Donald Rutherford and J. A. Cover (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195143744
- eISBN:
- 9780199835317
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195143744.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book presents 12 essays that illustrate the current state of scholarship on Leibniz’s metaphysics. Essays 1 and 2 tackle the different aspects of one of the main topics of Leibniz’s metaphysics ...
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This book presents 12 essays that illustrate the current state of scholarship on Leibniz’s metaphysics. Essays 1 and 2 tackle the different aspects of one of the main topics of Leibniz’s metaphysics — the relation of unity and multiplicity. Essays 3 and 4 focus on the ontological status of body in Leibniz’s middle period. Essays 5 and 6 challenge the features of Leibniz’s hypothesis of preestablished harmony. Essay 7 surveys Leibniz’s claims on behalf of teleological concepts in the explanation of nature and harmony. Essay 8 explores the conception of spontaneity or self-determination. Essays 9 and 10 examine Leibniz’s doctrine of moral necessity. Essays 11 and 12 address the role of “intelligence” in Leibniz’s account of freedom.Less
This book presents 12 essays that illustrate the current state of scholarship on Leibniz’s metaphysics. Essays 1 and 2 tackle the different aspects of one of the main topics of Leibniz’s metaphysics — the relation of unity and multiplicity. Essays 3 and 4 focus on the ontological status of body in Leibniz’s middle period. Essays 5 and 6 challenge the features of Leibniz’s hypothesis of preestablished harmony. Essay 7 surveys Leibniz’s claims on behalf of teleological concepts in the explanation of nature and harmony. Essay 8 explores the conception of spontaneity or self-determination. Essays 9 and 10 examine Leibniz’s doctrine of moral necessity. Essays 11 and 12 address the role of “intelligence” in Leibniz’s account of freedom.
Vladimir Mau and Irina Starodubrovskaya
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241507
- eISBN:
- 9780191599835
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241503.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter speculates on how the theory of revolution might develop further, in the light of the experiences of post‐communist Russia. This means regarding the Russian example, not as a case study ...
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This chapter speculates on how the theory of revolution might develop further, in the light of the experiences of post‐communist Russia. This means regarding the Russian example, not as a case study of the theoretical model, but as the occasion for a revision of that model. If it emerges that revolution is not solely a phenomenon of pre‐industrial, underdeveloped countries, then the features peculiar to such countries (such as low levels of literacy and general culture) cannot be regarded as universal features of revolutionary change in a theory of revolution. The most important problem in this regard is the place of violence as a necessary element of revolution, which has now come into serious question. Other theoretical issues involve spontaneity of action, the role of mass movements, and changes in concepts of property rights.Less
This chapter speculates on how the theory of revolution might develop further, in the light of the experiences of post‐communist Russia. This means regarding the Russian example, not as a case study of the theoretical model, but as the occasion for a revision of that model. If it emerges that revolution is not solely a phenomenon of pre‐industrial, underdeveloped countries, then the features peculiar to such countries (such as low levels of literacy and general culture) cannot be regarded as universal features of revolutionary change in a theory of revolution. The most important problem in this regard is the place of violence as a necessary element of revolution, which has now come into serious question. Other theoretical issues involve spontaneity of action, the role of mass movements, and changes in concepts of property rights.
Jacqueline Mariña
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199206377
- eISBN:
- 9780191709753
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206377.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter examines several fundamental philosophical problems regarding the conditions of the possibility of moral transformation preoccupying the younger Schleiermacher, especially as he ...
