Avi Max Spiegel
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159843
- eISBN:
- 9781400866434
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159843.003.0007
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Middle Eastern Studies
This chapter considers the question of how an authoritarian Arab state enables or encumbers Islamist mobilization. It elucidates a different model of state action—different in both content and form: ...
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This chapter considers the question of how an authoritarian Arab state enables or encumbers Islamist mobilization. It elucidates a different model of state action—different in both content and form: in what policies are pursued and in how they are implemented. The chapter suggests that the Moroccan state under King Mohammed VI has not simply elevated one Islamist group at the expense of the other, but rather, it has aimed to impede and impel distinct forms of activism within groups—in this case, attempting to draw new divides between religious and political modes of activism. These are policies that can be understood not simply by the old theory of divide and conquer, but by one more aptly conceptualized as selective suppression.Less
This chapter considers the question of how an authoritarian Arab state enables or encumbers Islamist mobilization. It elucidates a different model of state action—different in both content and form: in what policies are pursued and in how they are implemented. The chapter suggests that the Moroccan state under King Mohammed VI has not simply elevated one Islamist group at the expense of the other, but rather, it has aimed to impede and impel distinct forms of activism within groups—in this case, attempting to draw new divides between religious and political modes of activism. These are policies that can be understood not simply by the old theory of divide and conquer, but by one more aptly conceptualized as selective suppression.
N. W. Barber
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585014
- eISBN:
- 9780191595318
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585014.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter argues that when we talk of states possessing intentions and acting, we use these terms in an analogous sense to their primary use in the context of individuals. To talk of a state ...
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This chapter argues that when we talk of states possessing intentions and acting, we use these terms in an analogous sense to their primary use in the context of individuals. To talk of a state intending a thing amounts to a claim that it shares sufficient features in common with a person intending a thing to make the statement sensible; it does not amount to a claim that the state intends things in the same sense as a person intends things. The chapter begins by considering two collections of rival approaches to this issue: individualism and holism. Individualists contend that it is inappropriate to attribute mental states to groups: it confuses rather than assists our understanding of the world. Holists, in sharp contrast, contend that groups can possess some mental states in the same sense as individuals. It is argued that there is something to be learned from each of these traditions. An account of the intentions and actions of social groups based on the rules which constitute those groups is advanced; it is contended that it is plausible to talk of groups acting and intending, even if they do not exhibit these features in precisely the same sense as individuals. The chapter concludes by exploring the limits to which the attribution of mental qualities to social groups in general and states in particular can usefully be pushed.Less
This chapter argues that when we talk of states possessing intentions and acting, we use these terms in an analogous sense to their primary use in the context of individuals. To talk of a state intending a thing amounts to a claim that it shares sufficient features in common with a person intending a thing to make the statement sensible; it does not amount to a claim that the state intends things in the same sense as a person intends things. The chapter begins by considering two collections of rival approaches to this issue: individualism and holism. Individualists contend that it is inappropriate to attribute mental states to groups: it confuses rather than assists our understanding of the world. Holists, in sharp contrast, contend that groups can possess some mental states in the same sense as individuals. It is argued that there is something to be learned from each of these traditions. An account of the intentions and actions of social groups based on the rules which constitute those groups is advanced; it is contended that it is plausible to talk of groups acting and intending, even if they do not exhibit these features in precisely the same sense as individuals. The chapter concludes by exploring the limits to which the attribution of mental qualities to social groups in general and states in particular can usefully be pushed.
Helen Hershkoff
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195368321
- eISBN:
- 9780199867509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195368321.003.0009
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter addresses differences in how the U.S. Constitution and many individual state constitutions approach the state action requirement in enforcing constitutional rights. In contrast to the ...
