Bradley Monton (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199218844
- eISBN:
- 9780191711732
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218844.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book contains thirteen specially written chapters which discuss topics from the work of Bas C. van Fraassen, one of the most important contemporary philosophers of science. The central and ...
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This book contains thirteen specially written chapters which discuss topics from the work of Bas C. van Fraassen, one of the most important contemporary philosophers of science. The central and unifying theme of the book is empiricism, an approach which van Fraassen developed most fully in The Scientific Image and The Empirical Stance. Thirteen experts examine van Fraassen's defence of scientific anti-realism (which he sees as a core tenet of empiricism), as well as his claim that adopting a philosophical position like empiricism does not consist of holding a particular set of beliefs, but is rather a matter of taking a stance. The book concludes with an extensive and intriguing reply by van Fraassen, in which he develops and corrects his old views, and offers new insights into the nature of science, empiricism, and philosophy itself.Less
This book contains thirteen specially written chapters which discuss topics from the work of Bas C. van Fraassen, one of the most important contemporary philosophers of science. The central and unifying theme of the book is empiricism, an approach which van Fraassen developed most fully in The Scientific Image and The Empirical Stance. Thirteen experts examine van Fraassen's defence of scientific anti-realism (which he sees as a core tenet of empiricism), as well as his claim that adopting a philosophical position like empiricism does not consist of holding a particular set of beliefs, but is rather a matter of taking a stance. The book concludes with an extensive and intriguing reply by van Fraassen, in which he develops and corrects his old views, and offers new insights into the nature of science, empiricism, and philosophy itself.
Robert McKim
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195128352
- eISBN:
- 9780199834488
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195128354.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
The religious ambiguity of the world has many aspects, one of which is the hiddenness of God. Theists have proposed a number of explanations of God's hiddenness. Some putative explanations contend ...
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The religious ambiguity of the world has many aspects, one of which is the hiddenness of God. Theists have proposed a number of explanations of God's hiddenness. Some putative explanations contend that the advantages of God's hiddenness (“goods of mystery”) outweigh whatever benefits would result if God's existence and nature were clear to us (“goods of clarity”). Goods of mystery that have received a lot of discussion include human moral autonomy and the ability on our part to exercise control over whether we believe in the existence of God. The extent of the ambiguity that surrounds God's existence, and indeed all important religious matters, combined with our lack of an obviously correct and adequate explanation of this lack, suggest that, even if God exists, it is not important that people believe in God. Another central theme in the book is the significance of religious diversity for religious belief. The character of this diversity is such that it provides people who take a position on religious matters with reason to adopt the “Critical Stance” – which requires people in all the religious traditions to subject their religious beliefs to critical scrutiny and hold those beliefs in a tentative way.Some contend that religious faith requires complete confidence in what is believed but tentative belief actually is sufficient to sustain many forms of religious commitment.Less
The religious ambiguity of the world has many aspects, one of which is the hiddenness of God. Theists have proposed a number of explanations of God's hiddenness. Some putative explanations contend that the advantages of God's hiddenness (“goods of mystery”) outweigh whatever benefits would result if God's existence and nature were clear to us (“goods of clarity”). Goods of mystery that have received a lot of discussion include human moral autonomy and the ability on our part to exercise control over whether we believe in the existence of God. The extent of the ambiguity that surrounds God's existence, and indeed all important religious matters, combined with our lack of an obviously correct and adequate explanation of this lack, suggest that, even if God exists, it is not important that people believe in God. Another central theme in the book is the significance of religious diversity for religious belief. The character of this diversity is such that it provides people who take a position on religious matters with reason to adopt the “Critical Stance” – which requires people in all the religious traditions to subject their religious beliefs to critical scrutiny and hold those beliefs in a tentative way.Some contend that religious faith requires complete confidence in what is believed but tentative belief actually is sufficient to sustain many forms of religious commitment.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195138924
- eISBN:
- 9780199786480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138929.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Daniel Dennett’s “intentional stance” theory is a leading specimen of the rationality theory, though Dennett vacillates in offering stronger and weaker variants. In the strong formulations, the ...
