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Nationality claims are often seen as zero‐sum politics involving incompatible conceptions of the polity. Nationalism and self‐determination are seen as equivalent to separatism. Rethinking the concepts of nationality, self‐determination, and sovereignty and placing them in a historic context allows us to treat them as more tractable and as a form of politics. This is done through a study of the UK, Spain, Belgium, and Canada. Traditions of shared sovereignty are rediscovered. Analysis of the demands of minority nationalisms shows that these do not always entail separate statehood. Public opinion is more open than often assumed. Asymmetrical constitutional arrangements provide a means of accommodating plural national claims. The emerging European polity is a model for a post‐sovereign order in which legal pluralism and constitutional diversity can accommodate multiple nationality claims.

This book advances a novel theory of international justice that combines the orthodox liberal notion that the lives of individuals are what ultimately matter morally with the putatively antiliberal idea of an irreducibly collective right of self‐governance. The individual and his or her rights are placed at center stage insofar as political states are judged legitimate if they adequately protect the human rights of their constituents and respect the rights of all others. Yet, the book argues that legitimate states have a moral right to self‐determination and that this right is inherently collective, irreducible to the individual rights of the persons who constitute them. Exploring the implications of these ideas, the book addresses issues pertaining to democracy, secession, international criminal law, armed intervention, political assassination, global distributive justice, and immigration. A number of the positions taken in the book run against the grain of current academic opinion: there is no human right to democracy; separatist groups can be morally entitled to secede from legitimate states; the fact that it is a matter of brute luck whether one is born in a wealthy state or a poorer one does not mean that economic inequalities across states must be minimized or even kept within certain limits; most existing states have no right against armed intervention; and it is morally permissible for a legitimate state to exclude all would‐be immigrants.

This book presents the most plausible reading of Thomas Hobbes's moral and political theory based on his book, Leviathan. Hobbes constructs a political theory that bases unlimited political authority on unlimited individualism. The conclusion requires the premiss; anything less than unlimited individualism would justify only limited political authority. But the premiss is too strong for the conclusions; as this book shows, from unlimited individualism only anarchy follows. The theory is a failure. But it has two outstanding merits. First of all, Hobbes introduces a number of important moral and political concepts that deserve our attention. Obligation is his basic moral concept, while authorisation is his basic political concept. Hobbes relies neither on the goodwill of men – their willingness to consider each other's interests for their own sake, and not as means to self-satisfaction – nor on the efficacy of institutions, as the means of both concentrating and limiting political power. Aside from political and moral theory, the book explores Hobbes's views on the nature of man, sovereignty, and God.

What is the federal philosophy inspiring the structure of European law? The federal principle stands for constitutional arrangements that find “unity in diversity”. The two most influential manifestations of the federal principle emerged under the names of “dual” and “cooperative” federalism in the constitutional history of the United States of America. Dual federalism is based on the idea that the federal government and the State governments are co-equals and each is legislating in a separate sphere. Cooperative federalism, on the other hand, stands for the thought that both governments legislate in the same sphere. They are hierarchically arranged and complement each other in solving a social problem. Can the European Union be understood in federal terms? The book’s General Part introduces three constitutional traditions of the federal idea. Following the American tradition, the European Union is defined as a Federation of States as it stands on the “middle ground” between international and national law.

The issue of humanitarian intervention has generated one of the most heated debates in international relations over the past decade, for both theorists and practitioners. At its heart is the alleged tension between the principle of state sovereignty, and the evolving norms related to individual human rights. This edited collection examines the challenges to international society posed by humanitarian intervention in a post-September 11th world. It brings scholars of law, philosophy, and international relations together with those who have actively engaged in cases of intervention, in order to examine the legitimacy and consequences of the use of military force for humanitarian purposes. The book demonstrates why humanitarian intervention continues to be a controversial question not only for the United Nations but also for Western states and humanitarian organisations.

