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Expected Utility Theory *

Simon Grant and Timothy Van Zandt

in The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199290420
eISBN:
9780191710506
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290420.003.0002
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare

This chapter reviews classic normative expected utility theory. The goal is to frame the subsequent chapters (which consider more modern extensions to and deviations from this classic theory) in a ... More


The Normative Status of the Independence Principle

Edward F. McClennen

in The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199290420
eISBN:
9780191710506
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290420.003.0006
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare

Some version or other of what is known as the “independence principle” plays a ubiquitous role in the axiomatic derivation of the normative version of expected‐utility theory. The various versions ... More


Decision Theory

James Bergin

in Microeconomic Theory: A Concise Course

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199280292
eISBN:
9780191602498
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199280290.003.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

Deals with decision theory. The coverage includes decision making under risk and uncertainty. The theories of vonNeumann–Morgenstern and Savage are reviewed, along with recent developments in the ... More


Consistency

Lara Buchak

in Risk and Rationality

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199672165
eISBN:
9780191759048
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672165.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter discusses instrumental rationality and what decision theorists take it to consist in. It is claimed that to be decision-theoretically rational is to have consistent preferences and to ... More


The Second Challenge: Individuating Outcomes

José Luis Bermúdez

in Decision Theory and Rationality

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199548026
eISBN:
9780191720246
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548026.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

Standard presentations of decision theory adopt some version of the invariance principle (that it is irrational to assign different utilities to propositions known to be equivalent). This normative ... More


The Third Challenge: Rationality Over Time

José Luis Bermúdez

in Decision Theory and Rationality

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199548026
eISBN:
9780191720246
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548026.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

This chapter explores the challenge of developing decision theory to do justice to the sequential and diachronic nature of decision making. Classical decision theory is governed by a separability ... More


Challenges to the Principle of Personal Good

Douglas MacLean

in Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199684908
eISBN:
9780191765223
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684908.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

John Broome defends a Principle of Personal Good, which explains how the good of individuals combines to determine the general good. This chapter contains two main arguments. First, the conception of ... More


Diachronic Choice

Lara Buchak

in Risk and Rationality

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199672165
eISBN:
9780191759048
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672165.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter examines how risk-weighted expected utility maximizers perform in diachronic choice situations. In particular, it considers an argument that they are irrational on the grounds that they ... More


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