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Daniel Dennett’s “intentional stance” theory is a leading specimen of the rationality theory, though Dennett vacillates in offering stronger and weaker variants. In the strong formulations, the theory is quite implausible; in its weak formulations, its content is too thin to have predictive implications. It also suffers from an inability to handle attributions over the entire range of mental states, including sensations like thirst, hunger, or itchiness. Finally, it offers no satisfactory story of how mental concepts are understood. An ostensibly related theory, the “teleological stance” theory, doesn’t really claim to explain mental state attribution.Less
Daniel Dennett’s “intentional stance” theory is a leading specimen of the rationality theory, though Dennett vacillates in offering stronger and weaker variants. In the strong formulations, the theory is quite implausible; in its weak formulations, its content is too thin to have predictive implications. It also suffers from an inability to handle attributions over the entire range of mental states, including sensations like thirst, hunger, or itchiness. Finally, it offers no satisfactory story of how mental concepts are understood. An ostensibly related theory, the “teleological stance” theory, doesn’t really claim to explain mental state attribution.
John Russell Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195313932
- eISBN:
- 9780199871926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313932.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter explores the ramifications that the attribution to Berkeley of a use theory of meaning has for the interpretation of the divine language thesis, the relationship between individual ...
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This chapter explores the ramifications that the attribution to Berkeley of a use theory of meaning has for the interpretation of the divine language thesis, the relationship between individual spirits, the nature of spirits themselves. It is shown that the basic relations between spirits are normative in nature. For the purposes of elucidation, Berkeley's approach is compared and contrasted with that of Daniel Dennett's “intentional stance”.Less
This chapter explores the ramifications that the attribution to Berkeley of a use theory of meaning has for the interpretation of the divine language thesis, the relationship between individual spirits, the nature of spirits themselves. It is shown that the basic relations between spirits are normative in nature. For the purposes of elucidation, Berkeley's approach is compared and contrasted with that of Daniel Dennett's “intentional stance”.
Anja Jauernig
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199218844
- eISBN:
- 9780191711732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218844.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter begins by examining van Fraassen's claims that being an empiricist cannot amount to believing a central empiricist dogma (‘naïve empiricism’), but should be understood as consisting in ...
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This chapter begins by examining van Fraassen's claims that being an empiricist cannot amount to believing a central empiricist dogma (‘naïve empiricism’), but should be understood as consisting in taking the empiricist/empirical stance (‘stance empiricism’). It argues that not all versions of naïve empiricism run into the problems identified by van Fraassen, and that the stance empiricist is in at least as bad a position as the naïve or dogmatic empiricist with respect to the task of providing a ‘ radical critique of metaphysics’, which, according to van Fraassen, is one of the central desiderata for any empiricist position. That is, contrary to what van Fraassen claims, one is not forced to renounce naïve empiricism as a conception of what empiricism is, or could be, and replacing naïve empiricism by stance empiricism does not promise any advantage with respect to the required radical critique of metaphysics. But even if van Fraassen's more specific arguments fail, his proposal that empiricism in particular, and philosophical positions in general, should be understood as stances rather than dogmata merits attention and close scrutiny. Finally, the chapter takes a closer look at the question of whether a philosophical position can possibly consist in a stance, that is, of whether a stance can satisfy the conditions and serve the functions that we expect a philosophical position to satisfy and serve. The answer appears to be that stances cannot fulfill these expectations.Less
This chapter begins by examining van Fraassen's claims that being an empiricist cannot amount to believing a central empiricist dogma (‘naïve empiricism’), but should be understood as consisting in taking the empiricist/empirical stance (‘stance empiricism’). It argues that not all versions of naïve empiricism run into the problems identified by van Fraassen, and that the stance empiricist is in at least as bad a position as the naïve or dogmatic empiricist with respect to the task of providing a ‘ radical critique of metaphysics’, which, according to van Fraassen, is one of the central desiderata for any empiricist position. That is, contrary to what van Fraassen claims, one is not forced to renounce naïve empiricism as a conception of what empiricism is, or could be, and replacing naïve empiricism by stance empiricism does not promise any advantage with respect to the required radical critique of metaphysics. But even if van Fraassen's more specific arguments fail, his proposal that empiricism in particular, and philosophical positions in general, should be understood as stances rather than dogmata merits attention and close scrutiny. Finally, the chapter takes a closer look at the question of whether a philosophical position can possibly consist in a stance, that is, of whether a stance can satisfy the conditions and serve the functions that we expect a philosophical position to satisfy and serve. The answer appears to be that stances cannot fulfill these expectations.
