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This chapter suggests that the rabbinic discourse of minut offers an important point of view on the social-historical meaning of discourses of identity more broadly. For minut, in Tannaitic sources, is treated no less as a social and communal deviance than as a doctrinal challenge. This indicates that the problem with heretics, although frequently presented in relation to their religious beliefs and the doctrines they embrace, may be located, in fact, in the realm of social and communal concerns. What motivates the rabbinic discourse of minut is a concern for social and communal cohesion. It is characterized by concepts of social solidarity and belonging, no less than by a concept of “correct belief.”

This paper seeks to articulate a conception of justice in reparations for victims of human rights violations when the aim is to repair a large number of cases, as opposed to individual, isolated cases. It starts with an effort to establish some semantic clarity by trying to distinguish between two different contexts for the use of the term “reparations”. It discusses some of the problems with merely transplanting the ideal of compensation in proportion to harm from its natural home in the resolution of individual judicial cases, and using it as a standard of justice for massive reparations programs. Instead, it argues in favor of thinking about justice in the context of massive cases in terms of the achievement of three goals, namely, recognition, civic trust, and social solidarity — three goals that are intimately related to justice. Finally, it tries to shed light on the basic trade-offs that accompany some of the choices that have to be made in the process of constructing a comprehensive and coherent reparations program.

This essay considers the role of impartiality in theories of distributive justice. Impartiality is modelled by Rawls in his famous thought experiment of a veil of ignorance, where individuals reason about principles of justice without knowing fundamental aspects of themselves — such as talent or family background. It is argued that the veil of ignorance delivers recommendations that are inconsistent with prioritarianism, that is, the view that priority should be given to ameliorating the disadvantage of the worst off. Hence, prioritarianism, which is after all far weaker than strict egalitarianism, cannot be justified by appeal to a veil of ignorance. The veil of ignorance achieves impartiality, but impartiality needs to be conjoined with a principle of solidarity in order to justify the redistribution of wealth. The resource allocation rules that jointly satisfy impartiality, priority, and solidarity are described.

This chapter summarizes the preceding discussions and presents some concluding thoughts. This book presented a new theory of society by defining a new sphere, its cultural structures, its institutions, and its boundary relations with discourses and institutions outside it. It suggests that in a world of increasingly dangerous weapons and political tactics, a globalized civil sphere may be the only way to proceed. Without a global range, the promises even of civil society in its national form may die. Only the civil sphere can regulate force and eliminate arbitrary violence. It does so through persuasion and civil power and, if necessary, by dispensing force to defend democratic solidarity and to keep the aspirations of civil society alive. As violence becomes global, so must the civil sphere.

This chapter sketches the concepts of political solidarity and racialized solidarity. Contemporary political theorists have questioned the nature, scope, and basis of political solidarity: Is it primarily affective (based on fellow feeling) or rational (based on a capacity to will the common good)? Is it best conceived in local or global terms? Does it spring from shared membership in a nation or a more universal humanity? They have had little to say about the impact of race on political solidarity, however. Political solidarity, it is argued, is best conceived as simultaneously having an important affective dimension and an ethical orientation that moves us to action; as multiple and overlapping; as the product of structural conditions that require individuals to develop contingent solidarities not dependent on common interests or identities; and as being fundamentally shaped by race.

This chapter opens with a theoretical analysis of the concept of democracy with the emphasis on two questions, ‘What does it mean to rule?’ and ‘Who are the people?’ Whilst the introduction of EU citizenship has created a demos in legal terms it is argued that this demos has no social side because the European civic atmosphere continues to be characterized by relatively low levels of transnational solidarity and identification. In other words, technically there may be a European demos but it is only a demos ‘on paper’. On the basis of the discussion, it is concluded that it makes sense to distinguish between two sides of the social demos, the ethno-cultural side (history, language, political habits, ethnicity, and religion) and the subjective-emotional side (personal feelings of identity and solidarity). Although the former is often seen as a prerequisite for the latter, it may be possible to identify common values or wishes across European states, which can justify some level of supranational EU government.

