Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599325
- eISBN:
- 9780191741500
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of ...
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This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of Williams's work are explored and taken in new directions. The chapters are all concerned with Williams's work on the viability or wisdom of systematic moral theory, and his criticism, in particular, of moral theory's preoccupation with impartiality. Some chapters address Williams's work on moral luck, and his insistence that moral appraisals bear a disquieting sensitivity to various kinds of luck. One chapter makes further connections between moral luck and the ‘non-identity problem’ in reproductive ethics. Other chapters investigate Williams's defence of ‘internalism’ about reasons for action, which makes our reasons for action a function of our desires, projects, and psychological dispositions. One chapter attempts to plug a gap in Williams's theory which is created by Williams's deference to imagination, while another chapter connects these issues to Williams's accommodation of ‘thick’ ethical concepts as a source of knowledge and action-guidingness. A further chapter examines Williams's less-known work on the other central normative concept, ‘ought’. Another chapter takes a look at Williams's work on moral epistemology and intuitionism, comparing and contrasting his work with that of John McDowell, and Gerald Lang explores Williams's work on equality, discrimination, and interspecies relations in order to reach the conclusion, similar to Williams's, theory that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism.Less
This book comprises eleven chapters which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929–2003). Various themes of Williams's work are explored and taken in new directions. The chapters are all concerned with Williams's work on the viability or wisdom of systematic moral theory, and his criticism, in particular, of moral theory's preoccupation with impartiality. Some chapters address Williams's work on moral luck, and his insistence that moral appraisals bear a disquieting sensitivity to various kinds of luck. One chapter makes further connections between moral luck and the ‘non-identity problem’ in reproductive ethics. Other chapters investigate Williams's defence of ‘internalism’ about reasons for action, which makes our reasons for action a function of our desires, projects, and psychological dispositions. One chapter attempts to plug a gap in Williams's theory which is created by Williams's deference to imagination, while another chapter connects these issues to Williams's accommodation of ‘thick’ ethical concepts as a source of knowledge and action-guidingness. A further chapter examines Williams's less-known work on the other central normative concept, ‘ought’. Another chapter takes a look at Williams's work on moral epistemology and intuitionism, comparing and contrasting his work with that of John McDowell, and Gerald Lang explores Williams's work on equality, discrimination, and interspecies relations in order to reach the conclusion, similar to Williams's, theory that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism.
Jerome H. Barkow (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195130027
- eISBN:
- 9780199893874
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195130027.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology
Sociologists and social and cultural anthropologists have largely missed a major intellectual revolution of our time: the application to our own species of the Darwinian framework that has been ...
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Sociologists and social and cultural anthropologists have largely missed a major intellectual revolution of our time: the application to our own species of the Darwinian framework that has been spectacularly successful in explaining the behaviors and societies of every other species in the natural world. This volume demonstrates the utility of the evolutionary approach for the social sciences, while discussing the confusions and unfounded fears that have in the past made this scientific perspective seem so controversial. Our evolved psychology is foundational for fields ranging from feminism to criminology, an insight obscured by the endemic speciesism that has led the social sciences to nearly miss the revolution.Less
Sociologists and social and cultural anthropologists have largely missed a major intellectual revolution of our time: the application to our own species of the Darwinian framework that has been spectacularly successful in explaining the behaviors and societies of every other species in the natural world. This volume demonstrates the utility of the evolutionary approach for the social sciences, while discussing the confusions and unfounded fears that have in the past made this scientific perspective seem so controversial. Our evolved psychology is foundational for fields ranging from feminism to criminology, an insight obscured by the endemic speciesism that has led the social sciences to nearly miss the revolution.
Larry Carbone
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195161960
- eISBN:
- 9780199790067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161960.003.0003
- Subject:
- Biology, Animal Biology
This chapter presents select influential philosophical approaches to animal welfare, to see how they have and how they could enlighten animal welfare policy. Topics discussed include the concept of ...