Dien Ho
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199218844
- eISBN:
- 9780191711732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218844.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
In Lecture 2 of The Empirical Stance, Bas van Fraassen argues that empiricism cannot be construed as a simple philosophical position; instead, he suggests that empiricism should be thought of as a ...
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In Lecture 2 of The Empirical Stance, Bas van Fraassen argues that empiricism cannot be construed as a simple philosophical position; instead, he suggests that empiricism should be thought of as a stance. In the last section of the lecture, van Fraassen hints at the possibility that many other philosophical positions (e.g., materialism) are in fact stances if these positions are to survive as coherent views. This chapter points out some unsettling ramifications of van Fraassen's general thesis. The first section reconstructs van Fraassen's arguments against traditional empiricism. The second section offers an extension of his critique of empiricism to philosophy at large. The final section examines the consequences of van Fraassen's generalized thesis and how philosophy will survive in light of it.Less
In Lecture 2 of The Empirical Stance, Bas van Fraassen argues that empiricism cannot be construed as a simple philosophical position; instead, he suggests that empiricism should be thought of as a stance. In the last section of the lecture, van Fraassen hints at the possibility that many other philosophical positions (e.g., materialism) are in fact stances if these positions are to survive as coherent views. This chapter points out some unsettling ramifications of van Fraassen's general thesis. The first section reconstructs van Fraassen's arguments against traditional empiricism. The second section offers an extension of his critique of empiricism to philosophy at large. The final section examines the consequences of van Fraassen's generalized thesis and how philosophy will survive in light of it.
William L Randall and A. Elizabeth McKim
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306873
- eISBN:
- 9780199894062
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306873.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology, Developmental Psychology
This chapter prepares for an exploration of the poetics of aging by introducing a narrative approach to gerontology, one that focuses on the inside of aging, or biographical aging, instead of its ...
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This chapter prepares for an exploration of the poetics of aging by introducing a narrative approach to gerontology, one that focuses on the inside of aging, or biographical aging, instead of its outside, i.e., biological aging. Discussed as well is the intrinsic interdisciplinarity of the metaphor of life-as-story, recognized increasingly across numerous disciplines as a paradigm for understanding human experience. The chapter also considers how postmodern theories of text and textualization apply to the notion of lifestory, and the consequences of such theories for concepts of personal identity. In particular, it introduces the idea that reading life, like reading literature, is an intricate, interpretive activity — one we are engaged in anyway, if largely unconsciously, all of the time. By better understanding the dynamics of this process, however, we can undertake it more deliberately, in the process developing a reflective and indeed ironic stance toward our lives which this book calls literary self-literacy.Less
This chapter prepares for an exploration of the poetics of aging by introducing a narrative approach to gerontology, one that focuses on the inside of aging, or biographical aging, instead of its outside, i.e., biological aging. Discussed as well is the intrinsic interdisciplinarity of the metaphor of life-as-story, recognized increasingly across numerous disciplines as a paradigm for understanding human experience. The chapter also considers how postmodern theories of text and textualization apply to the notion of lifestory, and the consequences of such theories for concepts of personal identity. In particular, it introduces the idea that reading life, like reading literature, is an intricate, interpretive activity — one we are engaged in anyway, if largely unconsciously, all of the time. By better understanding the dynamics of this process, however, we can undertake it more deliberately, in the process developing a reflective and indeed ironic stance toward our lives which this book calls literary self-literacy.
Adam Jaworski and Crispin Thurlow
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195331646
- eISBN:
- 9780199867974
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331646.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This chapter examines elitism as a stance as it is accomplished in travel sections of two British weekend newspapers aimed at middle-class, affluent readership—The Sunday Times and The Guardian—and ...
