Jeffrey C. King
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199226061
- eISBN:
- 9780191710377
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226061.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter addresses objections to structured propositions generally. For the most part, the objections considered do not depend on difficulties in the account of structured propositions that has ...
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This chapter addresses objections to structured propositions generally. For the most part, the objections considered do not depend on difficulties in the account of structured propositions that has been sketched. Thus, this chapter focuses on a sample of challenges it is considered important to address.Less
This chapter addresses objections to structured propositions generally. For the most part, the objections considered do not depend on difficulties in the account of structured propositions that has been sketched. Thus, this chapter focuses on a sample of challenges it is considered important to address.
Stephen Schiffer
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199257768
- eISBN:
- 9780191602313
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257760.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The face-value theory is that theory of the logical form of belief reports that must be defeated if it is not to be accepted. It holds that ‘A believes that S’ is true just in case A stands in the ...
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The face-value theory is that theory of the logical form of belief reports that must be defeated if it is not to be accepted. It holds that ‘A believes that S’ is true just in case A stands in the belief relation to the proposition that S. The theory constrains, but provides no complete account of, the nature of the propositions we believe. Most face-value theorists hold that the propositions we believe are structured, and the big contest here is between Russellian and Fregean propositions. Both conceptions are problematic.Less
The face-value theory is that theory of the logical form of belief reports that must be defeated if it is not to be accepted. It holds that ‘A believes that S’ is true just in case A stands in the belief relation to the proposition that S. The theory constrains, but provides no complete account of, the nature of the propositions we believe. Most face-value theorists hold that the propositions we believe are structured, and the big contest here is between Russellian and Fregean propositions. Both conceptions are problematic.
Gillian Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199232192
- eISBN:
- 9780191715907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
A final problem left over from the previous chapter is that of substantive necessity. How are we to distinguish substantively necessary sentences from analytic ones? This problem arises because we ...
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A final problem left over from the previous chapter is that of substantive necessity. How are we to distinguish substantively necessary sentences from analytic ones? This problem arises because we have attempted to characterise analyticity in modal terms. This chapter proposes a more fine-grained ‘metaphysical picture’ of analyticity to underlie the rougher modal approximation developed in Chapter 2.Less
A final problem left over from the previous chapter is that of substantive necessity. How are we to distinguish substantively necessary sentences from analytic ones? This problem arises because we have attempted to characterise analyticity in modal terms. This chapter proposes a more fine-grained ‘metaphysical picture’ of analyticity to underlie the rougher modal approximation developed in Chapter 2.
Trenton Merricks
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- April 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198732563
- eISBN:
- 9780191796791
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732563.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The other leading account of propositions, alongside the thesis that propositions are sets of possible worlds, endorses structured propositions. This chapter’s central line of argument focuses on a ...
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The other leading account of propositions, alongside the thesis that propositions are sets of possible worlds, endorses structured propositions. This chapter’s central line of argument focuses on a proposition’s representing things as being a certain way. For example, the proposition that dogs bark represents dogs as barking, and for this reason is true if and only if dogs bark. The chapter assumes—as do all defenders of structured propositions—that if there are structured propositions, then something about each proposition explains how it manages to represent things as being a certain way. The chapter argues that if there are structured propositions, that explanation must be in terms of a proposition’s constituents and structure. And the chapter argues that a structured proposition’s constituents and structure would not fully explain how that proposition manages to represent things as being a certain way. So the chapter concludes that there are no structured propositions.Less
The other leading account of propositions, alongside the thesis that propositions are sets of possible worlds, endorses structured propositions. This chapter’s central line of argument focuses on a proposition’s representing things as being a certain way. For example, the proposition that dogs bark represents dogs as barking, and for this reason is true if and only if dogs bark. The chapter assumes—as do all defenders of structured propositions—that if there are structured propositions, then something about each proposition explains how it manages to represent things as being a certain way. The chapter argues that if there are structured propositions, that explanation must be in terms of a proposition’s constituents and structure. And the chapter argues that a structured proposition’s constituents and structure would not fully explain how that proposition manages to represent things as being a certain way. So the chapter concludes that there are no structured propositions.
Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237075
- eISBN:
- 9780191598456
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237073.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Contrasts possible‐worlds propositions with more fine‐grained structured propositions that build linguistic or quasi‐linguistic form into the contents of thought. The main argument is that the ...
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Contrasts possible‐worlds propositions with more fine‐grained structured propositions that build linguistic or quasi‐linguistic form into the contents of thought. The main argument is that the hypothesis that structured propositions are the objects of intentional mental states can be justified only if one's account of what mental states are, and how their content is determined, explains the role of the linguistic structure in distinguishing between different mental states. Several different ways in which linguistic structure might be involved in intentional mental states are distinguished. It is argued that neither an account of intentionality that presupposes a language of thought nor an account that makes linguistic expression essential to intentionality can be justified.Less
Contrasts possible‐worlds propositions with more fine‐grained structured propositions that build linguistic or quasi‐linguistic form into the contents of thought. The main argument is that the hypothesis that structured propositions are the objects of intentional mental states can be justified only if one's account of what mental states are, and how their content is determined, explains the role of the linguistic structure in distinguishing between different mental states. Several different ways in which linguistic structure might be involved in intentional mental states are distinguished. It is argued that neither an account of intentionality that presupposes a language of thought nor an account that makes linguistic expression essential to intentionality can be justified.
Friederike Moltmann
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199608744
- eISBN:
- 9780191747700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608744.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Propositions are abstract objects that play a major role in contemporary philosophy of language. There are a range of conceptual problems, though, for propositions that have been pointed out in the ...
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Propositions are abstract objects that play a major role in contemporary philosophy of language. There are a range of conceptual problems, though, for propositions that have been pointed out in the literature. The chapter argues that propositions should in general be replaced by “attitudinal objects.” Attitudinal objects are entities like “John’s belief that S” or “John’s claim that S.”Like mental or illocutionary events, they are concrete entities that depend on an agent as well as on a mental event or state. But attitudinal objects need to be distinguished from mental events or states. The distinction should be viewed as part of a more general distinction between what the Polish philosopher Twardowski called “actions” and “products.” Attitudinal objects, unlike propositions, do not play a role in simple attitude reports. They are introduced only on the basis of a nominalizing expression, such as a special quantifier in place of a that-complement. The chapter proposes a neo-Russellian analysis of attitude reports with that-clause complements.Less
Propositions are abstract objects that play a major role in contemporary philosophy of language. There are a range of conceptual problems, though, for propositions that have been pointed out in the literature. The chapter argues that propositions should in general be replaced by “attitudinal objects.” Attitudinal objects are entities like “John’s belief that S” or “John’s claim that S.”Like mental or illocutionary events, they are concrete entities that depend on an agent as well as on a mental event or state. But attitudinal objects need to be distinguished from mental events or states. The distinction should be viewed as part of a more general distinction between what the Polish philosopher Twardowski called “actions” and “products.” Attitudinal objects, unlike propositions, do not play a role in simple attitude reports. They are introduced only on the basis of a nominalizing expression, such as a special quantifier in place of a that-complement. The chapter proposes a neo-Russellian analysis of attitude reports with that-clause complements.
Mark Jago
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198823810
- eISBN:
- 9780191862595
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198823810.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Language
What kind of entity are truths? I shall argue that they are propositions (§8.1). To understand what propositions are, we must investigate their nature. Given what I’ve said previously about truth and ...
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What kind of entity are truths? I shall argue that they are propositions (§8.1). To understand what propositions are, we must investigate their nature. Given what I’ve said previously about truth and grounding, a characterisation of their nature is easy to give (§8.2). But finding a theory of what propositions are which respects that nature is much harder. I’ll argue that existing theories of propositions cannot account for their nature (§§8.2–8.4). A better account is to analyse propositions in terms of their possible truthmakers (§8.5). I investigate whether this is metaphysically tenable (§8.6) and what it tells us about the notion of same-saying (§8.7).Less
What kind of entity are truths? I shall argue that they are propositions (§8.1). To understand what propositions are, we must investigate their nature. Given what I’ve said previously about truth and grounding, a characterisation of their nature is easy to give (§8.2). But finding a theory of what propositions are which respects that nature is much harder. I’ll argue that existing theories of propositions cannot account for their nature (§§8.2–8.4). A better account is to analyse propositions in terms of their possible truthmakers (§8.5). I investigate whether this is metaphysically tenable (§8.6) and what it tells us about the notion of same-saying (§8.7).