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This chapter examines several fundamental philosophical problems regarding the conditions of the possibility of moral transformation preoccupying the younger Schleiermacher, especially as he struggled to come to terms with Kant's practical philosophy. Included in this set of issues is the problem of transcendental freedom and how it relates to an agent's character, as well as the problem of the relation of the faculty of representation (knowing) to the faculty of desire (doing). Both questions have to do with how we are to conceive of the unity and continuity of the self throughout its changing states. Schleiermacher's compatibalist view of freedom is examined, as well as his analysis of Kant's fundamental division of the sources of human knowledge into spontaneity and receptivity. The principle focus of the chapter is Schleiermacher's early essay On Freedom.Less
This chapter examines several fundamental philosophical problems regarding the conditions of the possibility of moral transformation preoccupying the younger Schleiermacher, especially as he struggled to come to terms with Kant's practical philosophy. Included in this set of issues is the problem of transcendental freedom and how it relates to an agent's character, as well as the problem of the relation of the faculty of representation (knowing) to the faculty of desire (doing). Both questions have to do with how we are to conceive of the unity and continuity of the self throughout its changing states. Schleiermacher's compatibalist view of freedom is examined, as well as his analysis of Kant's fundamental division of the sources of human knowledge into spontaneity and receptivity. The principle focus of the chapter is Schleiermacher's early essay On Freedom.
Mario Poceski
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195304671
- eISBN:
- 9780199866861
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195304671.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
Chapter 2 describes a ritual tradition that clearly goes back to the beginnings of Zen. These ritual occasions, sometimes daily and at other times less frequent, brought the entire assembly of monks ...
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Chapter 2 describes a ritual tradition that clearly goes back to the beginnings of Zen. These ritual occasions, sometimes daily and at other times less frequent, brought the entire assembly of monks together in a formal ceremony in which the abbot of the monastery would present a sermon on Zen doctrine or practice. Although these were the occasions most often valorized as expressions of the Zen master's spontaneity, in fact these sermons follow highly stylized and scripted patterns of Zen thought. Only certain doctrines and formats of delivery were appropriate for these sermons, and even the greatest of the early Zen masters rarely diverged from the “pre‐existing templates” that were bequeathed to them by their predecessors. Although the talks would sometimes involve transgressions or critiques of the ritual order, in fact they validated and maintained that order by carefully setting their remarks within the all‐encompassing sphere of Zen ritual.Less
Chapter 2 describes a ritual tradition that clearly goes back to the beginnings of Zen. These ritual occasions, sometimes daily and at other times less frequent, brought the entire assembly of monks together in a formal ceremony in which the abbot of the monastery would present a sermon on Zen doctrine or practice. Although these were the occasions most often valorized as expressions of the Zen master's spontaneity, in fact these sermons follow highly stylized and scripted patterns of Zen thought. Only certain doctrines and formats of delivery were appropriate for these sermons, and even the greatest of the early Zen masters rarely diverged from the “pre‐existing templates” that were bequeathed to them by their predecessors. Although the talks would sometimes involve transgressions or critiques of the ritual order, in fact they validated and maintained that order by carefully setting their remarks within the all‐encompassing sphere of Zen ritual.
Donald Rutherford
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195143744
- eISBN:
- 9780199835317
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195143744.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This essay explores the conception of spontaneity or self-determination presupposed by Leibniz’s analysis of freedom. It argues that Leibniz’s writings support a narrower notion of agent spontaneity, ...
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This essay explores the conception of spontaneity or self-determination presupposed by Leibniz’s analysis of freedom. It argues that Leibniz’s writings support a narrower notion of agent spontaneity, which characterizes cases in which an individual can be understood as acting for the sake of the greatest apparent good. It is shown how this notion is defined within the framework of monadic spontaneity, and why Leibniz believes that monadic and agent forms of spontaneity are relevant to the understanding of freedom.Less
This essay explores the conception of spontaneity or self-determination presupposed by Leibniz’s analysis of freedom. It argues that Leibniz’s writings support a narrower notion of agent spontaneity, which characterizes cases in which an individual can be understood as acting for the sake of the greatest apparent good. It is shown how this notion is defined within the framework of monadic spontaneity, and why Leibniz believes that monadic and agent forms of spontaneity are relevant to the understanding of freedom.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199267422
- eISBN:
- 9780191708343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It is sometimes said that reasoning, thought, and judgment essentially involve action. It is sometimes said that they involve spontaneity, where spontaneity is taken to be connected in some ...
