Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199699568
- eISBN:
- 9780191760730
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699568.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Subjects and conscious mental events are ontologically interdependent. What is right in Hume’s point that he could not find himself is that nothing is given in perception or sensation in a purely ...
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Subjects and conscious mental events are ontologically interdependent. What is right in Hume’s point that he could not find himself is that nothing is given in perception or sensation in a purely first personal way. The interdependence thesis is incompatible with neo-Humean views; it contributes to the explanation of one form of the unity of consciousness; it generates arguments against the thesis that subjects are merely centres of narrative gravity. The identity of a subject over time consists in identity of integrating apparatus. There are affinities with, but also differences between, this view and those of Locke.Less
Subjects and conscious mental events are ontologically interdependent. What is right in Hume’s point that he could not find himself is that nothing is given in perception or sensation in a purely first personal way. The interdependence thesis is incompatible with neo-Humean views; it contributes to the explanation of one form of the unity of consciousness; it generates arguments against the thesis that subjects are merely centres of narrative gravity. The identity of a subject over time consists in identity of integrating apparatus. There are affinities with, but also differences between, this view and those of Locke.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199699568
- eISBN:
- 9780191760730
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699568.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book presents a philosophical theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory the nature of first person representation of such a subject of consciousness. It develops a treatment of ...
More
This book presents a philosophical theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory the nature of first person representation of such a subject of consciousness. It develops a treatment of the metaphysics of subjects, distinct from previous theories, under which subjects were regarded either as constructs from mental events, or as fundamentally embodied, or as Cartesian egos. A theory of the first person concept, which integrates with the positive treatment of subjects, is developed, a theory that contributes to the explanation of various distinctive first person phenomena in the theory of thought and knowledge. The positive account is brought to bear on the contributions to these issues made by Descartes, Hume, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and Strawson. The book also addresses more recent literature in the philosophy of mind on immunity to error through misidentification. The later parts of the book distinguish and characterize three varieties of self-consciousness. Perspectival self-consciousness involves the subject’s capacity to appreciate that she is of the same kind as things given in a third personal way, and attributes the subject to a certain kind of objective thought about herself. Reflective self-consciousness involves awareness of the subject’s own mental states, reached in a distinctive way. Interpersonal self-consciousness is awareness that one features, as a subject, in some other person’s mental states. These varieties, and the relations and the forms of co-operation between them, are important in explaining features of our knowledge, our social relations, and our emotional lives.Less
This book presents a philosophical theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory the nature of first person representation of such a subject of consciousness. It develops a treatment of the metaphysics of subjects, distinct from previous theories, under which subjects were regarded either as constructs from mental events, or as fundamentally embodied, or as Cartesian egos. A theory of the first person concept, which integrates with the positive treatment of subjects, is developed, a theory that contributes to the explanation of various distinctive first person phenomena in the theory of thought and knowledge. The positive account is brought to bear on the contributions to these issues made by Descartes, Hume, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and Strawson. The book also addresses more recent literature in the philosophy of mind on immunity to error through misidentification. The later parts of the book distinguish and characterize three varieties of self-consciousness. Perspectival self-consciousness involves the subject’s capacity to appreciate that she is of the same kind as things given in a third personal way, and attributes the subject to a certain kind of objective thought about herself. Reflective self-consciousness involves awareness of the subject’s own mental states, reached in a distinctive way. Interpersonal self-consciousness is awareness that one features, as a subject, in some other person’s mental states. These varieties, and the relations and the forms of co-operation between them, are important in explaining features of our knowledge, our social relations, and our emotional lives.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199699568
- eISBN:
- 9780191760730
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699568.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The aim of the book is to present an integrated account of subjects of consciousness and the first person way of thinking about a subject of consciousness, and to apply the integrated account to some ...
More
The aim of the book is to present an integrated account of subjects of consciousness and the first person way of thinking about a subject of consciousness, and to apply the integrated account to some classical issues in the epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind that concern subjects of consciousness. Our discussion of this topic should be reoriented in three respects: (i) it should recognize an option beyond the three traditional positions of subjects as either constructs from mental events, as essentially embodied, or as Cartesian egos; (ii) it should acknowledge the primacy of the metaphysics of subjects in these issues; (iii) it should recognize that there is first person content at the nonconceptual level. An overview is given of the content and relations between the later chapters.Less
The aim of the book is to present an integrated account of subjects of consciousness and the first person way of thinking about a subject of consciousness, and to apply the integrated account to some classical issues in the epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind that concern subjects of consciousness. Our discussion of this topic should be reoriented in three respects: (i) it should recognize an option beyond the three traditional positions of subjects as either constructs from mental events, as essentially embodied, or as Cartesian egos; (ii) it should acknowledge the primacy of the metaphysics of subjects in these issues; (iii) it should recognize that there is first person content at the nonconceptual level. An overview is given of the content and relations between the later chapters.