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This chapter examines elitism as a stance as it is accomplished in travel sections of two British weekend newspapers aimed at middle-class, affluent readership—The Sunday Times and The Guardian—and demonstrate how the alignment positions and relations of superiority (and inferiority) are constructed in these texts through a number of discursive moves and devices: negative Other—evaluation (e.g. expressing disdain for ‘mass’ tourists and locals); positive Self-evaluation (e.g. claiming celebrity cachet; power/knowledge); creating ‘exclusive’ lists of knowable, desirable attractions expressed in the superlative (e.g. ‘Best of…’ lists); endorsing conspicuous consumption through excess, (self—)indulgence and service; claiming cultural capital through displays of ‘good taste’, spirituality and intertextual links to high-status texts and references (e.g., Hollywood films/ celebrity), and so on. This chapter argues that in elitist stance-taking the evaluation is made through a claim to both distinction and superiority. In functional terms, it therefore define stance-taking as simultaneously instantiating ideology, establishing interpersonal footing, styling the speaker/writer, and stylizing the second party hearer/reader and sometimes a third party who may or may not be present. Stance is thus an act of social Self- and Other-identification.Less
This chapter examines elitism as a stance as it is accomplished in travel sections of two British weekend newspapers aimed at middle-class, affluent readership—The Sunday Times and The Guardian—and demonstrate how the alignment positions and relations of superiority (and inferiority) are constructed in these texts through a number of discursive moves and devices: negative Other—evaluation (e.g. expressing disdain for ‘mass’ tourists and locals); positive Self-evaluation (e.g. claiming celebrity cachet; power/knowledge); creating ‘exclusive’ lists of knowable, desirable attractions expressed in the superlative (e.g. ‘Best of…’ lists); endorsing conspicuous consumption through excess, (self—)indulgence and service; claiming cultural capital through displays of ‘good taste’, spirituality and intertextual links to high-status texts and references (e.g., Hollywood films/ celebrity), and so on. This chapter argues that in elitist stance-taking the evaluation is made through a claim to both distinction and superiority. In functional terms, it therefore define stance-taking as simultaneously instantiating ideology, establishing interpersonal footing, styling the speaker/writer, and stylizing the second party hearer/reader and sometimes a third party who may or may not be present. Stance is thus an act of social Self- and Other-identification.
Adrienne Lo
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195327359
- eISBN:
- 9780199870639
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327359.003.0004
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
Previous work on Korean grammar has claimed that one person cannot “directly” speculate about another person's thoughts, intentions, and sensations (Choi 1991; Kim 1978; Lee 1993; Sohn and Park ...
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Previous work on Korean grammar has claimed that one person cannot “directly” speculate about another person's thoughts, intentions, and sensations (Choi 1991; Kim 1978; Lee 1993; Sohn and Park 2003). By looking at how a teacher at a Korean heritage language school represents her access to students' thoughts and feelings, I argue that expressions of epistemic stance relate to moral evaluation. Speakers portray their access to the thoughts and sensations of individuals who they deem morally worthy as more distant and uncertain. When individuals are evaluated as morally suspect, however, speakers represent their access to these persons' emotions, thoughts and sensations as direct and unmediated. Evidential marking thus serves as a resource for indexically constructing others as different kinds of moral beings and for constituting respect, power, and authority.Less
Previous work on Korean grammar has claimed that one person cannot “directly” speculate about another person's thoughts, intentions, and sensations (Choi 1991; Kim 1978; Lee 1993; Sohn and Park 2003). By looking at how a teacher at a Korean heritage language school represents her access to students' thoughts and feelings, I argue that expressions of epistemic stance relate to moral evaluation. Speakers portray their access to the thoughts and sensations of individuals who they deem morally worthy as more distant and uncertain. When individuals are evaluated as morally suspect, however, speakers represent their access to these persons' emotions, thoughts and sensations as direct and unmediated. Evidential marking thus serves as a resource for indexically constructing others as different kinds of moral beings and for constituting respect, power, and authority.
M. Agnes Kang
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195327359
- eISBN:
- 9780199870639
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327359.003.0008
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This chapter demonstrates how Korean American camp counselors locally construct ethnic identity through the practice of self‐categorization in discourse. Self‐categorization, or the identification of ...
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This chapter demonstrates how Korean American camp counselors locally construct ethnic identity through the practice of self‐categorization in discourse. Self‐categorization, or the identification of oneself in terms of ethnic identity, serves to position counselors in terms of Korean ethnicity and to associate that identity with one's personal goals in participating in the Korean camp. Counselors discuss and debate whether the teaching of Korean heritage or the mentorship of the campers should be the primary objective of the camp. This opposition between ‘heritage’ and ‘mentorship’ is cast as a source of tensions that map onto ideologies of identity, whereby ‘Korean American’ identity acquires the local meaning of being linked to the importance of mentorship over Korean heritage.Less
This chapter demonstrates how Korean American camp counselors locally construct ethnic identity through the practice of self‐categorization in discourse. Self‐categorization, or the identification of oneself in terms of ethnic identity, serves to position counselors in terms of Korean ethnicity and to associate that identity with one's personal goals in participating in the Korean camp. Counselors discuss and debate whether the teaching of Korean heritage or the mentorship of the campers should be the primary objective of the camp. This opposition between ‘heritage’ and ‘mentorship’ is cast as a source of tensions that map onto ideologies of identity, whereby ‘Korean American’ identity acquires the local meaning of being linked to the importance of mentorship over Korean heritage.