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This chapter addresses differences in how the U.S. Constitution and many individual state constitutions approach the state action requirement in enforcing constitutional rights. In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, which generally requires state action as a predicate to the adjudication of constitutional rights, many state constitutions do not require the same predicate for the evolution of constitutional norms. The chapter describes the practices by which state courts have extended constitutional protections to private conduct. It grounds this generally in a framework drawn from comparative constitutionalism, and elaborates on its implications for federalism, state courts, and state constitutionalism more generally. The way state courts have developed a convergence between private and public concepts in constitutional law has important implications for the distinct path of state constitutional rights adjudication in the United States, and this chapter provides a descriptive and conceptual grounding for the phenomenon.Less
This chapter addresses differences in how the U.S. Constitution and many individual state constitutions approach the state action requirement in enforcing constitutional rights. In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, which generally requires state action as a predicate to the adjudication of constitutional rights, many state constitutions do not require the same predicate for the evolution of constitutional norms. The chapter describes the practices by which state courts have extended constitutional protections to private conduct. It grounds this generally in a framework drawn from comparative constitutionalism, and elaborates on its implications for federalism, state courts, and state constitutionalism more generally. The way state courts have developed a convergence between private and public concepts in constitutional law has important implications for the distinct path of state constitutional rights adjudication in the United States, and this chapter provides a descriptive and conceptual grounding for the phenomenon.
Catherine M Donnelly
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199298242
- eISBN:
- 9780191711626
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199298242.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter examines the extent to which private delegates are bound by human rights obligations in the three jurisdictions. First, a justification for the extension of human rights obligations to ...
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This chapter examines the extent to which private delegates are bound by human rights obligations in the three jurisdictions. First, a justification for the extension of human rights obligations to private delegates of governmental power is offered. What is argued for is a ‘new definition of the public sphere’. Second, an overview of the law in all three jurisdictions is presented, considering the US ‘state action’ doctrine; the definition of ‘public authority’ in Section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (including the YL case); and relevant ECJ jurisprudence. Finally, a suitable framework is proposed to hold private delegates liable for human rights violations. It is argued that in the context of private delegation, whether power should be characterized as ‘governmental’ or ‘public’ should depend on its nature, not its holder.Less
This chapter examines the extent to which private delegates are bound by human rights obligations in the three jurisdictions. First, a justification for the extension of human rights obligations to private delegates of governmental power is offered. What is argued for is a ‘new definition of the public sphere’. Second, an overview of the law in all three jurisdictions is presented, considering the US ‘state action’ doctrine; the definition of ‘public authority’ in Section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (including the YL case); and relevant ECJ jurisprudence. Finally, a suitable framework is proposed to hold private delegates liable for human rights violations. It is argued that in the context of private delegation, whether power should be characterized as ‘governmental’ or ‘public’ should depend on its nature, not its holder.
ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195377781
- eISBN:
- 9780199775842
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377781.003.001
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter begins with a discussion of the focus of the book, which is the provisions and amendments of the Constitution that are generally understood to grant the most important individual rights: ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of the focus of the book, which is the provisions and amendments of the Constitution that are generally understood to grant the most important individual rights: the First Amendment, which is said to create the rights of free speech, freedom of assembly, free exercise of religion, and separation of church and state (i.e., no establishment of religion); the Second Amendment, which speaks of a right to keep and bear arms; and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which are said to give rights to due process of law and to the equal protection of the laws. It examines some specific examples of important modern constitutional controversies, which are illuminated by analyzing them in terms of appropriate limits on governmental power, rather than in terms of individual rights.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of the focus of the book, which is the provisions and amendments of the Constitution that are generally understood to grant the most important individual rights: the First Amendment, which is said to create the rights of free speech, freedom of assembly, free exercise of religion, and separation of church and state (i.e., no establishment of religion); the Second Amendment, which speaks of a right to keep and bear arms; and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which are said to give rights to due process of law and to the equal protection of the laws. It examines some specific examples of important modern constitutional controversies, which are illuminated by analyzing them in terms of appropriate limits on governmental power, rather than in terms of individual rights.
Pranab Bardhan
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294900
- eISBN:
- 9780191596728
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294905.003.0011
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic Systems
Consideration is given to the impediments to economic development and the social dysfunctions that market mechanisms cannot cure because the large number of collective actions required cannot emerge ...