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It is sometimes said that reasoning, thought, and judgment essentially involve action. It is sometimes said that they involve spontaneity, where spontaneity is taken to be connected in some constitutive way with action — intentional, voluntary, and indeed free action. There is, however, a fundamental respect in which reason, thought, and judgment neither are nor can be a matter of action. Any spontaneity that reason, thought and judgment involve can be connected with freedom only when the word ‘freedom’ is used in the Spinozan–Kantian sense according to which freedom is a matter of ‘rational necessitation’, determination by reason.Less
It is sometimes said that reasoning, thought, and judgment essentially involve action. It is sometimes said that they involve spontaneity, where spontaneity is taken to be connected in some constitutive way with action — intentional, voluntary, and indeed free action. There is, however, a fundamental respect in which reason, thought, and judgment neither are nor can be a matter of action. Any spontaneity that reason, thought and judgment involve can be connected with freedom only when the word ‘freedom’ is used in the Spinozan–Kantian sense according to which freedom is a matter of ‘rational necessitation’, determination by reason.
Anne Carolyn Klein and Geshe Tenzin Wangyal Rinpoche
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195178494
- eISBN:
- 9780199784790
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195178491.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
Spontaneity is a hallmark of Buddhahood. A central principle of Authenticity, spontaneity, is also integral to many features vital to Dzogchen's unique identity. Wisdom's status as primordial has to ...
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Spontaneity is a hallmark of Buddhahood. A central principle of Authenticity, spontaneity, is also integral to many features vital to Dzogchen's unique identity. Wisdom's status as primordial has to do with its being spontaneously arisen from the base and thus not dependent on causes. Likewise, wisdom is not paired oppositionally with delusion nor love with hatred, and so on, because all such qualities spontaneously arise in relation to the base. Wisdom's spontaneous presence also allows Dzogchen to maintain that wisdom itself is the path, meaning that path and goal are one, that meditative stabilization and its aftermath are a continuum, and that effort, being always conceptual, is not part of the path. This observation brings forward the question how a focus on virtue can itself be delusional, including such virtues as the cultivation of meditative stabilization. Virtue, like reasoning, has its limits, but is at the same time a crucial element in the overall pallet of scholar and practitioner alike. Here the inextricable connections between claims of spontaneous presence, primordiality, and unbounded wholeness can be seen.Less
Spontaneity is a hallmark of Buddhahood. A central principle of Authenticity, spontaneity, is also integral to many features vital to Dzogchen's unique identity. Wisdom's status as primordial has to do with its being spontaneously arisen from the base and thus not dependent on causes. Likewise, wisdom is not paired oppositionally with delusion nor love with hatred, and so on, because all such qualities spontaneously arise in relation to the base. Wisdom's spontaneous presence also allows Dzogchen to maintain that wisdom itself is the path, meaning that path and goal are one, that meditative stabilization and its aftermath are a continuum, and that effort, being always conceptual, is not part of the path. This observation brings forward the question how a focus on virtue can itself be delusional, including such virtues as the cultivation of meditative stabilization. Virtue, like reasoning, has its limits, but is at the same time a crucial element in the overall pallet of scholar and practitioner alike. Here the inextricable connections between claims of spontaneous presence, primordiality, and unbounded wholeness can be seen.
Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199647033
- eISBN:
- 9780191741166
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199647033.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay has a two‐fold aim. One is to respond to Daniel Dennett's naturalistic treatment of the free will problem. According to Dennett, the idea of free will is reducible to a deliberator's ...
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This essay has a two‐fold aim. One is to respond to Daniel Dennett's naturalistic treatment of the free will problem. According to Dennett, the idea of free will is reducible to a deliberator's unavoidable ignorance regarding the outcome of a proposed course of action, which is perfectly compatible with that action being causally determined. Against this, it is argued that Kant's account of rational agency makes a persuasive case for attributing to an agent a genuine spontaneity which eludes the naturalistic framework that is assumed by Dennett to be all‐encompassing. The other is to counter the views of John McDowell, who rejects a “bald naturalism” (such as Dennett's) and insists on the ineliminability of a conception of spontaneity like Kant's, while criticizing Kant for linking this spontaneity with transcendental idealism. In response, it is argued that McDowell misconstrues Kant's idealism and that he is himself committed to a form of idealism.Less
This essay has a two‐fold aim. One is to respond to Daniel Dennett's naturalistic treatment of the free will problem. According to Dennett, the idea of free will is reducible to a deliberator's unavoidable ignorance regarding the outcome of a proposed course of action, which is perfectly compatible with that action being causally determined. Against this, it is argued that Kant's account of rational agency makes a persuasive case for attributing to an agent a genuine spontaneity which eludes the naturalistic framework that is assumed by Dennett to be all‐encompassing. The other is to counter the views of John McDowell, who rejects a “bald naturalism” (such as Dennett's) and insists on the ineliminability of a conception of spontaneity like Kant's, while criticizing Kant for linking this spontaneity with transcendental idealism. In response, it is argued that McDowell misconstrues Kant's idealism and that he is himself committed to a form of idealism.