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This chapter presents select influential philosophical approaches to animal welfare, to see how they have and how they could enlighten animal welfare policy. Topics discussed include the concept of speciesism, animal minds and animal ethics, “marginal cases” illuminate philosophers' reasoning, and cost and benefit analysis in animal research ethics.Less
This chapter presents select influential philosophical approaches to animal welfare, to see how they have and how they could enlighten animal welfare policy. Topics discussed include the concept of speciesism, animal minds and animal ethics, “marginal cases” illuminate philosophers' reasoning, and cost and benefit analysis in animal research ethics.
Paul Waldau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145717
- eISBN:
- 9780199834792
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145712.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
This is a study of the ways in which animals have been viewed in the Buddhist and Christian religious traditions. The concept of speciesism is used to explore basic questions about which animals, ...
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This is a study of the ways in which animals have been viewed in the Buddhist and Christian religious traditions. The concept of speciesism is used to explore basic questions about which animals, human or otherwise, were significant to early Buddhists and Christians. The volume also seeks to establish a general method of assessing religious traditions’ relationship to cultures’ and believers’ views of the living beings outside the human species. Focusing on language choices, science and other empirical data, ethics, and mechanisms of cultural transmission, the volume assesses the earliest strata of, first, Buddhist tradition and then Christian tradition. Drawing on scriptures and interpretive traditions in Christianity and Buddhism, the volume argues that decisions about human ethical responsibilities in each religion are deeply rooted in ancient understandings of the place of humans in the world and our relationships with other animals. Assessing the reasoning and discourse patterns about nonhuman animals, especially in light of new perspectives that have emerged in reliance on the patient observation of the lives of the more complicated of nonhuman animals (elephants, dolphins, whales, and the nonhuman great apes), the volume attempts to provide a foundation for open‐minded discussions about possible relations with life outside the human species.Less
This is a study of the ways in which animals have been viewed in the Buddhist and Christian religious traditions. The concept of speciesism is used to explore basic questions about which animals, human or otherwise, were significant to early Buddhists and Christians. The volume also seeks to establish a general method of assessing religious traditions’ relationship to cultures’ and believers’ views of the living beings outside the human species. Focusing on language choices, science and other empirical data, ethics, and mechanisms of cultural transmission, the volume assesses the earliest strata of, first, Buddhist tradition and then Christian tradition. Drawing on scriptures and interpretive traditions in Christianity and Buddhism, the volume argues that decisions about human ethical responsibilities in each religion are deeply rooted in ancient understandings of the place of humans in the world and our relationships with other animals. Assessing the reasoning and discourse patterns about nonhuman animals, especially in light of new perspectives that have emerged in reliance on the patient observation of the lives of the more complicated of nonhuman animals (elephants, dolphins, whales, and the nonhuman great apes), the volume attempts to provide a foundation for open‐minded discussions about possible relations with life outside the human species.
Susan Wolf
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198289647
- eISBN:
- 9780191596698
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198289642.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
Wolf endorses Martha Nussbaum's stance and offers constructive criticism of some of its ambiguities and complications. Wolf's caveats point out that (1) Nussbaum's discussion of ‘human beings’ (as ...
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Wolf endorses Martha Nussbaum's stance and offers constructive criticism of some of its ambiguities and complications. Wolf's caveats point out that (1) Nussbaum's discussion of ‘human beings’ (as opposed to ‘persons’) unnecessarily risks biology‐linked issues of speciesism and sexism; (2) Nussbaum's list of essential human capabilities needs clarification in its application to avoid misdirected objections; (3) Nussbaum's development ethic require further elaboration to meet questions of how to set priorities and make trade‐offs among people or goods; and (4) Nussbaum's one‐humanity‐fits‐all claim does not capture the historical and cultural contingency and inevitability of gender differentiation.Less
Wolf endorses Martha Nussbaum's stance and offers constructive criticism of some of its ambiguities and complications. Wolf's caveats point out that (1) Nussbaum's discussion of ‘human beings’ (as opposed to ‘persons’) unnecessarily risks biology‐linked issues of speciesism and sexism; (2) Nussbaum's list of essential human capabilities needs clarification in its application to avoid misdirected objections; (3) Nussbaum's development ethic require further elaboration to meet questions of how to set priorities and make trade‐offs among people or goods; and (4) Nussbaum's one‐humanity‐fits‐all claim does not capture the historical and cultural contingency and inevitability of gender differentiation.
