Kees Hengeveld and J. Lachlan Mackenzie
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199278107
- eISBN:
- 9780191707797
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278107.003.0003
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics, Theoretical Linguistics
This chapter, the longest in the book, presents the Representational Level of FDG, which is a layered structure indicating the part-whole relations among semantic categories. After a discussion of ...
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This chapter, the longest in the book, presents the Representational Level of FDG, which is a layered structure indicating the part-whole relations among semantic categories. After a discussion of the hierarchically related categories, the chapter progresses to those that enter into equipollent relations, and finally to reflexive language.Less
This chapter, the longest in the book, presents the Representational Level of FDG, which is a layered structure indicating the part-whole relations among semantic categories. After a discussion of the hierarchically related categories, the chapter progresses to those that enter into equipollent relations, and finally to reflexive language.
Sydney Shoemaker
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199214396
- eISBN:
- 9780191706738
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214396.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
If physicalism is true, all property instances must be realized in microphysical states of affairs. Microphysical states of affairs will fall into types having causal profiles, and when a property ...
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If physicalism is true, all property instances must be realized in microphysical states of affairs. Microphysical states of affairs will fall into types having causal profiles, and when a property instance is realized by a microphysical state of affairs, there will be an isomorphism between the causal profile of the property and that of a type to which the microphysical state of affairs belongs. Corresponding to every type of microphysical state of affairs realizer there will be a property — an MSE property — that something has, just in case its career embeds such a state of affairs. So every case of microphysical realization will be a case of property instantiation in which the realizer is an MSE property. Instantiations of higher-order properties will have microphysical realizers that are parts of the microphysical realizers of instantiations of the lower-order properties, that are their property realizers.Less
If physicalism is true, all property instances must be realized in microphysical states of affairs. Microphysical states of affairs will fall into types having causal profiles, and when a property instance is realized by a microphysical state of affairs, there will be an isomorphism between the causal profile of the property and that of a type to which the microphysical state of affairs belongs. Corresponding to every type of microphysical state of affairs realizer there will be a property — an MSE property — that something has, just in case its career embeds such a state of affairs. So every case of microphysical realization will be a case of property instantiation in which the realizer is an MSE property. Instantiations of higher-order properties will have microphysical realizers that are parts of the microphysical realizers of instantiations of the lower-order properties, that are their property realizers.
Jan Westerhoff
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199285044
- eISBN:
- 9780191713699
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285044.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter focuses on the notion of a state of affairs as fundamentally primitive, which serves as a basis for the following discussion of ontological categories. It argues for the centrality of ...
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This chapter focuses on the notion of a state of affairs as fundamentally primitive, which serves as a basis for the following discussion of ontological categories. It argues for the centrality of states of affairs from both an epistemological and a semantic perspective. States of affairs constitute the first point of cognitive contact with the world and also play an important role in semantical theories. Thus, they constitute a suitable starting-point for philosophical investigations. The second part of this chapter examines the relationship between states of affairs and their constituents. It becomes evident that arguments for the centrality of states of affairs entail that states of affairs should be conceived of as prior to their constituents, at least in the order of cognition. A state of affairs is first shown as a whole, and only afterwards analysed into the different items it is made up of. This priority of states of affairs has important implications for the account of ontological categories developed.Less
This chapter focuses on the notion of a state of affairs as fundamentally primitive, which serves as a basis for the following discussion of ontological categories. It argues for the centrality of states of affairs from both an epistemological and a semantic perspective. States of affairs constitute the first point of cognitive contact with the world and also play an important role in semantical theories. Thus, they constitute a suitable starting-point for philosophical investigations. The second part of this chapter examines the relationship between states of affairs and their constituents. It becomes evident that arguments for the centrality of states of affairs entail that states of affairs should be conceived of as prior to their constituents, at least in the order of cognition. A state of affairs is first shown as a whole, and only afterwards analysed into the different items it is made up of. This priority of states of affairs has important implications for the account of ontological categories developed.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A realist approach to metaphysics and ontology is defended in the face of some antirealist tendencies in contemporary philosophical thought. The general notion of an ontological category is explained ...