Henry E. Allison
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199647033
- eISBN:
- 9780191741166
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199647033.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
After providing a brief account of what Kant understands by a practical justification and the various types of it found in his writings, the essay examines the ways in which Kant attempts to provide ...
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After providing a brief account of what Kant understands by a practical justification and the various types of it found in his writings, the essay examines the ways in which Kant attempts to provide a practical justification of freedom in various texts, chiefly the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. Its main focus is on the tension between Kant's attempt in the former work to ground the necessity of presupposing freedom in our conception of ourselves as rational agents, independently of any specifically moral considerations, and his view in the latter that, “[H]ad not the moral law already been distinctly thought in our reason, we should never consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as freedom” (KpV 5: 4n). The tension is resolved by linking the former with freedom as spontaneity and the latter with freedom as autonomy.Less
After providing a brief account of what Kant understands by a practical justification and the various types of it found in his writings, the essay examines the ways in which Kant attempts to provide a practical justification of freedom in various texts, chiefly the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. Its main focus is on the tension between Kant's attempt in the former work to ground the necessity of presupposing freedom in our conception of ourselves as rational agents, independently of any specifically moral considerations, and his view in the latter that, “[H]ad not the moral law already been distinctly thought in our reason, we should never consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as freedom” (KpV 5: 4n). The tension is resolved by linking the former with freedom as spontaneity and the latter with freedom as autonomy.
Tony Hunt
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198159148
- eISBN:
- 9780191673528
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198159148.003.0006
- Subject:
- Literature, Poetry, 16th-century and Renaissance Literature
The Testament's dialogic nature becomes evident in the testator's animated spontaneity as he engages in debate with his audience, inscribed listeners, and imaginary interlocutors when combining ...
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The Testament's dialogic nature becomes evident in the testator's animated spontaneity as he engages in debate with his audience, inscribed listeners, and imaginary interlocutors when combining jovial complicity and dramatic verve in offering an interactive plurality of views. In stanza 4, he recognizes the expression of hostility to Bishop Thibault. As this veers away from the Church's ethical teaching, the teaching is ironized by how ‘compte’ rhymes with ‘a ce compte’. The audience becomes involved in the debate as the testator appears to expect that the audience move that his views be revised. The dislocation of syntax or hyperbaton and the completion of the deferred verb indicate how the author calculates the foregrounding of ‘annemy’ and the use of permissio.Less
The Testament's dialogic nature becomes evident in the testator's animated spontaneity as he engages in debate with his audience, inscribed listeners, and imaginary interlocutors when combining jovial complicity and dramatic verve in offering an interactive plurality of views. In stanza 4, he recognizes the expression of hostility to Bishop Thibault. As this veers away from the Church's ethical teaching, the teaching is ironized by how ‘compte’ rhymes with ‘a ce compte’. The audience becomes involved in the debate as the testator appears to expect that the audience move that his views be revised. The dislocation of syntax or hyperbaton and the completion of the deferred verb indicate how the author calculates the foregrounding of ‘annemy’ and the use of permissio.
Tony Hunt
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198159148
- eISBN:
- 9780191673528
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198159148.003.0007
- Subject:
- Literature, Poetry, 16th-century and Renaissance Literature
Aside from how no detailed study is available regarding Villon's rhetoric or any attempt to demonstrate his carefully calculated effects, his writing has not been placed in the context of instruction ...