Cora Diamond
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195305104
- eISBN:
- 9780199850556
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305104.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
This chapter presents commentaries on Peter Singer's approach to animal rights. It contends that Singer's attack on ‘speciesism’ mischaracterises the moral issues at stake and contends that if people ...
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This chapter presents commentaries on Peter Singer's approach to animal rights. It contends that Singer's attack on ‘speciesism’ mischaracterises the moral issues at stake and contends that if people are to be on the side of animals, it must be for reasons different from those used by Singer and others who object to the current human use and mistreatment of animals. The chapter argues against the call to stop the killing of animals for food and the use of animals in scientific research.Less
This chapter presents commentaries on Peter Singer's approach to animal rights. It contends that Singer's attack on ‘speciesism’ mischaracterises the moral issues at stake and contends that if people are to be on the side of animals, it must be for reasons different from those used by Singer and others who object to the current human use and mistreatment of animals. The chapter argues against the call to stop the killing of animals for food and the use of animals in scientific research.
Richard A. Epstein
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195305104
- eISBN:
- 9780199850556
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305104.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
This chapter focuses on the two conceptions of animals: as objects and as subjects. It examines the historical rules that comprised the law of animals and which set the backdrop for the modern ...
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This chapter focuses on the two conceptions of animals: as objects and as subjects. It examines the historical rules that comprised the law of animals and which set the backdrop for the modern reforms, and explores the moral status of animals and their relationship to women, children, and slaves, under the traditional synthesis of legal rights. The chapter discusses the benefits to animals which arise from the system of human ownership and shows that the historical accounts of animals did not rest on any fundamental misconception as to their capacities, but on the simple but powerful proposition that the survival and advancement of human civilization depended on their domestication and use. It concludes that animals should continue to be treated as property and that a form of speciesism is justified.Less
This chapter focuses on the two conceptions of animals: as objects and as subjects. It examines the historical rules that comprised the law of animals and which set the backdrop for the modern reforms, and explores the moral status of animals and their relationship to women, children, and slaves, under the traditional synthesis of legal rights. The chapter discusses the benefits to animals which arise from the system of human ownership and shows that the historical accounts of animals did not rest on any fundamental misconception as to their capacities, but on the simple but powerful proposition that the survival and advancement of human civilization depended on their domestication and use. It concludes that animals should continue to be treated as property and that a form of speciesism is justified.
Paul Waldau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145717
- eISBN:
- 9780199834792
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145712.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
Focuses on the origin, history, and conceptual structure of “speciesism”. The central question asked is whether the notion of speciesism, under which inclusion of all humans within the purview of ...
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Focuses on the origin, history, and conceptual structure of “speciesism”. The central question asked is whether the notion of speciesism, under which inclusion of all humans within the purview of moral protections is paired with exclusion of all nonhumans from similar fundamental protections, is a valuable interpretive tool in discerning features of general views about nonhuman animals. Included is an overview of many uses of the term “speciesism,” including the seminal use by Peter Singer. The prevalence of ideology, in the sense of bias or prejudgment, in discussions regarding nonhuman animals is also identified. A working definition of “speciesism” is proposed: “Speciesism is the inclusion of all human animals within, and the exclusion of all other animals from, the moral circle.”Less
Focuses on the origin, history, and conceptual structure of “speciesism”. The central question asked is whether the notion of speciesism, under which inclusion of all humans within the purview of moral protections is paired with exclusion of all nonhumans from similar fundamental protections, is a valuable interpretive tool in discerning features of general views about nonhuman animals. Included is an overview of many uses of the term “speciesism,” including the seminal use by Peter Singer. The prevalence of ideology, in the sense of bias or prejudgment, in discussions regarding nonhuman animals is also identified. A working definition of “speciesism” is proposed: “Speciesism is the inclusion of all human animals within, and the exclusion of all other animals from, the moral circle.”
