Search Results

This chapter moves from the commonplace ideas found in the language of manhood to the more elaborate theoretical explorations of manhood, femaleness, and youth found in medical writings, encyclopaedia, sermons, and ‘mirrors for princes’. These writings accord with the language of manhood in associating manhood with strength and energy. Youth, too, is characterized by strength, but also by inconstancy, a lack of steadfastness which unites youths with women, and leaves them particularly exposed to evil counsel and the temptations of the flesh. It is these characteristics which served as the basis for the attack on Richard II, not the associations with strength and honour which the king's established reputation might lead one to expect. This invites a reconsideration of how these themes became so important in Richard's reign, by returning in detail to the politics of these years.

The debate concerning the phenomenology of thought is marked by severe disagreement about how best to characterize a given conscious thought on the basis of introspective reflecting upon it. In this paper I focus on the fact of this introspection‐based disagreement—in particular, on its epistemic import for participants in the debate. How ought these philosophers respond when facing such radical disagreement about the deliverance of introspection? I argue that the fact of such disagreement itself should lead participants to be less confident—or even to suspend judgement—in their own introspection‐based claims. If that is right, then to the extent that the debate about the phenomenology of thought is carried out by appeal to introspective evidence, this constitutes a serious epistemological concern. At the very least, if this is the epistemically appropriate response, non‐trivial reliance of introspective evidence in the debate comes under pressure.

In Ethics 7.1-10 Aristotle takes up the Socratic claim that knowledge is sovereign and never is dragged around like a slave. First charging that this view contradicts the phenomena, Aristotle in fact proceeds to show how the opinions that are disregarded in akrasia or lapses of self-control amount to less than full knowledge, and further that the passions that defeat them carry with them implicit and momentarily more persuasive opinions about what is best. Thought is not defeated by simple pleasure or passion, then, but rather one closely related passion-opinion pair is defeated by another. Since the healthy desires and judgments that should animate correct choices are weak when virtue is absent, self-control requires the help of other desires, such as the love of honor and anger, in themselves problematic but often useful in their effects: Aristotle is thus gentle on these lapses. The treatment of morbid vice uncovers ways in which all true vice is unhealthy. Most human failings are rooted in softness or a lack of steadfastness but above all in a lack of clear insight into the human good.

This chapter defends the view that an awareness of the facts of religious disagreement doesn’t make theistic belief irrational. The first section makes some general remarks about when discovering disagreement (on any topic) makes it rational to give up your beliefs. The second section argues that in cases of disagreement about theism, the theist’s evidence for theism and for the reliability of her theistic belief is often strong enough to support steadfastness in the face of disagreement. The third section argues that the theist’s evidence for the reliability of her disputant’s atheistic beliefs is often weak enough to allow her to rationally demote her atheist interlocutor. The final section focuses on theists whose disagreement-based doubts about theism persist. These doubts could result in defeaters for theistic belief, but the gift of faith can compensate for this.

This opening chapter spells out the key concepts deployed throughout the book. It also contends, against integrity skeptics of various types, that personal integrity, understood as fidelity to one’s fundamental commitments, can actually have independent moral significance. The focus is on two arguments, both revolving around unconditional commitments. The first, the unfairness argument, holds that since morality itself pushes agents to incorporate certain unconditional commitments into their self-conception, it is unfair to criticize agents who go on to treat these commitments as an independent factor in their moral deliberation. The second argument links agents’ unconditional moral commitments to their self-respect. Both arguments allow us to see why one’s integrity is not simply parasitic upon one “doing the right thing.” Rather, integrity can inform the analysis of what one morally ought to do.