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Consideration is given to the impediments to economic development and the social dysfunctions that market mechanisms cannot cure because the large number of collective actions required cannot emerge spontaneously. The focus of the chapter is to a large extent on differing emphases on (1) institutional impediments as outcomes of distributive conflicts, (2) the collective action problems these impediments exacerbate, and (3) in view of the critical need for coordination, a more complex and nuanced role of the state, which many (but not all) states fail to adopt. Recent Indian economic history provides the context of the discussion.Less
Consideration is given to the impediments to economic development and the social dysfunctions that market mechanisms cannot cure because the large number of collective actions required cannot emerge spontaneously. The focus of the chapter is to a large extent on differing emphases on (1) institutional impediments as outcomes of distributive conflicts, (2) the collective action problems these impediments exacerbate, and (3) in view of the critical need for coordination, a more complex and nuanced role of the state, which many (but not all) states fail to adopt. Recent Indian economic history provides the context of the discussion.
N. Scott Arnold
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195374964
- eISBN:
- 9780199871490
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195374964.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The first two sections of this chapter begin the discussion of what Chapter 1 calls “common ground arguments.” These are arguments that modern liberals might use to persuade classical liberals to ...
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The first two sections of this chapter begin the discussion of what Chapter 1 calls “common ground arguments.” These are arguments that modern liberals might use to persuade classical liberals to support their regulatory agenda. They are based on shared liberal beliefs about the presuppositions of a market economy, fundamental rights, and negative externalities. This chapter shows that none of these arguments succeed. The remainder of the chapter explores the possibility of representing the aims of the various elements of the modern liberal regulatory agenda as public goods, and state provision of these goods as solutions to public goods problems. Since some classical liberals can accept public goods arguments for state action, this sort of argument could in principle be used to bring about reasoned agreement between modern liberals and these classical liberals in a way favorable to these regulatory regimes.Less
The first two sections of this chapter begin the discussion of what Chapter 1 calls “common ground arguments.” These are arguments that modern liberals might use to persuade classical liberals to support their regulatory agenda. They are based on shared liberal beliefs about the presuppositions of a market economy, fundamental rights, and negative externalities. This chapter shows that none of these arguments succeed. The remainder of the chapter explores the possibility of representing the aims of the various elements of the modern liberal regulatory agenda as public goods, and state provision of these goods as solutions to public goods problems. Since some classical liberals can accept public goods arguments for state action, this sort of argument could in principle be used to bring about reasoned agreement between modern liberals and these classical liberals in a way favorable to these regulatory regimes.
Brian Simpson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197263242
- eISBN:
- 9780191734014
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197263242.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, Cultural History
This lecture discusses the influence of international law on the conduct of states. It focuses on two specific and very fully documented incidents that took place during the Second World War, and ...
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This lecture discusses the influence of international law on the conduct of states. It focuses on two specific and very fully documented incidents that took place during the Second World War, and which provoked strong protests from the Norwegian government. The lecture attempts to identify the severe problems that are involved in establishing the relationship between international law and state action. It concludes by identifying an area of legal theory that has been neglected by scholars: the nature of legal justification in international affairs.Less
This lecture discusses the influence of international law on the conduct of states. It focuses on two specific and very fully documented incidents that took place during the Second World War, and which provoked strong protests from the Norwegian government. The lecture attempts to identify the severe problems that are involved in establishing the relationship between international law and state action. It concludes by identifying an area of legal theory that has been neglected by scholars: the nature of legal justification in international affairs.
Christopher Dow
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241231
- eISBN:
- 9780191596179
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241236.003.0012
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
Previous chapters of this book have sought to explain why the major recessions of the twentieth century occurred; this chapter tries to answer the question of whether recurrent major recessions are ...