Thomas McFarland
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198112532
- eISBN:
- 9780191670800
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198112532.003.0006
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century Literature and Romanticism
This chapter discusses Wordsworth and his stance as a prophet, despite futurity not being in the direction of his deepest poetic intuition. This prophetic stance rather than the stance of the artist ...
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This chapter discusses Wordsworth and his stance as a prophet, despite futurity not being in the direction of his deepest poetic intuition. This prophetic stance rather than the stance of the artist was congenial to Wordsworth because of the curious simplicity of his poetic intent.Less
This chapter discusses Wordsworth and his stance as a prophet, despite futurity not being in the direction of his deepest poetic intuition. This prophetic stance rather than the stance of the artist was congenial to Wordsworth because of the curious simplicity of his poetic intent.
Emily Baragwanath
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231294
- eISBN:
- 9780191710797
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231294.003.0002
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Prose and Writers: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This chapter addresses Herodotus' relationship with his major narrative model, Homer, whose techniques Herodotus appropriates and develops. Homer's depiction of motivation supplies a perspective in ...
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This chapter addresses Herodotus' relationship with his major narrative model, Homer, whose techniques Herodotus appropriates and develops. Homer's depiction of motivation supplies a perspective in which to view Herodotus' methods: the epic storyteller's stance of omniscience illuminates the wholly different position of the historian—whose access to events is compromised by differences in time and space.Less
This chapter addresses Herodotus' relationship with his major narrative model, Homer, whose techniques Herodotus appropriates and develops. Homer's depiction of motivation supplies a perspective in which to view Herodotus' methods: the epic storyteller's stance of omniscience illuminates the wholly different position of the historian—whose access to events is compromised by differences in time and space.
Joan Petersilia
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195160864
- eISBN:
- 9780199943395
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195160864.003.0004
- Subject:
- Sociology, Law, Crime and Deviance
This chapter describes parole supervision (as distinguished from parole release) as it is practiced today. The major criticisms of parole release (e.g., unwarranted discretion and ineffectiveness) ...
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This chapter describes parole supervision (as distinguished from parole release) as it is practiced today. The major criticisms of parole release (e.g., unwarranted discretion and ineffectiveness) have been leveled at parole field supervision and have caused major changes and reforms there as well. Parole officers, historically committed to providing counseling and brokering community resources to assist parolees, have become more surveillance oriented. The public's tough-on-crime stance has demanded it, and the practical considerations of high parole caseloads combined with scarce resources have left parole officers with few alternatives. Drug testing, house arrest, and electronic monitoring are now common parole supervision techniques. Such techniques seldom contribute to rehabilitation; they just help identify the failures more quickly.Less
This chapter describes parole supervision (as distinguished from parole release) as it is practiced today. The major criticisms of parole release (e.g., unwarranted discretion and ineffectiveness) have been leveled at parole field supervision and have caused major changes and reforms there as well. Parole officers, historically committed to providing counseling and brokering community resources to assist parolees, have become more surveillance oriented. The public's tough-on-crime stance has demanded it, and the practical considerations of high parole caseloads combined with scarce resources have left parole officers with few alternatives. Drug testing, house arrest, and electronic monitoring are now common parole supervision techniques. Such techniques seldom contribute to rehabilitation; they just help identify the failures more quickly.
Richard Swedberg
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691155227
- eISBN:
- 9781400850358
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691155227.003.0007
- Subject:
- Sociology, Social Research and Statistics
This chapter focuses on the importance of heuristics in theorizing. The most common interpretation of the word heuristics is that it means “discovery.” When one theorizes, it has been argued, one ...