Paul Waldau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145717
- eISBN:
- 9780199834792
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145712.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
Criticisms of “speciesism” by various philosophers are engaged to provide a test for assessing limitations of the notion generally. Analogies of speciesism to racism and sexism are evaluated. The ...
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Criticisms of “speciesism” by various philosophers are engaged to provide a test for assessing limitations of the notion generally. Analogies of speciesism to racism and sexism are evaluated. The notion of “persons” is discussed in terms of Immanuel Kant's division of persons and things. Duty of inquiry as an obligation of ethics, and the notion of “species loyalty” or “species bond” is analyzed as a cultural artifact or conventionalism.Less
Criticisms of “speciesism” by various philosophers are engaged to provide a test for assessing limitations of the notion generally. Analogies of speciesism to racism and sexism are evaluated. The notion of “persons” is discussed in terms of Immanuel Kant's division of persons and things. Duty of inquiry as an obligation of ethics, and the notion of “species loyalty” or “species bond” is analyzed as a cultural artifact or conventionalism.
Donna Yarri
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195181791
- eISBN:
- 9780199835744
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195181794.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
The question of animal minds is a central one in the debate on the ethical treatment of animals in general, and on the issue of animal experimentation in particular. This chapter argues that animals ...
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The question of animal minds is a central one in the debate on the ethical treatment of animals in general, and on the issue of animal experimentation in particular. This chapter argues that animals possess at least rudimentary levels of cognition, including rationality, language, intelligence, consciousness, beliefs and desires, autonomy, and personhood. The existence of marginal humans, who lack to some degree the cognition of normal adult humans, challenges the notion of speciesism, in which automatic favor is granted to or denied to one simply by virtue of species membership. Thus, the conclusion is reached that the differences between humans and animals are differences of degree rather than differences of kind.Less
The question of animal minds is a central one in the debate on the ethical treatment of animals in general, and on the issue of animal experimentation in particular. This chapter argues that animals possess at least rudimentary levels of cognition, including rationality, language, intelligence, consciousness, beliefs and desires, autonomy, and personhood. The existence of marginal humans, who lack to some degree the cognition of normal adult humans, challenges the notion of speciesism, in which automatic favor is granted to or denied to one simply by virtue of species membership. Thus, the conclusion is reached that the differences between humans and animals are differences of degree rather than differences of kind.
Gerald Lang
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599325
- eISBN:
- 9780191741500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Drawing on some of Bernard Williams's work, especially his essays ‘The Idea of Equality’ and ‘The Human Prejudice’, this chapter argues that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism, and that ...
