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The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1

Keith DeRose

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199564460
eISBN:
9780191721410
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Contextualism is the view that the epistemic standards that a subject must meet in order for a sentence attributing knowledge to her to be true vary according to the contexts in which those sentences ... More


Introduction: Contextualism, Invariantism, Skepticism, and What Goes On in Ordinary Conversation

Keith DeRose

in The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199564460
eISBN:
9780191721410
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

In this initial exposition of contextualism, the view is explained and distinguished from other views, and especially from its rival, invariantism, whose two main forms, classical invariantism and ... More


Knowledge, Assertion, and Action: Contextualism vs. Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism

Keith DeRose

in The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199564460
eISBN:
9780191721410
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Subject-sensitive invariantism is shown to be wrong by its inability to handle certain important third-person uses of ‘know(s)’. Attention is then turned to important uses of ‘know(s)’ made in ... More


Now You Know It, Now You Don't: Intellectualism, Contextualism, and Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism

Keith DeRose

in The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199564460
eISBN:
9780191721410
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Contextualism is shown to avoid certain problems, and to thereby gain an important advantage over subject-sensitive invariantism, by its ability to respect ‘intellectualism’, the thesis that ... More


Knowledge In and Out of Context

Kent Bach

in Knowledge and Skepticism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262014083
eISBN:
9780262265782
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262014083.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In this chapter, the author offers another explanation of the variation in contents, which is explained by contextualism as being related to a variation in standards. The author’s explanation posits ... More


The Variability of Know(s)-that Judgments

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The usage evidence—various scenarios that realistically depict where and when we attribute knowledge to ourselves and others—shows that all the alternatives (epistemic contextualism, ... More


Knows

John Macfarlane

in Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
May 2014
ISBN:
9780199682751
eISBN:
9780191781636
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682751.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

Invariantist accounts of knowledge attributions force an uncomfortable choice between skepticism, dogmatism, and rejecting closure (the idea that knowledge is preserved by obvious entailments). ... More


Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge

Matthew Weiner

in Epistemic Value

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199231188
eISBN:
9780191710827
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Hawthorne has argued for subject-sensitive invariantism, on which whether a speaker knows that p depends on whether her practical environment makes it appropriate for her to use p in practical ... More


Who Wants to Know?

Jennifer Nado

in Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
March 2019
ISBN:
9780198833314
eISBN:
9780191871658
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that professional inquirers, including professional philosophers, are subject to special epistemic obligations which require them to meet higher standards than those that are ... More


Alternatives?

Peter Baumann

in Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780198754312
eISBN:
9780191815980
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754312.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This final chapter discusses alternatives to contextualism. Since classical invariantism has been a foil for the whole discussion in the book, it needs no special, repeated treatment here. Rather, ... More


Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense

Peter Baumann

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780198754312
eISBN:
9780191815980
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754312.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book develops and defends a version of epistemic contextualism, that is, of the view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions of the form “S knows that p” can vary with ... More


The Context Shiftiness Dilemma Generalized

Mona Simion

in Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
May 2021
ISBN:
9780192895288
eISBN:
9780191916083
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780192895288.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Most actors in the debate assume that the intuitive variability of proper assertion with practical stakes (the Shiftiness Intuition) motivates the following dilemma: either 1) we embrace a knowledge ... More


Applications

Sven Rosenkranz

in Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
April 2021
ISBN:
9780198865636
eISBN:
9780191897979
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

To earn their keep, theories of justification must be shown to have fruitful applications and to provide the means to address well-known puzzles and paradoxes. It is argued that the present account ... More


Idiosyncrasy, disagreement, and the reasonable person standard

Krista Lawlor

in Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199657896
eISBN:
9780191748127
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657896.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter gives a substantive account of how a reasonable person standard determines the set of reasonable alternatives in a given situation. The reasonable person possesses both world knowledge ... More


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