive interests and behavior). Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is now considered a national epidemic and has been expanded to include autism, Asperger's syndrome, pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified, and the rarer Rett's syndrome and child disintegrative disorder. The primary form of treatment for autistic children is educational therapy, combined with other specific therapies as needed (for example, physical, occupational, speech and language). The most frequently implemented educational treatment with consistent proven results is behavioral therapy, in which the principles of operant conditioning are applied to teach new skills across a broad domain. One increasingly recognized and legitimate component of therapeutic interventions involves play, because play skills are staggeringly different in children with ASD than in typically developing children. This chapter discusses the link between symbolic play and symbolic language, precursors to symbolic understanding, and play-based intervention designed to enhance autistic children's social skills.

This chapter argues that despite various subsequent alterations and expansions, the core of the parable of the Last Judgment does go back to Jesus himself. It stresses (with John Meier 1980) “the stunning universalism” of the story, and once again, it rejects the traditional interpretation of the words “Depart from me, you cursed” in terms of an everlasting “hell.” It highlights the profound transformation that eschatology has undergone in the last few decades, from prediction to warning and appeal. It discusses the symbolic language of both the Old and the New Testaments, drawing, again, on the writings of the seventh‐century mystic Isaac the Syrian, the Orthodox theologian Sergii Bulgakov, the Protestant theologian Juergen Moltmann and the Catholic theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar.

This introductory chapter sets out the central question that the book is seeks to answer: why was Coleridge privately, and sometimes publicly, sceptical about his own theory of symbolism? It argues that in order to understand Coleridge's doubts, his writings must be situated in relation to two important intellectual traditions. The first is a tradition of epistemological ‘piety’, which informs the work of predecessors such as Kant, Hume, Locke, and Boyle, and is connected to Protestant critiques of post-lapsarian natural reason. The second is a tradition of theological voluntarism, which emphasizes the omnipotence of God, at the expense of His other attributes, and posits an arbitrary and contingent relationship between God and His creation: the natural world. It is argued that Coleridge was familiar with both of these interrelated intellectual traditions, and that together they served to undermine his confidence in his ability to read the symbolic language of God in nature.

This chapter seeks to move beyond the colonial and nationalist narratives of the popular Kuka movement in order to answer a different set of questions: What sorts of codes of behaviour and symbolic language existed in nineteenth-century Punjab? Why are prophecies and apocalyptic visions believed in? What mobilizes common people to resist political regimes? What is the nature of charismatic leadership? What evokes the moral indignation of communities? How does culture influence everyday behaviour? In seeking answers to these questions that have not been posed within the registers of existing historiography we hope to gain a more nuanced view of indigenous forms of resistance in colonial Punjab.

The chapter argues for the authenticity of the first part of this parable. It shows that here, as elsewhere, the widely used term “reversal” is not sufficient for explaining the parable's meaning. It rejects the notion of “irreversible punishment” (a hell for some) as an insult to God and a misunderstanding of the nature of symbolic language; and it articulates, in simple and universal human concepts, the parable's message to the rich as well as that to the poor. Once again, it stresses the illocutionary purpose of the parable: not a prediction, but a warning and appeal.

In a culminating chapter, Whistler finally brings all the strands of his analysis of Schelling and the symbol together in a close reading of §73 of the Philosophy of Art, where Schelling constructs his theory of symbolic language. In particular, Whistler focuses on Schelling’s claim that language is a trans-potency phenomenon that corresponds to reason (rather than reflection). Indeed, Whistler detects in this section a suggestion that language is the most potentiated phenomenon possible in the system of identity—a conclusion that jars with most Schelling scholarship. In conclusion, Whistler suggests that, while this section is unsatisfying in many respects, it does indeed point to a fertile philosophy of language.