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A realist approach to metaphysics and ontology is defended in the face of some antirealist tendencies in contemporary philosophical thought. The general notion of an ontological category is explained and justified. Different systems of ontological categories are compared and contrasted with the four-category ontology: a one-category ontology of modes or tropes, a two-category ontology of particulars and universals, and a two-category ontology of substantial particulars and modes. The ontological status of states of affairs and natural laws, and the ontological implications of the truthmaker principle as advocated by D. M. Armstrong are discussed.Less
A realist approach to metaphysics and ontology is defended in the face of some antirealist tendencies in contemporary philosophical thought. The general notion of an ontological category is explained and justified. Different systems of ontological categories are compared and contrasted with the four-category ontology: a one-category ontology of modes or tropes, a two-category ontology of particulars and universals, and a two-category ontology of substantial particulars and modes. The ontological status of states of affairs and natural laws, and the ontological implications of the truthmaker principle as advocated by D. M. Armstrong are discussed.
Jan Westerhoff
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199285044
- eISBN:
- 9780191713699
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285044.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter focuses on a particularly important set of philosophical implications of the account of ontological categories. This account is fundamentally structuralist: it tries to get at ...
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This chapter focuses on a particularly important set of philosophical implications of the account of ontological categories. This account is fundamentally structuralist: it tries to get at information about the different constituents of states of affairs not by any direct information about them but by considering specific relations between them, that is information about which of them can go together to form states of affairs. It is interesting to note that a certain distinction between constituents of states of affairs, which would normally be regarded as clearly structural, cannot in fact be structural at all given that they cannot be distinguished by the structuralist account of ontological categories. This chapter shows why this is so and what wider philosophical implications it has.Less
This chapter focuses on a particularly important set of philosophical implications of the account of ontological categories. This account is fundamentally structuralist: it tries to get at information about the different constituents of states of affairs not by any direct information about them but by considering specific relations between them, that is information about which of them can go together to form states of affairs. It is interesting to note that a certain distinction between constituents of states of affairs, which would normally be regarded as clearly structural, cannot in fact be structural at all given that they cannot be distinguished by the structuralist account of ontological categories. This chapter shows why this is so and what wider philosophical implications it has.
Trenton Merricks
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205233
- eISBN:
- 9780191709302
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205233.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that, if every truth has a truthmaker, then some of those truthmakers are states of affairs or, in other words, events or Russellian facts. Moreover, some of those truthmaking ...
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This chapter argues that, if every truth has a truthmaker, then some of those truthmakers are states of affairs or, in other words, events or Russellian facts. Moreover, some of those truthmaking states of affairs must have certain of their constituents essentially. Furthermore, if Truthmaker is to rule out those theories typically taken to violate truth's dependence on being, it must exclude some alleged properties from truthmaking states of affairs. Truthmaker's thus excluding some properties is one reason that it is not a metaphysically neutral litmus test for philosophical theories. This chapter argues that Truthmaker requires that a truth be ‘about’ its truthmaker.Less
This chapter argues that, if every truth has a truthmaker, then some of those truthmakers are states of affairs or, in other words, events or Russellian facts. Moreover, some of those truthmaking states of affairs must have certain of their constituents essentially. Furthermore, if Truthmaker is to rule out those theories typically taken to violate truth's dependence on being, it must exclude some alleged properties from truthmaking states of affairs. Truthmaker's thus excluding some properties is one reason that it is not a metaphysically neutral litmus test for philosophical theories. This chapter argues that Truthmaker requires that a truth be ‘about’ its truthmaker.
Trenton Merricks
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205233
- eISBN:
- 9780191709302
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205233.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that Truthmaker should not be scaled back to allow truths such as that hobbits do not exist to lack truthmakers. It argues that the best truthmaker for all such truths is a single ...
