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This chapter re-examines the hypothesis that some anaphors can be long-distance bound independently of their discursive conditions. All analyses of long-distance anaphora, whether they assume binding domain parameterization or covert movement, rely on the existence of a specific type of anaphors that can be bound out of the Condition A domain and are further characterized by monomorphemicity, subject orientation, sloppy readings, and blocking effects. The goal of this chapter is to question this empirical claim and examine the hypothesis that such purported long-distance anaphors can in fact be reduced to exempt anaphors subject to logophoric conditions. Some tests are proposed and applied to Icelandic sig, Mandarin ziji, French soi, and Norwegian seg/sin using online questionnaires. The results suggest that the hypothesis that long-distance binding should be eliminated from the theory and reduced to logophoric exemption is viable—pending further cross-linguistic studies.

This chapter introduces and motivates parentheticalism about sentences of the form “S believes that P.” It starts from the so-called phenomenon of transparency of first-person sentences of this form. It is argued that this phenomenon is not aptly explained in wholly pragmatic terms. Parentheticalism offers a superior explanation, and it shows that transparent first-person uses are really just special cases of a wider class, a class of parenthetical readings which are available in all persons and many embedding environments. Formal implementations of the semantic and pragmatic elements of the view are suggested, and the role of parenthetical “believe”-antecedents in indicative conditionals is explored.

This chapter introduces and motivates parentheticalism about sentences of the form “S wants to ϕ‎.” It is argued that they manifest similar forms of transparency in first-person uses as in the case of “believe,” and that here, too, they are best explained in terms of parentheticalism. Again, formal implementations of the view are suggested. Special attention is paid to the semantics of the complements of “want,” which are argued to be similar to imperative contents. Parentheticalism about “want” is shown to provide an attractive account of certain indicative conditionals (hypothetical imperatives or so-called “anankastic” conditionals) and of certain instances of practical reasoning.