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Previous chapters of this book have sought to explain why the major recessions of the twentieth century occurred; this chapter tries to answer the question of whether recurrent major recessions are inevitable, or whether there are steps that governments (or central banks) can take to avoid or mitigate them. The questions involved extend beyond those dealt with earlier, and raise not only the disputable issues of economic theory but also many new ones, including broadly political questions. Section 12.1 deals with background issues, attributing a degree of effectiveness to policy, and recapitulating this and other respects in which the author's view differs from a neoclassical view; the general limits to state action are then discussed, and finally a view is set out about inflation. Section 12.2 deals with general questions about the instruments of economic policy; despite the waves of deconstruction that are generally taken to have destroyed the intellectual foundations for a Keynesian fiscal policy, the author sees a theoretical case for it––along with severe practical limits that stem from the reactions of financial markets to government borrowing; the section goes on to discuss the effect and role of monetary policy. Section 12.3 turns to practical possibilities, and considers the kind of action that, despite the above constraints presented, ought to be possible; Sect. 12.4 then assesses the likelihood that governments will avoid or minimize major recessions in the future.Less
Previous chapters of this book have sought to explain why the major recessions of the twentieth century occurred; this chapter tries to answer the question of whether recurrent major recessions are inevitable, or whether there are steps that governments (or central banks) can take to avoid or mitigate them. The questions involved extend beyond those dealt with earlier, and raise not only the disputable issues of economic theory but also many new ones, including broadly political questions. Section 12.1 deals with background issues, attributing a degree of effectiveness to policy, and recapitulating this and other respects in which the author's view differs from a neoclassical view; the general limits to state action are then discussed, and finally a view is set out about inflation. Section 12.2 deals with general questions about the instruments of economic policy; despite the waves of deconstruction that are generally taken to have destroyed the intellectual foundations for a Keynesian fiscal policy, the author sees a theoretical case for it––along with severe practical limits that stem from the reactions of financial markets to government borrowing; the section goes on to discuss the effect and role of monetary policy. Section 12.3 turns to practical possibilities, and considers the kind of action that, despite the above constraints presented, ought to be possible; Sect. 12.4 then assesses the likelihood that governments will avoid or minimize major recessions in the future.
Davide Rodogno
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151335
- eISBN:
- 9781400840014
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151335.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History
This book looks at the rise of humanitarian intervention in the nineteenth century, from the fall of Napoleon to World War I. Examining the concept from a historical perspective, the book explores ...
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This book looks at the rise of humanitarian intervention in the nineteenth century, from the fall of Napoleon to World War I. Examining the concept from a historical perspective, the book explores the understudied cases of European interventions and noninterventions in the Ottoman Empire and brings a new view to this international practice for the contemporary era. While it is commonly believed that humanitarian interventions are a fairly recent development, the book demonstrates that almost two centuries ago an international community, under the aegis of certain European powers, claimed a moral and political right to intervene in other states' affairs to save strangers from massacre, atrocity, or extermination. On some occasions, these powers acted to protect fellow Christians when allegedly “uncivilized” states, like the Ottoman Empire, violated a “right to life.” Exploring the political, legal, and moral status, as well as European perceptions, of the Ottoman Empire, the book investigates the reasons that were put forward to exclude the Ottomans from the so-called Family of Nations. It considers the claims and mixed motives of intervening states for aiding humanity, the relationship between public outcry and state action or inaction, and the bias and selectiveness of governments and campaigners. An original account of humanitarian interventions some two centuries ago, the book investigates the varied consequences of European involvement in the Ottoman Empire and the lessons that can be learned for similar actions today.Less
This book looks at the rise of humanitarian intervention in the nineteenth century, from the fall of Napoleon to World War I. Examining the concept from a historical perspective, the book explores the understudied cases of European interventions and noninterventions in the Ottoman Empire and brings a new view to this international practice for the contemporary era. While it is commonly believed that humanitarian interventions are a fairly recent development, the book demonstrates that almost two centuries ago an international community, under the aegis of certain European powers, claimed a moral and political right to intervene in other states' affairs to save strangers from massacre, atrocity, or extermination. On some occasions, these powers acted to protect fellow Christians when allegedly “uncivilized” states, like the Ottoman Empire, violated a “right to life.” Exploring the political, legal, and moral status, as well as European perceptions, of the Ottoman Empire, the book investigates the reasons that were put forward to exclude the Ottomans from the so-called Family of Nations. It considers the claims and mixed motives of intervening states for aiding humanity, the relationship between public outcry and state action or inaction, and the bias and selectiveness of governments and campaigners. An original account of humanitarian interventions some two centuries ago, the book investigates the varied consequences of European involvement in the Ottoman Empire and the lessons that can be learned for similar actions today.
Sudhir Krishnaswamy
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198071617
- eISBN:
- 9780199081455
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198071617.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
After the conception of the basic structure doctrine in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, a clear type of basic structure review of constitutional amendments emerges in Indira Gandhi v. Raj ...