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Drawing on some of Bernard Williams's work, especially his essays ‘The Idea of Equality’ and ‘The Human Prejudice’, this chapter argues that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism, and that much of the philosophical apparatus which has been mobilized on behalf of anti-speciesism, such as moral individualism and the argument from marginal cases, is unsound. Moral individualists hold that the standards of appropriate ethical treatment of a creature must display fundamental sensitivity to only the intrinsic non-relational properties exemplified by that creature. But this doctrine cannot tell us, all by itself, when a creature has been unfortunate, and hence deserving of protection or compensation. Those questions can only be settled by locating the creature in a community of fellow creatures, which define the relevant standards of flourishing and misfortune. It is further contended that there is nothing unintelligible or morally obnoxious about defining these communities in species-sensitive ways, and that our understanding of the wrongness of racism and sexism is actually dependent on the background thought that those individuals who are victimized by racist or sexist treatment belong to a particular community: the human community.Less
Drawing on some of Bernard Williams's work, especially his essays ‘The Idea of Equality’ and ‘The Human Prejudice’, this chapter argues that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism, and that much of the philosophical apparatus which has been mobilized on behalf of anti-speciesism, such as moral individualism and the argument from marginal cases, is unsound. Moral individualists hold that the standards of appropriate ethical treatment of a creature must display fundamental sensitivity to only the intrinsic non-relational properties exemplified by that creature. But this doctrine cannot tell us, all by itself, when a creature has been unfortunate, and hence deserving of protection or compensation. Those questions can only be settled by locating the creature in a community of fellow creatures, which define the relevant standards of flourishing and misfortune. It is further contended that there is nothing unintelligible or morally obnoxious about defining these communities in species-sensitive ways, and that our understanding of the wrongness of racism and sexism is actually dependent on the background thought that those individuals who are victimized by racist or sexist treatment belong to a particular community: the human community.
Catherine Osborne
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199282067
- eISBN:
- 9780191712944
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282067.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter looks at the idea that some beasts threaten human well being, while others are conducive towards it. The views of Hermarchus on the need to wage war on the undesirable creatures, and to ...
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This chapter looks at the idea that some beasts threaten human well being, while others are conducive towards it. The views of Hermarchus on the need to wage war on the undesirable creatures, and to protect those that are useful are examined, along with his and other ancient attempts to analyse morality as based on rules drawn up on anthropocentric utilitarian lines. This utilitarian account of morality is compared with that of Socrates to indicate why Socrates' claim that it is beneficial to the agent to act morally well is not a utilitarian account, because for Socrates the benefit is explained by the moral goodness, whereas for the Utilitarian the moral goodness is explained by the benefit.Less
This chapter looks at the idea that some beasts threaten human well being, while others are conducive towards it. The views of Hermarchus on the need to wage war on the undesirable creatures, and to protect those that are useful are examined, along with his and other ancient attempts to analyse morality as based on rules drawn up on anthropocentric utilitarian lines. This utilitarian account of morality is compared with that of Socrates to indicate why Socrates' claim that it is beneficial to the agent to act morally well is not a utilitarian account, because for Socrates the benefit is explained by the moral goodness, whereas for the Utilitarian the moral goodness is explained by the benefit.
Kathleen V. Wilkes
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240808
- eISBN:
- 9780191680281
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240808.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the condition of the insane adult. It explores the scope of the condition that persons are rational beings. It looks at the sort of moral and practical stance appropriate to ...
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This chapter examines the condition of the insane adult. It explores the scope of the condition that persons are rational beings. It looks at the sort of moral and practical stance appropriate to take to them. It looks at the various forms of breakdown of rationality in an attempt to discover the kind of rationality that one might require from any non-human candidate for personhood. The problem of defining what it is in which human rationality consists arises. There are also implications for the plausible view that the notion of personhood is, to some extent, anthropologically, socially, and culturally determined.Less
This chapter examines the condition of the insane adult. It explores the scope of the condition that persons are rational beings. It looks at the sort of moral and practical stance appropriate to take to them. It looks at the various forms of breakdown of rationality in an attempt to discover the kind of rationality that one might require from any non-human candidate for personhood. The problem of defining what it is in which human rationality consists arises. There are also implications for the plausible view that the notion of personhood is, to some extent, anthropologically, socially, and culturally determined.
Paola Cavalieri
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195143805
- eISBN:
- 9780199833122
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195143809.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
What we call moral progress can for the most part be seen as the history of the replacement of hierarchical visions in favor of equality. Yet, we currently use nonhuman animals as means to our ends – ...