Trenton Merricks
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- April 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198732563
- eISBN:
- 9780191796791
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732563.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book has two main goals. The first is to show that there are propositions. The second is to defend an account of their nature. While pursuing these goals, the text draws a variety of ...
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This book has two main goals. The first is to show that there are propositions. The second is to defend an account of their nature. While pursuing these goals, the text draws a variety of controversial conclusions about related issues, including, among others, supervaluationism, the nature of possible worlds, truths about non-existent entities, and whether and how logical consequence depends on modal facts. An argument is modally valid just in case, necessarily, if its premises are true, then its conclusion is true. The book begins with the assumption that some arguments are modally valid. The book then argues that the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments are not sentences. In fact, it argues, they are propositions. So, because there are modally valid arguments, there are propositions. The book defends the claim that propositions are not structured and are not sets of possible worlds. It thereby presents arguments against the two leading accounts of the nature of propositions. Those arguments are intended not only to oppose those accounts, but also to deliver conclusions about what a satisfactory account of the nature of propositions should say. Of particular importance in this regard are arguments concerning the alleged explanations of how a set of possible worlds or a structured proposition would manage to represent things as being a certain way. The book then defends its own account of the nature of propositions, which says only that each proposition is a necessary existent that essentially represents things as being a certain way.Less
This book has two main goals. The first is to show that there are propositions. The second is to defend an account of their nature. While pursuing these goals, the text draws a variety of controversial conclusions about related issues, including, among others, supervaluationism, the nature of possible worlds, truths about non-existent entities, and whether and how logical consequence depends on modal facts. An argument is modally valid just in case, necessarily, if its premises are true, then its conclusion is true. The book begins with the assumption that some arguments are modally valid. The book then argues that the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments are not sentences. In fact, it argues, they are propositions. So, because there are modally valid arguments, there are propositions. The book defends the claim that propositions are not structured and are not sets of possible worlds. It thereby presents arguments against the two leading accounts of the nature of propositions. Those arguments are intended not only to oppose those accounts, but also to deliver conclusions about what a satisfactory account of the nature of propositions should say. Of particular importance in this regard are arguments concerning the alleged explanations of how a set of possible worlds or a structured proposition would manage to represent things as being a certain way. The book then defends its own account of the nature of propositions, which says only that each proposition is a necessary existent that essentially represents things as being a certain way.
David J. Lobina and José E. García-Albea
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190464783
- eISBN:
- 9780190464806
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190464783.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
The relationship between language and thought remains an unsettled issue. The chapter approaches it from the perspective of whether any of the representations the language faculty generates can be ...
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The relationship between language and thought remains an unsettled issue. The chapter approaches it from the perspective of whether any of the representations the language faculty generates can be said to be constitutive of thought (i.e., to form part of thought representations). It reviews four such linguistic formats or representations—phonetic (PHON), syntactic (SEM), phonological, and semantic—and argues that all of them are in principle extraneous to what a theory of thought requires. Thought must be subsumed by abstract, amodal, structured, and fully explicit propositional representations to account for cognitive flexibility, and all four formats fall short of exhibiting the necessary properties.Less
The relationship between language and thought remains an unsettled issue. The chapter approaches it from the perspective of whether any of the representations the language faculty generates can be said to be constitutive of thought (i.e., to form part of thought representations). It reviews four such linguistic formats or representations—phonetic (PHON), syntactic (SEM), phonological, and semantic—and argues that all of them are in principle extraneous to what a theory of thought requires. Thought must be subsumed by abstract, amodal, structured, and fully explicit propositional representations to account for cognitive flexibility, and all four formats fall short of exhibiting the necessary properties.