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This chapter argues that Truthmaker should not be scaled back to allow truths such as that hobbits do not exist to lack truthmakers. It argues that the best truthmaker for all such truths is a single totality state of affairs, even though this truthmaker is subject to serious objections. The chapter shows that Truthmaker implies that each true negative existential is really about the positive existence of something, namely, its truthmaker. It argues that these results are good reasons to doubt Truthmaker.Less
This chapter argues that Truthmaker should not be scaled back to allow truths such as that hobbits do not exist to lack truthmakers. It argues that the best truthmaker for all such truths is a single totality state of affairs, even though this truthmaker is subject to serious objections. The chapter shows that Truthmaker implies that each true negative existential is really about the positive existence of something, namely, its truthmaker. It argues that these results are good reasons to doubt Truthmaker.
Paul Hurley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559305
- eISBN:
- 9780191721212
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559305.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The focus of this book is consequentialism, the moral theory upon which an action is morally right just in case its performance leads to the best state of affairs. The theory can with some ...
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The focus of this book is consequentialism, the moral theory upon which an action is morally right just in case its performance leads to the best state of affairs. The theory can with some plausibility claim a status as the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy. Moreover, its pervasive deployment in spheres such as economics, public policy, and jurisprudence is one of the striking developments of the last 150 years. It is the thesis of this book that debates concerning the challenge of consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism, an unresolved tension between the theory and many of its most fundamental presuppositions. An appreciation of the nature of this tension grounds the articulation of a fundamental challenge to the theory from within. This challenge is developed and sharpened through the first 4 chapters of the book. Development of this challenge to consequentialism in turn reveals the apparent force of the challenge of consequentialism to be largely illusory. Chapter 5 demonstrates that many traditional rationales offered in its support draw upon systematic misappropriations of intuitions linking rightness of actions and goodness of actions, treating them as intuitions concerning rightness of actions and goodness of overall states of affairs. Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate that one remaining rationale — a rationale grounded in the appeal to the impartiality of morality — does not provide support for the theory; indeed, that attempts to respond to the tension within consequentialism suggest a fundamental role for an alternative to the consequentialist's impersonal conception of impartiality, an interpersonal rather than an impersonal conception of equal concern. Unlike the consequentialist's impersonal conception, such interpersonal impartiality can allow for the ordinary moral convictions that actions that do not promote the best overall state of affairs are often morally permitted, and are sometimes morally required.Less
The focus of this book is consequentialism, the moral theory upon which an action is morally right just in case its performance leads to the best state of affairs. The theory can with some plausibility claim a status as the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy. Moreover, its pervasive deployment in spheres such as economics, public policy, and jurisprudence is one of the striking developments of the last 150 years. It is the thesis of this book that debates concerning the challenge of consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism, an unresolved tension between the theory and many of its most fundamental presuppositions. An appreciation of the nature of this tension grounds the articulation of a fundamental challenge to the theory from within. This challenge is developed and sharpened through the first 4 chapters of the book. Development of this challenge to consequentialism in turn reveals the apparent force of the challenge of consequentialism to be largely illusory. Chapter 5 demonstrates that many traditional rationales offered in its support draw upon systematic misappropriations of intuitions linking rightness of actions and goodness of actions, treating them as intuitions concerning rightness of actions and goodness of overall states of affairs. Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate that one remaining rationale — a rationale grounded in the appeal to the impartiality of morality — does not provide support for the theory; indeed, that attempts to respond to the tension within consequentialism suggest a fundamental role for an alternative to the consequentialist's impersonal conception of impartiality, an interpersonal rather than an impersonal conception of equal concern. Unlike the consequentialist's impersonal conception, such interpersonal impartiality can allow for the ordinary moral convictions that actions that do not promote the best overall state of affairs are often morally permitted, and are sometimes morally required.