This chapter uses survey data to measure levels of transnational solidarity, awareness of EU-related matters, and public support for the integration process. It seeks to uncover the extent to which people identify with the union as well as the level of interest in transnational political participation. The aim of the empirical analysis is neither to make predictions about outcomes of future referendums nor to explain support or lack of support for European integration. Rather the aim is to offer some pointers as to whether it is realistic to claim that a demos is forming at the EU level. It is concluded that a European demos does not exist and that continued European Union membership does not serve to make citizens feel ‘more European’. Although most citizens are supportive of their country's membership of the union, more than half of the EU citizens would not be particularly sorry if the EU were to be dissolved. However, there are a number of fundamental values which enjoy high levels of support in all member states, most notably a very strong commitment to democracy.

This chapter addresses one of the most contested issues in feminist theology today: solidarity. Three important contemporary approaches to this issue (by white feminists Sharon Welch and Sheila Greeve Davaney and womanist M. Shawn Copeland) are examined. In critical conversation with Welch's views on communicative action, Davaney's pragmatism, and Copeland's appeal to eucharistic unity, the chapter proposes some conditions under which feminists might continue rethinking the notion of solidarity. This is followed by discussion of how a metaphor borrowed somewhat eclectically from the field of dance improvisation theory can help us look anew (though still very skeptically) at solidarity in light of inescapable and determinative differences in women's experience.

Camus’ novel, The Plague, breaks from the focus on individual experience to talk about solidarity and the experience of being with other people. The titular plague has been interpreted as a metaphor for the Nazi occupation, but it is interpreted here much more generally and more philosophically as the nature of human mortality and “the Absurd”. The novel also gives us Camus’ clearest statement about the significance of what Sartre calls “Being-for-Others”.

This introductory chapter presents the main arguments of the book: that the disparate ethical-historical perspectives developed by dominant and subordinated racialized groups have enormous consequences for how remedies to racialized oppression are adjudicated in the public sphere, and that as a result theorists of multiculturalism must begin to grapple with the obstacle the racialized politics of solidarity poses to the long-term project of achieving racial justice. It explains the concept of racialized solidarity and shows its pervasive presence in most diverse democracies, despite assumptions to the contrary. Key terms are defined and an overview of the objectives and structure of the book is provided.

What is the effect of the institutional design of minority group rights on political solidarity? Can debates about such rights begin to address racialized solidarity? This chapter examines these questions more concretely by analyzing the model of multiculturalism adopted in Nicaragua, where multiple indigenous and Afro-descendant groups requiring remedies for both racialized oppression and the accommodation of cultural difference are present (as in Latin America generally). The Nicaraguan case is analyzed in order to evaluate the kinds of minority group rights that might best enable the fair accommodation of ethnocultural diversity, remedy racialized oppression, and foster political solidarity. It suggests that debates about such rights can begin to address racialized solidarity by ushering in contestation about the content of public memory, but only if and when arguments for these rights reveal the existence of a state organized on the basis of cultural difference and racial hierarchy.

The central aims of the book—to show that racialized solidarity poses a significant obstacle to racial justice, and to consider how theories of multiculturalism might incorporate the promotion of political solidarity (both between disadvantaged groups, and between subordinated groups and dominant groups) into their conceptual apparatus—are discussed. The principal contributions of the book are noted, including (a) developing the concept of racialized solidarity, (b) bringing together African American political philosophy, theories of multiculturalism, and the literature on solidarity in political theory in order to develop a distinctive approach to the problem of racial justice, and (c) bringing Latin American experiences with multiculturalism to the forefront of debates about minority group rights in political theory.

This chapter presents some concluding thoughts from the author. It argues for a more bottom-up vision of Christianity, one that is much better suited to a respect for democratic pluralism and properly engaged with modern Christian social thought. This Christianity is cosmopolitan in its outlook but is rooted in the particular traditions of peoples, their histories, and the places that are dear to them. It leads by example and seeks to propose, rather than impose, the truth of its beliefs. Most important, it does not direct its primary energies to supporting the powerful and justifying the rich. Instead, it looks to relationships with the weak, the poor, and the marginalized as the foundation for meaningful community and solidarity, thereby enabling what Martha Nussbaum has termed a “purified patriotism” within the context of an increasing recognition of responsibilities to those outside the nation-state.