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After the conception of the basic structure doctrine in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, a clear type of basic structure review of constitutional amendments emerges in Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain. In this case, the Supreme Court identifies different types of basic structure review of constitutional amendments: namely, an extension of Article 13-type judicial review for compliance with fundamental rights to constitutional amendments, or an independent new form of judicial review. This chapter contends that the court's approach to basic structure review of executive action fails to articulate the relationship between basic structure review and administrative law review of executive action. It considers three issues related to the level at which courts scrutinize state action under the basic structure doctrine: that basic structure review ensures compliance with principles and not rules; whether basic structure review may be characterized as a soft incompatibility review rather than a hard unconstitutionality review; and whether judicial deference has any role to play in basic structure review.Less
After the conception of the basic structure doctrine in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, a clear type of basic structure review of constitutional amendments emerges in Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain. In this case, the Supreme Court identifies different types of basic structure review of constitutional amendments: namely, an extension of Article 13-type judicial review for compliance with fundamental rights to constitutional amendments, or an independent new form of judicial review. This chapter contends that the court's approach to basic structure review of executive action fails to articulate the relationship between basic structure review and administrative law review of executive action. It considers three issues related to the level at which courts scrutinize state action under the basic structure doctrine: that basic structure review ensures compliance with principles and not rules; whether basic structure review may be characterized as a soft incompatibility review rather than a hard unconstitutionality review; and whether judicial deference has any role to play in basic structure review.
Thomas Lundmark
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195368727
- eISBN:
- 9780199867530
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195368727.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
Most of the constitutional rights protect only against so-called “state action”. However, case law has construed the requirement quite broadly, as discussed in this part. The levels of scrutiny refer ...
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Most of the constitutional rights protect only against so-called “state action”. However, case law has construed the requirement quite broadly, as discussed in this part. The levels of scrutiny refer to the burden placed by the courts on the government to justify intrusions into liberty and equality. The three levels—minimum, intermediate, and strict—are described and illustrated.Less
Most of the constitutional rights protect only against so-called “state action”. However, case law has construed the requirement quite broadly, as discussed in this part. The levels of scrutiny refer to the burden placed by the courts on the government to justify intrusions into liberty and equality. The three levels—minimum, intermediate, and strict—are described and illustrated.
Paul Craig
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199568628
- eISBN:
- 9780191739415
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199568628.003.0020
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter considers proportionality and the legality of Member State action. The discussion begins with positive law and analysis of the principal areas in which proportionality is used to contest ...
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This chapter considers proportionality and the legality of Member State action. The discussion begins with positive law and analysis of the principal areas in which proportionality is used to contest the legality of Member State action. The application of proportionality and the four freedoms is considered, followed by examination of the case law on proportionality and equality, with the focus then shifting to the way in which proportionality constrains Member States' implementation and application of EU legislation. The remainder of the chapter is normative in orientation. It looks at the intensity of review and the justification for the close judicial scrutiny when applying proportionality to Member State action. It shows that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is nonetheless willing to apply proportionality in a way that is tolerant of differences in Member State values. The chapter concludes by considering the allocation of responsibility between the ECJ and the national courts when deciding on the application of proportionality.Less
This chapter considers proportionality and the legality of Member State action. The discussion begins with positive law and analysis of the principal areas in which proportionality is used to contest the legality of Member State action. The application of proportionality and the four freedoms is considered, followed by examination of the case law on proportionality and equality, with the focus then shifting to the way in which proportionality constrains Member States' implementation and application of EU legislation. The remainder of the chapter is normative in orientation. It looks at the intensity of review and the justification for the close judicial scrutiny when applying proportionality to Member State action. It shows that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is nonetheless willing to apply proportionality in a way that is tolerant of differences in Member State values. The chapter concludes by considering the allocation of responsibility between the ECJ and the national courts when deciding on the application of proportionality.
Ben Herzog
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780814760383
- eISBN:
- 9780814770962
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9780814760383.003.0010
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration
This chapter argues that the state action of taking away citizenship was introduced mainly to eliminate dual citizenship, a status that potentially undermines the national logic that assumes full ...