Keith Campbell
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199890576
- eISBN:
- 9780199980031
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199890576.003.0018
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter provides an overview of the development of Armstrong’s metaphysics, with special reference to his contributions to Ontology proper, and to the place that ontology now commands in ...
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This chapter provides an overview of the development of Armstrong’s metaphysics, with special reference to his contributions to Ontology proper, and to the place that ontology now commands in Anglophone philosophy. Armstrong was among the most influential philosophers in the transformation of philosophy away from the linguistic and positivist stance of the mid-20th century. After beginning with realist excursions into epistemology, he returned to the classic program of western philosophy, presenting a Materialist theory of mind. This was followed by, first, the development of an Aristotelian Realism, the application of this theory to accounts of Laws of Nature and of Possible Worlds, then, the presentation of an ontology of States of Affairs which embraces modality, the objects of mathematics, and an account of truth. While the treatment is sympathetic, questions are raised over the need for properties to be Universals, and whether his system of higher-order properties is fully consistent.Less
This chapter provides an overview of the development of Armstrong’s metaphysics, with special reference to his contributions to Ontology proper, and to the place that ontology now commands in Anglophone philosophy. Armstrong was among the most influential philosophers in the transformation of philosophy away from the linguistic and positivist stance of the mid-20th century. After beginning with realist excursions into epistemology, he returned to the classic program of western philosophy, presenting a Materialist theory of mind. This was followed by, first, the development of an Aristotelian Realism, the application of this theory to accounts of Laws of Nature and of Possible Worlds, then, the presentation of an ontology of States of Affairs which embraces modality, the objects of mathematics, and an account of truth. While the treatment is sympathetic, questions are raised over the need for properties to be Universals, and whether his system of higher-order properties is fully consistent.
Brian Leftow
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199263356
- eISBN:
- 9780191741777
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263356.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter sets out the genesis of secular modal status as a sequence, though in this context being earlier only means being presupposed by what follows. The steps are: God thinks up secular states ...
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This chapter sets out the genesis of secular modal status as a sequence, though in this context being earlier only means being presupposed by what follows. The steps are: God thinks up secular states of affairs. God notes any good-making or bad-making features they would have. If they would have good-making or bad-making features, God takes attitudes toward their obtaining. (If a state of affairs would have no such features, He takes no attitude.) Given His approval, disapproval, or neutrality, God decides whether to prevent these states of affairs. Finally, God prevents or permits, and perhaps also forms, dispositions to do so. The chapter argues that there are no temporal gaps between these steps.Less
This chapter sets out the genesis of secular modal status as a sequence, though in this context being earlier only means being presupposed by what follows. The steps are: God thinks up secular states of affairs. God notes any good-making or bad-making features they would have. If they would have good-making or bad-making features, God takes attitudes toward their obtaining. (If a state of affairs would have no such features, He takes no attitude.) Given His approval, disapproval, or neutrality, God decides whether to prevent these states of affairs. Finally, God prevents or permits, and perhaps also forms, dispositions to do so. The chapter argues that there are no temporal gaps between these steps.
Paul Hurley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559305
- eISBN:
- 9780191721212
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559305.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Many rationales are offered in support of the consequentialist theory of moral standards. This chapter harnesses the challenge to consequentialism mounted in prior chapters in order to demonstrate ...
