N. W. Barber
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585014
- eISBN:
- 9780191595318
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585014.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter discusses the relationships people can have with states and the ways in which these relationships interact with, and are conditioned by, the purposes and claims of the state. At the ...
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This chapter discusses the relationships people can have with states and the ways in which these relationships interact with, and are conditioned by, the purposes and claims of the state. At the heart of it is an account of citizenship. It reflects on the nature of citizenship as it is manifested in the connection between the citizen and the state, and — equally importantly — in the interaction of citizens. It argues that citizenship is the paradigmatic form of state membership; an institution which must be established if the state is to maximally achieve its primary purpose. To lay the foundations for this argument, the chapter starts by identifying this purpose, and then demonstrates how this illuminates the claims of the state, discussed in the previous chapter.Less
This chapter discusses the relationships people can have with states and the ways in which these relationships interact with, and are conditioned by, the purposes and claims of the state. At the heart of it is an account of citizenship. It reflects on the nature of citizenship as it is manifested in the connection between the citizen and the state, and — equally importantly — in the interaction of citizens. It argues that citizenship is the paradigmatic form of state membership; an institution which must be established if the state is to maximally achieve its primary purpose. To lay the foundations for this argument, the chapter starts by identifying this purpose, and then demonstrates how this illuminates the claims of the state, discussed in the previous chapter.
Peter J. Spiro
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780814785829
- eISBN:
- 9780814724347
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9780814785829.003.0008
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration
This chapter builds on the growing global acceptance of dual citizenship to suggest that it may rise to the level of a right. Where an individual is eligible for dual citizenship (that is, where an ...
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This chapter builds on the growing global acceptance of dual citizenship to suggest that it may rise to the level of a right. Where an individual is eligible for dual citizenship (that is, where an individual would otherwise qualify for citizenship in each of two or more states), states should be constrained from standing in the way. Dual citizenship is often a matter of actuating individual identity and reflects associational urges. This is clear in the case of the child who inherits citizenship from each of two parents. Other associational memberships are protected, absent of a compelling interest on the government’s part to intervene. There were once good reasons to limit multiple state memberships, which explains the historical disfavor attached to the status. Now that dual citizenship no longer threatens world order in any concrete way, an individual’s interest in retaining or acquiring the status should be vindicated as a human right.Less
This chapter builds on the growing global acceptance of dual citizenship to suggest that it may rise to the level of a right. Where an individual is eligible for dual citizenship (that is, where an individual would otherwise qualify for citizenship in each of two or more states), states should be constrained from standing in the way. Dual citizenship is often a matter of actuating individual identity and reflects associational urges. This is clear in the case of the child who inherits citizenship from each of two parents. Other associational memberships are protected, absent of a compelling interest on the government’s part to intervene. There were once good reasons to limit multiple state memberships, which explains the historical disfavor attached to the status. Now that dual citizenship no longer threatens world order in any concrete way, an individual’s interest in retaining or acquiring the status should be vindicated as a human right.