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What we call moral progress can for the most part be seen as the history of the replacement of hierarchical visions in favor of equality. Yet, we currently use nonhuman animals as means to our ends – in fact, we treat them in ways that we would deem profoundly immoral were they human beings. Is such a position warranted? This book's aim is to show that it is not. I argue that, just like the past justifications of intra‐human discrimination, the justifications of discrimination against nonhumans are indefensible. I first discuss the problem of moral status in the context of rational, nonreligious ethics; then, after criticizing the philosophical sources of the present double standards, I challenge both the appeal to species membership and the appeal to mental complexity as defenses of humanism – the limiting of equal basic moral protection to human beings. I then turn to the task of redefining the moral community without inconsistency or prejudice. The argument I put forward is not a freestanding one, but rather is derived from the most universally accepted of contemporary ethical doctrines – human rights theory. What I claim is that, if we take the egalitarianism of such theory seriously, we cannot but extend the institutionalized protection of the basic interests in life, freedom, and welfare, to (most) nonhuman animals. I conclude that, at the social level, such a reform would require the constitutional abolition of the mere property status of nonhuman animals, and the prohibition of all the practices that are today made possible by such status.Less
What we call moral progress can for the most part be seen as the history of the replacement of hierarchical visions in favor of equality. Yet, we currently use nonhuman animals as means to our ends – in fact, we treat them in ways that we would deem profoundly immoral were they human beings. Is such a position warranted? This book's aim is to show that it is not. I argue that, just like the past justifications of intra‐human discrimination, the justifications of discrimination against nonhumans are indefensible. I first discuss the problem of moral status in the context of rational, nonreligious ethics; then, after criticizing the philosophical sources of the present double standards, I challenge both the appeal to species membership and the appeal to mental complexity as defenses of humanism – the limiting of equal basic moral protection to human beings. I then turn to the task of redefining the moral community without inconsistency or prejudice. The argument I put forward is not a freestanding one, but rather is derived from the most universally accepted of contemporary ethical doctrines – human rights theory. What I claim is that, if we take the egalitarianism of such theory seriously, we cannot but extend the institutionalized protection of the basic interests in life, freedom, and welfare, to (most) nonhuman animals. I conclude that, at the social level, such a reform would require the constitutional abolition of the mere property status of nonhuman animals, and the prohibition of all the practices that are today made possible by such status.
Jerome H. Barkow
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195130027
- eISBN:
- 9780199893874
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195130027.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology
Sociology and social-cultural anthropology have trailed other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences in engaging with the evolution revolution. This is in part because of the horrific ...
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Sociology and social-cultural anthropology have trailed other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences in engaging with the evolution revolution. This is in part because of the horrific misuse in the past of Darwinian theories; in part because of an adherence to a Cartesian folk psychology in which body but not mind can be produced by evolution; and in part because of a misunderstanding of Durkheimian views of psychology and biology. The vertical-compatible approach makes it clear that evolutionary and social science accounts, being at different levels of organization, can never be in competition with one another. An evolutionary perspective is not the antithesis of social constructionism but, in fact, requires it and easily accommodates the frequent maladaptations found in social behavior. An evolutionary praxis can explain why, to the dismay of “moral mission” social scientists, yesterday's good guys are so often today's bad guys.Less
Sociology and social-cultural anthropology have trailed other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences in engaging with the evolution revolution. This is in part because of the horrific misuse in the past of Darwinian theories; in part because of an adherence to a Cartesian folk psychology in which body but not mind can be produced by evolution; and in part because of a misunderstanding of Durkheimian views of psychology and biology. The vertical-compatible approach makes it clear that evolutionary and social science accounts, being at different levels of organization, can never be in competition with one another. An evolutionary perspective is not the antithesis of social constructionism but, in fact, requires it and easily accommodates the frequent maladaptations found in social behavior. An evolutionary praxis can explain why, to the dismay of “moral mission” social scientists, yesterday's good guys are so often today's bad guys.