The European Union's (EU) market integration project has dramatically altered economic activity around Europe. This book presents evidence on how trade has increased, jobs have been created, and European business has been reorganized. The changes in the economy have been accompanied by dramatic changes in how people from different societies interact. This book argues that these changes have produced a truly transnational European society. The book explores the nature of that society and its relationship to the creation of a European identity, popular culture, and politics. Much of the current political conflict around Europe can be attributed to who is and who is not involved in European society. Business owners, managers, professionals, white-collar workers, the educated, and the young have all benefited from European economic integration, specifically by interacting more and more with their counterparts in other societies. They tend to think of themselves as Europeans. Older, poorer, less educated, and blue-collar citizens have benefited less. They view the EU as intrusive on national sovereignty, or they fear its pro-business orientation will overwhelm the national welfare states. They have maintained national identities. There is a third group of mainly-middle class citizens who see the EU in mostly positive terms and sometimes — but not always — think of themselves as Europeans. It is this swing group that is most critical for the future of the European project. If they favor more European cooperation, politicians will oblige. But, if they prefer that policies remain wedded to the nation, European cooperation will stall.

To what extent and in what ways have European integration redrawn the boundaries of national welfare states? What are the effects of such redrawing? These questions are interesting and relevant because boundaries “count”: they are a pre-requisite for bonding individuals, groups, and territorial units, and for activating or strengthening their dispositions to share. Historically, welfare state formation can be read as a process of boundary-building — essentially through the establishment of compulsory public insurance schemes. European integration has prompted a reversal of this process: free movement and competition rules have in fact started to challenge the traditional bounding prerogatives of the nation-state in the social sphere. Today, the EU constrains not only the scope and content of bounding decisions (who is entitled to share what), but also the very “right to bound” in the first place. Such constraints have far reaching economic and financial implications. But their social and political implications may be even greater, given the importance of nation-based social sharing for material life chances, cultural identities and legitimation dynamics. As shown by the chapters in this book, reshuffling the “boundaries of welfare” can destabilise the basic architecture of Europe’s national societies and political systems. In order to counter this destabilisation, a carefully designed strategy of institutional reform is needed, capable of reconciling “solidarity” and “Europe” through stronger citizenship rights and more socially friendly regulatory instruments.

The U.S. Constitution found in school textbooks and under glass in Washington is not the one enforced today by the Supreme Court. This book argues that since the nation's founding, but especially since the 1930s, the courts have been cutting holes in the original Constitution and its amendments to eliminate the parts that protect liberty from the power of government. From the Commerce Clause, to the Necessary and Proper Clause, to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has rendered each of these provisions toothless. In the process, the written Constitution has been lost. This book establishes the original meaning of these lost clauses and offers a practical way to restore them to their central role in constraining government: adopting a “presumption of liberty” to give the benefit of the doubt to citizens when laws restrict their rightful exercises of liberty. It also provides a new, realistic and philosophically rigorous theory of constitutional legitimacy that justifies both interpreting the Constitution according to its original meaning and, where that meaning is vague or open-ended, construing it so as to better protect the rights retained by the people. The book disputes the conventional wisdom, posing a powerful challenge to which others must now respond. This updated edition features an afterword with further reflections on individual popular sovereignty, originalist interpretation, judicial engagement, and the gravitational force that original meaning has exerted on the Supreme Court in several recent cases.

The principal aim of this book is to elucidate what freedom, sovereignty, and autonomy mean for Nietzsche and what philosophical resources he gives us to re-think these crucial concepts. A related aim is to examine how Nietzsche connects these concepts to his thoughts about life-affirmation, self-love, promise-making, agency, the ‘will to nothingness’, and the ‘eternal recurrence’, as well as to his search for a ‘genealogical’ understanding of morality. These twelve chapters by leading Nietzsche scholars ask such key questions as: Can we reconcile his rejection of free will with his positive invocations of the notion of free will? How does Nietzsche's celebration of freedom and free spirits sit with his claim that we all have an unchangeable fate? What is the relation between his concepts of freedom and self-overcoming?