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Aside from how no detailed study is available regarding Villon's rhetoric or any attempt to demonstrate his carefully calculated effects, his writing has not been placed in the context of instruction in vernacular composition. The poem is recognized as the impulsive expression of natural feeling. During the Middle Ages, poetry was perceived not as a product of spontaneity, but as the result of labour, skill, and attention. Like speech composition, the art of poetry writing had to be learned through the traditional precepts of rhetoric. The schools and universities of the Middle Ages taught humanities through the Seven Liberal Arts curriculum that was divided into the Trivium and the Quadrivium. This chapter concentrates particularly on the study of French rhetoric.Less
Aside from how no detailed study is available regarding Villon's rhetoric or any attempt to demonstrate his carefully calculated effects, his writing has not been placed in the context of instruction in vernacular composition. The poem is recognized as the impulsive expression of natural feeling. During the Middle Ages, poetry was perceived not as a product of spontaneity, but as the result of labour, skill, and attention. Like speech composition, the art of poetry writing had to be learned through the traditional precepts of rhetoric. The schools and universities of the Middle Ages taught humanities through the Seven Liberal Arts curriculum that was divided into the Trivium and the Quadrivium. This chapter concentrates particularly on the study of French rhetoric.
John Skorupski
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199587636
- eISBN:
- 9780191595394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 16 describes the epistemic circumstances in which a person is said to have warrant for a normative belief, or to have normative knowledge. It argues that an accurate description of our ...
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Chapter 16 describes the epistemic circumstances in which a person is said to have warrant for a normative belief, or to have normative knowledge. It argues that an accurate description of our epistemic practice is inconsistent with taking purely normative propositions to be substantially factual.Less
Chapter 16 describes the epistemic circumstances in which a person is said to have warrant for a normative belief, or to have normative knowledge. It argues that an accurate description of our epistemic practice is inconsistent with taking purely normative propositions to be substantially factual.
Anindya Ghose
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262036276
- eISBN:
- 9780262340427
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262036276.001.0001
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Marketing
Consumers create a data trail by tapping their phones; businesses can tap into this trail to harness the power of the more than three trillion dollar mobile economy. According to this book's author, ...
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Consumers create a data trail by tapping their phones; businesses can tap into this trail to harness the power of the more than three trillion dollar mobile economy. According to this book's author, this two-way exchange can benefit both customers and businesses. Drawing on extensive research and on a variety of real-world examples from companies including Alibaba, China Mobile, Coke, Facebook, SK Telecom, Telefónica, and Travelocity, the book describes some intriguingly contradictory consumer behavior: people seek spontaneity, but they are predictable; they find advertising annoying, but they fear missing out; they value their privacy, but they increasingly use personal data as currency. When mobile advertising is done well, the book argues, the smartphone plays the role of a personal concierge. The book identifies nine forces that shape consumer behavior, including time, crowdedness, trajectory, and weather, and examines how these forces operate, separately and in combination. It highlights the true influence mobile wields over shoppers, the behavioral and economic motivations behind that influence, and the lucrative opportunities it represents. In a world of artificial intelligence, augmented and virtual reality, wearable technologies, smart homes, and the Internet of Things, the future of the mobile economy seems limitless.Less
Consumers create a data trail by tapping their phones; businesses can tap into this trail to harness the power of the more than three trillion dollar mobile economy. According to this book's author, this two-way exchange can benefit both customers and businesses. Drawing on extensive research and on a variety of real-world examples from companies including Alibaba, China Mobile, Coke, Facebook, SK Telecom, Telefónica, and Travelocity, the book describes some intriguingly contradictory consumer behavior: people seek spontaneity, but they are predictable; they find advertising annoying, but they fear missing out; they value their privacy, but they increasingly use personal data as currency. When mobile advertising is done well, the book argues, the smartphone plays the role of a personal concierge. The book identifies nine forces that shape consumer behavior, including time, crowdedness, trajectory, and weather, and examines how these forces operate, separately and in combination. It highlights the true influence mobile wields over shoppers, the behavioral and economic motivations behind that influence, and the lucrative opportunities it represents. In a world of artificial intelligence, augmented and virtual reality, wearable technologies, smart homes, and the Internet of Things, the future of the mobile economy seems limitless.
