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Anonymous Games

James Bergin

in Microeconomic Theory: A Concise Course

Games with a continuum of players are described. Both one-shot and dynamic games are considered. The focus is on anonymous games where only the distribution of players and actions affect any given ... More

Games with a continuum of players are described. Both one-shot and dynamic games are considered. The focus is on anonymous games where only the distribution of players and actions affect any given player. A section discusses the social planner formulation of equilibrium. No aggregate uncertainty is briefly described.Less

The Role of Science

Gilles Saint-Paul

in The Tyranny of Utility: Behavioral Social Science and the Rise of Paternalism

This chapter describes the social sciences. Unlike the natural sciences, the social sciences are inevitably statistical. When documenting human behavior, for example, they can at most claim that a ... More

This chapter describes the social sciences. Unlike the natural sciences, the social sciences are inevitably statistical. When documenting human behavior, for example, they can at most claim that a trait is present in a certain fraction of the population. However, the social engineer of the paternalistic state must take into account that the “science of happiness” that is being implemented does not apply uniformly to all individuals. A policy that benefits some by preventing mistakes or removing their biases harms those who are immune to these issues. This difficulty, however, entirely disappears as long as the state is utilitarian or, more generally, pursues any objective that aggregates welfare between individuals, for the statistics are the only thing the utilitarian needs to know. Once the population distribution of the relevant effects and mechanisms is known, the social planner can safely use it to balance gains and losses across incarnations and perform the cost-benefit analysis of its policies.Less

Market Socialism or Capitalism?: The Transnational Critique of Neoclassical Economics and the Transitions of 1989

in Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism

This chapter focuses on the period from the 1970s to 1989, a time when neoclassical economists around the world felt that something was wrong with their field and began to criticize themselves ... More

This chapter focuses on the period from the 1970s to 1989, a time when neoclassical economists around the world felt that something was wrong with their field and began to criticize themselves despite gaining new forms of political and social influence. Many neoclassical economists saw 1989 as the end of the Soviet Union's state socialism, which they had opposed for so long, and the realization of market socialism. This chapter looks at the transnational critique of neoclassical economics and the transitions of 1989, focusing on criticisms in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and the United States. It looks at how mainstream neoclassical economists used socialisms for macroeconomic modeling, considers the notion of the “representative agent” or “social planner,” and neoclassical economics within the World Bank.Less

Conclusions

in Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is an ideology that seeks to expand the reach of markets and promotes capitalism, strong states, and enterprise owners and managers. However, it has not gained the support of the ... More

Neoliberalism is an ideology that seeks to expand the reach of markets and promotes capitalism, strong states, and enterprise owners and managers. However, it has not gained the support of the majority of mainstream neoclassical economists. Economists are incorrectly assumed to be advocates of either the market or the state, a dichotomy that blends into others such as neoliberalism versus socialism, monetarism versus Keynesianism, markets versus central planning, and neoclassical economics versus Marxism. As a result, neoliberalism is incorrectly intertwined with neoclassical economics. Beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, socialist economists rejected authoritarian models in favor of democratic market socialism based on neoclassical economics. In addition to economists, members of social movements, dissidents, and participants in reform circles within Communist Parties around the world introduced new ideas about socialism that were co-opted and distorted by elites into neoliberalism. Many neoclassical economists continued to reject authoritarianism while using a social planner model. In many ways, socialist ideas have remained latent within neoliberalism.Less

Political democracy in the great society

Albert Weale

in Democratic Justice and the Social Contract

Although deliberative theorists sometimes stress the importance of representation, the participatory political institutions of common property resource regimes cannot be directly transferred to great ... More

Although deliberative theorists sometimes stress the importance of representation, the participatory political institutions of common property resource regimes cannot be directly transferred to great societies. A good representative system will combine the functions of aggregation and representation. Political equality directly implies proportional representation. Majority voting in the legislature is the counterpart principle. Even when shifting coalitions of parties are decisive according to the rule of the issue-by-issue median, this does not negate a meaningful sense of deliberative rationality. Liberal constitutionalism cannot plausibly be made consistent with the democratic principle and counter-majoritarian institutions are deficient. The public reasoning of representative democracies involves a contest over the warrant of decision premisses and a bargaining to mutual advantage where disagreement persistsLess

The View from Nowhere

Robert Sugden

in The Community of Advantage: A Behavioural Economist's Defence of the Market

Chapter 2 addresses a question that economists rarely ask when they engage in normative analysis: to whom is this analysis addressed? I argue that both neoclassical and behavioural economists usually ... More

Chapter 2 addresses a question that economists rarely ask when they engage in normative analysis: to whom is this analysis addressed? I argue that both neoclassical and behavioural economists usually write as if addressing an imagined ‘social planner’, conceptualized as a benevolent autocrat who agrees with them on all controversial issues. Philosophers who write about normative economics sometimes imagine instead that they are engaging in ‘public reasoning’, addressing an assembly of moral agents who are trying to decide what, all things considered, is good for people (individually and collectively). Both approaches treat normative analysis as an attempt to find a ‘view from nowhere’—an impartial view of what is good for people that is not any actual person’s view of what is good for him. But this is not the only viewpoint from which normative analysis can be made.Less