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This chapter focuses on the importance of heuristics in theorizing. The most common interpretation of the word heuristics is that it means “discovery.” When one theorizes, it has been argued, one should not only use the individual steps to move forward but also to try to discover something new about the phenomenon one studies. The heuristic stance, or the attitude that theorizing is about discovery, is to some extent inherent in the decision to theorize in the first place. While some of the literature on heuristics is about making important discoveries along the lines of Archimedes, there also exists another and more recent branch that has a much more modest aim. This type of heuristics essentially tries to teach the average student to develop an independent approach to solving problems.Less
This chapter focuses on the importance of heuristics in theorizing. The most common interpretation of the word heuristics is that it means “discovery.” When one theorizes, it has been argued, one should not only use the individual steps to move forward but also to try to discover something new about the phenomenon one studies. The heuristic stance, or the attitude that theorizing is about discovery, is to some extent inherent in the decision to theorize in the first place. While some of the literature on heuristics is about making important discoveries along the lines of Archimedes, there also exists another and more recent branch that has a much more modest aim. This type of heuristics essentially tries to teach the average student to develop an independent approach to solving problems.
Jonardon Ganeri
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199652365
- eISBN:
- 9780191740718
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy
What is it to occupy a first‐person stance? Is the first‐personal idea one has of oneself in conflict with the idea of oneself as a physical being? How, if there is a conflict, is it to be resolved? ...
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What is it to occupy a first‐person stance? Is the first‐personal idea one has of oneself in conflict with the idea of oneself as a physical being? How, if there is a conflict, is it to be resolved? In this book a new way to address those questions, drawing inspiration from theories about the self in first millennial India, is formulated. These philosophers do not regard the first‐person stance as in conflict with the natural—their idea of nature not that of scientific naturalism but rather a liberal naturalism non‐exclusive of the normative. A wide range of ideas are explored: reflexive self‐representation, mental files, and quasi‐subject analyses of subjective consciousness; the theory of emergence as transformation; embodiment and the idea of a bodily self; the centrality of the emotions to the unity of self. Buddhism's claim that there is no self too readily assumes an account of what a self must be. This book argues instead that the self is a negotiation between self‐presentation and normative avowal, a transaction grounded in unconscious mind. Immersion, participation, and coordination are jointly constitutive of self, the first‐person stance at once lived, engaged, and underwritten. And all is in harmony with the idea of the natural.Less
What is it to occupy a first‐person stance? Is the first‐personal idea one has of oneself in conflict with the idea of oneself as a physical being? How, if there is a conflict, is it to be resolved? In this book a new way to address those questions, drawing inspiration from theories about the self in first millennial India, is formulated. These philosophers do not regard the first‐person stance as in conflict with the natural—their idea of nature not that of scientific naturalism but rather a liberal naturalism non‐exclusive of the normative. A wide range of ideas are explored: reflexive self‐representation, mental files, and quasi‐subject analyses of subjective consciousness; the theory of emergence as transformation; embodiment and the idea of a bodily self; the centrality of the emotions to the unity of self. Buddhism's claim that there is no self too readily assumes an account of what a self must be. This book argues instead that the self is a negotiation between self‐presentation and normative avowal, a transaction grounded in unconscious mind. Immersion, participation, and coordination are jointly constitutive of self, the first‐person stance at once lived, engaged, and underwritten. And all is in harmony with the idea of the natural.
Robert McKim
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195128352
- eISBN:
- 9780199834488
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195128354.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
The case for the Critical Stance is not undermined by appeals to religious experience. One reason for this is the sheer diversity of religious experiences: members of diverse religious traditions ...
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The case for the Critical Stance is not undermined by appeals to religious experience. One reason for this is the sheer diversity of religious experiences: members of diverse religious traditions report on experiences that they believe to be supportive of their beliefs. Another reason is that religious experience is normally capable of providing epistemic support for, at most, a subset of the set of beliefs associated with a tradition.Less
The case for the Critical Stance is not undermined by appeals to religious experience. One reason for this is the sheer diversity of religious experiences: members of diverse religious traditions report on experiences that they believe to be supportive of their beliefs. Another reason is that religious experience is normally capable of providing epistemic support for, at most, a subset of the set of beliefs associated with a tradition.
Robert McKim
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195128352
- eISBN:
- 9780199834488
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195128354.003.0011
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
The analysis of perceptual religious experience proposed by William Alston does not undermine the case for the Critical Stance. On the contrary, religious diversity is a more serious problem for his ...