Thomas Lewis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199595594
- eISBN:
- 9780191729072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199595594.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Religion and Society
Judging these early attempts to be inadequate, Hegel turns to post-Kantian philosophy as the only adequate basis for addressing the cultural and political problems of the modern world. Chapter Two ...
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Judging these early attempts to be inadequate, Hegel turns to post-Kantian philosophy as the only adequate basis for addressing the cultural and political problems of the modern world. Chapter Two sets out Hegel's confrontation with Kant's legacy and its centrality to his philosophical project as a whole. Hegel's reworking of the implications of thought's spontaneity and self-determination constitute a central task of his most daunting work, The Science of Logic. Articulating the task of Hegel's logic provides the systematic context essential to the interpretation of the philosophy of religion. In elaborating Hegel's relationship to Kant, this chapter bears the core of the argument that Hegel's thought is best interpreted as a distinctly post-Kantian project. It thus builds upon the work of scholars such as Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard to engage vibrant debates in contemporary Hegel scholarship over the nature of Hegel's idealismLess
Judging these early attempts to be inadequate, Hegel turns to post-Kantian philosophy as the only adequate basis for addressing the cultural and political problems of the modern world. Chapter Two sets out Hegel's confrontation with Kant's legacy and its centrality to his philosophical project as a whole. Hegel's reworking of the implications of thought's spontaneity and self-determination constitute a central task of his most daunting work, The Science of Logic. Articulating the task of Hegel's logic provides the systematic context essential to the interpretation of the philosophy of religion. In elaborating Hegel's relationship to Kant, this chapter bears the core of the argument that Hegel's thought is best interpreted as a distinctly post-Kantian project. It thus builds upon the work of scholars such as Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard to engage vibrant debates in contemporary Hegel scholarship over the nature of Hegel's idealism
Michael J. Murray
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195143744
- eISBN:
- 9780199835317
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195143744.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This essay argues that Leibniz’s conception of moral necessity is based on accounts of the notion developed by late-16th century Spanish Jesuits — that moral necessity entails the denial of ...
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This essay argues that Leibniz’s conception of moral necessity is based on accounts of the notion developed by late-16th century Spanish Jesuits — that moral necessity entails the denial of psychological determinism or the view that volitions are “causally necessitated by psychological antecedents”. An assertion of moral necessity presupposes the denial that an act of choice is either physically or causally determined by antecedent conditions, although such conditions may nonetheless be sufficient for choice. It presents evidence of anti-compatibilist sympathies in Leibniz’s thoughts.Less
This essay argues that Leibniz’s conception of moral necessity is based on accounts of the notion developed by late-16th century Spanish Jesuits — that moral necessity entails the denial of psychological determinism or the view that volitions are “causally necessitated by psychological antecedents”. An assertion of moral necessity presupposes the denial that an act of choice is either physically or causally determined by antecedent conditions, although such conditions may nonetheless be sufficient for choice. It presents evidence of anti-compatibilist sympathies in Leibniz’s thoughts.
Monte Ransome Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285303
- eISBN:
- 9780191603143
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285306.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Aristotle articulates his natural teleology in the context of a dialectical engagement with his predecessors, identifying each of them with a salient causal factor: Empedocles (luck or chance), ...
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Aristotle articulates his natural teleology in the context of a dialectical engagement with his predecessors, identifying each of them with a salient causal factor: Empedocles (luck or chance), Democritus (necessity or spontaneity), Anaxagoras (intelligence or mind), and Plato (art and form). Aristotle tries to co-opt each of these factors into his naturalistic teleology by an a fortiori argument: to the extent that luck, necessity, intelligence, or art is a cause, nature must even more so be considered a cause. For luck is an incidental cause of that which nature is an intrinsic cause, necessity is a conjoint cause of that which nature is a leading cause, and art imitates nature.Less
Aristotle articulates his natural teleology in the context of a dialectical engagement with his predecessors, identifying each of them with a salient causal factor: Empedocles (luck or chance), Democritus (necessity or spontaneity), Anaxagoras (intelligence or mind), and Plato (art and form). Aristotle tries to co-opt each of these factors into his naturalistic teleology by an a fortiori argument: to the extent that luck, necessity, intelligence, or art is a cause, nature must even more so be considered a cause. For luck is an incidental cause of that which nature is an intrinsic cause, necessity is a conjoint cause of that which nature is a leading cause, and art imitates nature.