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Many rationales are offered in support of the consequentialist theory of moral standards. This chapter harnesses the challenge to consequentialism mounted in prior chapters in order to demonstrate that the pull of many of these rationales is illusory. They do not provide a path of theoretical reflection that leads to consequentialism. They appear to result from what can profitably be seen as a misappropriation of general intuitions concerning the relationship between good/bad and right/wrong as properties of action and their misguided deployment as general intuitions concerning the relationship between good/bad as a property of states of affairs impersonally considered, and right/wrong as a property of actions. It is this misappropriation which underwrites the claim that consequentialism provides the most plausible interpretation of the general intuition that it is always right to do what is best. With this misappropriation in view, a return to the rationales that appear to favour consequentialism, reveals that their apparent support collapses.Less
Many rationales are offered in support of the consequentialist theory of moral standards. This chapter harnesses the challenge to consequentialism mounted in prior chapters in order to demonstrate that the pull of many of these rationales is illusory. They do not provide a path of theoretical reflection that leads to consequentialism. They appear to result from what can profitably be seen as a misappropriation of general intuitions concerning the relationship between good/bad and right/wrong as properties of action and their misguided deployment as general intuitions concerning the relationship between good/bad as a property of states of affairs impersonally considered, and right/wrong as a property of actions. It is this misappropriation which underwrites the claim that consequentialism provides the most plausible interpretation of the general intuition that it is always right to do what is best. With this misappropriation in view, a return to the rationales that appear to favour consequentialism, reveals that their apparent support collapses.
Fraser MacBride
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199283569
- eISBN:
- 9780191712708
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
The early David Lewis was a staunch critic of the Truthmaker Principle. To endorse the principle, he argued, is to accept that states of affairs are truthmakers for contingent predications. But ...
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The early David Lewis was a staunch critic of the Truthmaker Principle. To endorse the principle, he argued, is to accept that states of affairs are truthmakers for contingent predications. But states of affairs violate Hume's prohibition of necessary connections between distinct existences. So Lewis offered to replace the Truthmaker Principle with the weaker principle that ‘truth supervenes upon being’. This chapter argues that even this principle violates Hume's prohibition. Later Lewis came to ‘withdraw’ his doubts about the Truthmaker Principle, invoking counterpart theory to show how it is possible to respect the principle whilst admitting only things that do not violate Hume's prohibition. What this really reveals is that the Truthmaker Principle is no explanatory advance on the supervenience principle. Extending Lewis's use of counterpart theory also allows us to explain away the necessary connections that threatened to undermine his earlier statements of supervenience.Less
The early David Lewis was a staunch critic of the Truthmaker Principle. To endorse the principle, he argued, is to accept that states of affairs are truthmakers for contingent predications. But states of affairs violate Hume's prohibition of necessary connections between distinct existences. So Lewis offered to replace the Truthmaker Principle with the weaker principle that ‘truth supervenes upon being’. This chapter argues that even this principle violates Hume's prohibition. Later Lewis came to ‘withdraw’ his doubts about the Truthmaker Principle, invoking counterpart theory to show how it is possible to respect the principle whilst admitting only things that do not violate Hume's prohibition. What this really reveals is that the Truthmaker Principle is no explanatory advance on the supervenience principle. Extending Lewis's use of counterpart theory also allows us to explain away the necessary connections that threatened to undermine his earlier statements of supervenience.
Alvin Plantinga
Matthew Davidson (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195103762
- eISBN:
- 9780199833573
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195103769.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William ...
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This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.Less
This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.
Anna Sun
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691155579
- eISBN:
- 9781400846085
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691155579.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Hinduism
This chapter examines the contemporary debate in China over whether Confucianism should be classified as a religion. It begins by introducing the formation of the official religious classification, ...
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This chapter examines the contemporary debate in China over whether Confucianism should be classified as a religion. It begins by introducing the formation of the official religious classification, the Five Major Religions, in the 1950s in socialist China. The chapter then turns to the contemporary Confucianism as a religion controversy in 2000–2004, an important debate among Chinese intellectuals with significant academic, social, and political implications. It argues that ideas are shaped by their social situations, and that the ideas about Confucianism, like many other bodies of knowledge, were shaped by and yet succeeded in transcending their specific environments of origin. The chapter draws on interviews with officials from the State Administration of Religious Affairs, with members of the Department of Confucianism, and with the current head of the Institute of World Religions.Less
This chapter examines the contemporary debate in China over whether Confucianism should be classified as a religion. It begins by introducing the formation of the official religious classification, the Five Major Religions, in the 1950s in socialist China. The chapter then turns to the contemporary Confucianism as a religion controversy in 2000–2004, an important debate among Chinese intellectuals with significant academic, social, and political implications. It argues that ideas are shaped by their social situations, and that the ideas about Confucianism, like many other bodies of knowledge, were shaped by and yet succeeded in transcending their specific environments of origin. The chapter draws on interviews with officials from the State Administration of Religious Affairs, with members of the Department of Confucianism, and with the current head of the Institute of World Religions.