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This chapter argues that the state action of taking away citizenship was introduced mainly to eliminate dual citizenship, a status that potentially undermines the national logic that assumes full loyalty to one’s nation-state. Indeed, in contrast to the novel American political philosophy that embraced the transfer of national allegiance, the United States continued to be suspicious of divided national loyalty and established grounds for expatriation in order to regulate the singularity of nationality. However, since the middle of the twentieth century, the practice of expatriation has been gradually eliminated. Though the United States no longer rejects dual citizenship, in contrast to Canada’s embrace of the status, the United States now merely tolerates it. While the legal ruling on this issue is absolute, the sociological perception that national allegiance ought not to be divided lingers. This ambivalence is especially evident during war.Less
This chapter argues that the state action of taking away citizenship was introduced mainly to eliminate dual citizenship, a status that potentially undermines the national logic that assumes full loyalty to one’s nation-state. Indeed, in contrast to the novel American political philosophy that embraced the transfer of national allegiance, the United States continued to be suspicious of divided national loyalty and established grounds for expatriation in order to regulate the singularity of nationality. However, since the middle of the twentieth century, the practice of expatriation has been gradually eliminated. Though the United States no longer rejects dual citizenship, in contrast to Canada’s embrace of the status, the United States now merely tolerates it. While the legal ruling on this issue is absolute, the sociological perception that national allegiance ought not to be divided lingers. This ambivalence is especially evident during war.
Andrew Walter and Xiaoke Zhang
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199643097
- eISBN:
- 9780191741944
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199643097.003.0001
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Political Economy, International Business
The introductory chapter sets the general backdrop against which the central analytical objectives of the volume are defined and its major contributions to theoretical debates specified. It ...
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The introductory chapter sets the general backdrop against which the central analytical objectives of the volume are defined and its major contributions to theoretical debates specified. It interrogates leading theories of comparative capitalism in general and the VoC approach in particular to firmly situate the themes of the volume within recent conceptual and empirical discussions about capitalist development and establish an analytical framework for the whole study. Furthermore, drawing on the governance-centred literature that emphasizes the causal importance of political power in shaping capitalist institutions, this chapter develops a typology of East Asian capitalism against which the individual contributions set their empirical analyses of the institutional variations and changes of national capitalism since the late 1980s. Finally, the chapter illustrates empirically observable modes of institutional changes in national capitalisms and explores the value of causal propositions that centre on state action, political coalitions, and policy discourses.Less
The introductory chapter sets the general backdrop against which the central analytical objectives of the volume are defined and its major contributions to theoretical debates specified. It interrogates leading theories of comparative capitalism in general and the VoC approach in particular to firmly situate the themes of the volume within recent conceptual and empirical discussions about capitalist development and establish an analytical framework for the whole study. Furthermore, drawing on the governance-centred literature that emphasizes the causal importance of political power in shaping capitalist institutions, this chapter develops a typology of East Asian capitalism against which the individual contributions set their empirical analyses of the institutional variations and changes of national capitalism since the late 1980s. Finally, the chapter illustrates empirically observable modes of institutional changes in national capitalisms and explores the value of causal propositions that centre on state action, political coalitions, and policy discourses.
Paul Craig
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199568628
- eISBN:
- 9780191739415
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199568628.003.0021
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
While the precautionary principle is found in some legal systems, such as Germany, it is nonetheless relatively novel as a precept of administrative law. It has however become of increased importance ...
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While the precautionary principle is found in some legal systems, such as Germany, it is nonetheless relatively novel as a precept of administrative law. It has however become of increased importance in EU law. This chapter begins by examining the development of the precautionary principle into a general principle of EU law. It then analyses the use of the principle for review of EU and Member State action. It considers the political status of the principle and the way in which it informs decision-making. The chapter concludes by assessing the principle from a more normative dimension. There is considerable controversy over the meaning of the precautionary principle and its application. The political and legal interpretation of the principle is evaluated in the light of this critical literature.Less
While the precautionary principle is found in some legal systems, such as Germany, it is nonetheless relatively novel as a precept of administrative law. It has however become of increased importance in EU law. This chapter begins by examining the development of the precautionary principle into a general principle of EU law. It then analyses the use of the principle for review of EU and Member State action. It considers the political status of the principle and the way in which it informs decision-making. The chapter concludes by assessing the principle from a more normative dimension. There is considerable controversy over the meaning of the precautionary principle and its application. The political and legal interpretation of the principle is evaluated in the light of this critical literature.