Ze'ev Maghen
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199583157
- eISBN:
- 9780191728952
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583157.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
This chapter explains how apparent antitheses of law and exemplary individuality are, in fact, merely apparent, and how spirited, even revolutionary individuality is valued by both traditions. The ...
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This chapter explains how apparent antitheses of law and exemplary individuality are, in fact, merely apparent, and how spirited, even revolutionary individuality is valued by both traditions. The chapter considers the ways in which the comprehensive legalism of Judaic and Islamic thought actually is not an impediment to freedom or a constraining imposition on individuality. This approach to the relationship between law and freedom can do much to correct persistent misinterpretations of the Judaic conception of moral personality. It explicates the ways in which these faith-traditions are alert to the differences between what is required of people in regard to behaviour on the one hand, and the significance of the vigour of individual character, on the other. Moreover, the traditions have a realistic appreciation of the difference between aspiring to fashion a stable, virtuous social world, and trying to remake human nature or individual persons.Less
This chapter explains how apparent antitheses of law and exemplary individuality are, in fact, merely apparent, and how spirited, even revolutionary individuality is valued by both traditions. The chapter considers the ways in which the comprehensive legalism of Judaic and Islamic thought actually is not an impediment to freedom or a constraining imposition on individuality. This approach to the relationship between law and freedom can do much to correct persistent misinterpretations of the Judaic conception of moral personality. It explicates the ways in which these faith-traditions are alert to the differences between what is required of people in regard to behaviour on the one hand, and the significance of the vigour of individual character, on the other. Moreover, the traditions have a realistic appreciation of the difference between aspiring to fashion a stable, virtuous social world, and trying to remake human nature or individual persons.
Roland Kley
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198279167
- eISBN:
- 9780191684289
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198279167.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Friedrich A. Hayek defines social theory as the systematic study of spontaneous orders, maintaining that an individual may often be a member not only of the comprehensive spontaneous order of society ...
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Friedrich A. Hayek defines social theory as the systematic study of spontaneous orders, maintaining that an individual may often be a member not only of the comprehensive spontaneous order of society but also ‘of numerous other spontaneous sub-orders’. This chapter explores what further applications the idea of a spontaneous order may have in the social world. It considers the distinction between order as a network of interactions among numerous parties and order as an established system of rules or norms. It also offers various semantic and other reflections exploring the concepts of social order and spontaneity to be found at the root of the idea of a spontaneous social order. Five claims are discussed that represent the substance of the notion of a spontaneous economic order, and how far they may be applicable to a wider range of phenomena loosely qualifying as spontaneous social orders.Less
Friedrich A. Hayek defines social theory as the systematic study of spontaneous orders, maintaining that an individual may often be a member not only of the comprehensive spontaneous order of society but also ‘of numerous other spontaneous sub-orders’. This chapter explores what further applications the idea of a spontaneous order may have in the social world. It considers the distinction between order as a network of interactions among numerous parties and order as an established system of rules or norms. It also offers various semantic and other reflections exploring the concepts of social order and spontaneity to be found at the root of the idea of a spontaneous social order. Five claims are discussed that represent the substance of the notion of a spontaneous economic order, and how far they may be applicable to a wider range of phenomena loosely qualifying as spontaneous social orders.
Márton Dornbach
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780823268290
- eISBN:
- 9780823272495
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823268290.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, European Literature
Beginning with Kant, German idealist philosophers undertake a radical rethinking of the nature of human mindedness whose ramifications have yet to be fully assessed. At the heart of this project is ...