D. M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book tries to present in brief compass a metaphysical system, matured (as is hoped) over many years. By metaphysics is understood an account of the fundamental categories of being, such notions ...
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This book tries to present in brief compass a metaphysical system, matured (as is hoped) over many years. By metaphysics is understood an account of the fundamental categories of being, such notions as property, relation, causality. These notions are more abstract than the results of scientific inquiry, and are controversial among scientists as well as among philosophers. The book sprang from lectures given to graduate students, and has deliberately been kept at an informal level. It includes some explanations not required in a book for professional philosophers. The argument is developed in sixteen short chapters. It is argued that the world is a world of states of affairs, involving universals and particulars. The notion of finding suitable truthmakers for truths grows in importance as the book proceeds.Less
This book tries to present in brief compass a metaphysical system, matured (as is hoped) over many years. By metaphysics is understood an account of the fundamental categories of being, such notions as property, relation, causality. These notions are more abstract than the results of scientific inquiry, and are controversial among scientists as well as among philosophers. The book sprang from lectures given to graduate students, and has deliberately been kept at an informal level. It includes some explanations not required in a book for professional philosophers. The argument is developed in sixteen short chapters. It is argued that the world is a world of states of affairs, involving universals and particulars. The notion of finding suitable truthmakers for truths grows in importance as the book proceeds.
Michael Slote
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195093926
- eISBN:
- 9780199833689
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195093925.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Two different kinds of intrinsic goodness are often conflated. A state of affairs can be intrinsically good (e.g. the virtuous being happy), but certain things can be intrinsically good for a person, ...
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Two different kinds of intrinsic goodness are often conflated. A state of affairs can be intrinsically good (e.g. the virtuous being happy), but certain things can be intrinsically good for a person, a constitutive element in his or her welfare. These notions do not come together, as Kant's example of the prosperous but evil individual manifestly indicates: intuitively, such a state of affairs is in itself intrinsically bad but is nonetheless intrinsically good for, i.e. beneficial to, the prosperous individual. Any virtue ethics needs to keep these concepts distinct.Less
Two different kinds of intrinsic goodness are often conflated. A state of affairs can be intrinsically good (e.g. the virtuous being happy), but certain things can be intrinsically good for a person, a constitutive element in his or her welfare. These notions do not come together, as Kant's example of the prosperous but evil individual manifestly indicates: intuitively, such a state of affairs is in itself intrinsically bad but is nonetheless intrinsically good for, i.e. beneficial to, the prosperous individual. Any virtue ethics needs to keep these concepts distinct.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A connection between metaphysical realism and the idea that truth is single and indivisible (alethic monism) is proposed. It is argued that propositions are the primary bearers of truth and truth ...
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A connection between metaphysical realism and the idea that truth is single and indivisible (alethic monism) is proposed. It is argued that propositions are the primary bearers of truth and truth itself is ineliminable. It is urged that truthmakers are many and do not all belong to the same ontological category. The need to posit facts or states of affairs as truthmakers, as proposed by D. M. Armstrong, is questioned. The unity of truth is related to the principle of non-contradiction, and the unpalatable ontological implications of relativism are examined.Less
A connection between metaphysical realism and the idea that truth is single and indivisible (alethic monism) is proposed. It is argued that propositions are the primary bearers of truth and truth itself is ineliminable. It is urged that truthmakers are many and do not all belong to the same ontological category. The need to posit facts or states of affairs as truthmakers, as proposed by D. M. Armstrong, is questioned. The unity of truth is related to the principle of non-contradiction, and the unpalatable ontological implications of relativism are examined.
