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This chapter addresses objections to structured propositions generally. For the most part, the objections considered do not depend on difficulties in the account of structured propositions that has been sketched. Thus, this chapter focuses on a sample of challenges it is considered important to address.

The face-value theory is that theory of the logical form of belief reports that must be defeated if it is not to be accepted. It holds that ‘A believes that S’ is true just in case A stands in the belief relation to the proposition that S. The theory constrains, but provides no complete account of, the nature of the propositions we believe. Most face-value theorists hold that the propositions we believe are structured, and the big contest here is between Russellian and Fregean propositions. Both conceptions are problematic.

A final problem left over from the previous chapter is that of substantive necessity. How are we to distinguish substantively necessary sentences from analytic ones? This problem arises because we have attempted to characterise analyticity in modal terms. This chapter proposes a more fine-grained ‘metaphysical picture’ of analyticity to underlie the rougher modal approximation developed in Chapter 2.

The other leading account of propositions, alongside the thesis that propositions are sets of possible worlds, endorses structured propositions. This chapter’s central line of argument focuses on a proposition’s representing things as being a certain way. For example, the proposition that dogs bark represents dogs as barking, and for this reason is true if and only if dogs bark. The chapter assumes—as do all defenders of structured propositions—that if there are structured propositions, then something about each proposition explains how it manages to represent things as being a certain way. The chapter argues that if there are structured propositions, that explanation must be in terms of a proposition’s constituents and structure. And the chapter argues that a structured proposition’s constituents and structure would not fully explain how that proposition manages to represent things as being a certain way. So the chapter concludes that there are no structured propositions.

Contrasts possible‐worlds propositions with more fine‐grained structured propositions that build linguistic or quasi‐linguistic form into the contents of thought. The main argument is that the hypothesis that structured propositions are the objects of intentional mental states can be justified only if one's account of what mental states are, and how their content is determined, explains the role of the linguistic structure in distinguishing between different mental states. Several different ways in which linguistic structure might be involved in intentional mental states are distinguished. It is argued that neither an account of intentionality that presupposes a language of thought nor an account that makes linguistic expression essential to intentionality can be justified.

Propositions are abstract objects that play a major role in contemporary philosophy of language. There are a range of conceptual problems, though, for propositions that have been pointed out in the literature. The chapter argues that propositions should in general be replaced by “attitudinal objects.” Attitudinal objects are entities like “John’s belief that S” or “John’s claim that S.”Like mental or illocutionary events, they are concrete entities that depend on an agent as well as on a mental event or state. But attitudinal objects need to be distinguished from mental events or states. The distinction should be viewed as part of a more general distinction between what the Polish philosopher Twardowski called “actions” and “products.” Attitudinal objects, unlike propositions, do not play a role in simple attitude reports. They are introduced only on the basis of a nominalizing expression, such as a special quantifier in place of a that-complement. The chapter proposes a neo-Russellian analysis of attitude reports with that-clause complements.

What kind of entity are truths? I shall argue that they are propositions (§8.1). To understand what propositions are, we must investigate their nature. Given what I’ve said previously about truth and grounding, a characterisation of their nature is easy to give (§8.2). But finding a theory of what propositions are which respects that nature is much harder. I’ll argue that existing theories of propositions cannot account for their nature (§§8.2–8.4). A better account is to analyse propositions in terms of their possible truthmakers (§8.5). I investigate whether this is metaphysically tenable (§8.6) and what it tells us about the notion of same-saying (§8.7).

The relationship between language and thought remains an unsettled issue. The chapter approaches it from the perspective of whether any of the representations the language faculty generates can be said to be constitutive of thought (i.e., to form part of thought representations). It reviews four such linguistic formats or representations—phonetic (PHON), syntactic (SEM), phonological, and semantic—and argues that all of them are in principle extraneous to what a theory of thought requires. Thought must be subsumed by abstract, amodal, structured, and fully explicit propositional representations to account for cognitive flexibility, and all four formats fall short of exhibiting the necessary properties.