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Beginning with Kant, German idealist philosophers undertake a radical rethinking of the nature of human mindedness whose ramifications have yet to be fully assessed. At the heart of this project is the claim that the mind is fundamentally active and self-determining. In the wake of this innovation, it becomes difficult to account for the central fact that humans’ orientation in the world depends on culturally transmitted models of acting, feeling, and thinking. If the defining feature of the mind is self-induced activity, how much room, if any, remains for receptive openness toward the world of artefacts and meanings made by our fellow humans? This book shows that the need to avoid an antinomy between the claims of spontaneous activity and the indispensability of cultural transmission was a key driving force of idealist thought. Spanning the period from Kant to Hegel, the book examines the ways in which the German idealists envisioned and enacted cultural transmission. In chapters focusing on aesthetic experience, the historical character of philosophy, textual communication, and literary criticism, the book presents a series of interrelated attempts at understanding the conjunction of receptivity and spontaneous activity in the transmission of human-made models of mindedness. The book combines a reconstructive approach to the idealist legacy with attention to subsequent intellectual developments to argue that we cannot hope to keep our bearings in the contemporary intellectual landscape without the conceptual framework established by the idealists.Less
Beginning with Kant, German idealist philosophers undertake a radical rethinking of the nature of human mindedness whose ramifications have yet to be fully assessed. At the heart of this project is the claim that the mind is fundamentally active and self-determining. In the wake of this innovation, it becomes difficult to account for the central fact that humans’ orientation in the world depends on culturally transmitted models of acting, feeling, and thinking. If the defining feature of the mind is self-induced activity, how much room, if any, remains for receptive openness toward the world of artefacts and meanings made by our fellow humans? This book shows that the need to avoid an antinomy between the claims of spontaneous activity and the indispensability of cultural transmission was a key driving force of idealist thought. Spanning the period from Kant to Hegel, the book examines the ways in which the German idealists envisioned and enacted cultural transmission. In chapters focusing on aesthetic experience, the historical character of philosophy, textual communication, and literary criticism, the book presents a series of interrelated attempts at understanding the conjunction of receptivity and spontaneous activity in the transmission of human-made models of mindedness. The book combines a reconstructive approach to the idealist legacy with attention to subsequent intellectual developments to argue that we cannot hope to keep our bearings in the contemporary intellectual landscape without the conceptual framework established by the idealists.
Karl Ameriks
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238973
- eISBN:
- 9780191597022
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238975.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter concerns human freedom, a topic that Kant remarkably struck from the list of main topics in rational psychology, although right before the Critique, he had given it pride of place. ...
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This chapter concerns human freedom, a topic that Kant remarkably struck from the list of main topics in rational psychology, although right before the Critique, he had given it pride of place. Hence, it is crucial to see why the Critique neither presents nor directly criticizes the rationalist arguments for our freedom with which Kant was extremely familiar. Kant's views here must be understood in terms of clues from his lectures, and especially in the light of the different kinds of arguments to freedom, which he presents in his Groundwork (a ‘deduction’) and second Critique (a ‘fact of reason’). I connect the changes in his presentation there with the clearer expression, in the second ed. of the first Critique, of his anti‐rationalist doctrine of self‐knowledge (as dependent on knowing spatial things). In this way, I show how—to appreciate the full interconnection and development of Kant's theoretical and practical views on freedom—we need to go beyond readings by Beck, Paton, Henrich, and others.Less
This chapter concerns human freedom, a topic that Kant remarkably struck from the list of main topics in rational psychology, although right before the Critique, he had given it pride of place. Hence, it is crucial to see why the Critique neither presents nor directly criticizes the rationalist arguments for our freedom with which Kant was extremely familiar. Kant's views here must be understood in terms of clues from his lectures, and especially in the light of the different kinds of arguments to freedom, which he presents in his Groundwork (a ‘deduction’) and second Critique (a ‘fact of reason’). I connect the changes in his presentation there with the clearer expression, in the second ed. of the first Critique, of his anti‐rationalist doctrine of self‐knowledge (as dependent on knowing spatial things). In this way, I show how—to appreciate the full interconnection and development of Kant's theoretical and practical views on freedom—we need to go beyond readings by Beck, Paton, Henrich, and others.
