Jennifer M. Saul
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219155
- eISBN:
- 9780191711848
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219155.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
It has traditionally been thought that the substitution of co-referential terms succeeds in all but a few special linguistic contexts, such as belief reports. Philosophers have devoted considerable ...
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It has traditionally been thought that the substitution of co-referential terms succeeds in all but a few special linguistic contexts, such as belief reports. Philosophers have devoted considerable energy to attempting to understand these special contexts. This book discusses apparent cases of substitution failure in simple sentences: those that do not involve any such special contexts. It shows that existing theories — whether semantic or pragmatic — cannot accommodate these cases, and that certain central assumptions regarding the role of intuitions must be abandoned in order to deal with them. The book offers a new explanation of anti-substitution intuitions that builds on empirical data from psychology, and explores the methodological implications of this form of explanation.Less
It has traditionally been thought that the substitution of co-referential terms succeeds in all but a few special linguistic contexts, such as belief reports. Philosophers have devoted considerable energy to attempting to understand these special contexts. This book discusses apparent cases of substitution failure in simple sentences: those that do not involve any such special contexts. It shows that existing theories — whether semantic or pragmatic — cannot accommodate these cases, and that certain central assumptions regarding the role of intuitions must be abandoned in order to deal with them. The book offers a new explanation of anti-substitution intuitions that builds on empirical data from psychology, and explores the methodological implications of this form of explanation.
Jennifer Saul
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219155
- eISBN:
- 9780191711848
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219155.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter provides a detailed look at the consequences of apparent substitution failures in simple sentences for standard debates on substitution. It begins with a look at traditional puzzle cases ...
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This chapter provides a detailed look at the consequences of apparent substitution failures in simple sentences for standard debates on substitution. It begins with a look at traditional puzzle cases involving belief reports and traditional approaches to these puzzles, both semantic accounts and those invoking conversational implicature. It argues that none of these traditional approaches can accommodate apparent substitution failures in simple sentences.Less
This chapter provides a detailed look at the consequences of apparent substitution failures in simple sentences for standard debates on substitution. It begins with a look at traditional puzzle cases involving belief reports and traditional approaches to these puzzles, both semantic accounts and those invoking conversational implicature. It argues that none of these traditional approaches can accommodate apparent substitution failures in simple sentences.
Ruth Barcan Marcus
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195096576
- eISBN:
- 9780199833412
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195096576.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This paper reflects, in a loosely historical and personally reminiscent fashion, on Quine's animadversions on modalities, the debates they provoked, and some of its outcomes.
This paper reflects, in a loosely historical and personally reminiscent fashion, on Quine's animadversions on modalities, the debates they provoked, and some of its outcomes.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145281
- eISBN:
- 9780199833702
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145283.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
It is argued that propositional attitude ascriptions of the form a believes / asserts that S semantically express propositions that report that an agent bears the relevant attitude – belief or ...
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It is argued that propositional attitude ascriptions of the form a believes / asserts that S semantically express propositions that report that an agent bears the relevant attitude – belief or assertion – to the proposition semantically expressed by S in the context in which the report is made. Apparent instances of substitution failure – in which substitution of coreferential names or indexicals in S appears to change the truth value of the original attitude ascription – are then used to formulate a challenge to the views about the semantic contents drawn in earlier chapters. According to those views, the proposition semantically expressed by S is simply its Russellian semantic content, and attitude ascriptions differing only in the substitution of coreferential names or indexicals semantically express the very same proposition (and so have the same semantically determined truth conditions), even though assertive utterances of the two ascriptions in certain contexts may result in the assertion of propositions with different truth value. According to an alternative conception, such substitution really does change the semantically determined truth values of the attitude ascriptions, and the proposition semantically expressed by a sentence S is an amalgam of its Russellian semantic content plus the very sentence S itself (i.e., it is a linguistically enhanced proposition).Less
It is argued that propositional attitude ascriptions of the form a believes / asserts that S semantically express propositions that report that an agent bears the relevant attitude – belief or assertion – to the proposition semantically expressed by S in the context in which the report is made. Apparent instances of substitution failure – in which substitution of coreferential names or indexicals in S appears to change the truth value of the original attitude ascription – are then used to formulate a challenge to the views about the semantic contents drawn in earlier chapters. According to those views, the proposition semantically expressed by S is simply its Russellian semantic content, and attitude ascriptions differing only in the substitution of coreferential names or indexicals semantically express the very same proposition (and so have the same semantically determined truth conditions), even though assertive utterances of the two ascriptions in certain contexts may result in the assertion of propositions with different truth value. According to an alternative conception, such substitution really does change the semantically determined truth values of the attitude ascriptions, and the proposition semantically expressed by a sentence S is an amalgam of its Russellian semantic content plus the very sentence S itself (i.e., it is a linguistically enhanced proposition).