Paola Cavalieri
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195143805
- eISBN:
- 9780199833122
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195143809.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Despite bioethical discussions of its moral irrelevance, membership in the species Homo sapiens is still appealed to as a criterion for access to superior moral status. Along the lines of the authors ...
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Despite bioethical discussions of its moral irrelevance, membership in the species Homo sapiens is still appealed to as a criterion for access to superior moral status. Along the lines of the authors who have equated ”speciesism” with racism and sexism, I challenge this view on several grounds. I claim that biological characteristics cannot carry direct moral weight. I maintain that species membership cannot be referred to as a mark of a more complex mental endowment because some nonparadigmatic human beings are not so endowed. Finally, I argue that relational defenses of the moral relevance of species membership are either prejudiced or circular.Less
Despite bioethical discussions of its moral irrelevance, membership in the species Homo sapiens is still appealed to as a criterion for access to superior moral status. Along the lines of the authors who have equated ”speciesism” with racism and sexism, I challenge this view on several grounds. I claim that biological characteristics cannot carry direct moral weight. I maintain that species membership cannot be referred to as a mark of a more complex mental endowment because some nonparadigmatic human beings are not so endowed. Finally, I argue that relational defenses of the moral relevance of species membership are either prejudiced or circular.
Stuart J. Youngner
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199682676
- eISBN:
- 9780191763168
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682676.003.0048
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
When scholars grant wisdom to their own emotions, they become advocates (political or religious) pushing some cause or another. Dr. Mills gives us no way of deciding which emotions should be given ...
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When scholars grant wisdom to their own emotions, they become advocates (political or religious) pushing some cause or another. Dr. Mills gives us no way of deciding which emotions should be given prominence in moral decision-making. When she touts her own favourite form of repugnance (against state-sponsored torture) without argument, she abandons her role as scholar. Dr. Ikeda goes too far when he seems to equate the mental abilities of people with Down’s Syndrome with those of chimpanzees. Certainly, many of the former outperform all of the latter when it comes to intelligence, compassion, and social sophistication. PVS or anencephaly would make better examples than Down’s Syndrome for the argument Ikeda wishes to make.Less
When scholars grant wisdom to their own emotions, they become advocates (political or religious) pushing some cause or another. Dr. Mills gives us no way of deciding which emotions should be given prominence in moral decision-making. When she touts her own favourite form of repugnance (against state-sponsored torture) without argument, she abandons her role as scholar. Dr. Ikeda goes too far when he seems to equate the mental abilities of people with Down’s Syndrome with those of chimpanzees. Certainly, many of the former outperform all of the latter when it comes to intelligence, compassion, and social sophistication. PVS or anencephaly would make better examples than Down’s Syndrome for the argument Ikeda wishes to make.
Roger Teichmann
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199606177
- eISBN:
- 9780191729461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606177.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Reasons for action are elicited by such a question as, ‘Why are you doing that?’, the rationale for which depends on the context in which it is asked. Contexts of enquiry have for their background a ...
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Reasons for action are elicited by such a question as, ‘Why are you doing that?’, the rationale for which depends on the context in which it is asked. Contexts of enquiry have for their background a set of humanly intelligible needs and proclivities, including pre-rational impulses and attitudes, some of which constitute ethical bedrock. Hence practical rationality is necessarily anthropocentric, and critiques of ‘speciesism’ are misguided; though to the extent that we can feel those same pre-rational impulses towards animals, many ethical concepts apply to them. Impulses and attitudes of the sort in question are emotions, and are not to be conceived of as ‘inner states’, but as manifest in syndromes of behaviour, in a way that enables us to see how action and judgement are interconnected (pace Hume). Ethical judgement is informed by various ‘pictures’, e.g. of the human being, and such pictures can be incomplete or distorted.Less
Reasons for action are elicited by such a question as, ‘Why are you doing that?’, the rationale for which depends on the context in which it is asked. Contexts of enquiry have for their background a set of humanly intelligible needs and proclivities, including pre-rational impulses and attitudes, some of which constitute ethical bedrock. Hence practical rationality is necessarily anthropocentric, and critiques of ‘speciesism’ are misguided; though to the extent that we can feel those same pre-rational impulses towards animals, many ethical concepts apply to them. Impulses and attitudes of the sort in question are emotions, and are not to be conceived of as ‘inner states’, but as manifest in syndromes of behaviour, in a way that enables us to see how action and judgement are interconnected (pace Hume). Ethical judgement is informed by various ‘pictures’, e.g. of the human being, and such pictures can be incomplete or distorted.
