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For Friedrich A. Hayek, the idea of a spontaneous order is not only liberalism's ‘central concept’ and therefore vital to its defence but, at the same time, also the notion on which all social theory converges. Hayek argues that the whole task of social theory consists in little else but an effort to reconstruct the various spontaneous orders existing in the social world. However, the idea of a spontaneous order does not receive a sufficiently systematic treatment in Hayek's writings. This shows in the secondary literature, where the views about its substance, its scope, and its significance as an analytical concept differ widely. According to Hayek, all associations, institutions, and other social formations can be classified either as spontaneous orders or as organisations. For Hayek, order in social life is identical with the pattern of interactions arising from a market in operation. This chapter examines what Hayek really intends spontaneous order to mean and discusses his theory of complex phenomena.

Friedrich A. Hayek defines social theory as the systematic study of spontaneous orders, maintaining that an individual may often be a member not only of the comprehensive spontaneous order of society but also ‘of numerous other spontaneous sub-orders’. This chapter explores what further applications the idea of a spontaneous order may have in the social world. It considers the distinction between order as a network of interactions among numerous parties and order as an established system of rules or norms. It also offers various semantic and other reflections exploring the concepts of social order and spontaneity to be found at the root of the idea of a spontaneous social order. Five claims are discussed that represent the substance of the notion of a spontaneous economic order, and how far they may be applicable to a wider range of phenomena loosely qualifying as spontaneous social orders.

This chapter focuses on Hayek's social theory of individualism. It identifies the distinct elements of Hayek's individualism and evaluates the strength of his social theory. Just as Hume's philosophy sought only to caution against rationalist inspired justifications of existing authority or of revolutionary reform, this theory is able to suggest the limits to which any social order can be moulded or controlled by individuals or governments, whether well or ill-mentioned. Despite the problems Hayek encounters in trying to establish a set of normative liberal principles, his social theory offers an important challenge to the critics of liberal individualism. This chapter also elucidates the theory of spontaneous order and explains how it informs Hayek's critique of social justice.

Friedrich A. Hayek argues that order in the market is the result of individuals observing certain rules and adjusting to their specific situation. The significance he accords to rules can hardly be overrated. Often, he does not mention individual adjustment at all, implying that the observance of rules suffices to bring about economic order. This chapter discusses the role and nature of such rules, including the so-called rules of just conduct that lead to spontaneous economic order. The second section expounds a contrast Hayek draws between rule-guided conduct and purposive action and explores his view of market rules as a device for coping with the unknowable consequences of individual economic action. The third section asks how the idea of a spontaneous economic order accommodates the state. Hayek's discussion of economic order being the result of rule-following (and adjustment) portrays markets as entirely self-sufficient and self-regulating systems.

This chapter considers Friedrich A. Hayek's claim about the inherently beneficial character of spontaneous economic order. Hayek does not confine himself to an explanatory perspective, merely giving an account of how in the market society individual adjustment and rule-following bring about and sustain economic order. He also regards such order as uniquely advantageous. Hayek appears to offer two arguments intended to lend force to this claim. The first, more hinted at than spelled out, is the argument from the mutually advantageous nature of uncoerced exchange, while the second pertains to the argument from the market's efficiency. Hayek's argument is that the spontaneous order of the market society, consisting in innumerable voluntary exchange relations, is beneficial for everyone participating in it because it embodies in generalised form the principle that uncoerced exchange is mutually advantageous.

According to Friedrich A. Hayek, the web of exchange relations forming in the market is the outcome of a two-part mechanism. Spontaneous economic order develops when the members observe certain rules and adjust to their local situation. Whenever Hayek talks about the mechanism conducive to spontaneous order, he gives individual adjustment much less prominence than rule-following, the other element of that mechanism. The idea that spontaneous economic order is, partly, the result of the members adapting to the specific circumstances of their individual situation is the by-product of, and is usually only mentioned in connection with, a claim to which Hayek consistently attaches much greater significance. This chapter explores the sense in which individual adjustment may be said to contribute to the emergence of a spontaneous economic order. Hayek's views on the epistemic role of the market are also discussed.

This book examines the liberal political philosophy and social theory of Friedrich A. Hayek (1899–1991). According to Hayek, liberalism derives from the discovery of a self-generating or spontaneous order in social affairs, an order which makes it possible to utilise the knowledge and skill of all members of society to a much greater extent than would be possible in any order created by central direction. Hayek argues that there are basically only two rival political doctrines, liberalism and socialism. Hayek concedes that in one respect the ends of liberalism and socialism do diverge: only socialism, but not liberalism, aims at an ideal of distributive justice. Hayek's instrumental approach is unique in contemporary liberal political philosophy. Reading Hayek in an instrumentalist light brings into focus, above all, his social theory.

This chapter examines Friedrich A. Hayek's thesis that some of the rules of just conduct, which form the institutional basis of spontaneous economic order, are followed unconsciously. Hayek thinks that wide areas of human activity are guided by behavioural rules. He says individuals are able to orient themselves in the world, exercise skills, and interact with others they observe rules. Yet it would in his view be a misunderstanding to believe that thought, perception, skills, and social interaction are all the result of the deliberate application of known rules. Human conduct, he claims, is also based on unconscious, or tacit, rule-following. Hayek defines tacit rule-following as conduct guided by rules which the acting person need not explicitly know, be able to specify, describe discursively, or verbalise. The claim, then, appears to be that often people are not aware of, and are not in a position expressly to state, the rules which actually direct their behaviour.

This book argues that Friedrich A. Hayek fails in his instrumental approach to the justification of the institutions of liberal market society, and in his defence of its system of rules on grounds of their conduciveness to human survival, general prosperity, and social peace. That instrumental considerations form an indispensable part of the defence of liberalism and liberty is not to be disputed. The question is whether an instrumental approach alone could ever suffice to establish the legitimacy of a liberal market regime. An instrumental justification as it is pursued by Hayek rests on at least four crucial assumptions. Firstly, it presupposes that the social and political ends are given and, secondly, that they are uncontested. Thirdly, it postulates that the means—the various institutional systems available—are morally neutral and, fourthly, that they represent a class of distinct and specific options. Each of these assumptions is problematic in its own way.