Andrew Simester
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199696796
- eISBN:
- 9780191742293
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696796.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology, Philosophy of Law
This chapter addresses the differences between justifications and excuses, their respective characters and basic structures. It argues that justifications and ‘rationale-based’ excuses such as duress ...
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This chapter addresses the differences between justifications and excuses, their respective characters and basic structures. It argues that justifications and ‘rationale-based’ excuses such as duress are fundamentally similar, and that their differences have relatively few implications for the criminal law. It is often claimed that justifications are ‘about the act’ and excuses ‘about the actor’: but they are about both — and equally so. Both rationale-based excuses and justifications are personal, and impersonal, alike to the actor. While their differences track a categorical moral distinction about the normative status of an agent's conduct, the main driver of that difference is whether the agent's rationale for acting was, or was not, what Raz calls an ‘excluded’ reason. If not excluded, a justification may well lie. Even if excluded, it may ground an excuse. So there are key differences in how, morally speaking, the defendant's rationale is relevant to her exculpation. But that same rationale leads in either case to blameless acquittal. The starting point is the same. The end point is the same. There are some idiosyncratic stop signs, but basically the difference is the routes. It is argued that there is no fundamental difference of output in the criminal law, at least for individual defendants. Rather, from the perspective of the law, the main differential consequence regards actions by the state. State action may be justifiable, but it is inexcusable.Less
This chapter addresses the differences between justifications and excuses, their respective characters and basic structures. It argues that justifications and ‘rationale-based’ excuses such as duress are fundamentally similar, and that their differences have relatively few implications for the criminal law. It is often claimed that justifications are ‘about the act’ and excuses ‘about the actor’: but they are about both — and equally so. Both rationale-based excuses and justifications are personal, and impersonal, alike to the actor. While their differences track a categorical moral distinction about the normative status of an agent's conduct, the main driver of that difference is whether the agent's rationale for acting was, or was not, what Raz calls an ‘excluded’ reason. If not excluded, a justification may well lie. Even if excluded, it may ground an excuse. So there are key differences in how, morally speaking, the defendant's rationale is relevant to her exculpation. But that same rationale leads in either case to blameless acquittal. The starting point is the same. The end point is the same. There are some idiosyncratic stop signs, but basically the difference is the routes. It is argued that there is no fundamental difference of output in the criminal law, at least for individual defendants. Rather, from the perspective of the law, the main differential consequence regards actions by the state. State action may be justifiable, but it is inexcusable.
Pärtel Piirimäe
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199599875
- eISBN:
- 9780191595813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599875.003.0010
- Subject:
- Law, Legal History
This chapter begins by sketching the development of views on defensive war from the formulation of the Christian doctrine until Gentili's day. It then looks at the impact of Gentili's doctrine on ...
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This chapter begins by sketching the development of views on defensive war from the formulation of the Christian doctrine until Gentili's day. It then looks at the impact of Gentili's doctrine on 17th-century normative views on warfare, drawing on two different kinds of sources. First, it proceeds in a more conventional manner, studying the theoretical treatises that dealt with the issue of the laws of war. Secondly, it investigates whether and to what extent the views expressed in theoretical tracts were reflected in actual state practice. Specifically, a specific body of source material is used — namely the declarations, manifestos, and pamphlets — which justify states' actions to European audiences. Such propagandistic texts, rather than inventing new theoretical arguments, appeal to normative principles that are held by their authors as universally valid. Therefore they are a rather good indication of whether specific theoretical innovations — such as those of Gentili — had acquired any validity in the eyes of contemporaries.Less
This chapter begins by sketching the development of views on defensive war from the formulation of the Christian doctrine until Gentili's day. It then looks at the impact of Gentili's doctrine on 17th-century normative views on warfare, drawing on two different kinds of sources. First, it proceeds in a more conventional manner, studying the theoretical treatises that dealt with the issue of the laws of war. Secondly, it investigates whether and to what extent the views expressed in theoretical tracts were reflected in actual state practice. Specifically, a specific body of source material is used — namely the declarations, manifestos, and pamphlets — which justify states' actions to European audiences. Such propagandistic texts, rather than inventing new theoretical arguments, appeal to normative principles that are held by their authors as universally valid. Therefore they are a rather good indication of whether specific theoretical innovations — such as those of Gentili — had acquired any validity in the eyes of contemporaries.