Angus Nurse and Tanya Wyatt
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9781529204346
- eISBN:
- 9781529204384
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Policy Press
- DOI:
- 10.1332/policypress/9781529204346.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Environmental and Energy Law
This chapter defines wildlife criminology as a criminology concerned not only with wildlife trafficking, but considers criminological perspectives on animals and wildlife within a broader context. ...
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This chapter defines wildlife criminology as a criminology concerned not only with wildlife trafficking, but considers criminological perspectives on animals and wildlife within a broader context. The introduction provides a definition of wildlife as constituting animals living primarily outside human control or influence; thus distinguished from companion animals who are directly dependent on humans for food and shelter. However, wild non-human animals are affected by human activity in a variety of ways from trafficking in wildlife, through to destruction of habitat, and development that impacts directly on wildlife. Thus, this chapter explains that the book’s focus is on a wildlife criminology that considers a wide range of unlawful and deviant acts that impact on and harm wildlife. It introduces the four interconnected themes used to explore crimes and harms against wildlife - commodification and exploitation, violence, rights, and speciesism and othering.Less
This chapter defines wildlife criminology as a criminology concerned not only with wildlife trafficking, but considers criminological perspectives on animals and wildlife within a broader context. The introduction provides a definition of wildlife as constituting animals living primarily outside human control or influence; thus distinguished from companion animals who are directly dependent on humans for food and shelter. However, wild non-human animals are affected by human activity in a variety of ways from trafficking in wildlife, through to destruction of habitat, and development that impacts directly on wildlife. Thus, this chapter explains that the book’s focus is on a wildlife criminology that considers a wide range of unlawful and deviant acts that impact on and harm wildlife. It introduces the four interconnected themes used to explore crimes and harms against wildlife - commodification and exploitation, violence, rights, and speciesism and othering.
Reiko Ohnuma
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190637545
- eISBN:
- 9780190637576
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190637545.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
This chapter examines the animal realm of rebirth in early Buddhist doctrine and cosmology and shows that the animal rebirth was characterized very negatively in comparison to rebirth as a human. ...
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This chapter examines the animal realm of rebirth in early Buddhist doctrine and cosmology and shows that the animal rebirth was characterized very negatively in comparison to rebirth as a human. Rebirth as an animal was seen as an “unfortunate destiny” (Skt. durgati) brought about by negative karma and afflicted by extreme suffering. Constantly engaged in preying upon one another and pursuing mindless sex and violence, animals are distinguished from human beings by their lack of the higher mental faculties (Skt. prajñā), their lack of moral agency, and their inability to engage in spiritual cultivation. The distinction between human beings and animals is categorical in nature and might be described as a form of speciesism.Less
This chapter examines the animal realm of rebirth in early Buddhist doctrine and cosmology and shows that the animal rebirth was characterized very negatively in comparison to rebirth as a human. Rebirth as an animal was seen as an “unfortunate destiny” (Skt. durgati) brought about by negative karma and afflicted by extreme suffering. Constantly engaged in preying upon one another and pursuing mindless sex and violence, animals are distinguished from human beings by their lack of the higher mental faculties (Skt. prajñā), their lack of moral agency, and their inability to engage in spiritual cultivation. The distinction between human beings and animals is categorical in nature and might be described as a form of speciesism.