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The analysis of perceptual religious experience proposed by William Alston does not undermine the case for the Critical Stance. On the contrary, religious diversity is a more serious problem for his doxastic practice epistemology than he recognizes. In general, the outputs of doxastic practices that are functioning in conditions of ambiguity, and in conditions in which there is disagreement, ought to be viewed with some suspicion, even by those who engage in the practices in question.Less
The analysis of perceptual religious experience proposed by William Alston does not undermine the case for the Critical Stance. On the contrary, religious diversity is a more serious problem for his doxastic practice epistemology than he recognizes. In general, the outputs of doxastic practices that are functioning in conditions of ambiguity, and in conditions in which there is disagreement, ought to be viewed with some suspicion, even by those who engage in the practices in question.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199267422
- eISBN:
- 9780191708343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter glosses ‘naturalism’, ‘physicalism’, ‘intentionality’, ‘aboutness’, ‘mental’, ‘content’, ‘mental content’, ‘representational content’, and so on in ways that may seem unorthodox but ...
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This chapter glosses ‘naturalism’, ‘physicalism’, ‘intentionality’, ‘aboutness’, ‘mental’, ‘content’, ‘mental content’, ‘representational content’, and so on in ways that may seem unorthodox but shouldn't. It points out that dispositions like belief dispositions cannot — metaphysically cannot — be (mentally) contentful entities, and argues dutifully for the existence of things that obviously exist — not only conscious experience, but also, more specifically, cognitive conscious experience as opposed to sensory experience. The chapter then puts the case for saying that: (1) the only truly intentional entities are conscious experiential episodes. The chapter argues that although one can (with Humpty Dumpty) use words like ‘mental’ and ‘intentional’ as one likes, there is in the end no tenable ground between (1) and (2) full-blown Dennettian behaviourism/instrumentalism/antirealism about the mind — as Dennett himself agrees. To accept (2), however, is to have completely lost touch with reality.Less
This chapter glosses ‘naturalism’, ‘physicalism’, ‘intentionality’, ‘aboutness’, ‘mental’, ‘content’, ‘mental content’, ‘representational content’, and so on in ways that may seem unorthodox but shouldn't. It points out that dispositions like belief dispositions cannot — metaphysically cannot — be (mentally) contentful entities, and argues dutifully for the existence of things that obviously exist — not only conscious experience, but also, more specifically, cognitive conscious experience as opposed to sensory experience. The chapter then puts the case for saying that: (1) the only truly intentional entities are conscious experiential episodes. The chapter argues that although one can (with Humpty Dumpty) use words like ‘mental’ and ‘intentional’ as one likes, there is in the end no tenable ground between (1) and (2) full-blown Dennettian behaviourism/instrumentalism/antirealism about the mind — as Dennett himself agrees. To accept (2), however, is to have completely lost touch with reality.
Bradley Monton
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199218844
- eISBN:
- 9780191711732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218844.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the chapters included in this book. The chapters in Part I make important contributions to the developing understanding of what van Fraassen achieved ...
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This introductory chapter presents an overview of the chapters included in this book. The chapters in Part I make important contributions to the developing understanding of what van Fraassen achieved in The Scientific Image. The chapters in Part II focus on new literature discussing The Empirical Stance. The issues discussed in the two parts are not completely independent of one another, and interconnections are shown between the ideas about empiricism in science and about empiricism in general.Less
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the chapters included in this book. The chapters in Part I make important contributions to the developing understanding of what van Fraassen achieved in The Scientific Image. The chapters in Part II focus on new literature discussing The Empirical Stance. The issues discussed in the two parts are not completely independent of one another, and interconnections are shown between the ideas about empiricism in science and about empiricism in general.
Ernan McMullin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199218844
- eISBN:
- 9780191711732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218844.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter begins by considering the role of emotion in scientific revolutions. It argues that one can undergo a scientific revolution without ever facing an existentialist moment where emotion is ...
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This chapter begins by considering the role of emotion in scientific revolutions. It argues that one can undergo a scientific revolution without ever facing an existentialist moment where emotion is essentially involved. It then takes up van Fraassen's discussion of religion from the final chapter of The Empirical Stance. It proposes that such a discussion of emotion in conceptual shifts is relevant to van Fraassen's ideas about encountering God.Less
This chapter begins by considering the role of emotion in scientific revolutions. It argues that one can undergo a scientific revolution without ever facing an existentialist moment where emotion is essentially involved. It then takes up van Fraassen's discussion of religion from the final chapter of The Empirical Stance. It proposes that such a discussion of emotion in conceptual shifts is relevant to van Fraassen's ideas about encountering God.