Jeffrey D. Gonda
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781469625454
- eISBN:
- 9781469625478
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469625454.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, African-American History
The fourth chapter considers how and why the Department of Justice chose to intervene on the NAACP’s behalf in the cases. It explores the overlapping political pressures influencing President Harry ...
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The fourth chapter considers how and why the Department of Justice chose to intervene on the NAACP’s behalf in the cases. It explores the overlapping political pressures influencing President Harry S. Truman’s administration and the growth of a newly strengthened partnership between the NAACP and the federal government in the nation’s courts. The chapter then examines the presentation of the cases before Supreme Court and the substance of Chief Justice Fred Vinson’s opinions in favor of the NAACP’s clients in Shelley v. Kraemer and Hurd v. Hodge. Finally, the chapter assesses some of the popular reactions to the outcome of the cases and what black communities hoped the victory would signal in the years ahead.Less
The fourth chapter considers how and why the Department of Justice chose to intervene on the NAACP’s behalf in the cases. It explores the overlapping political pressures influencing President Harry S. Truman’s administration and the growth of a newly strengthened partnership between the NAACP and the federal government in the nation’s courts. The chapter then examines the presentation of the cases before Supreme Court and the substance of Chief Justice Fred Vinson’s opinions in favor of the NAACP’s clients in Shelley v. Kraemer and Hurd v. Hodge. Finally, the chapter assesses some of the popular reactions to the outcome of the cases and what black communities hoped the victory would signal in the years ahead.
Christopher W. Schmidt
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226522302
- eISBN:
- 9780226522586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226522586.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter examines the Supreme Court’s confrontation with the sit-in cases. Between 1961 and 1964, the justices faced round after round of appeals of criminal convictions of sit-in protesters. ...
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This chapter examines the Supreme Court’s confrontation with the sit-in cases. Between 1961 and 1964, the justices faced round after round of appeals of criminal convictions of sit-in protesters. These cases were the great aberration of the Warren Court. At a time when the justices confidently reworked one constitutional doctrine after another, often in response to the moral challenges of the civil rights movement and often in the face of considerable public resistance, they broke pattern in the sit-in cases. The Court overturned the convictions on narrow, fact-based grounds, avoiding the looming constitutional question of the limits of “state action” under the Fourteenth Amendment. In late 1963, in the case of Bell v. Maryland, when another minimalist opinion appeared impossible, a majority of the Court, led by Justice Hugo Black, was prepared to explicitly reject the students’ constitutional claim. This outcome was only averted when, in the spring of 1964, with Congress poised to pass the Civil Rights Act, Justice Black’s majority dissolved, and a fractured Court issued yet another narrow opinion, with no majority to resolve the constitutional question one way or the other. This chapter explains why the sit-in cases caused such dramatic difficulties for the Court.Less
This chapter examines the Supreme Court’s confrontation with the sit-in cases. Between 1961 and 1964, the justices faced round after round of appeals of criminal convictions of sit-in protesters. These cases were the great aberration of the Warren Court. At a time when the justices confidently reworked one constitutional doctrine after another, often in response to the moral challenges of the civil rights movement and often in the face of considerable public resistance, they broke pattern in the sit-in cases. The Court overturned the convictions on narrow, fact-based grounds, avoiding the looming constitutional question of the limits of “state action” under the Fourteenth Amendment. In late 1963, in the case of Bell v. Maryland, when another minimalist opinion appeared impossible, a majority of the Court, led by Justice Hugo Black, was prepared to explicitly reject the students’ constitutional claim. This outcome was only averted when, in the spring of 1964, with Congress poised to pass the Civil Rights Act, Justice Black’s majority dissolved, and a fractured Court issued yet another narrow opinion, with no majority to resolve the constitutional question one way or the other. This chapter explains why the sit-in cases caused such dramatic difficulties for the Court.