Michael S. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199256860
- eISBN:
- 9780191719653
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256860.003.0014
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter seeks to lay out a taxonomy of the sorts of things that may plausibly be thought to be related by causation, things like events, facts, states of affairs, objects, persons, tropes, ...
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This chapter seeks to lay out a taxonomy of the sorts of things that may plausibly be thought to be related by causation, things like events, facts, states of affairs, objects, persons, tropes, properties, etc. It begins with the law's framing of this issue, both because there is wisdom in the law's simplified taxonomy of these possibilities and because the law is our ultimate interest here. The thesis of the chapter is that all plausible causal relata can be reduced either to coarse-grained things (events under the Davidsonian conception of them) or to relatively fine-grained things (either tropes, states of affairs, or facts).Less
This chapter seeks to lay out a taxonomy of the sorts of things that may plausibly be thought to be related by causation, things like events, facts, states of affairs, objects, persons, tropes, properties, etc. It begins with the law's framing of this issue, both because there is wisdom in the law's simplified taxonomy of these possibilities and because the law is our ultimate interest here. The thesis of the chapter is that all plausible causal relata can be reduced either to coarse-grained things (events under the Davidsonian conception of them) or to relatively fine-grained things (either tropes, states of affairs, or facts).
Georges Dicker
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195153064
- eISBN:
- 9780199835027
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195153065.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter first reconstructs and criticizes the version of the Refutation of Idealism that Kant offers in the Critique. Next, it reconstructs and defends an improved version of the Refutation, ...
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This chapter first reconstructs and criticizes the version of the Refutation of Idealism that Kant offers in the Critique. Next, it reconstructs and defends an improved version of the Refutation, found by Guyer in Kant’s later “Reflexions.” Finally, it discusses the relation of the Refutation of Idealism to both the strong on the weak versions of Transcendental Idealism.Less
This chapter first reconstructs and criticizes the version of the Refutation of Idealism that Kant offers in the Critique. Next, it reconstructs and defends an improved version of the Refutation, found by Guyer in Kant’s later “Reflexions.” Finally, it discusses the relation of the Refutation of Idealism to both the strong on the weak versions of Transcendental Idealism.
Helen Beebee and Julian Dodd
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199283569
- eISBN:
- 9780191712708
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
This introductory chapter sets the scene for the topics covered by the subsequent chapters. First of all, the truthmaker principle is introduced and questions concerning its formulation highlighted. ...
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This introductory chapter sets the scene for the topics covered by the subsequent chapters. First of all, the truthmaker principle is introduced and questions concerning its formulation highlighted. Doing this, however, raises the question of the principle's motivation, and, with this project in mind, three such candidate motivations are briefly introduced: that an adherence to the truthmaker principle enables us to solve the problem of the universals; that a commitment to realism requires us to adopt the said principle; and that the truthmaker principle gives us a superior criterion of ontological commitment to that offered by Quine. Further questions broached towards the chapter's end include: whether truthmakers are best construed as states of affairs or tropes; whether the truthmaker theorist should regard truthmaking as a relation, or else regard ‘makes true’ as sentence connective; and the nature of the relation between truthmaker theory and the correspondence theory of truth.Less
This introductory chapter sets the scene for the topics covered by the subsequent chapters. First of all, the truthmaker principle is introduced and questions concerning its formulation highlighted. Doing this, however, raises the question of the principle's motivation, and, with this project in mind, three such candidate motivations are briefly introduced: that an adherence to the truthmaker principle enables us to solve the problem of the universals; that a commitment to realism requires us to adopt the said principle; and that the truthmaker principle gives us a superior criterion of ontological commitment to that offered by Quine. Further questions broached towards the chapter's end include: whether truthmakers are best construed as states of affairs or tropes; whether the truthmaker theorist should regard truthmaking as a relation, or else regard ‘makes true’ as sentence connective; and the nature of the relation between truthmaker theory and the correspondence theory of truth.